

Personality and its Transformations

PSY230

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University of Toronto

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
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Chapter 1

The Beginnings of Psychoanalysis: Sigmund Freud

Biographical Overview

Sigmund Freud was born 6 May 1856 in the small town of Freiberg, Moravia (Czechoslovakia). He was of Jewish extraction and proud of his heritage but never practiced the religion. His father, a merchant and a free-thinker, had been widowed, and Sigmund was the first child of the father's second wife. She was twenty-one years old at the time, and it is not surprising that Sigmund grew to be the apple of his mother's eye. He was a well-behaved son, and he tells us in later years that he stood at the head of his grammar school class for the full seven years.¹ When he was about four or five years old, his family relocated in Vienna, Austria, a more cosmopolitan environment and the city in which Freud was to live and work for the majority of his eighty-three years. As an adult he was critical of Vienna, but he also seems to have loved the city, for he would not leave his residence at Berggasse 19 until forced to do so by the threat of hostility after the Nazis entered Austria in 1939. He finally



Sigmund Freud

gave in to the urgings of friends and emigrated to England where, on 23 September 1939, he died after suffering for almost two decades with cancer of the mouth and jaw.

As a young man Freud was undecided about what career he would pursue. He was more drawn to human than to natural science problems,² and for a time he gave serious consideration to the study of law. Thanks to inspiration from Darwin and Goethe, Freud eventually settled on medicine, but he was the first to admit that he was never a doctor in the usual sense of the term.³ After entering premedicine at the University of Vienna in 1873, Freud found himself greatly attracted to the career of a basic scientist. This attraction was based on the model

provided him by a tough-minded physiology professor named Ernst Brücke. Brücke, whom Freud grew to admire greatly, once swore to follow the scientific canon that “no other forces than the common physical-chemical ones are active within the organism.”⁴ As we shall see, this traditional Newtonian view of science was to stay with Freud and end up in a much-disguised form as his theories of instincts and libido.

Working in Brücke’s laboratory, Freud did many studies on the structure of the nervous system and devised a method of staining cells for microscopic study that in its own right earned him a minor reputation. Freud never experimented successfully, in the sense of validation through the design of a study (see Introduction). His view of science stressed careful observation. But events were

to make a career as university scholar impossible for Freud. Only a limited number of positions were available, and Brücke had two excellent assistants ahead of Freud. Time had slipped by, and Freud's medical class had already graduated. He had also, in the meantime, met and fallen in love with Martha Bernays, the young woman who was to become his wife. Since income was now more than ever an important consideration, Freud talked things over with Brücke and decided to go on, complete his medical degree, and enter medical practice as a neurologist (specialist in the nervous system).

Before doing so he was fortunate enough—with the help of Brücke—to obtain a small traveling grant, which permitted him to spend a year (1885) in Paris studying under the famous neurologist Jean Charcot at the Salpêtrière (mental hospital). In 1889 he again returned to France to observe the work of Bernheim in Nancy. Both Charcot and Bernheim were conducting experiments on hysterics with the use of hypnotism. *Hysteria* is a mental disorder (neurosis) in which patients believe they have lost some sensory (like vision) or motor (like walking) function, although they have not. Under hypnosis the patient suffering from hysterical blindness or lameness can often be made to see or walk again. Students of Freud have noted that his contact with the French helped support him years later, when he began to deviate from the kinds of chemical-mathematical theories to which Brücke had limited his scientific explanations.⁵

After a short stay in Berlin, where Freud served a medical residency in neurology (which included the direction of a children's ward), he returned to Vienna to marry and to take up the practice of neurology. Today, his medical specialty would come under the heading of neuropsychiatry, or simply psychiatry. Even before he had traveled to France, Freud had made the acquaintance of

Joseph Breuer, a neurologist like himself but an older, more settled and successful practitioner in the Vienna area. Later, Breuer was instrumental in helping Freud to establish a practice in Vienna. He was important in the evolution of psychoanalysis as well, and we shall turn to Freud's professional relations with him in the next section.

Another important friend of Freud's in his early years as practitioner was Wilhelm Fliess, who had apparently been introduced to Freud by Breuer. Fliess was a successful nose-throat specialist who practiced in Berlin, thus accounting for the need to correspond through the mails with his friend in Vienna (though they also met fairly regularly to exchange scientific points of view). Fortunately, Fliess kept all of his letters from Freud, and this correspondence reveals the remarkable fact that virtually all of Freud's theoretical ideas had been sketched in during the period of 1887 through just after the turn of the twentieth century; the 1890s were especially important: Freud observed that the "secret of dreams" was revealed to him on 24 July 1895.⁶ His father died in October 1896, which seems to have increased certain anxiety tendencies and psychosomatic problems (colitis) which troubled Freud throughout his life. Having by this time worked out a general approach to the study and treatment of neuroses, Freud began in 1897 his celebrated self-analysis, from which we trace the personality theory and psychotherapy procedure now called *psychoanalysis*. In the 1900–1901 period Freud published his two great initial works, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (Volumes IV and V) and *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (Volume VI). These books mark Freud's beginnings as the father of modern personality theory.

Freud was soon to attract a group of supporters, among whom the more famous were Alfred Adler, Carl Jung, Sandor Ferenczi, Otto Rank, Karl Abraham, and Ernest Jones. He was not to hold the friendship of all these men, however; in fact, Freud's life is the story of a man with a tendency (if not a weakness) to reject or be rejected by those colleagues whose views opposed his own. Breuer, Fliess, Adler, Jung, Ferenczi, and Rank—not to mention others—were to separate from Freud on more or less friendly terms; the separation with Adler was probably the most bitter.

Freud made one trip to the United States in 1909 at the invitation of G. Stanley Hall, who invited him and Jung to speak at Clark University. As he grew in stature and reputation he was also active in helping to establish the International Psycho-Analytic Association with an accompanying journal; it began as a small group of friends in Vienna and then spread throughout the world.

The Breuer Period

Around 1880, while Freud was still in medical school, Breuer undertook the treatment of a twenty-one-year-old woman who was bedridden, suffering from a series of hysterical symptoms like headache, loss of speech, inability to understand when spoken to, visual distortions, and in particular, a pronounced loss of function and feeling in her right arm.⁷ This woman was to become the patient in the celebrated case of Anna O. (a pseudonym), which in a way is the very first psychoanalytical case history. On a hunch, Breuer decided to use the hypnotic tactic that Freud later observed Charcot using. Breuer found that when Anna was put under light

hypnosis and taken back through time (time regression), she could recall the onset of each hysterical symptom (taken in turn). The common factor in all these recollected beginnings was that Anna was feeling some kind of strong emotion at the time, which for various reasons she could not express. For example, she was feeling anger toward her father, but as a good daughter she refrained from expressing her growing rage. Instead, she found herself unable to understand her native German tongue when her father spoke to her, though she could still communicate in English! Gradually, her inability to understand German spread to contacts with others as well.

Breuer encouraged Anna to express her formerly unexpressed emotions while under hypnosis and reliving the old situation, and to his complete surprise he found that as she worked through each symptom in this fashion it disappeared. Breuer called the situation out of the past in which Anna had not reacted emotionally the *pathognomic situation* and the emotion that she did not express, the *strangled affect*. (It is common for the words *affect* and *emotion* to be used interchangeably in psychology.)

The central symptom of the immobile right arm provided the most dramatic hypnotic recollection. Anna recalled sitting in a chair next to the bed of her father, who was terminally ill (he later died). Her mother was out of the house and the servants were dismissed for the evening, so doubtlessly Anna felt frightened at the responsibility of looking after someone so close to death. Suffering from fatigue and prone to what she called *absences* (momentary blackouts like sleepwalking), Anna seems to have had what Breuer called a *waking dream*.⁸ She "saw" a black snake coming from the wall next to her father's bed, ready to bite the dying man. Anna tried to fend the snake off, moving her right arm from the back of her chair where

it had been resting. Apparently it had become slightly numb due to the lack of proper blood circulation, for when she tried to move it, she could not. Glancing at her hand, Anna was further startled to see that her fingers had turned into little snakes with her fingernails appearing to be like “death’s heads.”

Though she was unable to scream or otherwise express the terror she felt at the time (pathognomic situation), Anna *did* do so under hypnosis, and as we have noted, this release led to an improvement in her condition. After several such relivings of the pathognomic situation in which she now gave vent to screaming and flailing about, Anna’s right arm returned to normal. Breuer and Freud were later to call this *mental* reliving of a situation out of the past an *abreaction*. The physical expression of emotion was called *catharsis*. These terms have since been used interchangeably by psychoanalysts, but strictly speaking there is a mind (abreaction) versus body (catharsis) issue involved here.⁹ Now Breuer was a conventional medical theorist, who favored Brücke’s approach to science. He saw illness as being due to hereditary-biological influences, as being brought on by purely biochemical processes. He suggested that Anna suffered from a hereditary disorder which he called the *hypnoid state*. He believed that some people are born with this tendency to “split consciousness” in a way that allows a set of ideas with strong emotional coloring to continue to influence behavior outside of the person’s self-control. Freud never really accepted this line of theory.

In 1893 Breuer and Freud coauthored *Studies on Hysteria* (Volume II), in which they presented various cases of hysteria and two theories of its etiology (causes). Freud was finding in his practice that invariably there was some unknown (by the patient) *reason* for the splitting of consciousness. What he saw at work was not simply some in-

herited, automatic hypnoid state. Rather, there was what he termed a kind of *defense hysteria*, in which the person invariably rejected a sexual implication in some behavior in question. As Freud’s later case histories were to demonstrate, at least *some* of the emotion that Anna never expressed in relation to her father was lust. He would call this the Oedipal complex one day. Though he is polite enough in the *Studies*, accepting in theory that hysteria may take two forms, Freud wryly observes: “Strangely enough, I have never in my own experience met with a genuine hypnoid hysteria. Any that I took in hand has turned into a defence hysteria.”¹⁰ In thus turning his attention away from the strangulated affect to the *strangulator* of the affect—the defensive counter to whatever was trying to reach expression initially—Freud made himself over into a new kind of physician. He was not *only* a healer, but a student of the workings of mind.

Personality Theory

Structural Constructs

Dualism of Mind versus Body

Freudian psychology is a *dualism*, meaning that it builds on the assumption that there are two interacting spheres of behavior—the *psyche* (mind) and the *soma* (body). Brücke’s science would explain everything in terms of bodily constructs, thereby reducing mental to physical processes. Freud began with a preference for theorizing about people the way his beloved professor wanted, and he received additional promptings in this direction from both Breuer and Fliess. In fact, he once started but did not finish a

theory of psychology based exclusively on biology (a *monism*), but he found after a few months that he simply could not fit this mechanistic view of behavior to his understanding of abnormal behavior (see the *Project*¹¹). Freud later said that physical explanations were useless for the proper understanding of the psychological side of human behavior.¹²

Even though he relied less and less on physicomodels of human behavior and turned to the writings of anthropologists, archaeologists, and sociologists for understanding, Freud continued to admit and even to stress a necessary tie-in of purely biological factors to human behavior.¹³ There is disagreement among those who have studied Freud as to his actual reliance on biological or physical explanation. Since he always kept the door open to such explanations, we cannot claim that he was a purely psychological theorist. Yet his theory, including its energy conceptions, was always kept *exclusively* in the realm of the psyche once the body-mind dualism had been bridged by the instinct construct (see below).

The Early Mental Structural Constructs: Depth Emphasis

In his pursuit of the strangulator of affection, Freud first put together a model emphasizing the *depth* features of the mind or the psyche. He broke down the sphere of mind into three regions: *conscious*, *unconscious*, and *preconscious*. In order to appreciate why he did this, we will have to consider what is actually a motivational construct, the *ensorship*, for it is this mechanism of defense that plays the role of strangulator in Freud's first model. His first patients—most of whom were upper-socio-economic-class women—were invariably defending themselves against the

recall of a memory out of the past that was *still active* in mind, but in a deeper region outside of awareness. What is more, these were almost always memories of a sexual or hostile nature. Figure 3 provides us with a schematization of Freud's early mental structural constructs. Note the stylized dotted arc, moving an arrow from left to right across points 1 through 9, both originating and ending in the external world.

This arc traces a perception that might be taken in at point 1 through an action at point 9 that the person might perform in relation to what was perceived. For example, the person might see a water fountain (point 1), and assuming that all went well through the mind, would end up at the fountain, taking a drink to satisfy thirst (point 9). This scheme is actually based on the reflex-arc concept, which was a popular style of explanation in 1900 when Freud framed this model.¹⁴ The important thing to remember, however, is that Figure 3 is a model of *mind*. Reflexes are biological units, built into the body (*soma*). Hence, in framing this model Freud was *analogizing* to the body but he was referring exclusively to mind. If we now follow a mental perception (stimulus) from its entry at point 1, note that it passes through consciousness into the second region of preconsciousness and down into the lowest level of mind, the unconscious, before returning upward again through points 7 and 8 (ensorship points) and issuing into motor action at point 9.

Freud defined *consciousness* as a "sense organ for the apprehension of psychological qualities,"¹⁵ through which the individual is aware of sensory input (seeing, smelling, thinking about things seen) and also of pleasurable or painful experiences. Consciousness does *not* rule the mind in Freudian psychology. It does not even retain memories, which are kept down below the level of conscious awareness. Freud considered mental contents




Figure 3 Freud's Early Mental Structural Constructs

to be in consciousness only if we are *presently* aware of them.¹⁶ Thoughts do *not* originate in consciousness. For centuries, philosophers had identified ideas in awareness with thought, but Freud broadened the concept of mind when he said that "every psychical act begins as an unconscious one, and it may either remain so or go on developing into consciousness, according as it meets with resistance or not."¹⁷

To understand what Freud called the person's "true psychical reality," we have to understand the unconscious.¹⁸ Sense impressions as perceptions may be taken in at point 1, but *ideas* are put together somewhere around point 6. Freud used the construct

of *unconscious* in a general and a specific sense. In its general sense, *unconscious* merely meant all those psychic contents like thoughts, ideas, and images that are not conscious at the moment but might become so at any time (he sometimes included preconscious contents in this general usage).¹⁹ More specifically, however, Freud considered the *unconscious* to be an actual region of mind, one that was much larger than consciousness and that lived a mental life of its own. The analogy of an iceberg is often drawn. The portion we see above the water line is merely the tip of

the iceberg; the vast majority is below the water line. Consciousness is like the tip of an iceberg, and unconsciousness is the vast area below. We can never appreciate psychoanalysis if we fail to understand the importance of the unconscious to behavior. As Freud observed, “the unconscious is a particular realm of the mind with its own wishful impulses, its own mode of expression and its peculiar mental mechanisms which are not in force elsewhere.”²⁰ We can only get in touch with the unconscious by interpreting what it seems to be indicating in our dreams, waking fantasies, “slips of the tongue,” and so on.²¹

Freud accepted Darwinian theory, which holds that human beings have evolved from lower animal forms. Freud believed that the unconscious was more in touch with this basic animalistic nature than was consciousness. We are all more primitive as unconscious identities. Unconscious ideas are totally *hedonistic*, which means they are aimed solely at providing pleasure for the individual. Consciousness has to take reality into consideration, and hence it is more oriented to the needs of others. The unconscious “never forgets” because it literally does not weaken its hold on ideas over the passage of time.²² What we call *forgetting* is actually the disappearance of conscious ideas into the unconscious, where they remain perfectly clear for all time. Indeed, every person now alive carries around in the unconscious a memory of everything that ever happened to him or her. What is more, these memories can form into a body of ideas having complete autonomy and independence from the typical style of thinking in consciousness.

Then, when the unconscious wants to make known something to consciousness, it

can do so directly—that is, in a waking state—by way of what Freud called *unconscious derivatives*.²³ We can use the example of Anna’s snake and the death heads she saw on her fingers. These hallucinated (imagined) derivatives were communicating something that Anna did not want to admit consciously—possibly a wish that her father would die! Before something this dramatic takes place there has to be a long period of censorship. Sometimes when the unconscious breaks through like this in the waking state, the person may be astonished by the illogical things that take place. The unconscious does not worry about logic and often wants both to have its cake and to eat it too.²⁴ People with severe mental illness may feel they have been possessed by a devil who forces them to do strange things. A less dramatic possibility in the waking state occurs when two people actually communicate at a completely unconscious level.²⁵ Freud believed that two people could be relating at one level in consciousness and yet *also* be relating in their mannerisms and bodily postures at a totally different level outside of awareness. For example, two men may talk business consciously and yet carry on an unconscious homosexual flirtation at the same time.

Since emotions are revealed to us through consciousness, is it correct to speak of unconscious emotions? Strictly speaking, Freud would say no. There are no unconscious emotions per se, but there are unconscious ideas that in themselves relate to emotions. If these ideas begin to traverse our dotted arc in Figure 3 and threaten to seek motor action, then conscious awareness would reflect an emerging emotion to the personality.²⁶ Assume that a person has an unconscious desire to kill a loved one (a seeming contradiction, but remember: the unconscious is not logical!). As this idea drifts forward in mind from point 6 to point 7 and especially 8, considerable emotion is generated because it is

terrifying to think that one would want to hurt a beloved person. It is the idea that causes the emotion here, and what we censor in holding back potentially emotional circumstances is always a mental and not an emotional factor in our mind.

Another often-raised issue concerns the possibility of unconscious ideas coming down to us from our evolutionary ancestors. Did Freud think of the unconscious *only* as a receptacle for ideas or images fed into the mind from external reality and then kept from conscious awareness by the censor? Although this was surely his major emphasis, the truth is that Freud was influenced on this point by his famous associate C. G. Jung (see Chapter 3) and held open the possibility of hereditary transmission of psychic contents.²⁷ If human beings were to receive mental influences from racial heredity, then such ideas or images would make themselves known in the unconscious (by way of the id²⁸).

To account for that region of unawareness over which we often *do* have some control, Freud proposed the term *preconscious*. The *preconscious region* is made up of contributions from *both* the conscious and the unconscious, and it is the area of mind where censorship takes place.²⁹ The conscious and unconscious never communicate directly, but only by way of this intermediate level of preconsciousness. When we forget something like the telephone number of a friend only to recall it after an effort of concentration, we have dealt exclusively with a preconscious content. Since the telephone number returns to our consciousness in time (an unconscious psychic content like a death wish would not do this), we can refer to the forgotten number as unconscious only in that general sense to which we referred above.

Notice that Figure 3 has two different censorship points. As we shall see in other aspects of his theory, Freud was likely to speak of primary and secondary mental func-

tions (this will come up in his theory of repression, for example). The primary point of censorship occurs at the region between unconsciousness and preconsciousness. As long as a mental content (idea, image) is held below this level, there is no threat to the personality. This would be a basic strangulation. But if we move up now to the region between consciousness and preconsciousness (point 8), here is where severe threat arises, for the person might now be prompted to *act out* his or her unconscious ideas.³⁰ In other words, Freud's model assumes that if mental contents get into consciousness, they *will* be carried out, or at least the *intent* of the idea will be known. A person might realize "I know now that I really *do* want to kill my father." Censorship seeks to avoid these literal acts as well as the necessity of having to face up to them at all. Here is where Freud brought in his idea of unconscious derivatives to tilt the direction of excitation from progression to regression.

Note in Figure 3 that moving from left to right, from stimulus to motor action along the dotted arc, was termed *progression* of mental excitation, whereas moving in the reverse direction was called *regression*. This is clearly a Freudian addition to the reflex-arc concept, because our bodily reflex arcs—as witnessed in the action of the patellar knee tap—always move in the progressive direction (stimulus to response). In proposing a reversal to this direction, Freud was trying to account for the fact that sometimes ideas originating in the unconscious are experienced by the individual as literal stimuli in the environment—as visions or hallucinations (seeing, feeling, smelling things that do not exist). Anna's snake and death's heads reflected such a regression of an unconscious image moving in the reverse direction. She

did not experience this image as the internal stimulus that it was but as an external perception.

What determines which way a mental excitation will move? This selection is up to the censor. If it blocks the progressive flow very aggressively, the process can be tilted in reverse, and then if in addition the unconscious very much desires to fulfill a wish, this reverse trend can culminate in a false input at the stimulus end of the dotted arc (point 1).³¹ These regressive states are not always abnormal, since all dreaming depends on them. This concept of regression in mental life is to play a very important role in Freudian developmental theory (see below). The concept of a progression is for all practical purposes dropped after its appearance in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, which appeared in 1900, and we shall have no further need of it.

The Final Mental Structural Constructs: Dynamic Emphasis

The depth model is all right for describing interactions *across* levels of mind, as between unconscious and preconscious contents, but what about those mental interactions that seem to go on *within* as well as across levels? Freud found that he needed more complexity in his model of mind if he wanted to account for all of the psychic dynamics that seemed to be taking place in his patients. He therefore modified the depth model by combining it with what he called a *topographical* model. Topography is the science of graphing or mapping a region that is capable of being divided into different kinds of terrain. Freud therefore introduced a series of three constructs, some of which stretched *across* the depth levels of unconscious, preconscious, and

conscious as if these were different sorts of terrain. This meant that all three identities could function at the same topographical level and work out certain mental defenses among them. Unconscious or preconscious mind no longer opposed conscious mind, but certain identities within and across these regions now opposed one another. This clash-and-compromise model fixed once and for all the *dynamic* quality of Freudian psychology.

Figure 4 presents a schematization of the final structural model of mind employed by Freud. In order to maintain a continuity with our discussion above, assume that we have placed the egg-shaped structure of Figure 4 as a transparent template *over* the levels of mind of Figure 3. Note that now our combined schematization has an id (completely in the unconscious region), an ego, and a superego stretching across all three levels, and an area of repressed content at about the spot of our primary censorship. The term *repression* now replaces *ensorship* as a motivational construct, but it is the same general idea of strangulation first used by Breuer.

Down at the very depths of the mental structure in Figure 4 we find the *id*, which now is taken as that animalistic, hedonistic side to our natures that we discussed above as true of the unconscious mental contents. The id never leaves the unconscious realm of mind, and it is the identity point at which instinctual promptings which begin in the bodily sphere first make contact with mind. The id seeks satisfaction or pleasure in all things; it is entirely amoral and incapable of making judgments like good versus bad or just versus unjust. The id in everyone is greedy, envious, and thoroughly selfish. As Freud poetically defined it, “we call it a chaos, a cauldron of seething excitations.”³² The id is not concerned with realistic evaluation of the demands of society, much less of logic. It often has illogical wishes, as for ex-




Figure 4 Freud's Final Mental Structural Constructs

ample to both lust after and want to kill the same person.³³ The id is full of such contradictions and never bothers to iron out inconsistency.³⁴ The id is not concerned with the passage of time or of changes that may take place; but it never forgets as it never forgoes anything it wants.³⁵

Out of this unorganized, self-serving heritage from nature there develops a portion of mind devoted to reason, the realistic evaluation of external conditions, and self-identity. It does not exist at birth,³⁶ but as conscious awareness progresses over the first few months of life, the *ego* begins to be identified as an unchanging permanent component of the personality structure.³⁷ The role of muscular sensations in this developmental process is important, as the newborn

child begins to identify a difference between "over here" (self-identity) in the movements of the body and the external world "over there."³⁸ Although the ego has contact across all three levels of mind, its sphere is predominantly that of consciousness.³⁹ What we superficially consider to be our personality is usually the style of behavior taken on by our egos in contact and negotiation with the external world.⁴⁰

The ego has a commitment to the external world, but it is also directly tied to the id. In fact, since it develops out of the id, Freud once referred to the ego as the "organized portion of the id."⁴¹ It is in this organization and order that the ego becomes useful,

because the id is totally lacking in these qualities. Other definitions of the ego used by Freud were a “dominant mass of ideas”⁴² and a “coherent organization of mental processes.”⁴³ We see Freud’s Darwinianism emerging in his theory once again. That is, he assumed that what is first or earliest on the scene in life is basic to and determinative of all that is to follow. Thus, since the ego develops from the id, the id is primary; and an ego would not evolve if this ego did not further the hedonistic goals of the id. We must never forget that the ego wants to get the same pleasurable things out of life that the id wants. They differ only over the means to the ends sought. As Freud said, “the ego stands for reason and good sense while the id stands for the untamed passions.”⁴⁴

Freud also expressed this difference between the id and the ego in terms of what he called the *primary* versus the *secondary* process in mind.⁴⁵ The id, coming earlier in development, operates according to a primitive (primary) mental process, which seeks immediate gratification through what in Figure 3 we called progression to motor action or, if checked, resorts to regression in order to hallucinate what is desired (see Figure 3). A baby might react in this way during the first weeks of life, grabbing out for whatever it wants or possibly even hallucinating a desired mother’s breast as if it were within view when it is not. It is the ego’s (secondary) process in reasoning that helps check in time these impulsive and make-believe tendencies in the child’s behavior. The ego is that part of the personality that learns to cry and show signs of needing attention when the mother is actually within view or presumed to be within earshot. But of course, in this process there is a lot of immediate gratification that goes unfulfilled as the baby matures. This checking of the id is, accord-

ing to Freud, the reason why most of our unconscious contents consist of unsatisfied wishes.⁴⁶

In working out a proper strategy for need satisfaction, the ego must actually serve *three* masters: the id (which may lust and want to kill someone), the demands of external reality (where society frowns on such acts of murder), and the final identity of the topographical model, the *superego*.⁴⁷ We all realize that a certain “voice within” us—which we call our conscience—may well disturb us as we plan to do something wrong, even though nobody else may know about it. In 1914 Freud said this “judgment from within” was due to a standard of how we ought to behave called the *ego ideal*.⁴⁸ When he later introduced the id construct (1923), Freud referred to the ego ideal as the *superego*. He did not make any real distinction between these terms, and we can view them as synonymous.⁴⁹ The main point is that, as the id is organizing into the ego, a portion of this ego-organization is forming into a superego—that is, an identity point in mind that is ego but is also beyond or above it as a built-in ideal.

Since the superego has developed from the same mental beginnings as the ego, it too is basically a product of the id.⁵⁰ It is easy for us to forget this, because the contents of the superego are often so clearly in opposition to the id.⁵¹ The id wishes to take something, even if it is stealing. The superego wishes that the id would be punished for thinking such thoughts or for bringing them about if the person actually does steal. Rather than confronting the id directly, the superego makes its wishes known to the ego. In some of Freud’s writings it is clear that he thought the id might even occasionally stir up or irritate the superego with extreme indecencies so that it will nag at the ego all the more. In this way, the id can sometimes get back at the ego if too many repressions are being put

on the personality. These “negotiations” between id, ego, and superego take place in the region of mind known as the unconscious. The ego unfortunately always ends up as the one in the middle, having to restore harmony in the personality while keeping “one eye” open to reality considerations.

The superego is just as unbending and unreasonable as the id. It has, like the id, received a kind of inheritance from the past in the sense of ethicomoral principles (like the Ten Commandments). It sticks to these rigidly and can never see exceptions to the rule. The id’s inheritance is physical and hedonistic, and the superego’s is sociocultural, but both of these identities in mind try to dictate to the ego. The superego dictates in a dual sense, for it not only tells the ego what it “ought to be like,” but it also tells the ego what it “may not be like.”⁵² The seat of reason, common sense, and good judgment in changing circumstances is thus found only in the ego.

Motivational Constructs

Instinct and Energy

Freud did not make much use of an instinct construct in his earliest writings. It was not until about 1905, following his major work on dreams, that he began employing the instincts as a major theoretical tool.⁵³ By that time Freud was beginning to attract colleagues and students who met with him weekly at his home, a group that became in 1906 the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society.⁵⁴ These discussions with colleagues had brought up the question of the relation between mind (psyche) and body (soma). Freud found that the *instinct* construct could help him here, and he eventually made three definite points concerning instincts: (1) they are based on a stimulation taking place within the body and not in the external

world; (2) they provide a *constant* level of stimulation that we cannot run away from as we can run away from pressing stimulations (like cold or heat) in our external environment;⁵⁵ and (3) they seem always to function “on the frontier between the mental and the somatic,”⁵⁶ acting therefore as bridges between the mind and body. Figure 5 schematizes this bridge function of the instinct, originating in the body but leading to the mind; it also lists the four characteristics that Freud attributed to any instinct (source, aim, pressure, object).

Each instinct is said to have the *aim* of satisfaction, or removing the *pressure* (extent of stimulation) from its *source* (the point in the internal body area from which it originates). If we have a great need for something, a given instinctual stimulus is exerting great pressure on us with the aim of achieving satisfaction, and the particular nature of the instinct (let us say it is to eat when hungry) determines just how we act (look for something to eat). Now, “the thing in regard to which the instinct is able to achieve its aim” is the *object*.⁵⁷ This is a widely used technical term in psychoanalysis which can refer to a person, an item of food, or a general desired state of affairs. It can even refer to one’s own person. Literally *anything* that might conceivably lead to the satisfaction of an instinct is an object.

The instinct theory is also a different way of talking about hedonism. Pleasure consists in removing the pressure of an instinctive prompting in the body. Re-establishing the harmony of the body and keeping all tension at a low level is known in biology as *homeostasis*. Freud’s concept of pleasure is therefore a homeostatic construct. But how do we explain this balancing out of tensions in the




Figure 5 Freudian Instinct as a Mind-Body “Bridge”

body so that the individual no longer feels hunger, thirst, sexual lust, and so on? Here is where we can see the influence on Freud of his former teacher and mentor, because Ernst Brücke had emphasized that all natural actions followed the *principle of constancy*. This principle was first proposed by Robert Mayer in 1842; it was later popularized by a student friend of Brücke’s, named Hermann von Helmholtz.⁵⁸

The basic idea of the constancy principle is that energies or forces within a closed system tend to redistribute themselves if for any reason there has been a disruption or unequal distribution of energy in different parts

of the system. For example, weather patterns are influenced by high and low pressure points in the earth’s atmosphere. When the barometer falls, we know that a “low” is moving into our area, and that there will probably be clouds, rain, or snow in the picture for us pretty soon. High pressure areas, on the other hand, send the barometer upward and signify that a clearing trend is on the way. But why do these changes in weather take place? Because, Helmholtz and Brücke would have said, something like a principle of constancy is at work in the total earth’s atmosphere, redistributing the pressures in order to seek a kind of balance. There is a *constant* tendency to equalize, forcing the high pressure points to press outward and replace the lows so that in the end the total

amount of energy in the earth's atmosphere will be evenly distributed. For various reasons, this total balance is never achieved and so we have our varying weather patterns.

When Freud and Breuer were collaborating on the *Studies on Hysteria*, they actually made use of the constancy-principle idea in what they called the *principle of neuronial inertia*, as follows: "If a person experiences a psychical impression, something in his nervous system which we will for the moment call the sum of excitation is increased. Now in every individual there exists a tendency to diminish this sum of excitation once more, in order to preserve his health."⁵⁹ In other words, just as a high pressure point in the atmosphere presses outward to dissipate itself into low pressure areas, so too do the excitations of the nervous system press outward to re-establish an even level of sensation (nervous impulses) throughout this bodily system. If, for some reason, this sum of excitation is not run off and a homeostasis achieved, then there would be trouble developing. Anna's pathognomic situation was a "sum of excitation" (in memory) like this that never quite got released (or worked over) and therefore resulted in her hysterical symptoms. The manner in which the mind succeeds—however effectively—in ridding itself of these states of heightened excitation is called the *vicissitudes* of the instincts.⁶⁰ A vicissitude is a regular or irregular state of change in something (like the weather!), and this is the pattern of change we see in our instinctive promptings as we get hungry and eat, only to get hungry again and eat once more. Sexual instincts are somewhat more difficult to satisfy.

Most psychologists would define *motivation* as the "activation of behavior due to a need deficit in relation to a goal (object)." Freud's *object* was usually an item in the person's experience that could satisfy such a need, but the *aim* of instinctual satisfaction

was *pleasure* (the hedonistic issue once again). Freud even spoke of a *pleasure principle* in mental life, as follows: "It seems as though our total mental activity is directed towards achieving pleasure and avoiding unpleasure—that it is automatically regulated by the *pleasure principle*."⁶¹ It would be proper to identify the constancy principle with the pleasure principle as a homeostatic mechanism in mind seeking an even keel.⁶² Freud did not believe that human beings have an instinct to feel *pain*. At best, pain is a "pseudo-instinct" which has as its aim "simply the cessation of the change in the organ and of the unpleasure accompanying it."⁶³ *Pain* is thus merely another way of saying *loss of pleasure*, and Freud has assigned the role of pleasure seeker (balancer) to the instinct construct. How many instincts (needs) do human beings have? Before we speak of Freud's theory of instincts as a whole, we must consider the *one* instinct (and need) he could never forgo in his view of the human being.

Freud's Promethean Insight: The Sexual Instinct

Freud's lifelong conviction was that he had found the basic reason for all neuroses, as well as the major motivator of all human behavior, in the human being's sexual instinct. He had a rather stubborn attitude about the use of the term *sex* in his theory. Though its meaning seemed stretched out of proportion at times and he broke with colleagues rather than rename this instinct (Jung being the most famous example), Freud steadfastly refused to change this precise usage.

Freud believed that the strangulator in defense hysteria was *always* an unwillingness to accept into consciousness a sexual thought or impulse. He repeatedly found evidence for

this in his early clients, and we also have reason to believe that during his self-analysis Freud recalled his own sexual urges for his mother, whom he once saw in the nude when he was very young.⁶⁴ But over the years, the meaning of *sex* broadened tremendously in his writings, so that at times it is impossible to distinguish this meaning from the meaning of *pleasure*. Thus, Freud noted that in “man the sexual instinct does not originally serve the purpose of reproduction at all, but has as its aims the gaining of particular kinds of pleasure.”⁶⁵ Sucking in a baby may be compared to other behaviors like masturbation as *identical* forms of what Freud called *autoerotic* activities. The term *autoerotic* means that the person uses the instinctual source of pleasure (mouth area, penis, and so on) as the *object* of pleasure. This gaining of pleasure from areas other than the genital regions of the body is sometimes referred to as *organ pleasure*, but Freud was quick to point out that the *reason* various organs have pleasure attached to them is because they satisfy a sexual instinct. Hence, regions of the body other than genital regions are sources of sexual instinctual stimulation.⁶⁶

Freud called a region of the body giving rise to the sexual instinct at any point in time an *erotogenic zone*. Literally *any* part of the skin can become, an erotogenic zone, stimulating the person to seek pleasure in some way. It can be the mouth area (pleasure in sucking) or the anal area (pleasure in defecation); even the eye can serve as a sexual stimulant (pleasure in pornographic viewing).⁶⁷ In line with his view that there are a number of erotogenic zones, Freud made perfectly clear that he believed there are *many* sexual instincts, each contributing its

components to the overall state we think of as “sexual excitation.”⁶⁸ There are also other than sexual instincts in the body, a theoretical view that Freud was never to reject. Thought of as a bridge concept, the instinct originates in the body but it has its ultimate effect in the mind. Freud contended that the *physically* based instincts stimulate or set loose a *psychic* energy in the mind (symbolized by the arrow in Figure 5). Precisely how this takes place was never clarified, because of course this would mean Freud had solved the mind-body problem (that is, how can the physical and the mental interact?).

Despite this multiplicity of instincts in his theory, Freud gave a name to only *one* energy in mind, so that whenever he would describe a patient’s behavior based on his structural model (id, ego, superego), he would frame the description exclusively in terms of this single mental energy. This energy was called *libido*, and it was defined variously as “*psychical desire*,”⁶⁹ all of the person’s “*erotic tendencies*,”⁷⁰ “*sexual desire in the broadest sense*,”⁷¹ and “*the motive forces of sexual life*.”⁷² But probably the most complete statement of libido in his writings, and one that also gives us a good picture of Freud’s use of *love*, may be found in the following quote:

Libido is an expression taken from the theory of the emotions. We call by that name the energy, regarded as a quantitative magnitude (though not at present actually measurable), of those instincts which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word “love.” The nucleus of what we mean by love naturally consists (and this is what is commonly called love, and what the poets sing of) in sexual love with sexual union as its aim. But we do not separate from this—what in any case has a share in the name “love” on the one hand, self-love, and on the other, love for parents and children, friend-

*ship and love for humanity in general, and also devotion to concrete objects and to abstract ideas.*⁷³

With an energy this all-encompassing there was probably no need for naming alternatives. Nevertheless, since there *are* other instincts than the sexual, one would have thought that Freud might have named an energy for at least one more such instinct. The fact that he never did is mute testimony that he continued to base his major motivational theories on sexual factors in the human personality. One of the most common errors made in studying Freud is to equate libido with emotion, with the “good feeling” experienced in genital release and so on. As noted above, since emotions are not directly “in mind” any more than the pain we feel when we stub our toes is “in mind,” the mental energy known as libido is not directly comparable to feelings or emotions. Emotions are rooted in the body and are made known to us mentally. We are aware of the pain of a stubbed toe, but we do not equate our awareness with the locus of our pain (the toe area). In like fashion, sexual pleasures emanate from the genital region of the body and are central in our emotional life. But libido is in the mind, orienting behavior in terms of these bodily based needs yet separate and distinct from them as well.

Libido is the *psychic* energy of the sexual instincts, and Freud now required an additional term to describe how this worked, how it oriented the person to seek a sexually desirable object. The term he settled on was *cathexis*. Freud first used this construct in his *Project* (see p. 44) as a physical concept, and noting his original usage helps us to understand what he means in his later psychological theorizing. In the *Project*, Freud said that a physical neurone (which is a “cell” in the nervous system) was *cathected* when it was filled with a certain quantum of phys-

ical energy.⁷⁴ This is related to the principle of neuronc inertia, because what happens when a “sum of excitation” is increased is that a neurone “fills up” with physical energy (see p. 53 for discussion of neuronc inertia).

This idea of filling up or occupying something is what Freud retained when he later used cathexis in relation to libido as a *mental* energy. Thus, if a man were to fall in love with a woman, he would mentally “fill” her image in his mind’s eye with libido!⁷⁵ *Cathexis* now has the meaning of a thrust, an entering, an occupation of a mental image, or a fixing of interest on some *given object* by attaching libido to it or engulfing it with libidinal energies.⁷⁶ Motives are therefore concerned with the libidinal cathexis of this or that object. The next step is to attain the cathected object (in our example, for the man to win the woman’s love in return). However, simply cathecting an object does not mean the individual will always seek to attain it in the external world (that is, external to the contents of mind). For example, if the id lusts for some object—let us assume it is a parent—then the ego can *anticathect* this investment of libido in the image of the parent by opposing its own supply of libido to the id’s cathexis.⁷⁷ Anticathexis, therefore, is another way of talking about strangulation, censorship, or repression.

One last point must be made concerning Freud’s views on sex. He always held to the position that humans were *bisexual*. This theory was favored by Fliess, and Freud never rejected the notion, even though he did not develop it very much in his formal theories. Fliess made use of the concept in a physical sense, arguing that both men and women are guided by a natural constitutional cycle of influence. Women show

this in their menstrual cycles, and men can be shown to experience something comparable in the fact that the blood vessels in certain tissues of their nasal region engorge with blood periodically. Both sexes are thus governed by periodic cycles of physical influence.⁷⁸ Fliess's theory was similar to what are called biological-clock theories, which attempt to show that behavior is based on natural rhythms built right into the physical structures of the body.

Freud, on the other hand, gave his construct of bisexuality a *psychological* interpretation, viewing masculinity as akin to *activity* and femininity to *passivity*.⁷⁹ He even thought of libido as masculine in nature, because it was such an active agent of mental life.⁸⁰ Freud made the greatest use of bisexuality in his analysis of President Woodrow Wilson, but most of his descriptions here were centered around Wilson's activity versus his passivity toward his father.⁸¹ Hence though we have here a bisexual theory, biological in tone, it is actually a psychological theory of how the mind thrusts and parries in interpersonal situations—in either an active or a passive manner.

History of Freud's Instinct Theories

Now that we have an understanding of some basic terms, let us review the history of Freud's thinking on the role of instincts in human behavior. The first question that arises is, just how many instincts are in the human animal? Freud believed that this was unknown and that the only way the question could be answered was to study the problem empirically by tracing each instinct in turn to its ultimate *source* in the body.⁸² The problem here, Freud noted, was that one is tempted to think up too many instincts to describe behavior. For example, to explain

playfulness, we might propose that human beings have an instinct to play. Yet, if we were to break this activity down into its components, we might find that an underlying instinct entered into this activity in combination with one or possibly two other *more basic* instincts, so that playfulness was not a true instinct at all. Freud therefore suggested that we probably need think of only a small number of underlying instincts to explain all kinds of behavior at more complex levels.

Freud called these underlying instincts *primal instincts*, and the instincts made up of these he called *compound instincts*. Now, it is very important to keep in mind that, as a general theoretical strategy, *Freud was always to base psychoanalytical theory on the interplay of two primal instincts, even though he implied that more than two were in effect*. He changed the names of these primal instincts over the years, but the fundamental opposition of two basic forces in the personality remains constant in Freudian thought. In fact, Freud maintained that instincts occurred in pairs of opposites, usually—as we have seen in the case of bisexuality—taking an active and a passive opposition.⁸³

Freud's first opposition of instincts was that of the *self-preservative instincts* (or *ego instincts*⁸⁴) and the *sexual instincts* (or *object instincts*⁸⁵). Recall that the ego was seen as the seat of reason in the personality. Whereas the id was guided initially by the pleasure principle, Freud now said that the ego comes to be guided by the *reality principle*. "This latter principle does not abandon the intention of ultimately obtaining pleasure, but it nevertheless demands and carries into effect the postponement of satisfaction, the abandonment of a number of possibilities of gaining satisfaction and the temporary toleration of unpleasure as a step on the long indirect road to pleasure."⁸⁶ Rather than permit the id to act out (motor action) its

cathexes overtly (in real life), the ego opposes itself to these impulses (anticathexes) and seeks a pleasurable gratification in more acceptable ways. For example, the married woman who works as a secretary to an employer she lusts after might still refrain from being seduced by him, thanks to the anticathexes of the ego in union with the superego, which hold her sexual motives below consciousness (point 7 of Figure 3). However, in the evenings when this woman makes love with her husband, the id might hallucinate her boss in place of the husband—all going on still at the unconscious level! Since the marital vows have not been broken, this type of solution would be generally acceptable to all identities concerned, id, ego, and superego.

As we have already noted, Freud never coined an energy for the self-preservative instinct, even though he continually spoke of *energies*, implying that something other than libido was involved in moving the mental apparatus. But in actual practice, theoretical explanations were primarily based on the libido. With further experience and some challenges on certain points from his critics, Freud was eventually to change his theory of instincts. In place of self-preservation, he introduced the construct of a death instinct. This addition was part of a masterful piece of theorizing, and the way in which he accomplished it was to base the Death-Instinct theory on two preliminary ideas: *narcissism* and the *repetition compulsion*. We will work our way into this change by way of these preliminary constructs.

Narcissism. In Greek myth, Narcissus, the beautiful son of the river-god Cephissus, was supposedly the embodiment of self-conceit. Many nymphs wanted to be his lover, but he rejected their flirtations. One such rejected maiden prayed to the deity that he might know what it meant to love and not be loved

in return. A curse was put on his head and one day, leaning over a river bank for a drink of water, Narcissus was doomed to fall in love with his own reflection. He talked to it, tried to embrace it, lusted after it, and pined away until he died without ever achieving satisfaction.⁸⁷ Freud was to take this theme of self-love and use it to alter his instinct theory. Problems were mounting because of the challenges of his detractors, some of whom—like Adler—wanted Freud to give a more central role in the personality to conscious, reasonable, ego functions. Others—like Jung—felt that he was redefining the meaning of libido, making it into an *élan vital*, a general life force subsuming sexuality and many other functions as well.⁸⁸ What Freud had to do was (1) explain ego functions (self-preservation) as a special case of the sexual instincts, yet (2) avoid making the sexual instinct the *only* primal instinct of his theory. In short, he deliberately set out to remove self-preservation from the list of *primal* instincts and to replace it with some other opposing force in the personality.

His first step was accomplished through his use of *narcissism*, a term that had been used by Paul Näcke and Havelock Ellis to describe a person who treats his or her own body as if it were a sexual object.⁸⁹ Rather than saying that the ego looks after self-preservation because of a *primal* (basic, underlying) instinct of this nature, Freud now claimed that the *ego is itself cathected* with libido from the outset. Thus, in developing out of the id, the ego takes over its share of libido in the mental structure and acts like a special instance of love—that is, self-love (narcissism). We can now draw a parallel between autoerotism (see p. 54) and narcissism because they both refer to gaining sexual pleasure from an investment of libido in our own bodies as objects (ego-cathexes).⁹⁰

Freud referred to the libido invested in the ego as *ego libido* or as *narcissistic libido* and the libido eventually sent outward to others as *object libido*. It is the sign of a more mature person that libido is being sent outward (object libido) rather than being invested inwardly (ego libido) in narcissistic fashion. But by the same token, everyone begins life and wishes to sustain it only because there *is* this initial self-love or self-cathexis.

Freud had now successfully done away with self-preservation as a *primal* instinct, even though the same kinds of self-preservative actions that the ego carries on continue as a secondary (component) instinctual pattern. The person looks out for himself or herself, avoiding injury whenever possible. Self-care is self-love. But what do we now oppose to the sexual instinct and its pleasure principle? At this point, Freud went “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (Volume XVIII) and introduced one of his most controversial theoretical constructs as opponent to pleasure—the Death Instinct.

Repetition compulsion. Not until roughly 1920 did Freud decide to drop the pleasure principle as a major concept and to substitute in its place an entirely new concept of mental functioning, the *repetition compulsion*. He had been observing for decades that neurotics in psychoanalysis seemed to have a compulsion (uncontrollable urge) to repeat the dynamics of their past life in therapy, bringing him as therapist into their conflicts as if he were their parent in the re-enactment. He was also struck by the fact that children are ever willing to repeat the same game or to hear the same fairy tale over and over again. It was as if they were working through some anxious concern that preoccupied them,

like the mystery of birth in their hide-and-go-seek amusements. There are repetitive dreams and repetitive fantasies that everyone experiences occasionally, and even historians have noted that history tends to repeat itself.

Basing his argument on such points, Freud then concluded that in addition to the pleasure principle, “there really does exist in the mind a compulsion to repeat.”⁹¹ Note that this is a mental principle, whereas, if we recall, Fliess’s periodic cycle theory had suggested something of the sort in the biological realm. Freud now brings his two final primal principles together by a stroke of genius that ties them both back to Brücke’s constancy idea. He observes that “*an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of organic elasticity, or to put it another way, the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life.*”⁹² Instincts do not make new things happen so much as they cause things happening to return to an earlier state (the conservative nature of instincts). As in the case of the pleasure principle, a state of quiescence is achieved through sexual activity, thereby returning the organism to its even, homeostatic level. Life is a rhythm—expressed initially by Freud in the construct of vicissitudes of the instincts (see p. 53). But the ultimate state of quiescence is death itself!

If we consider the issue biologically, even physical matter has a way of returning to a common inorganic state, as the Biblical reference of “dust to dust” reminds us. Thus, Freud can say, in a biological manner of speaking, “*the aim of all life is death.*”⁹³ This now permits us to oppose our two instincts and view life as a vacillating rhythm of self-destruction (death) and self-perpetuation (life). He called the life-propelling in-

instincts *Eros*, and they now take over the role of the older sexual instincts, including self-preservation by way of narcissism. Eros ensures that the final quiescence (death) will not come about too quickly. We love ourselves, so we look out for ourselves and try to extend our stay on this planet. Eros also ensures that there will be offspring to perpetuate the race as a by-product of pleasurable copulation between the sexes.⁹⁴ Opposed to Eros we now have another collection of instincts that have as their *aim* the restoring of living human beings to an inorganic state from which they presumably sprung during centuries past. This collective name is the *Death Instinct* (Freud did not like the term *Thanatos*, which some of his advocates have used since). Grisly though they may be, the aims of death are the satisfactions of the grave—repose, rest, and organic constancy.

As when he seemed to be identifying libido with pleasure (see p. 54), Freud here again seems to be identifying death with (pleasurable) satisfaction. He referred to this ultimate reduction in tension into the quiescence of death as the *Nirvana principle*,⁹⁵ but for all practical purposes as a theoretical device this is nothing more than a rephrase of the constancy principle and identical to the pleasure principle in a theoretically technical sense. Thus, in his final theory of instincts, Freud has Eros and Death as the two primary instincts entering together into all kinds of secondary or component instincts found in the personality (that is, the interactions of id, ego, and superego). This was sometimes called a *fusion of instincts*.⁹⁶ For example, sadism (receiving pleasure from inflicting pain on others) would be termed a component instinct in which there has been a fusion of hostility (Death) and sex (Eros).⁹⁷ Even something as simple as looking out for one's self, being willing to fight if necessary to retain one's integrity as a person, could be

seen as a fusion of self-love (Eros) and hostility (Death). In fact, Freud once said that the Life and Death Instincts hardly ever appear in their pure form in human behavior; there is almost always some fusion of the two.⁹⁸

We might finally ask, since Freud named libido as the energy of Eros in this final formulation of his instinct theory, did he ever name an energy in opposition to it? No, this was never to be the case. Even though he said that the Death Instinct can turn into a destructive instinct during wartime and thus send out its hostile influences toward objects in the external world, Freud never sent a theoretical—to coin a word—“lobodo” outward to cathect such objects.⁹⁹ In his analysis of President Woodrow Wilson, he actually referred to the mixture of life and death energies without naming one of them, as follows: “. . . and the charge [that is, quantum] of mingled libido and Death Instinct was again without outlet and remained repressed.”¹⁰⁰ It seems certain that he *did* have an energy in mind for the Death Instinct, and his theory surely called for it, but Freud was not moved to raise other energies into the prominence he had assigned to libido.

Defense Mechanisms or Mental Mechanisms

Over the years, Freud introduced a number of constructs that helped him to describe the dynamics of personality. Since in most instances he was describing the behavior of abnormals, we have come to think of these as *defense mechanisms*. However, as the extension was made to normals and what Freud called the “psychopathology of everyday life,” we have come to think of them as

simply *adjustment* or *mental mechanisms*. They are often defined in terms of energy expenditure, the blocking or rerouting of mental energies, and so forth. However, there is a clear meaning for each mechanism, which is easily grasped by anyone who lacks knowledge of libido theory.

Repression. We have already introduced this construct as the historical descendant of the strangulator and the censorship. Repression was Freud's most basic mental mechanism on which all of the other mechanisms are predicated. As Freud said, repression is "the corner-stone on which the whole structure of psycho-analysis rests."¹⁰¹ We can define *repression* in two ways: (1) it is a countering of one cathexis by an anticathexis, or (2) it is the opposing of one idea in mind by an opposing idea. These are two ways of saying the same thing. We really cannot understand why one energy cathexis is opposed by a countercathexis without knowing the content of the ideas. The ideas act as *intentions*, preparations for action which come into conflict with one another. One aspect of the personality structure (id) intends to do one thing, and another aspect of the structure (ego-superego) intends another.¹⁰² Though it is popular today for a person to say "I have repressed that" in referring to something that is annoying to think about, actually this is a misuse of the term. If we *know* that we have put something out of mind because it is annoying, then we have not repressed but *suppressed* a mental content. It is possible to suppress and remove mental contents from consciousness to the preconscious. However, true repression is *always* done unconsciously. We are unaware of our repressions, unless of course we have been

psychoanalyzed and thereby informed of what they are by the analyst.

There are actually two stages in repression (Freud's dichotomizing tendency again; see p. 46). The first, or *primal repression*, takes place during the time of the original conflict between ideas. This results in what Freud called a *fixation*, a mental mechanism that we will take up in the next section, which deals with the stages of psychosexual development. Then later, when certain mental *derivatives* (vague recollections or symbolical manifestations like Anna's death's heads; see p. 43) begin slipping by the primal censorship (repression), a *repression proper* is carried on by the mind. This has to be kept up, and it proves taxing to the mind.

Displacement. Freud introduced *displacement* to describe how it is possible to fool the censor and, in a dream formulation, to displace the true meaning of a dream content onto an unrelated event or happening.¹⁰³ If we have an unconscious hatred for our brother, for example, we might displace this hatred in our dream onto a bobcat, which we track down and kill after a satisfying hunt. We never actually realize *consciously* that our victim is Bob, which is short for our brother's name, Robert. Unconsciously we have killed our brother, but consciously only an unconscious derivative symbolized by a game animal has been done in.

Substitution. Humans can often find alternate objects in life. We can redirect our interests, for example, and find a new libidinal object if we are blocked from getting our first sexual preference. Freud suggested that when an aging unmarried woman dotes over a pet dog, or when an old bachelor collects snuff boxes, the former has found a substitute for the marital partner she never acquired, and the latter has substituted a series of pretty boxes for the succession of beautiful

women he never conquered.¹⁰⁴ *Substitution* thus specifically refers to the replacing of one object by another.

Sublimation. Freud defined this as follows: "The most important vicissitude which an instinct can undergo seems to be *sublimation*; here both object and aim are changed, so that what was originally a sexual instinct finds satisfaction in some achievement which is no longer sexual but has a higher social or ethical valuation."¹⁰⁵ Sublimation thus goes beyond substitution, to change *both* the object and the aim of the instinct. The cited definition makes it appear that a person cannot sublimate hostility or the Death Instinct. Actually, most of the instances which Freud uses to demonstrate sublimation *do* deal with sex or Eros, but it seems clear that he meant that *any* (primal or component) instinct that is unacceptable to the superego could be sublimated.¹⁰⁶ An example might be the young man who considers his sexual promptings to be "dirty" (due to severe superego), and therefore turns to art and becomes a talented painter. The paintings are changed objects, but there is no longer a sexual instinctual aim in the painting activity.

Projection. Freud often noted that his patients—particularly the paranoid (extremely suspicious tendencies)—would behave like a dreamer and attribute internal fantasies to the external world in the way reviewed in Figure 3 (regression of mental excitation back to the stimulus). For example, the id might prompt the patient to feel hostility toward another person, but the superego would negate any expression of this anger in overt behavior. At this point, the patient could *project* her own hostility onto the disliked person and say, "I'm not hostile to her, but she is very irritated with me." Notice that the *nature* of the projected instinct remains the same—it is still hostility that we are

dealing with.¹⁰⁷ Freud believed that the capacity to project internal perceptions outward was a very primitive tendency in humans, and that in point of fact, projection "normally plays a very large part in determining the form taken by our external world."¹⁰⁸

Reaction-Formation. Freud introduced the construct of reaction-formation to account for those instances in which people seem to be arguing or favoring some action, point of view, or intention in diametric opposition to what they *really* wish would occur. The pregnant young woman who unconsciously wishes that her forthcoming child would miscarry may profess consciously that she wants the child "very, very much."¹⁰⁹

Rationalization. Freud's student and biographer, Ernest Jones, introduced the term *rationalization*, which refers to the fact that a person often finds an acceptable (plausible, rational) reason to justify some action that is really prompted by a completely different (usually irrational, emotional) motive.¹¹⁰ Thus, an otherwise gracious and friendly woman who unconsciously dislikes another woman in her circle of friends may find all manner of reasons for avoiding contact with this particular person. Her real reason is unconscious hatred (Death-Instinct components), but her consciously stated reasons (rationalizations) may include that she is too busy to call the woman on a telephone, she is never free on the afternoons when this woman has a tea party, she was sick on the occasion when they were to travel together, and so on.

Isolation. A disturbed person may sometimes be able to keep a rather horrible or frightening idea in mind. In order to account for

this feature of mental life, Freud introduced the construct of *isolation*, by which he meant separating an idea from its emotion.¹¹¹ Thus, a psychotic person might have a delusional belief that his stomach had turned into a huge snake and that it was eating him alive, or some such. The normal person would be horrified—on the order of Anna O.’s reaction—but this psychotic individual might continue to think about the delusion without showing a sign of emotion. Normals might occasionally isolate, such as in times of war when killing is required, or when a parent tries to remove a child’s badly mangled finger from a wire fencing where it had become impaled in an act of play. We cannot always let our emotions get the better of us and must sometimes carry out a difficult task with a cool head even though it may appear unnatural to others.

The mental mechanisms of *introjection*, *identification*, *fixation*, and *regression* will be taken up in the next section, as we outline the stages of psychosexual development.

Time-Perspective Constructs

Psychosexual Stages

Freud first suggested that four life stages covered the period from birth to adulthood.¹¹² He told Fliess in 1896 that each stage must build on the earlier one, and that measurable amounts of psychic energy probably pass along from an earlier to a later developmental level. If the proper amount of psychic energy does *not* move up from level A (ages 8 to 10) to level B (ages 13 to 17), then “the excitation is dealt with in accordance with the psychological laws in force in the earlier psychical period and along the paths open at that time. Thus . . . *fueros* are still in

force, we are in the presence of ‘survivals.’”¹¹³ A *fuego* is an ancient Spanish law or decree made by a ruler, which is given to a province for some reason and can at some later date be exercised or used. For example, a king might give a province exemption from paying taxes or the right to avoid contributing manpower to the military forces. A *fuego* is thus a claim on the head of state for privileges.

In like fashion, said Freud, we have personal *fuegos* that dictate to us from out of our own past (recall that the unconscious is timeless!). They arise when we do not pass smoothly through one developmental stage to another. A primal repression at one stage will surely mean that a *fuego* has been established there, forever afterward placing demands on the personality structure to—in a sense—return and resolve the issue that led to the conflict of cathexis and counter-cathexis. As time went by, Freud not only worked out a detailed series of psychosexual stages in human development, but he provided many theoretical explanations for why certain of these stages are not passed through satisfactorily. This became an important part of psychoanalysis, allowing Freud to account for everything from minor personality differences to neurotic and even psychotic disorders.

The term *psychosexual* reflects Freud’s dualism. We must appreciate that the developmental stages occur in *mind* (psyche), even though they are given their unique coloring by the region of the *body* from which Eros, or the life instinct (sexual), is being most active at the time. Freud called these bodily regions through which the pleasure principle is primarily active at any one point in development the *erotogenic zones*. Sucking, a pleasurable activity to the infant, receives its libidinal component from the erotogenic zone of the mouth. If for some reason the developing baby does not move on

psychologically to the next erotogenic zone, then the resulting *fuero* in mind would have mouthlike or oral dictates to make on the total personality structure.

Freud was to drop his first model of four levels in mind, and over the years we can actually count six or seven stages (sometimes called *phases*) in the development of the human being from birth to maturity. However, the first four, which are called the *pregenital stages*, are the most important in personality formation. Freud meant by *genital* the capacity to reproduce, so that pregenital levels are those in which, although sexuality is active, the genital (procreative) potential is not yet realized and no offspring can result from sexual intercourse. These psychosexual stages, to which we now turn, should not be thought of as fixed rigidly to age level. There can be several months' variation in age between any two people passing through the same psychosexual stage.

Oral Psychosexual Stage

At birth the person is all id, because there is no real consciousness and the ego-superego elaborations of the personality structure have not yet taken place. Infants are said to have an *oceanic feeling* of power, for the world is their oyster.¹¹⁴ Desire is centered around *oral erotism* or the seeking of pleasure in activities of the mouth (which is the erotogenic zone of this stage). Food sources like the mother's breast or a milk bottle are "attacked" and devoured as a cannibal might attack and devour another person.¹¹⁵ Freud called this taking something physical into our body from an outside source *incorporation*. The oral stage is typified by such *takings-in*, both from the external and the internal world of experience. In fact, this is how it is possible for the ego to begin developing. In the same way that the total person takes in milk as nourishment, what will become the

ego within the personality takes in libido from the id to build its alternative, a more reality-oriented outlook on life.

The child in the first few months of life is said to be in a state of *primary narcissism* (autoerotic), living only on the basis of the pleasure principle. If a bodily tension arises, the infant removes it automatically through internal reflex actions like urination or defecation. But if in order to remove the tension some external object is necessary—like mother's breast—the child can resort to *wish fulfillment* and literally see (that is, hallucinate) what he or she desires in an act of fantasy (primary process thought). Wish fulfillments through fantasy are identical to the mechanisms of dream formation (both follow the model presented in Figure 3). Since there are no superego wishes to be met with this early in life, the wish fulfillments of a baby in the oral stage are *all* pleasant.¹¹⁶

Gradually, the taking-in tendencies of the oral stage bring about *identification*, a mental-mechanism process that is not completed until the phallic stage of development (as we discuss later in this chapter). To identify is to take over the behavioral styles, attitudes, and belief systems of other people as our own. Freud considered identification to be a more primitive mechanism than object choice. To choose an object means that the person has sent libidinal cathexes outward, away from the self-identity. But to identify is to send libido inward, forming the internal life of the psyche in what is essentially a narcissistic way. Recall that in narcissism the person's own identity is the object. Psychoanalysis recognizes that narcissism always precedes object choice in human development. The id is totally narcissistic, and even as the ego is forming, it does so on this basis. For this reason Freud occasionally referred

to the oral period as the *stage of narcissism*.¹¹⁷ His student Ferenczi coined the term *introjection* to describe the specific act of taking into the personal identity characteristics of others.¹¹⁸

Anal Psychosexual Stage

Sometime around the close of the first year of life, when the child is first confronted with the need to meet the demands of polite society and learn to control his or her sphincters (urination, defecation), Freud viewed a shift in erotogenic zones from the mouth area to the anus (and also to the urethra, our next stage). Whereas experience up to this time had allowed the child to take in (introject, incorporate), he or she is now called upon to delay certain gratifications (secondary process in thought), to live more along the lines of a reality principle. By this time the ego is being differentiated out of the mass that was the oceanic total of psychic events, and as such the ego is confronted with certain problems in living. Freud said that when an instinct is not satisfied, the person experiences a *frustration*; the rules and restrictions put on the child by parents that cause this frustration he called a *prohibition*; and the resulting psychological state of affairs in general he called a *privation*.¹¹⁹ The anal stage begins a lifelong process of having to put up with privations and trying to live up to the prohibitions of one's elders, who ultimately represent the values of the broader culture. The little girl therefore bears up with frustrations in order to obey her mother ("Don't soil yourself"). Often punishments follow if the child does not meet parental prohibitions. This is therefore a difficult time for the child, who has to move from the passive-receptive coloring of the oral stage to a more aggressive and as-

saultive stage of development (Death Instinct more prominent now!). In fact, Freud first referred to the personality in this phase as the "*sadistic-anal* organization, in which the *anal* zone and the component instinct of *sadism* are particularly prominent."¹²⁰ Sadism involves taking (sexual) pleasure from the infliction of pain (see p. 59).

The anal stage is still pregenital; but as the child is toilet-trained by the mother, there is an ever-increasing source of potential difficulty in the clash of wills, both individuals desiring to fulfill their own ends. The child finds that the mucous membranes of the anal region are a source of pleasure and might even physically manipulate this region or play with fecal matter through retention, then rapid expulsion in defecation, and so forth. The mother may find such "games" disgusting and punish the child; of course, another mother might be more permissive and allow the child to make extensive manipulations of this sort.

Urethral Psychosexual Stage

The *urethra* is the canal that carries urine from the bladder to the male's penis or to the vestibule of the female's vagina. Although he did not draw a hard and fast line between the anal and urethral stages, Freud did feel that an erotogenic-zone contribution is made to pleasure (sex in the broader sense) from the urethra. We probably all pass through a phase where the anus is uppermost as contributor of libido and then another, briefer period in which the urethra takes the center stage in this role as source. This stage is still pregenital, and we are therefore speaking about the life period of roughly the third year. Children at this time often take pleasure in manipulating urination along the lines of retention-and-release "games," which they play with themselves or even other children. For example, two

boys may have competitive exchanges in a kind of urinary combat, or they may try to see who can send a stream of urine the farthest from a fixed point. Obviously, such activities greatly upset parents when they are uncovered.

Phallic Psychosexual Stage

We come now to the stage in which infantile sexuality takes a heterosexual turn, as object cathexes are directed outwardly toward a parent. This is still a pregenital stage because the child is not yet able to reproduce. The term *phallus* refers specifically to the male penis or female clitoris being engorged with blood. This can occur even before the reproductive (genital) organs have fully matured, of course, and in naming this level the phallic stage Freud wanted to stress that it was based on “not a primacy of the genitals, but a primacy of the *phallus*.”¹²¹ We begin now to see that Freudian psychology places the masculine above the feminine as an ideal for *both* sexes. Freud has been much criticized as a masculine chauvinist, but he believed this is what the clinical findings were *in fact* and that therefore it would be un- courageous to deny that in early life *both* boys and girls highly value the *penis* (when erect, *phallus*).

The phallic stage begins late in the second or third year of life.¹²² Differences between the sexes at this point are nonexistent, and for all practical purposes “the little girl is a little man.”¹²³ The boy discovers his pleasurable organ as the erotogenic zone shifts away from the anus-urethra to the penis, and he begins masturbating in order to capitalize on this new libidinal source; the girl does precisely the same thing with her “small penis,” the clitoris.¹²⁴ In fact, the girl senses a loss or a lack and very much envies her brother and other boys (called *penis envy*) for their superior organ, which un-

doubtedly exudes more pleasure as an erotogenic zone because of its size.¹²⁵ Often the first reaction of the girl is to *deny* or *disavow* that she lacks a penis, but in time her psychology is greatly influenced by this fact.¹²⁶

Ontogeny Recapitulates Phylogeny and the Origin of Society. Before going into what are called the Oedipal complexes of children, we will review Freud’s theories on the origin of society, culture, or civilization (he did not make fine distinctions among these terms). First of all, we must understand the Darwinian-Lamarckian theoretical rule that *ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny*. This rule suggests that in its *in utero* (“prebirth”) development from a fertilized egg (one cell) to a highly complex anthropoid, the human being re-enacts the evolution of the entire animal kingdom. The human fetus passes through a state in which it has a gill structure, suggesting a fishlike animal; later it develops a tail, and during the early stages of gestation it is hard to tell a human fetus from a pig fetus. This theory is rejected by many biological scientists today, but Freud was much taken by it and seems to have used it to buttress his theory of the repetition compulsion.¹²⁷ By 1913 he was arguing that we had to see this principle in operation mentally as well as physically.¹²⁸ Freud therefore contended that not only did people re-enact their *physical history* before birth, but they also re-enacted their *psychological history* after birth! The family setting, with its relations between parents and children, is to be seen analogically to the *origin of society*. Each family re-enacts what took place in the “first” family, or social unit.

Theories of societal origin fall into two broad categories: those that stress the aggressive conquering of one people by another,

and those that stress the more reasonable, cooperative, even loving side of human behavior.¹²⁹ Freud succeeded in using both views at different points in his theory. Basing his main argument on Darwin's theory of a *primal horde*, he argued that in the dawn of human society people lived in small groups under the complete dominance of a single male. This "primal father" owned all of the horde's property, and the women of the group were his most prized possessions for they brought him sexual pleasure. He had unlimited power and exerted it sadistically, keeping all of his sons from the pleasures of sexual contact with the women in the group (privation). If a son violated this prohibition, the father would either kill, castrate, or send him off into the wilderness to fend for himself. This naturally led to the practice of *exogamy* (seeking sexual objects as mates from outside one's kinship group), as the sons raided other groups and kidnapped their own women.

However, one group of sons eventually violated this pattern. A number of them who had been run off by the primal father returned as a smaller group of attackers with a common hatred. They were fearful of the old man, but through the strength of their numbers they succeeded in killing him off. Then, as many primitive groups are known to have done, they *literally* incorporated his physical identity. They ate him (or a goodly portion of him) in cannibalistic fashion, just as the baby now eats mother's milk in the oral stage. The reason for eating the father was that they hoped to take in or introject his strength. We might say that in killing him the sons cathected their father's body with the energy of the Death Instinct, but they *also* cathected him with libido in desiring his power. Hence, rather than taking him as a sexual object (object choice), they reverted

to the more *primitive identification* (incorporation) in the narcissistic oral fashion that we have already discussed.¹³⁰

The shock of having killed and eaten the old man sobered the sons up enough to realize that hostility breeds a return in kind and that no one profits if the killing continues. Hence, they succeeded in doing what the primal father could not bring himself to do: they struck a rational bargain (sometimes called a social contract). They agreed to found what we now think of as families within the society, to have sexual intercourse with only their specific group of wives (this was a polygamous society), and that *their sons* should limit their selection of wives from outside the family (taboo of exogamy). Hence, sons and daughters could not properly expect to have sexual gratification (Eros) within their own family units. As the generations slipped by, the memory of having killed an actual human being was repressed, and the father's image was replaced by a totemic animal of some sort. Ordinarily, the animal could not be eaten except on certain ceremonial occasions, such as that of a sacrifice to God. And this now heavenly God-image was also a projection of the primal father. Religious myths were then thought up to change the meaning of early events in the history of society. For example, the true original sin was not violating orders from God about whether or not to eat certain fruit; the true sin was killing the primal father (God) in order to get the forbidden fruits of sexuality.¹³¹ With a common totemic animal and a common God, the families that were organized into a culture (commonly identified with a leader) would drain off hostility stimulated within the group (Death Instinct) by directing it outward in wars on other societies that also had evolved in the manner we have outlined.¹³²

To weld this social theory to a single family, Freud now once again drew on

Greek mythology in the tale of Oedipus. This famous myth runs as follows: Laius, king of Thebes, having been warned by the oracle that his newborn son would destroy him, had the child sent off to be murdered by a herdsman. Emotionally unable to kill the child, the herdsman merely pierced his feet and left him on a mountain to die in the elements. However, a shepherd rescued the boy and carried him to another region where he was reared by a noble family, who named him *Oedipus* which means "swollen foot" (the foot is a penis symbol in Freudian thought). In time, as he grew to manhood, Oedipus was to hear from the oracle that he would someday slay his father. Thinking his stepfather was his natural father, he left the region by chariot only to meet Laius on a narrow road. After a disagreement over the right of way, Oedipus unknowingly killed his real father. Later, thanks to the heroic act of solving the riddle of the Sphinx, Oedipus was made king of Thebes and thereby took Jocasta, his mother, as wifely queen. Years passed, and eventually the oracle made known the true relationship of mother and son to the two principles of our drama. Jocasta put an end to her life by hanging herself, and Oedipus blinded himself by puncturing the pupils of both eyes.¹³³ Freud used the term *Oedipus* to describe a *complex* (an ideational content or collection of ideas¹³⁴) that both males and females carry about within their unconscious minds, and that they actually lived through in the sense of ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny as follows:

Male Oedipus Complex. In the case of the boy, along about his third year of life in the phallic stage, we find a re-enactment (repetition) of the primordial lust for the female in the home (the mother). The boy senses pleasurable stimulations from his penis erotogenic zone, and he also has some hunch that this region is tied to mother in a physical

way. Thus, said Freud, ". . . he becomes his mother's lover. He wishes to possess her physically in such ways as he has divined from his observations and intuitions about sexual life. . . ." ¹³⁵ This talk of intuition reminds us of the Jungian influence on Freud concerning the possibility of inheriting mental contents from antiquity in the unconscious (see p. 181). The law of *talion* (animalistic retribution in kind, as in "dog eat dog") is one such possible sense of intuition that everyone might generate via unconscious promptings. It is precisely at this time that the son is lusting after the mother in the primitive-horde re-enactment. He therefore senses the early prohibition of this ancient drama with its threat of castration for those who break the father's commands.¹³⁶ This *castration fear* establishes what Freud called the *castration complex* as an aspect of the broader Oedipus complex.¹³⁷ The four-year-old boy literally believes that his father will cut off his testicles, penis, or both! With each rise in the level of mother cathexis (the more libido invested in her image as an object choice), the boy feels a parallel rise in anxiety as he senses the inevitable castration (this idea is coming up from unconsciousness to consciousness). The ego is the most intimidated portion of the personality. It tries to head off the id, but as we know, the latter's needs are unreasonably insatiable. Things look increasingly bad for the boy.

When things are darkest and the fear is greatest, a solution is found by the boy who essentially sells out his interest in his mother, reverts from object choice to identification, and rather than continuing his lust for mother, takes in (introjects) the father's superego standards. Since the father's ideals also represent the cultural norm, the boy gets "civilized." The male conscience is thus

born of fear. Although the son had had a warm feeling for his father before the phallic period, and he had doubtlessly begun to identify with the father somewhat out of this love, the final act of *paternal identification* is a matter of self-defense, born of extreme anxiety. “Conform or be castrated” is the civilizing rule. This is why Freud said that the superego is the “heir of the Oedipus complex.”¹³⁸ In terms of libido theory, what supposedly happens is that a great wave of *anticathexis* sets in, which turns the boy’s interest away not only from the mother (repressing his lustful id prompting), but from *all* members of the opposite sex (bringing on the latency period; see below). Men do not recall their earlier lustful desires (cathexes) for their mothers because out of castration fear they have succeeded in putting this all down into the darkest regions of their unconscious mind. The ego triumphs by giving birth to the superego, but this is rarely a total victory. Virtually every man suffers some remnant of his Oedipal conflict. But if he does not resolve this complex pretty much as outlined, acquiring a reasonably effective superego in place of the castration anxiety, he will surely be doomed to a life of neurosis.

Female Oedipus Complex. Some of his students have called this the *Electra complex*, basing their analogy on the mythological tale of a slaying of a mother that was instigated and abetted by a revengeful daughter (Electra), but Freud specifically rejected this usage and its mythological parallel.¹³⁹ We continue now with the fact noted above that psychoanalysis is more a masculine than a feminine theory of personality. Freud was definitely uncertain in his theory of female sexuality. He did not believe that girls experience the great fear of the mother as boys do of the father. The prephallic attachment

of a daughter to her mother is far more important in the development of a girl, and it is only much later that hostility and competitiveness with the mother might set in. Put another way, girls do not have a castration fear of the same-sex parent because of course they lack the testicles or penis to fear for. What they do have is a *penis envy* and a basic sense of inferiority because they assume that they have *already been* castrated—either by nature or by one of their parents (the mother is usually seen as the guilty party after a period of time).¹⁴⁰

The course of feminine development is now seen as the girl working out the substitutes and sublimations of her “lost penis.” The healthiest solution in the Freudian view is simply that the little girl find in her father’s penis an adequate substitute, cathect it with libido, and thereby come in time to identify with her mother’s role in the family. This gives us a certain parallel with masculine psychology, because this makes the little girl her father’s lover. Many Freudians use this framework today and say that there is a hostile competitiveness between the maturing girl and the mother over who will *really* be the father’s genital partner. They surmise that Freud believed this competition set up a comparable level of fear to the boy’s castration anxiety, and that in this way the anticathexes of latency set in with roughly equivalent force for both sexes. Actually, though Freud *did* feel feminine identification was furthered in the competition with mother,¹⁴¹ he *did not* propose such a neat parallel with masculine identification.

Freud’s theoretical problem was that he did not have this mounting level of anxiety on which to base the final formation of the superego for the girl. He vacillated about how much trouble this affords the female, noting in one context that it does little harm if she does not fully resolve her Oedipal attitudes,¹⁴² but stressing in others that she

really has a more difficult Oedipal maturation than the boy.¹⁴³ Both heterosexual desire and motherly love spring from the root of penis envy. The normal, healthy progression for the girl is thus: castration acceptance *to* penis envy *to* cathect father's penis and identify with mother *to* desire for a father-substitute's penis (husband) *to* desire for a baby.¹⁴⁴

But what about the superego as heir to the Oedipal complex? If girls do not have castration fear, how can they get their superegos firmly in place? Well, they really cannot, and in Freudian psychology they do not. Speaking of women, Freud observes:

*Their super-ego is never so inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of its emotional origins as we require it to be in men. Character-traits which critics of every epoch have brought up against women—that they show less sense of justice than men, that they are less ready to submit to the great exigencies of life, that they are more often influenced in their judgements by feelings of affection or hostility—all these would be amply accounted for by the modification in the formation of their super-ego which we have inferred above.*¹⁴⁵

Women sublimate less often than do men,¹⁴⁶ which would account for the fact that it is the man who has been the prime mover of civilization. It is easy to see why the modern feminist finds Freudian psychology so offensive. Women are undoubtedly painted as lesser human creatures by psychoanalysis (although there have been female analysts who countered these portions of Freudian theory).

Latency Psychosexual Stage

Both sexes eventually do forget (repress) their parental Oedipal attractions.¹⁴⁷ Thus,

at about age six to eight and lasting until sexual pubescence at age ten to as late as fourteen, there is a dramatic decline in the sexual interests of maturing children. Freud called this span of years the *latency period*.¹⁴⁸ The child substitutes a feeling of affection for the former emotion of lust, which suggested to Freud that the sexual instincts become "inhibited in their aim"¹⁴⁹ during the latency period. The child begins turning now to imaginative play with members of his or her own sex (sublimated libido, projected onto other humans "who look like me").¹⁵⁰ We can also see the phenomenon of reverting to identification from object choice here (see p. 66), as little boys solidify their identities as *males* and little girls as *females*; they may say at this time that they hate the other sex (reaction formation) and wish only to play and be with members of their own sex, which essentially means "with myself" (autoerotic use of libido). Object choice has been successfully eclipsed for the time being.

Freud did not believe that latency was inevitable in every person's life. He notes that in some life histories the latency period has been skipped entirely. He also stressed that the course of the latency period is not always uniform, and the cessation of sexual promptings might not be observed at every point along the way.¹⁵¹ Some children, depending particularly on their environmental stimulation, have incidents of overt sexual play during this time of life. However, by and large, the principle of aim-inhibited sexuality is the case for children in this age span. One last point concerning latency: there is always the clear implication in psychoanalysis that a contribution is made to the onset and ending of latency by sheer biological factors. Freud referred to sexual development as a two-stage or *diphasic*

process, which begins very early in life and is then interrupted by latency before surging forth again at pubescence. This diphasic process he referred to as a “biological peculiarity” of the human species,¹⁵² but one that did not function unless it was nurtured in a certain sociocultural climate. “The period of latency is a physiological phenomenon. It can, however, only give rise to a complete interruption of sexual life in cultural organizations which have made the suppression of infantile sexuality a part of their system. This is not the case with the majority of primitive peoples.”¹⁵³

Pubescence and Adolescence

Pubescence is the period of maturation when humans begin to take on the mature physical characteristics of sexuality, including pubic hair, the production of semen in the male, and menstruation and enlarged breasts in the female. The period heralds the onset of genitality—true reproduction is now possible—and when this transformation in the body is completed, humans enter the adolescent period, which is usually considered to fall between the ages of twelve and twenty years. Primitive peoples often have puberty rites, which ceremonially introduce the child into adulthood with much fanfare and recognition. Often this is tied to a religious theme, as in the *bas/bar mitzvah* of the modern Hebrew religion. But in the main the adolescent period is a time of uncertainty and stress for most individuals because of the rapidly changing demands being put on the growing young adult, who sometimes feels neither fish nor fowl as he or she tries to work out a place in the scheme of things. Freud did not devote very much of his writings to adolescence *per se*, doubtlessly because he

felt that the personality is already established by the time of puberty. One must always go back to the first five years to really understand a personality system in Freudian terms.¹⁵⁴

Puberty, said Freud, initiates the second step in the diphasic human sexual development. The sexual instinct now makes known the full strength of its demands.¹⁵⁵ Due to the changes in internal physical secretions of the various sexual hormones associated with pubescence, the actual amount of libido “accumulated” in the cathexes and anti-cathexes of the Oedipal resolution is increased.¹⁵⁶ This serves to enliven the repressed Oedipal conflict, which flares up again but in a somewhat modified form.¹⁵⁷ Unless a neuroticism is involved, the usual course of this flare-up is that the adolescent falls in love with an older person of the opposite sex (crush):¹⁵⁸ a teacher, a cinema star, or a political figure. Adolescents are also noted for their sense of emotional commitment, and Freud would have viewed this characteristic as sublimation of libido into political causes, public demonstrations, or the desire to make this a better world.

In addition to the sublimation of libido (Eros) in the sociopolitical criticisms of adolescence, we can also see a Death-Instinct component in the *hostility* that adolescents sometimes express. They are angry young men and women. Their hostility can also be channeled into antisocial behaviors like delinquency or revolutionary activities.¹⁵⁹ The opposite can be seen in that sometimes all instinctual promptings are repressed out of sight, even to the point of reaction-formations like the pursuit of asceticism, vows of celibacy, the need to be alone, and the attraction to mystical philosophies, religions, and esoteric cults—literally, a total rejection of the sensory or material world. But the average adolescent will, in time, find a substitute for his or her parental objects in the

heterosexual partners of the “dating and petting” years. The adolescent will thus fall in love—probably several times—and eventually marry one of these heterosexual partners as he or she achieves adulthood.

Most modern theorists who have studied the adolescent stress the latter’s reliance on a peer group or gang. Although he did not address himself directly to the question of adolescence, Freud *did* place great stress on the role of group factors in human behavior. Freud described the human being as “a horde animal, an individual creature in a horde led by a chief.”¹⁶⁰ In developing a group interest, the adolescent is therefore merely reflecting the in-group identification tendency that will be carried on for the rest of his or her life.

Adulthood and Genitality

Adulthood or the *genital phase* of psychosexual development implies not only the ability to reproduce, but also to obtain satisfactory *heterosexual* physical gratification in lovemaking. Freud therefore did not see a homosexual adjustment as fully adult or satisfactorily genital (see our discussion below, p. 79). He also emphasized that the female’s *second* phase in the diphasic sexual development had to be a feminine one, whereas initially she had been a “little man.” To accomplish this shift, the girl’s erotogenic zone moves from the clitoris (“little penis”) to the vaginal area proper, which occurs during and following pubescence.¹⁶¹ As this takes place the maturing woman becomes increasingly passive (feminine) and receptive to the sexual advances of the male, finding personal satisfaction in the penis of her lover and also in the bearing of a child.

Freud realized that mere sexual activity would never bring happiness in adulthood. In his view, people who are “sexually liberated” and therefore promiscuous by con-

ventional standards are also likely to be immature and narcissistic. If two people marry and feel *only* sexual lust for one another, this union will probably not last. To be sexually gratified through lovemaking is, after all, to satisfy the instinctive promptings of lust.¹⁶² Romantic love or a “passing affair” are based on such immediate sexual passions; but if a man and woman are to remain committed to each other, something must be added to the relationship in addition to lustful passion. Freud therefore suggested that to last, a mature love must consist of *both* lustful desire *and* the aim-inhibited lust of “feelings of affection,” like those we have for our parents during latency.¹⁶³ Marriages are often begun under the original drive of lust, but in time a growing sense of affection (aim-inhibited lust) partially replaces this exclusively sensual zeal. The marital partners say “I not only love my mate, I *like* him (her).” If only aim-inhibited ties of affection are involved in the marriage (no lust), then the love is platonic. Freud did not favor the platonic relationship for most people because instincts should be satisfied and a complete lack of sexual activity in marriage would not meet this natural need of the human organism.

Fixation and Regression

Freud based his explanations of personality differences and mental illness on the various ways in which people pass through the psychosexual stages. By *pass through*, we mean in the psychic realm. Someone who does not grow up mentally we consider psychologically immature. In this sense, Freudian theory has all of us more or less immature. This is what gives us our different personality tendencies. Since the libido theory plays a central role in this explanation of how we

mature, it is a good point at which to consider this construct in more detail. What did Freud have in mind when he spoke of this mental energy? What analogies or metaphors did he use as his model of psychic energy? We have already gotten the impression of libido as similar to an electrical charge of some type, as when Freud first spoke of a neuron as cathected when it was filled with an electrical charge (see p. 55). Even though he later switched to the mental-energy usage, we are left with the clear impression of an analogy to electricity. But now in some of the most important passages on the fixation and regression of libido, Freud *also* analogizes to a stream of water or a riverbed.¹⁶⁴ He was fond of using the phrase *psychical damming-up*, which he took from Lipps,¹⁶⁵ and the reader will find the modern Freudian referring to *dammed-up libido* as one way of talking about repression (cathexis dammed-up by anticathexis).

We conclude that Freud's libido construct comes down somewhere between a charge of electricity being carried along and a hydraulic force of the type we associate with a liquid in its fluid or a steamlike state. Actually, since libido is a construct that has no measurable referent in observed experience, it is impossible to get a clear picture of what it is "really" like. In reading him over the years, one can easily get the impression that Freud initially thought of libido as an energizer that might someday be discovered and measured; but in time this view seems to have weakened and in the end it is obvious that he is simply using the term *libido* to organize his thoughts as a metaphor. Jung tried valiantly to get Freud to clarify the concept, but without success. What makes it all the more difficult for the student of Freud

is that he seems to have relied on libido as a construct more and more over the years.

When Freud put stress on the hydraulic meaning of libido, he usually spoke in terms of what he called its *quantitative factors* in behavior. Any single person has just so much libido available to the total personality at any given point in time. That aspect of the personality structure that has relatively the most of this precious mental fuel can accomplish the most, get its needs answered the most, or keep mentally active the most.¹⁶⁶ The artist who sublimates libido into his or her art form must take it away from something else, and therefore the heterosexual drive will be to some extent reduced. Moreover, if libido is dammed-up over time in the development of personality, then the psychosexual stage that pocketed this libido must necessarily have more to say about the ultimate coloring of that particular personality structure, in the sense of influencing the style of behavior it will engage in. Another way of putting this is that the fuero of a psychosexual stage at which libido has been dammed-up makes the major claims on the style of behavior that this given personality will emphasize (see our discussion of the fuero, p. 62). We are mixing metaphors now, but the truth is, so did Freud over the years of his theoretical efforts.

This trapping or pocketing of libido during any given stage of psychosexual development is called *fixation*. Freud noted that the pathway to adulthood through the psychosexual stages is never without problems—today we might call these hang-ups—and it is such frustrations that lead to a psychical damming-up of libido.¹⁶⁷ Such fixations can take place at any point in psychosexual development, and even repeatedly so.¹⁶⁸ Figure 6 presents a schematization of libido as a "river" beginning its flow at the top *from birth* and continuing downward through the various psychosexual stages (which are




Figure 6 Fixation of Libido and Regression

listed on the left-hand side of the figure and further divided into pregenital and genital levels). Note that, as the river flows down through these stages, it has three pockets of libido running off to one side, as when a river forms small ponds or larger lakes as tributaries when it flows along the land. (To enrich the metaphor, try to think of this river as flowing down a sloping mountain.) These pockets of libido can be thought of as having been dammed-up, brought about artificially by draining off libido from the mainstream and then trapping it with a dam. Each of these reserves of dammed-up libido is a *fixation*. We could also describe the fixation pockets as being due to primal repressions (see p. 60), and by going back even further to Breuer, we could call them

pockets of *strangled affect* (see p. 42). There is a common thread running through all of these models.

Why does fixation take place? Here is where Freud has been severely criticized, because he has used almost any reason possible to account for this adjustment mechanism. We see a remnant of the medical model in the fact that Freud said certain hereditary or constitutional factors might make it more likely for a person to fixate in development than another.¹⁶⁹ Sometimes a fixation occurs because the child is so pleased with one level that he or she becomes frustrated when it comes time to move on to the next level.¹⁷⁰

A baby receiving considerable oral gratification in sensual sucking does not want to move on to the demands of the anal stage when toilet-training comes on, and therefore fixates libido (builds a dam mentally!) at the oral stage. A fuero is framed that says essentially “But I don’t want to leave this nice life. Let me be. Come back and let me focus on my sucking pleasures.” The request to “come back” is being made to the total personality structure, so that even in adulthood a person fixated orally has this unconscious desire to *act out* oral needs. It is unconscious because, of course, it would be the id pressing for continued orality, and the ego-superego would have in the meantime counteracted (or anticathected) the id’s cathexis of mother’s breast leading to the fixation.

The most common reason for fixating is probably thought to be some continuing *dissatisfaction* while living through a given psychosexual level. Instead of being orally gratified, what if a baby had been continually frustrated by a mother who did not allow sufficient sucking? Then, rather than being frustrated at the point of having to move on to the anal stage (leaving a “good” period of life), the baby would be miserably frustrated throughout the oral period itself (living a “bad” period of life).¹⁷¹ This would doubtlessly result in even *more* libido being fixated than in the first case, resulting in a more severe fixation.¹⁷² The fuero-claims might be even more dramatically put, as follows: “I was cheated. You must come back and help me get restitution. I demand fair play. This was a terrible time for me and I have many claims needing settling.” Like anyone who is dealt an unfair blow in life, particularly if it seems arbitrary and unnecessary, the fixated portions of the per-

sonality seek retribution and restitution. Mother must be made to pay! Things cannot be simply swept under the rug and forgotten. We can see now more clearly how the repetition compulsion works. Fixation is a part of it, calling the personality back to repeat something that happened in the past or that did not happen but should have happened.¹⁷³ Things need correcting, or at least, evening up (eye for an eye!).

There are three pockets of fixated libido in Figure 6, because it is possible to have—and in most cases we all do have—more than one fixation point in the same personality. Usually, there is a major fixation (it is the oral stage in Figure 6), which lends coloring via fuero-claims to the personality, and then others provide secondary hues. Note also that Figure 6 has two rivers of libido, one labeled *normal* and the other *abnormal*. The obvious difference is that in the case of an abnormal sequence of fixations there is considerably *more* libido being fixated along the way (Freud’s quantitative emphasis). This heavy concentration of nonflowing libido results in a narrowing of the abnormal river. Since this means that the personality structure (id, ego, superego) has less and less active libido to use in current behavior, the abnormal personality is doomed to break down at some point. All of the abnormal’s mental energy is being shunted off to keep something that happened a long time ago enlivened at the unconscious level. Like an animal with inadequate food supplies or a machine without fuel, the person destined to be abnormal staggers and sputters along in life with a weak defensive system, a weak ego, and a lot of personal pressure from the internal fueros, which like bills of credit need to be met someday.

Note also in Figure 6 that we have placed a large tributary coming into the main course of libido, as when a smaller river joins a larger one. This occurs at pubescence and is

the second step of the diphasic sexual development in humans (see p. 69). As we may recall, there is a quantitative increase of libido at this time. Since the Oedipal conflict is stimulated by this increase, the abnormal libidinal development of Figure 6 is in great danger of suffering a breakdown of some sort, because all of its troubles will be greatly multiplied simply because of the greater quantities of libido that must be dealt with. The normal libidinal development can absorb the influx of libido at puberty without much strain, although the adolescent behavioral patterns we discussed above are brought on by this elevation in level of mental energy. There are two rules of thumb we can cite concerning fixation: (1) virtually no one gets through development without *some* minor fixations taking place; and (2) the greater the amount of libido fixated and the earlier these serious fixations take place, the more abnormal is a person's later life adjustment going to be.

Are the fuero-claims ever answered? Does the personality system ever go back and try to recoup some of the libido that has been pocketed, working through the problems of that level in the process? Yes, the personality does indeed revert at times and, as if the river could turn back on its course, returns to the psychosexual levels where fixation occurred. This reversion of libido Freud called *regression*.¹⁷⁴ It happens when the maturing personality—possibly in adulthood—receives additional frustrations. For example, the orally fixated adult might be fired from a job or confront an unhappy love affair. At such frustrating points in life, said Freud, as when a “stream of water . . . meets with an obstacle in the river-bed,”¹⁷⁵ there is a reversion of the flow back into old channels.

When this happens, all of the fuero-complaints and claims may be enacted in behavior. The orally fixated man may go off

on a drinking binge, which regressively re-create the oral preoccupation (taking in) of his major fixation point. A woman who cries easily and needs constant reassurance from her friends may be regressing to oral passive-dependencies on a regular basis. The slightest life challenge may send her into one of her crying spells. Though we have not referred to Death-Instinct fixations, the model represented in Figure 6 could work here as well. Because of its more aggressive features we could think of the anal level as relating to hostile regressions. The teen-aged “tough guy” who has a reputation for hotheadedness and is ready to fight at the drop of a hat may in fact be regressing in the face of social frustrations. Being easily intimidated and basically afraid of relating to people, this young man is essentially re-enacting the hostility he feels toward parents who frustrated him when he should have been learning the first lessons of social propriety (toilet-training demands); now, instead of feeling at ease socially, he is constantly on edge and ready to fight at the slightest provocation. His conscious reasons for fighting are foolish, but unconsciously there is a serious battle being waged, a fuero-claim is being settled, again and again, as he tries to get back at his parents (repetition compulsion).

Freud was fond of using as an analogy to mind the stratified levels of Rome, the “eternal city,” which is constructed of layer upon layer, city ruin upon city ruin, open to all manner of archaeological excavation.¹⁷⁶ So too with the mind. No matter when something has taken place in the past, it is open to study today because “the primitive mind is, in the fullest meaning of the word, imperishable.”¹⁷⁷ Freud used the term *topographical* for these spatial layers in mind (see p. 48), and he spoke of *topographical regression*

whenever he meant the return of libido across these levels. If an adult returns completely to an earlier psychical state and becomes infantile as a whole person, the case would be one of *temporal regression*. And if only certain primitive behavior styles replace the more mature styles that we should be using in the present, then this would be called *formal regression*. A psychotic person who literally becomes babylike in total behavior would be experiencing a temporal regression, whereas an occasional reversion to childishness by an otherwise mature adult would be formal regression.

Individual-Differences Constructs

Adult Character or Personality Styles

We have been considering the adjustment mechanisms of fixation and regression in terms of how they color the personality—or as Freud called it, the *character*—structure of a given person. Now we take an additional step in this direction to say that *all* personality styles are analyzable in terms of the particular fixation levels and mechanisms employed by people to deal with their past life experiences.¹⁷⁸ Hence, by *personality* Freud means the working out of conflicts among the id, superego, and ego,¹⁷⁹ involving the repressions, sublimations, and reaction-formations of instinctual pressures,¹⁸⁰ and the resultant compromises that can be worked out across the topographical levels of mind. Let us now review some typologies that Freud suggested might be observed among all peoples. Each of these discussions follows the pattern we referred to in the Introduction (see p. 23) of first being cited as a typology and then moving to a trait description (from

the “anal personality” to “anal tendencies in all people, more or less”).

Oral Personality

Since the mood of the oral stage is predominantly *passive* and *receptive* (taking-in), it follows that an adult with major fixations at this level tends to be passive, dependent, and subservient in personality. This person is more likely to be a follower than a leader. Since the oral period is a fairly care-free time of life (toilet-training demands not yet placed on the child), the oral personality is prone to be optimistic, trusting, and accepting—even a little gullible. The smiling, congenial, easy going young person who is always open to influence from others is reflecting an oral-personality style. Since love is equated with the ingesting of food in the oral stage, these personality types tend to be heavy eaters—and often therefore overweight. Any oral personality might also enjoy other mouth-related activities, such as gum-chewing, drinking, smoking, or simply talking and laughing with others. The stereotype of the cheery, chubby fat person whom everybody loves stems from the oral behaviors it subsumes. Think of how the Santa Claus image would suffer with each pound of weight the jolly little fat man shed!

When things go wrong, the oral personality tends to feel blue, but is not too likely to become irritable or hostile. If we were to stress the cannibalistic potentials of this phase (eating mother’s milk), an oral type might be called hostile or even sadistic,¹⁸¹ but by and large the *main* suggestion of orality is passivity and acceptance of what the world has to offer. These individuals are more likely to be “lovers” than “haters.” They also tend to identify with the people from whom they receive what are sometimes called *external supplies* of affection, attention, and respect. Show our congenial young man that

you are interested in him and he begins to take an interest in your hobbies, dresses a bit like you, and seeks your advice on many of his life's problems.

Anal Personality

Freud named three characteristics of the anal personality, and we can see in each of these a persistence of a fuero-attitude associated with bowel training. Freud said anal personalities have the characteristics of *orderliness* (concern over having cleaned the anus following a bowel movement, not soiling one's underclothes), *parsimoniousness* (wanting to hoard money and other valuable items, just as the child once wanted autoerotically to hoard and cherish its own fecal matter), and *obstinacy* (negativism stemming from early conflicts with parents over whether or not to "go potty" when expected).¹⁸² Recall also that the toilet situation is the first time our external world places definite requirements on us, intruding on our autoerotic satisfactions, and asking that we begin laying down the outline of a superego in our personality. Fecal matter is, in a manner of speaking, the first *gift* that the child has for the parent, something which he or she has created entirely through personal effort.¹⁸³ It is not unusual for children to "save" their fecal matter after "going potty" until everyone in the family has had a chance to observe and admire this personal "creation."

In fact, feces can become a kind of economic barter between parent and child. If mother loves baby, baby gives feces when coaxed to do so on the potty; if mother rejects baby, baby withholds feces in retribution. For this reason, Freud took fecal content in dreams as symbolizing something very valuable like money,¹⁸⁴ or in the case of females, as symbolizing a baby.¹⁸⁵ Misers are anal adults, for they want to retain money (derivative of feces). People who hoard just

about anything have traits of anality. The woman who expects her husband and children to live "only for her" is exhibiting an anal trait of hoarding affection and allegiance in interpersonal relations. The anal personality is not as loving or passive as the oral personality. Anality can be a helpful personality tendency for those professions that demand an orderly approach, such as lawyers who must track down every last detail in making their case presentations. But in a less positive vein, anality can lead to excessive efforts for perfection. Some highly religious people are overly guilty about everything they do, reading in sins where none exist because of their anal tendencies. The anal housekeeper gets on our nerves, as he or she constantly jumps up to straighten pictures we would never have noticed were crooked or picking up minute specks of lint from the furniture.

The anal personality is often asocial and selfish, but to that extent it is also self-sufficient; whereas the oral person, who is usually socially engaging and unselfish, can become a clinging, dependent individual. The anal person is thus more likely to emerge as a leader than the oral type. Of course, excessive anality can lead to a narrow, constricted view of life and a hostile suspiciousness of the other person's point of view, which we can identify in the Scrooge character in Dickens' *Christmas Carol*.

Urethral Personality

Freud noted that certain of his clients who had suffered the humiliation of enuresis as a child acquired a burning *ambition* to succeed in life.¹⁸⁶ Rather than fighting through life's annoyances in the head-on manner of the anal personality, urethral characters are

likely secretly to envy the success of others and to look for quick successes of their own. If they cannot attain easy success on the first attempt, they find it difficult to try again.¹⁸⁷ Thus, urethral personalities have built their competitiveness on a strong underlying sense of inferiority (“You can’t even keep from wetting your pants”). Though they strive to overcome personal doubt (react-formate), their bid to achieve something is usually unsuccessful because they crumble when the going gets rough or they are placed on the spot in having to perform as their manner suggested they could perform. Males of this personality type never really feel heterosexually potent.¹⁸⁸ The man who becomes sexually excited only when flirting with and fantasizing the seduction of other men’s wives is reflecting urethral competitiveness in these flirtations. Actually, he has protected himself because these are all women he cannot have anyway. Should one of the married women with whom he flirts respond and seek to carry the relationship forward, he would find some reason to break it off; or he might make the contact only to fail in some way as a sexual partner (impotence, crudeness, selfishness, and so on).

Phallic Personality

The Oedipal complex takes place during this stage and fixations at the phallic level therefore take on the dynamic characteristics of this most important of all triangles in the life of every person. If the Oedipal complex has not been satisfactorily resolved, the adult person *will* develop a neurosis (see p. 67). However, more restricted fixations and the female’s rather subdued working through of the Oedipal result in distinctive personality styles that are not in themselves neurotic (see

discussion of male-female differences, pp. 67–69). We therefore expect to see a sexualized pattern in the phallic personality. This adult might be concerned with looking sexually attractive to the opposite sex. He or she may be very *self-centered* and egotistical. The “glamour-girl” stereotype fits here. Unlike the urethral character discussed above, the phallic character not only flirts but carries through on sexual liaisons with a vengeance. The “Don Juan” type of man, who presumably goes from one love affair to another seeking mother substitutes, is fixated at this level. For the phallic personality, heterosexual love is more colored by lust than affection (aim-inhibited lust). These people may masturbate when tense or upset.

Male phallic personalities are often driven by unconscious remnants of their castration anxiety. In some cases a male will react-formate and strive to be revolutionary rather than accepting the paternal superego (as heir to the Oedipal).¹⁸⁹ We may then find the person taking up the banners of social movements to overthrow the system currently in power. Often sexual promiscuity is a major feature of such antisocial acting-out, which can also take a criminal turn. Freudians are not surprised to learn that many famous criminals of history were sons of ministers or highly religious fathers. It would follow from Freudian theory that when the Oedipal does not “take,” such male offspring would be more likely than other men to live totally at variance with the conventional superego values.

Another type of phallic personality is the female who never resolves her Oedipal by accepting that she lacks a penis. This attitude frames her fixation at the phallic level with what Freud called a *masculinity complex*. Such a maturing girl goes on acting like a boy, retaining her aggressive clitoral pleasure and renouncing the passive vaginal pleasures of femininity.¹⁹⁰ As an adult, she might be

the career woman who seeks her place in a man's world. Such women are often called *castrating females*, because the suggestion is that they wish to take a man's penis for their own (show him up at the office, defeat him in a court case, and so forth). If the masculine identification is extreme, we might even witness a homosexual tie, so that a greatly masculinized woman might well find her sensual pleasure in playing husband to another female.¹⁹¹ Here again, we find Freud's theory generating hostility among those women today who consider themselves feminists. Obviously, there are present-day women who wish to compete equally with men in professional careers who are not castrating or seeking a penis of their "own." Freud would not wish to apply his theory indiscriminately against all women who are part of the feminist social movement. Yet this does not invalidate his views for any one individual currently active in this movement. Obviously, only a clinical case history framed from the psychoanalytical perspective would settle the issue for any individual woman.

Another controversial area in which Freudian theory is being challenged today is that of *homosexuality*. As we noted above (p. 71), homosexual behavior was *not* considered a healthy alternative to normal heterosexual behavior in the Freudian outlook. Homosexuals are one type of phallic personality. Freud's psychological explanations of the origins of homosexuality varied over the years, and he was always careful to note that genetic or hereditary factors probably contributed to the likelihood of a person becoming a homosexual. His theory of female homosexuality is particularly unclear, but we might take a look at the most common homosexual theory Freud advanced.

Homosexuality begins in the phallic phase for the boy, even though his actual decision for a lasting homosexual adjustment is presumably not made until around the onset of

pubescence.¹⁹² In order to explain homosexuality in the male, Freud made use of the now-familiar theoretical device of reversion from object-choice to identification (see discussion on p. 66 and p. 69). The homosexual boy is one who has been very close to and presumably pampered, doted over, greatly protected by a maternal figure (mother or mother-substitute). Rather than taking this mother as object in the phallic stage, thereby initiating the Oedipal complex, the male invert reverts from object choice and *identifies* with his mother. He thereby not only becomes feminized in his outlook, but he also seeks to re-enact the mother-son love pattern that he had enjoyed, playing the mother's part himself and using other boys as *his* substitute.¹⁹³ As he moves into latency, therefore, his sexual instincts may be less aim-inhibited than those of normal boys. Other males are really projections of himself, and he seeks to cathect them with libido as stand-ins *for himself*—also a variation on the identification process. Homosexuality and narcissism are therefore related phenomena, because what the homosexual is seeking is a narcissistic self-love through loving himself in other males.¹⁹⁴

This was an important theoretical point: although homosexual acts in earlier maturation are often a normal feature of sexual education, Freud questioned homosexuality as a satisfactory adjustment beyond the teenage years because it was a more primitive, identification-based, narcissistic pattern of adult behavior than heterosexuality. Modern homosexuals may dispute this view, and in time the gay community may even alter the dynamics of homosexuality. But for the present we should merely be cognizant of the grounds for Freud's clinical judgments.

*Latency, Adolescent, and
Genital Personalities*

Since the personality structure is finalized by the onset of latency—approximately age six years¹⁹⁵—Freud had no need to frame a latency or adolescent personality type. The important figures in our lives, our parents, brothers and sisters, and related family members who dealt with us in the formative years, now act as *imagoes* against which we will be measuring the behavior of everyone we meet throughout life. An *imago* is thus a kind of “person prototype” (original scheme), and Freud observed that all of the person’s later friendship and love choices “follow upon the basis of the memory-traces left behind by these first prototypes.”¹⁹⁶ We thus re-enact (repetition compulsion of instincts) our very earliest patterns throughout life.

Some psychoanalysts do speak about the *genital character organization*, but this too is one of those uncertain constructs in Freudian theory. All this means, really, is that the person is finally capable of reproduction and presumably can find in sexual relations the satisfactions that he or she had obtained earlier from the pregenital erogenous zones. Of course, not all humans pass through the earlier levels smoothly enough to find sexual relations gratifying. Many women in particular find sex degrading and “dirty” because of the contents of their superego instruction as children. Interestingly enough, Freud viewed the sexual organs as *animalistic*—that part of human physiognomy that had not altered in evolution from its original shape in the state of lower existence.¹⁹⁷ Even so, he felt that heterosexual intercourse was an important aspect of human self-realization. Freud simply could not see the value of celibacy,¹⁹⁸ and he looked upon the supposed

love of mankind (altruism) that religious or socialistic political leaders often voiced as a convenient smokescreen for an underlying hatred of an outgroup.¹⁹⁹ He viewed altruistic love as *entirely* aim-inhibited, derived basically from genital lust but not really a natural solution to the instinctual prompting. Freud once said that he could not see universal love as man’s highest form of behavior, and then he added dourly, “A love that does not discriminate seems to me to forfeit a part of its own value, by doing an injustice to its object; and secondly, not all men are worthy of love.”²⁰⁰

Psychopathology and Psychotherapy

Theory of Illness

Antithetic Ideas and Counterwill

At about the time of his first publication with Breuer, and in fact, even before the Breuer-Freud “Preliminary Communication” on hysteria (1893) made its appearance, Freud put out a small paper under his name alone, entitled “A Case of Successful Treatment by Hypnotism.”²⁰¹ In what seems to be his first attempt at explaining how a hysterical symptom like Anna O.’s right arm might arise, Freud made use of a psychological theory without employing mental energies at all. He began by noting that there are two kinds of ideas that have an emotion connected with them: (1) *intentions* to do something in the future that might be challenging or threatening, and (2) *expectations proper*, which are estimates of what might actually take place given the threat or challenge. It is the worry involved in our expectations proper that causes us to have strong emotions about the future. Can we really do what we intend to do?

Because of such personal uncertainties, we tend to frame what Freud called *distressing antithetic ideas* about our upcoming performance, whether we want to do so or not.²⁰² To quote Freud's example of a distressing antithetic idea, "I shall not succeed in carrying out my intention because this or that is too difficult for me and I am unfit to do it; I know, too, that certain other people have also failed in a similar situation."²⁰³ We all have such antithetic ideas as we undertake life's challenges. We are about to be interviewed for a job that we very much want yet deep down are certain we will not get because others are more capable. Highly competent people have such doubts, but as long as they are normal they can keep them suppressed thanks to the "self-confidence of health."²⁰⁴ Unfortunately, the neurotic person has lost this confidence and begins to give in to the influence of his or her distressing antithetic ideas. It is almost as if a *counterwill* within the personality were taking over and forcing the person to do the opposite of what his or her original intention was framed to accomplish.²⁰⁵

Freud gave as an example the case history of a woman (Frau Emmy von N.) who uncontrollably made a clacking sound with her tongue and lips (hysterical tic). He traced the origin of this symptom to a time when, exhausted with worry and fatigue while nursing her sick child, the woman had told herself that she must not make any noise lest she disturb the sleep into which the child had fallen. But in her exhausted state the antithetic idea that she *would* make a noise took the upper hand and in spite of her attempts to suppress it, she began to clack her tongue. In time, the symptom generalized, so that to her extreme embarrassment she began clacking her tongue at inopportune times in the company of others. Freud said that the symptom had thus become fixated in her behavior for many

years.²⁰⁶ Charcot's famous student Pierre Janet had used a concept of the *fixed idea*, which is obviously similar to Freud's construct of the antithetic idea. Janet's theory was primarily biological, akin to Breuer's hypnoid state theory (see p. 43). Thus, Janet suggested that probably because of some as yet undiscovered physiological mechanism, certain people *dissociate* or split off an idea from the rest of their mind's contents, and this fixed idea then operates on its own without any possibility of influence from the rest of mind.²⁰⁷ A woman gets the idea that she is going blind. As this idea dissociates from the rest of her common sense understanding, she gradually *does* go blind, even though there is no biological reason for her illness (hysterical blindness); it is the fixed idea alone that causes the illness. Freud may well have been influenced by the French during his studies in Paris, but his concept added the important psychological explanation of how such ideas arise—namely, as *antitheses to intentions*. Freud would therefore be drawn to the question: "What did this woman intend to see in the first place? Was it something she considered improper, antisocial, or disgusting?"

We all have such unacceptable promptings from time to time which we consciously refrain from acting out, thanks to the healthy state of our ego control. Are these antithetic inclinations over a life span ever lost from the mind? Freud answered no, they are not, ". . . they are stored up and enjoy an unsuspected existence in a sort of shadow kingdom, till they emerge like bad spirits and take control of the body, which is as a rule under the orders of the predominant ego-consciousness."²⁰⁸ We recognize the "shadow kingdom" of this quote as what Freud would someday call the unconscious mind. Thus, Freud continued, mass hysteria among the

clergy in the Middle Ages seemed to be possessions by the Devil for monks and nuns would from time to time shout out blasphemies and erotic language that they had been successfully suppressing for years. The triggering mechanism seemed to be a form of mass hypnosis in which there was a release of the suppressed material allowing the counterwill to be expressed.

Coitus Interruptus and Childhood Molestation

Since antithetical ideas are *reverse intentions*, that is, intentions that we *do not* wish to carry out, they must bear some meaningful import in opposition to what we consider proper or acceptable behavior. They must be at odds with our conscious ego structures. Freud was fully aware of this conflict, and as we have seen, in time he was to find that invariably a sexual experience was somehow involved in the mental dynamic. Two of his earliest sexual theories of illness are of historical interest because they were really somewhat more physically based than we ordinarily expect from Freud. Freud was searching about for a straightforward physical explanation of the possible relationship between the sexualized memories his patients were recalling and the nature of the neurotic illness that had prompted them to seek treatment.

One of the complaints he often heard, especially from patients suffering an anxiety neurosis, was that they could not obtain gratification in sexual intercourse. A female patient could not achieve climax because she feared having children. A male patient became hysterically ill during a period when his wife was physically ill and sexual intercourse had to be suspended.²⁰⁹ Freud referred to

this sexual frustration as *coitus interruptus* (interrupted sexual intercourse), and he felt that possibly a kind of *sexual noxa* (a harmful physical substance) was physiologically generated in the body during the time when a pressing sexual need (he did not speak of instincts at this time) was not being gratified.²¹⁰ He did not always try to trace the psychic factors that might have led to an inability on the part of some people to copulate successfully. Just *any* interruption was taken as a potentially harmful event, and he thought of this process in fairly mechanical, automatic terms. Though he believed that coitus interruptus was invariably a factor in certain neuroses, he was cautious enough to suggest that possibly a predisposing hereditary factor was also involved (an obvious remnant of the medical model in Freud's theorizing at this point).²¹¹

The second biosexual theory that Freud entertained early in his career centered around the belief that neurotics had been molested or seduced into sexual activity before their physical apparatus had matured.²¹² He had a series of patients who could recall an early childhood experience of having been either raped or at least sexually fondled by a parent, sibling, relative (uncle, aunt), or possibly, a household servant.²¹³ Accepting these memories as factual, Freud felt that the premature introduction to sexuality might well have acted like a precipitator of the maladjustment he was then observing in coitus interruptus. Here again, the weight of explanation was on what had happened to the individual in the past. It was just an unhappy accident that the neurotic was molested as a very young child, and his or her present disturbance was therefore in large measure independent of a directly *personal* involvement. Something bad had happened to the neurotic, who was not in any way at fault.

The corrected *infantile sexual theory* was a remarkable example of how to win by

losing, and it fixed for all time Freud's commitment to what we have called his Promethean insight. He could make this turnabout because, as one sees in his speculations, he was giving a growing weight to the purely psychological role of fantasy (wish fulfillment) in behavior.²¹⁴ In his reformulation, the individual was no longer portrayed as an innocent bystander in life's sexual misfortunes. Freud now claimed that recollections of seduction scenes are not copies of a past reality but rather the memories of *fantasies* indulged in during what we now call the early phallic phase.²¹⁵ While masturbating at this stage, the child has fantasied the sexual rape or molestation, then has repressed the entire affair following the Oedipal resolution. The memory of a fantasy is subsequently recovered while the patient is in treatment and taken as fact. Sometimes this experience is indeed a factual recollection, but more often fantasy is confused with reality. The difference between fantasy and fact in the memory of patients is always difficult to distinguish,²¹⁶ but this confusion makes no difference because psychical reality is what counts in behavior and not what may or may not have *factually* happened outside of mind.²¹⁷ Thus, rather than rejecting his retrospective method of personality study because it had generated false memories, Freud now made a virtue of the error, and through the concepts of fantasy and wish fulfillment, took as *convincing evidence* of sexuality the fact that his patients "remembered" so many *untrue* instances of sexual aberration in their early lives.

Three-Stage Compromise Model of Mental Illness

Freud eventually settled on what we would like to call a *three-stage compromise model* of mental illness. His mature view of mental illness retained the kernel ideas of both

coitus interruptus and the seduction-to-fantasy theory, added them to the original antithetic-idea theory, and then proposed a *deflection* concept which could account for how abnormal symptoms might arise. The coitus-interruptus theory gradually evolved into what Freud called the *actual neuroses*—which were in turn then opposed to the *psychoneuroses proper*. The actual neuroses (neurasthenia, anxiety, and hypochondria) were presumed to be caused by a somatic (bodily) toxic factor, a *physical noxa* much like the one he had earlier attributed to frustrated copulation.²¹⁸ The psychoneuroses proper were those disorders (hysterias) that were due to purely psychological causes (via the compromise model). Since they were due to a physical toxic factor, Freud said the actual neuroses could not be treated by purely verbal psychoanalysis; the physician had to prescribe definite changes in sexual routine in order to cure them.²¹⁹ Thus, despite his distinction between a physical (constitutional or hereditary) and a psychological cause of neuroses, Freud was still explaining *all* abnormal behavior exclusively on the basis of sexual difficulties. The somatic (bodily) toxic substance was not a foreign blood protein of undetermined origin nor was it set loose by some unknown irregularity in the bodily structure. It was strictly a *sexual* function that led to the toxic substance being set loose, and we can see in this the earlier imprint of the coitus-interruptus theory.²²⁰

The major difference between the original seduction theory and the fantasy-recollection theory was that the abnormal person moved from the role of an innocent victim to that of a central and willing actor in a re-enactment of the Oedipal situation. Freud was emphatic in calling the Oedipal the nuclear complex of every neurosis.²²¹ *All neurotics have unresolved Oedipal complexes.* In their

present abnormal states the neurotics are re-enacting family situations that have never been properly sublimated, anticathexed, or otherwise resolved (repetition compulsion). Recall that Freud referred to the initial stage of repression as *primal* (see p. 60). Then later on, the individual is forced to keep repressed material down through a continuing repression proper (sometimes called *after-repression* by his students). Neurotics find it impossible to keep Oedipal and other content-memories out of consciousness without also making it known overtly in a symptom. We will now review this process, using the schematization in Figure 7 as a point of reference for the three-stage compromise model of mental illness.

Figure 7 retains the dualism of Freudian theory: the mind is schematized by the figures on the left and the body by those on the right. In Figure 5 (p. 52), we confronted the theoretical problem of how to think about a bodily influence (instinct) on mind. Figure 7 represents the opposite problem, for now we want to picture how it is that a purely mental conflict can be reflected in a bodily symptom (like Anna O.'s arm).

Beginning at the top of Figure 7 and working downward, stage I takes place in the pregenital life period. A hostile idea might have occurred to a little boy concerning his father ("I will kill him") during the phallic psychosexual stage, along with an Oedipal idea concerning the mother as sexual object ("I want to steal her for my sexual pleasure alone"). We see here the Oedipal re-enactment of society's origins (see p. 67). In trying to resolve the Oedipal conflict and also reduce the castration anxiety it generates, the little boy represses such id (Life- and Death-Instinct) wishes by using energy (libido plus "lobodo") from the ego and whatever superego is formed by now as anti-


cathexes. In Figure 7 we have symbolized this repressive process by inserting two steps under stage I: step A (black arrow) would be the id wishes (kill, steal, sex) and step B (white arrow) would be the countering defensive wishes (avoid castration, conform) of the ego-superego tandem. Two sets of mental intentions are opposed, checkmating one another for the time being. We have symbolized this clash in the meeting of the black and white arrows of stage I, which confront each other in an unconscious region, probably at the primary censorship point of Figure 3 (see p. 45). Stage I thus resolves itself into a *primal* repression, and if things have not been worked out smoothly at this period of life (unresolved Oedipal), there would of course have been a fixation developing during this phallic psychosexual stage (earlier fixations may also have occurred; see p. 71).

Let us assume that the boy we have been considering does not satisfactorily resolve his Oedipal complex. Trouble would develop for him at the close of latency, brought on by the quantitative increase of libido following pubescence (diphasic theory of sexual maturation).²² This is schematized as stage II in Figure 7. Note that the inadequately repressed id promptings (kill, steal, sex) symbolized by the black arrow come dangerously close to entering consciousness. The anti-cathexes symbolized by the white arrow have been pushed back to the brink of awareness (point 8 or the "secondary censorship point" of Figure 3, p. 45). We have symbolized the danger here by the stressed appearance of the black and white arrows at stage II, as the cathexes and anticathexes strain against one another. The pubescent boy is about to know consciously what he already knows unconsciously—that he is at heart a rapacious murderer who would kill his father and sexually assault his mother! Freud referred to this dangerous circumstance as the *return of the repressed memories*, caused by


STAGE I: PRIMAL REPRESSION IN THE PREGENITAL STAGES

STEP A: Id Prompting (Wish)

STEP B: Ego Defends (Counterwish)



STAGE II: RETURN OF THE REPPRESSED CONTENT FOLLOWING PUBESCENCE



STAGE III: COMPROMISE DEFLECTION (CONVERSION) TO "SYMPTOMS"




Figure 7 Freud's Three-Stage Compromise Model of Mental Illness

a breakdown in the defense system.²²³ Desperate efforts are made at this point to keep up a repression proper, but without real success. Things have gone too far, and a more drastic maneuver is called for. The problem now facing the personality is how to “show” the mental conflict in a way that is not consciously understandable even though it is, in a sense, out in the open at last.

To accomplish this feat, said Freud, humans are able to substitute one form of overt expression (physical) for another (psychological), thereby deflecting the course of an intention by way of a compromise that satisfies all sides (id, ego, superego) in the conflict. The two wishes (black and white arrows) strike a bargain and find some mutually expressive way to make themselves known in a physical symptom of some sort. Stage III of Figure 7 symbolizes this compromise process. Note that the combined black and white arrows are deflected now as one interfused arrow pointing back into a bodily symptom of neurotic illness that always expresses the conflict overtly if we could but understand the subtleties. Thus, in addition to being compromises,²²⁴ symptoms are always wish fulfillments.²²⁵ The unconscious mind knows what symptoms mean, but even though they are observable, the conscious mind remains ignorant. In the case of our boy, we might find him developing a severe stammer, which immediately disgusts his father, an excellent public speaker, and brings out all of the maternal instincts of his mother. His id wishes which are fulfilled here are to frustrate the father (Death Instinct) and to get physically close to mother whenever possible (Eros). Mother smothers him with affection each time he has one of his stuttering episodes. Father storms out of the room in a rage. The ego wish would be

satisfied here thanks to the fact that no real murder or carnal display, much less a castration, takes place. And the superego’s wish is also granted because the boy does, after all, suffer from a vocal disturbance. He has been punished for the illicit intentions that the id entertained!

Precisely how this deflection takes place cannot be stated, nor can we say exactly how the instinct turns mental energy free in the mind (see Figure 5). Freud called this stage-III process *conversion*, which he defined as “the translation of a purely psychical excitation into physical terms.”²²⁶ As our example demonstrates, neuroses are actually begun in childhood, but they do not show themselves until the second wave of libido comes on at pubescence or possibly after years of failing repression efforts.²²⁷ Freud’s definition of the neurotic symptom was as follows: “A symptom is a sign of, and a substitute for, an instinctual satisfaction which has remained in abeyance; it is a consequence of the process of repression.”²²⁸ The symptom is, in a very real sense, a communication to the environment of the person from the unconscious. It literally says something (expresses meaning) though the person is not consciously aware of what it is saying. Freud even referred to the *organ speech* of a hypochondriacal symptom.²²⁹

We might have considered our model in Figure 7 a four-stage model, since we have two “wish” steps in stage I; or we might have considered stage II identical to stage III because Freud virtually identified “return of the repressed” with “symptom formation.”²³⁰ However, the alignment chosen meshes best with our earlier presentations of the Breuer model and the diphasic theory of sexual development. Freud once speculated that this diphasic onset of sexual maturation in human beings—its onset in two waves with latency intervening—might perhaps be the biological determinant of our predisposition to neu-

roses.²³¹ It is interesting to note that Freud retained the core of his early antithetical-idea theory in this final model of symptom formation. In every neurotic disturbance he diagnosed, Freud considered the likelihood that there were dual wishes or intentions reflected in the single symptom of the disorder.²³² As he once expressed it, at least certain "illnesses . . . are the result of intention."²³³ The intention is not to be sick, of course, but to let sickness express the antithetical intentions (wishes) that have been compromised and converted into the symptom picture. This is a far cry from his constancy-principle days. It represents a major break with the medical model. Sickness takes on intelligence; it expresses an intended meaning for all to know if we but understand the method of expression being employed.

Differential Diagnosis

There is a certain advantage to be gained from illness: the individual can usually expect to be cared for by others or at least to be worried about thanks to his or her *flight into illness*.²³⁴ It is uncomfortable having a symptom, but this advantage has long been noted in medicine and is often called *secondary gain*. For example, a daughter who has just faced the introduction into her home of a baby brother may regress for a period of time into some uncertain "illness," taking the spotlight off her sibling for a while.²³⁵ Freud once compared neurosis to a monastery, as a place of refuge where people can flee when they feel too weak to face life's frustrations.²³⁶

Freud has a quantitative as opposed to a qualitative view of mental illness. He did not draw a hard and fast line between normal and abnormal or between neurosis and psychosis within the abnormal disorders.²³⁷ People fall ill from the same frustrations that normals bear up under.²³⁸ How then

does abnormality arise? Well, first of all we must recall that instinctual promptings cannot be avoided (p. 51). They exist within our psychosomatic identity, and unlike other stimuli in the environment, we cannot flee from the stimulations of the instincts.²³⁹ Hence, if at some point early in life we fixate libido because of a frustration and then later as adults suffer a frustration and regress even as we are evolving a mental illness, the nature of the illness will be colored by (1) the initial stage of fixation, (2) the amount of libido fixated initially, and (3) the extent of libido regressed following the second frustration in adulthood.

Thus, as with differences in personality, we fall back on the fixation-regression model to understand differences in abnormal behavioral styles.²⁴⁰ Someone who as an adult is behaviorally abnormal enough to be called psychotic (insane, crazy) would therefore have fixated a large amount of libido at one of the pregenital levels or a moderate amount very early in the oral stage (weakening the developing personality in the process; see p. 73). Neurotic fixations are not so libidinally profound nor do they occur so early in life as the psychotic fixations. Neurotic symptoms of *obsessive-compulsivity*, in which the patient is afraid to touch anything for fear of germs or must follow a rigid routine in life without variation, would be traced to anal fixations. *Hysterical* patients, who are very suggestible and easily swayed by others, would likely be fixated at the oral psychosexual level. *Psychosomatic* problems follow suit: *ulcers* are oral; *colitis* (constipation, diarrhea) are anal; and so on.

Just as Freud could find unlimited numbers of differences in personality based on the partial fixations and regressions of a lifestyle, so too could he find ways of distinguishing between clinical syndromes in the

re-enactment of earlier fixations (see stage I of Figure 7) of the more severe variety. Since this fixation-depth-of-regression explanation is used to cover both normal and abnormal behavior, it is almost better to distinguish between normal, neurotic, and psychotic adjustments on the basis of how the individual handles reality than on the basis of how deep or extensive the regressions are. Everyone must confront frustration in life. We also all regress occasionally, and thus any of us might reveal in our regressive behavior the levels at which we have fixated (more or less) libido. But the difference between normal and abnormal regression centers around what the person is trying to accomplish in the process.

Freud believed that the *neurotic* does *not* reject reality or try to change reality as he or she understands it to be; the neurotic merely flees into illness through a regressive symptom-formation. The *psychotic*, on the other hand, *rejects* perceived reality in the regressive process and then seeks to reconstruct it in fantasy according to how he or she would prefer (wish) that it be. Thus, psychotics concoct *delusions* (unrealistically false beliefs) and *hallucinations* (seeing, hearing things that are not there), whereas neurotics retain a better contact with perceived reality. Freud then suggested that the *normal* personality combines the best, most constructive features of both clinical syndromes. “We call behaviour ‘normal’ or ‘healthy,’ if it combines certain features of both reactions—if it disavows the reality as little as does a neurosis, but if it then exerts itself, as does a psychosis, to effect an alteration of that reality.”²⁴¹ In short, the normal person fights to keep in contact and to effect a constructive outcome, a change in the external state of things. Normals neither run away from a

challenge nor do they settle for a dream-world solution, even though they might regress and even act childlike from time to time.

Anxiety Theory

Freud experienced some major difficulties getting his theory of anxiety stated clearly over his long career. Problems arose when anxiety seemed for a time to be taking over the energizing role that Freud had assigned to libido (and, by implication, to the energy of the Death Instinct as well). It seems clear that Freud viewed anxiety as he did any emotion (see p. 46), that is, as a feeling-tone that takes place in the *physical* realm. Anxiety is something felt in the body. It is *not* something that runs the mind, particularly the unconscious mind! But for a long time, thanks to a way he had of referring to anxiety, it seemed as though Freud really meant for anxiety—a feeling rooted in the body—to be the main motivator of the personality. We want in the present section to review Freud’s developing views on anxiety.

His first theory of anxiety was strictly physical in nature, based on a daring analogy between the similarities in bodily responses during an acute anxiety attack and those to be seen during sexual intercourse! Freud proposed this theory around 1894 as an offshoot of his coitus interruptus theory (see p. 82). The construct of libido was not even being used at this time. He described anxiety as a physical-release mechanism, in which we use primarily the breathing apparatus of the body to rid ourselves of physical stimuli that cannot themselves be worked over mentally. By *working over mentally*, Freud meant something like the principle of neurotic inertia (see p. 53), in which a mounting energy dissipates itself by being carried throughout the mind (in the constancy-principle sense). For example, if because of

her prudish attitudes a woman cannot gain full sexual release in copulation, then there will be a mounting sexual tension generated in her physical (bodily) apparatus. She will be experiencing *biological emotions* which she is *psychologically* unprepared to accept. Were she able to accept the meanings involved in sexual intercourse, then even if her climax (release) were not always attained, she could at least take some satisfaction in the foreplay and the mental understanding of what such displays from her lover signify in their relationship.

But she cannot mentally confront the meanings of sex, and since she also cannot gain release in the sexual act, there is no place for the rising sexual tension—the *emotion* of sex in her bodily apparatus—to go. In such a case, an anxiety neurosis is likely to show itself in this woman's behavior (fixation point would probably be the phallic, reflecting poor Oedipal-conflict resolution). As Freud put it, "*anxiety* has arisen by *transformation* out of accumulated sexual tension. . . ." ²⁴² Thus, in her anxiety attack, this neurotic woman will show the clinical appearance of sexual intercourse—heavy breathing, shortness of breath, heart palpitation—because she is draining off her physical sexual tension through a common autonomic-nervous-system pathway in the body. ²⁴³

An indirect release is therefore attained solely at a physical level without any intervention of the mind at all. Freud said very clearly that, whereas hysterics convert a psychical excitation (fellatio fantasy) into a physical symptom (cough or sore throat), anxiety neurotics convert one physical excitation (sexual tension) into another physical manifestation (anxiety attack). ²⁴⁴ Of course, we are referring now to the case of anxiety in an *actual* neurosis. In the case of *anxiety hysteria* (psychoneurosis proper), the individual transforms a psychical excitation (libido) into physical manifestations (symp-

toms) along the lines of the compromise model in Figure 7.

It was this latter use of anxiety that Freud turned to. He dropped the solely physical interpretation of anxiety after about three years and then for about thirty years referred to anxiety simply as *transformed libido*. ²⁴⁵ This usage follows the conversion model of Figure 7. A person represses libidinal cathexes made by the id via anti-cathexes put up by the ego and superego, and then in time this combined libido is transformed (converted) into an anxiety dream ²⁴⁶ or a symptom of neurosis (stage III of Figure 7). ²⁴⁷ This second theory of anxiety presented a few theoretical problems, which Freud had eventually to deal with. First of all, it was difficult to explain the type of traumatic neurosis (sometimes called *shell shock*) that developed in many soldiers following World War I as being due supposedly to transformed libido. ²⁴⁸ Such men often had repetitive nightmares regarding the battlefield from which they awakened in a state of absolute panic. The construct of repetition compulsion (see p. 58), as a need to repeat a traumatic situation out of the past as part of the striving to master it seemed a more accurate description of what took place in these war neuroses than did an explanation based on libidinal factors alone.

Secondly, and more importantly, a theoretical conflict arose because of the tendency to substitute anxiety for libido in explanations of behavior. Freud had a number of students—Otto Rank was the foremost example (see p. 574)—who seemed too ready to consider anxiety the prime motivator of the personality. This would mean that Freud's Promethean insight (sexuality is what moves personality) would be theoretically engulfed

by a desexualized account. It is vital to appreciate that in the Freudian view, the abnormal person (as well as the normal person) does *not* behave symptomatically in order to avoid anxiety. Indeed, as we have seen, anxiety is often itself a symptom of “something else” in the personality. Abnormal behavior is defensive and regressive because it is seeking to avoid confronting the repressed mental content, which in turn is moved about in the psyche (mind) by libido (mental energy) as well as by the energy of the Death Instinct. Anxiety is a physical emotion, “felt” mentally as all sensations including sight and hearing are experienced mentally. But anxiety no more runs the personality than vision or hearing.

In order to clear up such problems, in 1925, some thirty-odd years after proposing his first (entirely physical) theory of anxiety to Fliess in their exchange, Freud settled on a more general definition of *anxiety* as simply “a reaction to a situation of danger.”²⁴⁹ Anxiety symptoms occurring at stage III of Figure 7 are therefore seen as *substitutes*, as the means whereby the individual can avoid facing up to the return of the repressed. Rather than being a major motivator, anxiety is merely an *instrumentality* or a *signal* of the real danger that is yet to come. As Freud said: “. . . the ego subjects itself to anxiety as a sort of inoculation, submitting to a slight attack of the illness in order to escape its full strength. It vividly imagines the danger-situation, as it were, with the unmistakable purpose of restricting that distressing experience to a mere indication, a signal.”²⁵⁰ In speaking of the ego subjecting itself to anxiety, Freud meant that the unconscious portion of the ego, which knows what the “danger-situation” is, submits itself including its *conscious* portion to anxiety, thereby offsetting a complete confrontation or “facing-

up-to” of the Oedipal themes that are bringing on the danger.

Freud now specifically removed anxiety from being *only* transformed libido.²⁵¹ Literally any situation of danger—real or imagined—could generate anxiety. Since the id is unable to evaluate situations, it does not even “feel” this emotion. In fact, neither does the superego “feel” anxiety, which is why it can wish for such harsh self-punishments as people inflict on themselves—as when someone cuts off a finger or a hand to “pay for” the past sins committed by this appendage (the realization of a superego wish in overt behavior!). Only the ego is said to produce and feel anxiety that is based on id and superego promptings, but is done in order to self-deceive and avoid doing what the id and superego want done directly.²⁵² In fact, Freud’s final types of anxiety paralleled what he had earlier called the “three tyrannical masters” of the ego, namely “the external world, the super-ego, and the id.”²⁵³ Each of these sources of influence has its own intentions (wishes) that it would like the ego as personality executive (arbitrator, decision maker, identity in the middle) to do, to be, to act out overtly. The pressured ego is thus in a constant state of diplomatic relations, trying to see that all sides get some form of satisfaction in the transactions and negotiations.

In his final theory, Freud spoke of three forms of anxiety paralleling the harsh masters of the ego,²⁵⁴ but he also emphasized their basic similarity in signaling the ego of an impending situation of danger.²⁵⁵ Freud did not always draw a hard and fast distinction between anxiety and fear. The convention today is to suggest that we are anxious when the worry we have is uncertain or unclear, but we are fearful when the point of our worry is clear. We are anxious about going to the dentist because we may have a cavity or we may not, but once the diagnosis is

made and the dentist prepares to drill our infected tooth, we become fearful. Freud's first form of anxiety probably always touches on the emotion of fear at some point. He called this *realistic* anxiety, because it points to a factual challenge in the external world (the first of the three harsh masters). Realistic anxiety is experienced by a young man who knows that he is to go into battle tomorrow; he is safe for the night, but what of tomorrow? It is this kind of fear that many of the traumatic neurotics (shell-shocked) have, for any of a number of reasons, failed to master. Freud said that the very first (prototypical) form of this anxiety occurs at birth, which is the first traumatic situation we all face.²⁵⁶ Simply growing up and taking leave of one's parents can also be seen as involving realistic anxieties in living.²⁵⁷

The second form of anxiety relates to the compromise model (Figure 7) and was termed *neurotic* anxiety. If a person has an inadequately resolved Oedipal complex, then the id-wishes that have not been properly repressed by the ego (and superego) continually threaten to return to consciousness following puberty (stage II of Figure 7).²⁵⁸ The thought, "I wish mother were dead," might come dangerously close to conscious awareness in the teen-aged girl, who might at this point use the defense of anxiety by developing fainting spells (stage III of Figure 7). She is now completely preoccupied with anxiety over her fainting (conversion) and no longer in danger of confronting the true mental state. Note that it would be incorrect to say that this girl's behavior is "motivated by anxiety." The girl is no more determined by anxiety than we would be determined by anxiety (or fear) as we stood on a railroad track with a freight train bearing down on us, roaring and whistling our imminent destruction. We would surely be anxious in this realistic situation. But why exactly would

we jump off the track bed? Would we jump because we wanted to remove the signs of anxiety, the heart palpitation, rapid breath, and knotting up of our stomach? If we could take a pill that instantly removed these uncomfortable symptoms, would we go on standing on the tracks and watch, knowing that in a second or two the train would most surely crunch our bodies into a lifeless pulp of flesh and bone?

Obviously, though the warning sign of anxiety is uncomfortable, what is *really* motivating our behavior—as well as the instrumentality of anxiety—is the *knowledge* that the train is there, and closing and we are here, in its path and unmoving. In like fashion, the girl with the fainting spells has an unacceptable weight of knowledge bearing down on her. She knows what this is unconsciously (the unconscious portion of her ego knows!). She does *not* want to be "hit" with this unacceptable wish for her mother's death bearing down on consciousness (stage II of Figure 7). Hence, the anxiety and the fainting are her means of "jumping off the track" without really knowing consciously why she is doing so. But these are merely the *symptoms* of her problem and as such do not cause her behavior to take place. What causes her behavior is a totally unacceptable picture of herself as harboring an unconscious wish she cannot accept into consciousness; there is possibly an additional concern lest she actually do something to bring about her mother's death. Behavior is caused by all these *meanings*, by the psychological circumstance of her existence, and *not* by the biological complex of her feelings.

Freud termed the final type of anxiety *moral*, tying it to the superego of the personality. Recall that in Freudian terms, the superego is formed out of fear (see p. 68).

In the father's castration threat to the son, there is a form of anxiety that serves as the initial pattern (prototype) of the conscience the boy later forms. Freud said that castration anxiety develops into moral or *social anxiety*.²⁵⁹ Hence, all of the moralistic teachings that are introjected by the child in framing the superego (the heir of the Oedipal complex!) can later serve as grounds for calling down the ego as acting sinfully.²⁶⁰ This is actually what we mean by *guilt*; as Freud put it, ". . . the sense of guilt is at bottom nothing else but a topographical variety of anxiety; in its later phases it coincides completely with *fear of the super-ego*."²⁶¹ Note here again that it is the poor ego that is always made to feel anxiety, or its derivative, guilt. The id and superego are often extreme in their demands because they do not have to suffer these biologically based feelings. There is another truism of Freudian psychology to be noted here. Quite often Freud found the cause of a neurotic symptom in the too-harsh, too-demanding superego, which serves as the handmaiden of cultural taboos and prohibitions. This takes us to the final topic of this section.

Culture as a Prime Agent of Abnormality

Freud's theory of society and the ways in which we become socialized through anxiety made him inevitably base the major cause of mental illness on the demands of civilization.²⁶² Culture advances thanks to the sublimations of sexual impulse, but people are forced by this same culture to keep their animalistic behaviors relating to hostility and lust in check.²⁶³ Freud once said that he could not form a very high opinion of the

way in which society attempts to regulate the problems of sexual life.²⁶⁴ In most instances, he felt that the individual's superego is overly severe and does not appreciate the strength of the id promptings that the ego has to bear up under; more generally, the *cultural superego* (common beliefs, norms, and values of the group) is too rigid and unrealistic, issuing commands people find impossible to obey.²⁶⁵ Thus, society, civilization, culture, and religion *all* melt into one at this point, constricting people by imposing unattainable standards on them. Freud's attitude toward the Golden Rule is interesting in this regard: "Love thy neighbour as thyself' is the strongest defence against human aggressiveness and an excellent example of the unpsychological proceedings of the cultural super-ego. The commandment is impossible to fulfill; such an enormous inflation of love can only lower its value, not get rid of the difficulty."²⁶⁶

The reason the superego can become so cruel and literally wish to destroy the ego is, that as the individual checks his or her outwardly directed hostility, the ego ideal becomes ever more *severe*. There is a continually higher standard set. Freud noted that even ordinary morality has a rather harshly restraining, cruelly prohibiting quality about it in the thou-shalt-nots of formalized religion. Hence, to the extent that we *do not* express our basic human natures (including hostility and lust), our ego ideals must be elevated and made more demanding, seeking a higher and higher standard by which to live in almost a snowballing manner.²⁶⁷ And the higher these standards the less likely we are to achieve them, which in turn means that the superego (ego ideal) has a greater sense of the disparity between where behavior ought to be and where it actually is. This disparity generates hostility for the ego because it is, after all, the executive of the personality. Freud's analysis of President

Woodrow Wilson's character, including his eventual depression and nervous breakdown, was based in large measure on such an elevated superego, with the attendant tie to the father as a representative of—and, in fact identifiable with—God, who is now carried within as ego ideal.²⁶⁸

It follows, therefore, that Freud would favor a relaxation of the strict rules of religion and other social taboos. Not that he was in any way an advocate of sexual licentiousness and unrestrained hostility. His own life was a model of mature conformity to the niceties of polite society. Psychoanalysis as a world view is anything but a philosophy of revelry and instinctual release, which in most instances would be viewed as abnormally narcissistic and regressive in tone.²⁶⁹ But Freud did argue for more insight into the nature of mental illness as a preventive measure, so that child-rearing practices might be better gauged to human nature as we honestly find it and not according to unrealistic overidealizations that foredoom the person to feelings of worthlessness and sinfulness.

Theory of Cure

The Role of Insight

If we believe that a neurotic is suffering from certain meanings buried (repressed) deep in the unconscious, then our tactic of cure should be to provide the person with an understanding of these hidden meanings (which *are* known to the unconscious, of course). Thus Freud's first theory of cure after his separation from Breuer stressed what has come to be called the *insight* of the client. As Freud then phrased it: "The principal point is that I should guess the secret and tell it to the patient straight out; and he is then as a rule obliged to abandon his rejection of it."²⁷⁰ The general steps in provid-

ing client insight include (1) determining which decision for the flight into illness was made and why; (2) assuring the patient that a different pathway in life is possible and worthwhile; and (3) stressing all the changes of a positive nature that have taken place in the patient's life since his or her act of primal repression.²⁷¹

Freud viewed insight therapy as something different from traditional medical therapies. A physical therapy that could remove symptoms of illness through the use of chemical agents (pills, drugs), he termed a *causal therapy* (meaning, of course, material and efficient causes were being used; see Introduction, pp. 4, 7).²⁷² Freud did not claim that psychoanalysis was a causal therapy. There are no chemical agents to give the patient in psychoanalysis, and so Freud said that he worked at symptom-removal from a more distant point of origin.²⁷³ Even if a chemical were someday discovered that could alter levels of libido and therefore make a truly causal therapy possible, Freud believed that psychoanalysis would have already clarified how it was that the libido became abnormally distributed (fixated, cathected, and so on) in the first place. A physical or causal therapy would *not* therefore invalidate his theory of illness.

Fundamental Rule of Psychoanalysis, and Free Association

To facilitate insight, Freud asked his clients to be as free and open in their dealings with him as was humanly possible. He was, of course, trying to relax the level of client censorship, loosening the grip of the anti-cathexes. One day, a female client criticized him for talking too much during the hour, asking questions of her, and so Freud simply sat back in his chair and let her speak. He

found that he could gain as much insight into her condition by letting her do all of the talking during the hour as he could gain through questioning her directly. The main factor of importance was that she say everything that occurred to her, no matter how irrelevant or silly it might appear to her conscious judgment. Thus, open verbal expression and complete honesty are the hallmarks of the *fundamental rule* of psychoanalysis, and the procedure followed by the client is termed *free association*.²⁷⁴

The usual free-association procedure is to have the client report what comes to mind spontaneously, no matter how irrelevant or even foolish it may appear to common sense. A female client might say “I don’t know, for some stupid reason the idea of ‘face cream’ just popped into my head. Now, I can see my jar of face cream when I close my eyes. What has that to do with my problems?” The analyst need not answer at this point, merely recording what is freely associated and waiting until the full picture begins falling into place. Gradually, the client will probably drift off into a recollection of past life events, trailing back to childhood times. If the client cannot get started during any one therapy session, the therapist may cue him or her by returning to material that has been mentioned earlier, or possibly by taking an image or an idea from a dream or fantasy (like the face cream) and asking the client to focus on this for a time to see what ideas or images occur next.

Although we refer to *free association*, the fact that Freud believed he could in time come to guess or discern his client’s repressed mental contents reflected his belief in *psychic determinism* (see discussion of determinism in Chapter 4, p. 262). Incidental ideas like “face cream” were not irrelevant

or chance affairs to Freud. As he said, “I cherished a high opinion of the strictness with which mental processes are determined, and I found it impossible to believe that an idea produced by a patient while his attention was on the stretch could be an arbitrary one and unrelated to the idea we were in search of.”²⁷⁵ Freud said that he believed in chance only in the realm of external events; in the internal world of psychical events, he was an uncompromising determinist.²⁷⁶ It is fundamental to the Freudian view that mental events press on to expression. The unconscious is said to have an “‘upward drive’ and desires nothing better than to press forward across its settled frontiers into the ego and so to consciousness” (see Figure 7).²⁷⁷

Resistance and Transference

From the first, when he was using hypnosis, Freud noted that neurotics disliked having to look into themselves.²⁷⁸ They tried in countless ways to end or at least alter the course of therapy, in hopes of retaining the status quo in their lives. According to Freud’s later theory of defense, any neurotic has two motives for beginning therapy—one to be cured and one to avoid being cured (discovered, uncovered).²⁷⁹ He called these defensive efforts during therapy *resistance*, which in its broadest phrasing refers to “*whatever interrupts the progress of analytic work*.”²⁸⁰ Literally anything the client does to disrupt or even detract from the validity of analysis is considered resistance, no matter how innocent it appears on the face of things. Asking for a change in the appointment hour is resistance. Telling the analyst a joke in which psychoanalysis is made to appear a hoax is resistance. In fact, even when the client miraculously loses his or her presenting symptoms after a brief period of analysis, this “sudden cure” is resistance.²⁸¹ There can

be a “flight into health” in order to avoid confronting (resisting) the details of the Oedipal repressions.

Freud had some interesting things to say about regression in resistance. Sometimes, in reaction to the frustration of being analyzed by the therapist, the ego of a client regresses in hopes of recreating a life period that was more pleasant than the present.²⁸² The analyst can actually see the psychosexual level at which fixation occurred being reflected in the nature of this resistance.²⁸³ For example, a man with an anal personality might begin going into extreme detail (pedantism) on each freely associated memory, stalling, through his obsessiveness, any chance the therapist has to pull things together into a coherent picture. The resultant confusion of details acts as a smokescreen. A woman with an oral personality might regress to a state of childlike dependency and “yes doctor” the therapist, letting insightful comments go over her head by agreeing to everything the analyst says without *really* letting the insights register and thereby have an impact on her personality.

Another way in which the client can resist is to change the nature of the relationship, from analyst-*analysand* (the latter is the person being analyzed) to one of father-son or father-daughter or two brothers or two lovers. Freud found that several of his female clients began relating to him in a most unprofessional and often amorous manner. They asked him questions about his personal life, they wanted to know what kinds of books he read, or what he did with his free time. If he gave in to any of these diversions by answering such questions, he found his therapeutic effectiveness declining. In one session a woman threw her arms around his neck in an erotic gesture, and as Freud later said, the “unexpected entrance of a servant relieved us from a painful discussion.”²⁸⁴ Freud did not attribute these love feelings

to his personal charm. He saw in these maneuvers the re-enactment of *earlier* paternal affections (Oedipal feelings for the father).

By projecting her lust from father to therapist, the patient achieved two results: (1) she could re-enact her past dynamic, thereby repeating attitudes and emotional displays from her fixation point (repetition compulsion),²⁸⁵ and (2) she could establish the possibility that therapy would have to be ended like a broken love affair, because how can the analyst—a married man, with many other patients to treat daily—return such love? ²⁸⁶ Freud called this emotional involvement with the therapist *transference*, by which he meant “. . . transference of feelings on to the person of the doctor, since we do not believe that the situation in the treatment could justify the development of such feelings.”²⁸⁷ The female patient was *acting out* her repressed images and ideas, now coming to consciousness and diverted into sexual feelings for the therapist by way of a *father-*imago**. An *imago* is someone we have known in the past (see p. 80), whose image we can press onto other people, turning someone in the present (therapist) into someone in the past (father). Considered in light of libido theory, transference always involves cathecting the therapist with mental energy (libido, but also Death-Instinct energies) that has been withdrawn from the imago and put onto the therapist as stand-in. The emotional feelings for the imago *then* follow as the client re-enacts the earlier dynamic (that is, libido is *not* feeling, but feelings are generated in the repeated dynamic just as Anna O. relived emotionally what was pathognomic in her memory under hypnosis).

Thus, through use of the imago the patient can “replace some earlier person by the person of the physician.”²⁸⁸ Re-enactments of

this sort, in which present-day people are substituted for early people, go on all of the time in the neurotic's life as a result of the repetition compulsion.²⁸⁹ A man or woman working as a machinist turns the supervisor into a father-or-mother-*imago* and begins to act very strangely toward this person. As we have already indicated in citing the variety of relationships that can be attempted, the *imagos* being projected onto the therapist by the client need not be *only* those of the parents. Brother, sister, and literally any figure of importance out of the client's past can serve as an *imago*-projection.²⁹⁰ The therapist often finds himself or herself a composite of *many* people (including both sexes!) over the course of psychoanalysis with a single client.

The feelings transferred onto the therapist are not always *positive* in tone, of course. In fact, Freud said that it was virtually impossible for a patient to remain in psychoanalysis and continue in a positive state of transference throughout.²⁹¹ This is due to the fact that the feelings (evaluations) generated by the dynamic interaction with *imagos* are never one way, but are always *ambivalent* (from *ambi*, meaning "both," hence both positive and negative evaluations); inevitably the therapist sees both sides to the feelings being expressed concerning an *imago*-figure. In addition to this unrealistic factor, there is the course of therapy itself to consider. As the client reveals more of his or her unconscious conflicts in the ongoing analysis, there is sure to be a sense of threat generated by this *uncovering process*. This threat invariably brings on resistance, which shows up as what Freud called *negative transference*.

Precisely when the negative transference will emerge is hard to say. Freud believed he

could sense it beginning when a client's free associations began to fail (called *blocks*), or there were no dreams to report; any prolonged period of silence in the therapy hour suggested the possibility of negative transference.²⁹² The analyst begins at this point to *interpret* the nature of these positive or negative transferences. To interpret is to "find hidden sense in something,"²⁹³ and in providing insight through analysis of the transference, the therapist is trying to *overcome the client's resistance*. This move on the therapist's part is all the more threatening, and hence it is not unusual for the client to go through some very difficult therapy sessions at this point in the series, suffering high levels of neurotic anxiety at the challenge of having to face up to the return of the repressed. The therapist is present to assist the client, but this does not make it much easier and the person of the therapist often becomes a scapegoat for irritation and hostility.

It is therefore no surprise that, as time went by, Freud began to think of overcoming resistance as the most difficult and yet crucial aspect of psychotherapy. He once defined psychoanalytic treatment as "a *re-education in overcoming internal resistances*."²⁹⁴ Clients can become quite hostile and abusive during this period of analysis. Freud summed up the hard work of analyzing resistance (negative transference) as follows:

*Resistance, which finally brings work to a halt, is nothing other than the child's past character, his degenerate character. . . . I dig it out by my work, it struggles; and what was to begin with such an excellent, honest fellow, becomes low, untruthful or defiant, and a malingerer—till I tell him so and thus make it possible to overcome this character.*²⁹⁵

Although it need not always proceed in step fashion—sometimes both sides of the

ambivalence emerge in the early sessions—the usual course of transference is from a positive to a negative *stage*. Freud believed that successful therapy calls for a complete resolution of the transference phenomenon. The full implications of the transference onto the therapist must be made clear to the patient, who through insight gains an understanding of his or her dynamics. As Freud put it, “At the end of an analytic treatment the transference must itself be cleared away; and if success is then obtained or continues, it rests, not on suggestion, but on the achievement by its means of an overcoming of internal resistances, on the internal change that has been brought about in the patient.”²⁹⁶ Many ex-patients who leave their therapists during the stage of negative transference are highly critical of the procedure and give psychoanalysis an undeservedly bad name.²⁹⁷ Even so, Freud did not favor avoiding such—what he took to be—necessities of the therapeutic procedure; he did not think it advisable to use the transference-love to manipulate clients and thereby allow the hostile repressions to escape examination.²⁹⁸

The therapist must also be careful about forming a *countertransference*, which involves the unconscious motives that the therapist might have acted out in relations with the client.²⁹⁹ If the therapist has not developed adequate insight into his or her own personality dynamics, then very possibly there will be a reversal of the usual procedure, in which the therapist uses the client as a “blank screen” on which to project imagoes. This is why Freud believed that a psychoanalyst should first be analyzed before personally undertaking the role of therapist.³⁰⁰ Indeed, as we shall see below, he even favored a kind of continuing, periodic psychoanalysis for therapists (as patients!) to keep them growing and in command of their mental and emotional faculties. A therapist who actually engages in sexual relations with a client

would not only be doing something that is professionally unethical, he or she would literally be bringing the client into what are *personal* neurotic dynamics. Therapy ends when there is such a turn of events, and indeed, clients can be made worse.

Final Theory of Cure

Thus far we have been considering the general terminology that evolved in Freud's thinking about the nature of cure. His final formulation brought in libido as well (which we mentioned only in passing above) as fundamental to transference. The final theory of cure may be summarized in six points.

1. The neurotic is a person with significant primal repressions (Figure 6), including those surrounding the unresolved Oedipal complex. Due to the repetition compulsion, the neurotic seeks in interpersonal relations to re-enact these Oedipal themes, trying to find that sense of love that he or she never adequately repressed, substituted, or sublimated. Freud termed this seeking of love in relations with others a *libidinal anticipatory idea* (that is, looking forward in anticipation of recapturing the Oedipal cathexes by projecting the imago onto others).³⁰¹ This libidinal idea, which encompasses the *fuero-demand* (see p. 62), is in operation unconsciously and it might be something like “Won't you give me your love and sexual commitment?” or “Maybe now I can smooth things over and experience that love that was denied me earlier.” These libidinal anticipatory ideas influence the neurotic's behavior in his or her everyday routine, bringing about those transferences onto others whom the person must deal with daily (see p. 95). It is this re-enactment with others that eventually drives the neurotic

into therapy, because all sorts of interpersonal problems arise as the acting-out process distorts normal social relations.³⁰²

2. In therapy this same acting-out process occurs in the transference of feelings onto the therapist. There are three aspects to transference, two of which are positive and one negative. First, a neurotic transfers affectionate, friendly feelings for the therapist *as a person*—a helper with the power and authority to cure a sickness or solve a problem. Second, there are the positive transferences of an erotic, sexually lustful nature that are actually aimed at the imago. Third, there are the negative transferences of a hostile, death-wishing variety that are also aimed at the imago rather than the person of the therapist. Freud candidly admitted that it is on the basis of the first factor in transference that the relationship between patient and doctor is built and out of which the therapist gains a certain power of suggestion to influence the neurotic to change. But it is the neurotic who must do the hard work of facing up to the repressed contents if therapy is to work. As Freud put it:

*We readily admit that the results of psychoanalysis rest upon suggestion; by suggestion, however, we must understand . . . the influencing of a person by means of the transference phenomena which are possible in his case. We take care of the patient's final independence by employing suggestion in order to get him to accomplish a piece of psychical work which has as its necessary result a permanent improvement in his psychical situation.*³⁰³

3. Neuroses stem from a personal dynamic, and it is only the neurotic who can directly confront his or her own unconscious and

try to end the lack of communication between the private realms of mind. Freud measured his success as a psychoanalyst according to the extent that he could remove amnesias dating from roughly the second to the fifth year of the client's life when the Oedipal complex was active.³⁰⁴ Because it brings out the dynamics of such Oedipal fixations, Freud called transference the "*true vehicle of therapeutic influence.*"³⁰⁵ We must also keep in mind that transference has its resistance components to hinder therapy, and that such duality is common to neurotics who are generally ambivalent in behavior.³⁰⁶ Recall that every neurotic symptom means *at least* two things (repressed wish plus repressing wish!).

4. As the neurotic client moves through psychoanalysis, he or she develops an *artificial* or *transformed neurosis* within the four walls of the consulting room.³⁰⁷ This is a miniature replica of the neurotic dynamics then being acted out in everyday life. It is prompted by the repetition-compulsion nature of the instincts, so that the neurotic cannot help but reflect the Oedipal dynamics in the therapeutic relationship. Freud occasionally referred to this miniature re-enactment as the *transference illness*,³⁰⁸ a usage that has led to some confusion, because the artificial or transformed neurosis has since been called the *transference neurosis* by some of his followers. Actually, the latter phrase is better reserved for a distinction that Freud made between those mentally disturbed individuals who can profit from therapy and those who cannot.
5. Put in mental-energy terms, when we speak of positive or negative feelings being transferred to the therapist via imagos, we are *also* saying that libidinal or hostile cathexes are taking place (Eros and/or the Death Instinct is active). This is another way of speaking about the li-

bidinal anticipatory idea. Recall that feelings are generated bodily, but the imago and fuero dynamics occur *exclusively* in the mental sphere. Shifting our emphasis to the energetic type of Freudian explanation, we might say that psychoanalysis as a therapeutic method requires that the client be able *in fact* to cathect objects. If an individual cannot cathect objects, he or she will be unable to develop a transformed neurosis within the transference relationship; how then can we hope to provide such a client with insight? We cannot, really. We need the dynamic play staged by the acting-out in order to interpret for the client what is going on in his or her life.

Based on this capacity for cathexis to occur or not, Freud distinguished between those people who can profit from psychoanalysis and those who cannot. People, he said, suffer from two basic kinds of neuroses: (1) the *transference neuroses*, which include anxiety neurosis, hysteria, and obsessive-compulsive disorders; and (2) the *narcissistic neuroses*, which include the schizophrenias and the more serious affective disorders like manic-depression. Today we consider the latter disorders to be psychoses (insanity). The point Freud was making, however, is that any mental disorder taking on a narcissistic feature means that the individual has removed all libidinal cathexes from the external world and affixed them onto his or her own personality structure (taking self as object).

The woman who has regressed to the severe psychotic state of hebephrenia (a form of schizophrenia)—doing nothing all day but making faces and giggling a lot, sucking her thumb, and soiling herself without concern—is no longer in libidinal contact with the outer world. She has built her dream world in her narcissistic neurosis (psychosis) and now lives completely

within it as a baby, and no psychoanalyst can hope to break into her delusions as a significant part of her daily life.³⁰⁹ The man who goes through life with all kinds of physical symptoms, expecting to be worried over and cared for by others, *does* experience libidinal anticipatory ideas, meaning he *does* cathect others in his transference neurosis, and therefore he *would* be a proper candidate for psychoanalysis. We could as therapists expect him to re-enact his dynamics in the transformed neurosis of the therapy hour. Using this fascinating replay of the Oedipal situation, said Freud, “we oblige him to transform his repetition into a memory” which is *insight*.³¹⁰

6. In more precise libido terms, the patient in psychoanalysis comes gradually to remove libido from object cathexes in the environment and from the symptoms manifested in the body and to redirect this free libido onto the relationship with the therapist. This is why the therapist becomes so important to the client; he or she is now an object in which very much libido is invested. The therapist’s tactic is to make this additional libido available to the conscious aspects of the client’s ego and thereby to further a strengthening of the ego, thanks to its added quota of energy. How is this accomplished? By having the therapist support and encourage the client’s ego to study its total personality. As the conscious portion of ego confronts the return of the repressed and finds it possible to live with what this all means, an increasing amount of the libido initially invested in the therapist returns to the control of the ego and strengthens it.

The therapist must watch out lest this reinvestment in the conscious ego becomes

narcissistic. It may begin this way, but in time a client should begin extending his or her growing feeling of competence to interpersonal relations with others, building a realm of cathected objects including aim-inhibited contacts of a friendly nature. It is also important to prevent a client from forming additional repressions. When this happens the ego has to use libido to form anticathexes, and this simply wastes energies which could be better used in adapting to the external world. Gradually, the “ego is enlarged at the cost of this unconscious.”³¹¹ The man who had before shrunk from people and regressed to states of physical self-concern now begins to meet others, to entertain and be entertained by them. He finds a woman companion and begins to mature into love relationships which until this time had been impossible due to the unproductive use of libido in the past. Assuming that this man also has a good idea of the role of transference in his change of behavior, we would consider his case to have reached a successful therapeutic outcome.

Extent and Permanence of Cure

Experience with clients was in time to suggest that psychoanalysis was not a cure-all. In a paper entitled “Analysis Terminable and Interminable,” written in 1937 a few years before his death, Freud made some rather limited claims for the effectiveness of psychoanalysis. He had found that only those instinctual conflicts that were *literally* being acted out in the transformed neurosis could be helped through providing insight of the dynamics involved.³¹² If some *other* problem exists in the psyche but does not come alive in the therapy hour, then simply talking

about it in post hoc (after-the-fact) fashion will not result in a cure. Assume that a young man has authority problems in everyday life, projecting a father imago onto others. In therapy he acts out this problem with the therapist in the transformed neurosis. He at some point is literally alive with the hostility feelings he once had in relations with his father, projected now onto the therapist. The therapist waits for the right moment, and when these feelings are clearly active, makes an interpretation to the young man. The resultant insight works, even though there may still be a degree of resistance to work through. But now, a related problem in this case might be this young man’s inability to compete with other men. The therapist might include this fear of competition in the broader interpretation of the young man’s personality conflicts. But since the young man has not brought this conflict into the transformed neurosis—for example, by awkwardly trying to compete with the therapist in the use of language, only to abruptly switch and ridicule all those who use “big words”—no interpretation made by the therapist based on past life competitions with other men will work. In order to *really understand* this personality dynamic, the young man has to be feeling in a competitive mood “right now,” when the therapist makes the interpretation.

This phenomenon has come to be known as the difference between intellectual and emotional understanding in psychotherapy. It shows up in all insight approaches, where the experienced therapist soon learns that intellectual insight is not enough. There has to be fundamental feeling involved in the client’s understanding at the time insight is provided, or it will just not take hold. The fascinating thing about this is that it takes us back to the abreactive-cathartic method first used by Breuer and Freud (see p. 43). If we think of hypnotic time regression as

going back to the pathognomic situation and being recalled at that point and now acted out (abreacted), then the emotional release (catharsis) signifies that a legitimate recollection is being made. This is not simply an intellectual memory. The emotional display could not be faked. This memory is the real thing! Anna O. could never have intellectually dreamed up the emotion-laden circumstance Breuer observed her reliving. In his closing years Freud claimed that in order for his therapy to work, there had to be a similar, genuine reliving of a past emotion in combination with an intellectual understanding (insight) putting this feeling into perspective. We are back where psychoanalysis started!

Freud believed a patient can never bring *all* of his or her past conflicts into the transference relationship as a transformed neurosis.³¹³ Nor can the therapist artificially stimulate them by using theatrical tricks, such as acting like a parent in order to bring out the client's death wishes for this parent.³¹⁴ Here again, fakery is less than useless to the curative process. The backbone of psychoanalysis remains truthfulness and genuineness. All the therapist can hope for is to end a psychoanalysis on the best terms possible. As Freud put it:

*Our aim will not be to rub off every peculiarity of human character for the sake of a schematic "normality," nor yet to demand that the person who has been "thoroughly analysed" shall feel no passions and develop no internal conflicts. The business of the analysis is to secure the best possible psychological conditions for the functions of the ego; with that it has discharged its task.*³¹⁵

Because of this likelihood that certain conflicts have not been experienced emotionally in the transformed neurosis, Freud advocated periodic reanalyses for even practicing psy-

choanalysts. He felt that a practitioner should go back into analysis every five years or so, as a kind of continuing prophylactic against the menace of countertransference.³¹⁶ This is why psychoanalyses never seem to end. They *do* end for one problem, but then begin again (in a sense) to consider another problem.

Social Revision

Freud was a "proper" man, and in no sense a revolutionary. His hope for the future emphasized not sexual license, but a life based on the insights of science and the *rule of reason*.³¹⁷ We are not to give ourselves over to base emotions at every turn. In the final analysis, Freud's therapy is more *preventive* than anything else. If humankind is instructed by the insights of psychoanalysis—as a "student body" or a "patient" en masse—then just possibly it will no longer need to bring on those harmful repressions that it now bears up under. Oedipal conflicts need not be so severe, superegos need not be so rigid, human understanding and mutual acceptance based on something more honest and true than even brotherly love can be brought about in human relations. A gradual revision in the social structure is clearly implied in Freud's writings.³¹⁸ Sometimes, in removing repressions during analysis, a patient's life situation is actually made worse. The resulting frustration at having to give up a symptom picture that provided a secondary gain may lead to the patient acting out against the society. Even so, said Freud:

The unhappiness that our work of enlightenment may cause will after all only affect some individuals. The change-over to a

*more realistic and creditable attitude on the part of society will not be bought too dearly by these sacrifices. But above all, all the energies which are to-day consumed in the production of neurotic symptoms serving the purposes of a world of phantasy isolated from reality, will, even if they cannot at once be put to uses in life, help to strengthen the clamour for the changes in our civilization through which alone we can look for the well-being of future generations.*³¹⁹

This is the ultimate therapeutic message of Freudian psychoanalysis. Freud is not a doctor “in the proper sense”³²⁰ of being a physician for the individual. He is the doctor of the body politic, and his cures through insight transcend the individual or even an individual generation of human beings.

Therapeutic Techniques

The relationship between therapist and client is commonly referred to as a *method* of therapy. Though we have occasionally employed this usage earlier in the chapter, at this point we will keep more strictly within our definition of *method* (see Introduction) as the vehicle for the exercise of evidence, and refrain from using *method* in the present section, which deals with therapeutic techniques. The evidential usage would be appropriate for Freud, because he believed that psychoanalysis is a scientific investigation in addition to a curative process. But not all of the therapists who practice psychoanalysis today agree, and many therapy orientations never propose to do the work of science within the four walls of the consulting room. We will refer to factors like the nature of the relationship and the various devices used to further

therapy as *techniques*, recognizing that this does not imply any commitment by the therapist to use of a manipulative approach in dealings with clients. Just as many styles of behavior are subsumed by the term *personality*, so too we can refer to various styles of relating to clients as *techniques*.

Evolution of the Relationship

Freud began his career like most neurologists of his day, using various physical remedies for the treatment of mental illness, including sedatives, rest, massage, hydrotherapy (for example, baths or stimulating showers), diet control, and change of routine. Freud’s clients were predominantly of the upper socioeconomic classes,³²¹ and therefore he could send them off for a period of rest at a local resort spa. Of course, in extremely disturbed (psychotic) cases, he hospitalized the patient. Freud gradually defined a new doctor-patient relationship as he evolved the psychoanalytical technique.³²²

As we recall, Freud began his search for the pathognomic (repressed) memory through the technique of *hypnotic* age or time regression. The patient was asked to relax in a reclining or semireclining position on a sofa, and hypnosis was induced through the usual suggestions of drowsiness, falling off to sleep, and so forth. As he used this technique with more clients, Freud found that not all of them could be put under a sufficiently deep hypnotic state to bring about time regression. In fact, several could not be hypnotized at all. Freud recalled that Bernheim (one of the French doctors he had studied with) could get subjects to remember what had gone on during a previous hypnotic trance by taking their heads in his hands and essentially ordering them (strong suggestion) to do so. When one day a difficult patient was not responding to the hypnosis instructions, Freud took her head in his hands,

asked her to concentrate, and while applying a slight pressure he confidently asserted that she *would* recall when her symptoms had begun. Sure enough, the patient remembered the pathognomic situation and obtained a certain cathartic release in reliving it.³²³

Freud called this the *pressure technique*, and he used it successfully for several years, feeling that it had definite advantages over hypnosis because the client was conscious of the thought processes as he or she made the mental search. The therapist did not have to retrace these steps later after the client came out of hypnosis, when the added problem now arose of trying to remember what went on in the hypnotic trance. Freud had surpassed Bernheim! Even so, the focus of psychoanalysis was still on symptom removal during this period of its development. It was only a matter of time until Freud noted a strange and annoying tendency in the client's efforts to recall the past while not under hypnosis. He found them recalling all manner of trivia, apparently unrelated scraps of information that had no bearing on their neurotic symptoms. He did not dismiss these apparent irrelevancies; instead, drawing on a theory of psychic determinism (see Chapter 4, p. 264), he considered them to be *screen memories* or *screen associations*.³²⁴ These supposedly random memories were covering up a more deep-seated complex of memories clustering around the pathognomic situation. Freud began to question his clients about these screen memories, taking them even further back in time, until he hit upon the technique of free association. For a time, Freud used both the pressure technique and free association in combination, but by 1905 he had stopped touching the client entirely (a dangerous procedure, considering the matter of transferences). Thus today free association has emerged as the exclusive technique of the classic psychoanalyst (see p. 94 for a discussion of this technique).

View of Therapeutic Change

Freud was aware of the historic relationship psychoanalysis had with hypnosis, and by way of this tie, the possible criticism that he had cured people exclusively through suggestion. He defined *suggestion* as uncritically accepting an idea implanted in one's mind by another,³²⁵ but he did *not* accept that this is what went on during psychoanalysis. He felt that the id promptings which lay at the root of a neurosis could not be so easily influenced, thanks to the counterweight influence of the superego and the compromise effected by the ego. The id, after all, is illogical and refuses to evaluate any of its anticipatory ideas realistically. The therapist can use a little suggestion because the client likes him or her as a person (see p. 98), but this kind of suggestion is directed to the ego and it might not help at all with the id! Freud loved to point out that anyone who works with clients in therapy soon learns that they do not swallow whole every idea the therapist offers them.³²⁶

He also critically observed that those who use the concept of suggestion never say what it *is*. According to Freud, suggestion is based on sexual forces in operation between two people. Its power in therapy results from the childlike dependency—the re-enactment of an infantile relationship—on the person of the therapist as a stand-in for others. To understand the nature of suggestion we must first understand the nature of transference. Thus Freud's goal in therapy was to provide a certain type of relationship and thereby to learn something of the client's past history. He was not out to prove some obscure theoretical point in each case, and he observed, ". . . the most successful cases are those in which one proceeds, as it were, without any

purpose in view, allows oneself to be taken by surprise by any turn in them, and always meets them with an open mind, free from any presuppositions.”³²⁷ Freud said that he refused emphatically to make a patient into his private property, to force his own ideals on the patient “and with the pride of a Creator to form him in our own image.”³²⁸

The point is: *a neurotic is not a free person*. He or she is locked into the past like a character in a play. The past forces the neurotic person to re-enact the unresolved Oedipal complex again and again. Thus, says Freud, “analysis sets the neurotic free from the chains of his sexuality.”³²⁹

Client Prognosis and Trial Analyses

Freud once suggested (half jokingly) that the ideal client for psychoanalysis is a person suffering considerably from an inner conflict that he or she cannot solve alone. This person would therefore come to analysis literally begging for help.³³⁰ Anything short of this ideal circumstance—which is probably never realized, we might add—detracts from the *prognosis* (likelihood of cure) in a given case. If a man is forced into analysis by relatives, this is *not* a good prognostic sign. If a woman is using psychoanalysis as a way of getting back at her husband through making him pay for large doctor bills, this is *not* a good prognostic sign. As we know from our discussion of the narcissistic neurosis (see p. 99), psychotic individuals are not good bets for psychoanalysis nor are the mentally retarded, the brain damaged, or the senile members of our society.

Children present a special difficulty, and in truth Freud was not much attracted to the role of child therapist. His famous case of Little Hans (Volume X) was based on the work of an intermediary therapist—the boy’s

father—who saw Freud privately and then carried the sexual interpretations to his five-year-old son in a most open and straightforward manner. In general, Freud thought it was best for the parent and child to enter into therapy together. Children externalize their problems in their current parental relations and therefore it is not too helpful to search about in their internal psychic lives for solutions. The best bet is simply to try to improve the parent-child relationship in the ongoing present.³³¹

When a therapist takes a patient, usually he or she is “buying a pig in a poke.”³³² Freud favored a trial period of diagnostic assessment of from a few weeks to a few (or even several) months during which the therapist can make the decisions so important to prognosis, such as whether a relationship can be formed, whether we have here a narcissistic or a transference neurosis, and so on. This trial period is quite flexible, and when it is extended, the reputation of psychoanalysis suffers because these rejected clients are considered failures by critics who do not understand or accept the principle of a trial analysis. Freud admitted that psychoanalysis takes a long time, in some cases many years, but he could see no other way of curing neurosis short of the superficial, suggestive cures that relied on manipulation and the authority of positive transference to suppress a symptom.³³³

Interpretative Techniques in Dreams and Parapraxes

Freud once said that he based the entire science of psychoanalysis on the *foundation stone of dream interpretation*.³³⁴ As totally mental phenomena, dreams express a meaning, they say something, and though we think we do not know what their content is getting at, in the unconscious regions of mind *we know full well*.³³⁵ While asleep, all of those

anticipatory libidinal ideas that we cannot consciously express because of their repression by the ego and superego—which combined might be thought of as the censoring agency of mind—are given expression. Of course, in order to get around the censorship, these ideas must be distorted in various ways so that their content is expressed through symbols which must be deciphered. Dreams have a *manifest* (apparent, evident) content or story line which often appears foreign and even odd to us because we do not understand the meaning. For example, we may dream that we are walking upside down on the ceiling and that our hair is falling out, but it drops upward to the ceiling instead of to the floor. Each of these dream concepts would be taken as a potential content for hidden meaning. Freud's technique involved translating this manifest content into what he called the *latent* (hidden, potential) content, which gets at the real meaning of the dream.³³⁶ If we free-associate to our dream contents (ceiling, hair, upside down, and so on), what translations might occur to us or the therapist as several related meanings are associated? A stable translation, one that invariably means the same thing no matter who dreams it, Freud termed a *symbol*.³³⁷ Thus, in general, elongated objects are taken to be masculine (penis symbols) and enclosed objects are likely to be more feminine (vaginal or uterine symbols). Humankind's use of symbols traces back to its most primitive thought forms, and they can be seen in the various myths and religions of antiquity.³³⁸

A dream is put together by the unconscious mind from *day residues*, which are the little bits and pieces of experience during the sleep day (day before night of dream) on which we have probably not fixed our conscious attention.³³⁹ The dream is prompted by a wish fulfillment, of course, but we must keep in mind that this can be a lustful wish of the id, or it can be the self-punishing wish

of the superego. We must not make the error of assuming that by claiming every dream is a wish fulfillment Freud necessarily referred to a pleasurable outcome.³⁴⁰ Freud relented on the idea that all dreams have to have a sexual content, but his wish fulfillment construct was retained to the end. This wish-fulfilling aspect of dreaming is achieved by way of what he called *dream work*, and its fundamental way of expression is through imagery. We do not dream in ideas (words, sentences), but in images, so that dreaming is like thinking in pictures. Freud once put it well when he observed that "a dream is a picture-puzzle."³⁴¹ Dreaming also bears a psychological tie to the process of hallucination in psychosis.³⁴² Recall that Freud spoke of a regression of excitation to the stimulus-end in Figure 3 (see p. 45). This process is fundamental to both dreaming and hallucinating. In fact, Freud was to say that "a dream . . . is a psychosis, with all the absurdities, delusions, and illusions of a psychosis."³⁴³

Since dreaming follows primary-process thought, Freud suggested that the rules of conventional logic are suspended when we dream. Thus, we can *condense* many concerns or even different people in our lives into a single dream image and often *displace* the resultant combination onto a seemingly unrelated activity.³⁴⁴ For example, a young man, with doubts about his ability to succeed independently in life because he has been kept immature by a dominant but loving father who makes all the family's decisions, drives past an amusement park one afternoon. Snatching scenes from the park as day residue, the young man dreams that night that he is riding round and round on a carousel; instead of the usual horse, however, he is sitting on a bull which—free association later establishes—has the heavy torso of his father.

Though it is an amusement ride, the young man recalls clearly that he is *not* having a good time on the carousel. The dream is about important life issues and the feeling of domination by a parent (latent content), but the young man recalls only that he had a rather strange time at an amusement park (manifest content).

A more general case of this human ability to combine several factors into one dream content is *overdetermination*. Freud believed that many dream images are more pregnant with meaning than is minimally necessary to make them occur in the first place.³⁴⁵ Many more wishes squeeze into the same dream image than are required to express this content in the dream. Hence, it follows that no *single* interpretation of the manifest content can capture all of the latent content that is actually being expressed.³⁴⁶

Dreams are actually the *guardians* of sleep, because if we could not express our unconscious mental concerns in some form, we would probably toss and turn all night long. If these concerns occasionally disturb our rest, we must appreciate that they are merely carrying out a noisy duty for a good end, “just as the night-watchman often cannot help making a little noise while he chases away the disturbers of the peace who seek to waken us with their noise.”³⁴⁷ Since dreams always deal with our more important mental concerns, the interpretation of dreams provides the analyst with a “*royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind.*”³⁴⁸ Freud gave the following rules of thumb for analyzing a dream:

1. Do not take the manifest content of a dream literally, because it never reflects the unconscious meaning intended.

2. Present various portions of the dream contents to the client as a prompt for free association, and do not worry about how far this line of investigation takes you from the original dream story.
3. Never lead or suggest things about the dream to the client; wait until several dreams and/or free associations to dream contents suggest the direction to be taken in making interpretations.³⁴⁹

Freud made many practical hints for dream interpretation over the years. The following are examples. Dreams produce logical connections by simultaneity in time, so that things happening together are probably seen by the dreamer as somehow related. When a cause-effect relationship is suggested, then the dream content is changed or distorted, as by a sudden shift in scene or the distortion of a face from one person into another's. If we dream that our parent's face changes into our spouse's, then it is likely that we see an influence stemming from the former to the latter. We cannot express *either/or* in a dream, but instead link such alternatives with an *and* so that opposites can be combined into single images or actions. Any time there is a condensation of dream figures, we must always suspect that the dreamer sees a similarity, identity, or possession of common attributes between the figures (father and bulls are *both* strong, if also a bit too demanding). A popular device used by the dreamer is *reversal*, or the turning into its opposite of some latent wish or image in the manifest content. For example, the business man or woman recalls dreaming that a competitor scored a major financial gain and wonders why he or she should be dreaming such an unhappy theme. All of these devices Freud referred to as the *means of representation* in dreams.³⁵⁰

In addition to the content of free associations and dreams, Freud found that he could

gain insights into the motives of others through what he called *parapraxes*, or errors in behavior, “misactions” in which the person does something he or she is not intending to do. When a man intends to say to his wife “please sit down” and says instead “please fall down,” he is actually substituting the opposite of his intention—in this case, hostility for affection.³⁵¹ Here again, the censoring agency is circumvented for a fleeting moment when our attention is caught off guard. The new bride writes a letter to her mother-in-law, beginning with “dead mother” instead of “dear mother,” and the cat is out of the bag. Whether in spoken or written word, these are the notorious *Freudian slips* which tell us something of our unconscious wishes. The reason they are often humorous to uninvolved people observing us is that they know intuitively what our true feelings are.³⁵²

Some Procedural Details

Although such techniques have been altered considerably today by psychoanalysts, Freud had a patient lie on a sofa while he sat behind the head of the patient, out of direct sight.³⁵³ This position reflected the influence of his earlier hypnotic and pressure techniques, but Freud believed, too, that it was wise to eliminate feedback to the client from his facial expressions. Also, he frankly admitted that he could not stand being stared at by other people for eight hours or more per day. He felt it advisable to tell the patient that therapy would take a long time—a year or more at the very least. His clients assumed a heavy burden in time commitment, for he met them several times a week—anywhere from two or three to five or six sessions weekly. As therapy wore on, the number of sessions might be reduced, depending on how well the client was progressing. Another important burden to the client was financial. Freud stressed that analysts must treat money

matters as frankly as they treat sensitive personal topics. Money can be a tool of resistance for the client, who can use this excuse to terminate the contacts—particularly because the practice followed by Freud (and since by his followers) was to charge for *every* scheduled session, including those that a client missed (except under highly unusual circumstances). The only recourse, Freud thought, is simply to state things clearly to the client at the outset and then to carry on without any further embarrassment. As Freud summed it up, in any case, “nothing in life is so expensive as illness—and stupidity.”³⁵⁴

Freud saw his patients for the classic fifty-minute hour. He was not much attracted to taking notes during the hour, preferring to do this sort of record keeping between patient appointments and at the close of the day. In the very earliest—including the first—sessions, Freud would simply turn the lead in the conversation over to the client and say, “Before I can say anything to you I must know a great deal about you; please tell me what you know about yourself.”³⁵⁵ Many of these early sessions undoubtedly were spent in going over details of the illness that had prompted the client to seek assistance. Gradually, they would turn their attention to dreams and other materials emerging in the free associations. Freud would begin instructing the client in the basics of psychoanalysis, even as early as the fifth or sixth session,³⁵⁶ but he was decidedly opposed to the patient’s independent reading and studying of psychoanalysis from books.³⁵⁷

Freud advised his patients not to make important decisions during the course of treatment—such as choosing a profession or selecting a marital partner.³⁵⁸ His reason was to limit the patient’s chances of making important errors in life decisions through the

acting-out of unconscious impulses during the transformed neurosis. This suggestion may appear inconsistent with Freud's desire to avoid living the patient's life, but he viewed this request to *delay* important decisions as something quite different from the making of decisions *for* the client. In the lesser of life's decisions, he definitely favored a hands-off policy for the therapist.

When he first began treating clients, Freud went quickly into an interpretation of their personality dynamics, but later in his career he cautioned against rushing the client. He favored having the therapist wait on an interpretation until the client is "one step short" of making it himself or herself.³⁵⁹ Freud also dabbled in setting time limits to a therapy series—particularly since one of his students (Rank; see p. 574) made this a major technique variation. He admitted that at times if a client is told that there will be only so many more sessions, this can act as a prompt to get around the client's resistance. But Freud felt that one has to use this time-setting technique sparingly, and his reference to it as a "blackmailing device" obviously suggests that Freud did not think highly of it in any case.³⁶⁰ Freud said analysis ends when the analyst and patient mutually decide to stop seeing one another. From the therapist's point of view, two general conditions have to be met before an ending to therapy is called for:

. . . first, that the patient shall no longer be suffering from his symptoms and shall have overcome his anxieties and his inhibitions; and secondly, that the analyst shall judge that so much repressed material had been made conscious, so much that was unintelligible has been explained, and so much internal resistance conquered, that there is no need to

*fear a repetition of the pathological processes concerned.*³⁶¹

Summary

Freud came on the historical scene at the height of traditional natural-science explanation. He was encouraged by his teachers and colleagues to explain behavior monistically, according to the principle of constancy. Realizing that he could not capture the behavior of his clients without a dualism, Freud bravely argued for both a psychic and a somatic realm of behavior, linking the two through his concept of the instinct. Instincts have an aim, pressure, source, and object which must be satisfied if homeostasis is to be attained, and it is through the vicissitudes of the instincts that the person experiences pleasure. That is, when the instincts rise in pressure they have to be eased, and in this return to normalcy a feeling of pleasure arises. However, the vicissitudes (rising and falling) of the instincts is not simply automatic, for people can intentionally bring on increased pressure of an instinct, as when they wish for sexual excitement or think about favorite foods. The psyche has an innate capacity to frame experiences that in turn influence the instinctive drives to change their level and even the way in which they will be enacted overtly. Much of this framing of experience goes on at an unconscious level. Indeed, conscious thought arises from unconsciousness in the course of development and is never more than a small portion of the total mind (psyche).

Certain unconscious thoughts which frame wishes for external objects cannot be enacted overtly because of their hostile and/or sexual nature. Parents and other family members are the first objects of these culturally unacceptable wishes. Indeed, Freud believed that

in the Oedipal conflict the person re-enacts the patricidal beginnings of the social order, moving from the primal horde to the rules of monogamy currently practiced by civilized peoples. When a wish cannot be enacted, it is counteracted by another wish, leading to what Freud called repression—and thereby, any of a number of defense mechanisms can be brought to bear in order to fulfill the intentions of the wish. When he began attributing such intentional, self-directing behavior to human beings, Freud ran into trouble with colleagues like Breuer and Fliess, who preferred to remain with the biological reductive explanations of natural science. Thus, whereas Freud traced the strangulations of affect to be seen in hysteria to defensiveness, Breuer claimed it was due to an inherited physical condition which he called the hypnoid state.

Freud was not completely insensitive to the criticisms of his telic, anthropomorphic style of explanation, so he began to analogize to physical energies by introducing a conception of psychic energies which supposedly propelled the mind along on the order of physical energy. He always admitted that psychoanalysis did not provide the evidence for this energy conception, but that biology seemed to demand it, and he was, after all, a physician. The chief energy he used in his explanations and the only one he ever named was libido, the energy of the sexual instinct. As his theory developed, Freud always found it possible to explain things in either a strictly psychological manner *or* in an energetic manner. Thus, his topographical model of the psyche, which enlarged on his initial depth model, effectively broke down the personality into three somewhat distinct identity points—that is, the id, ego, and superego. The id was viewed as the basic animalistic, selfish, completely amoral side of the personality. We all enter life as id creatures in a state of primary narcissism, which gradually gives way to a less selfish, more realistic approach to life—

one in which we consider the feelings and attitudes of others with whom we identify. Much of this identification is out of fear, as in the boy's castration anxiety prompting identification with the father during the Oedipal conflict.

As a result of such identifications, the person begins to put down what Freud called the ego, and its closely related aspect, the superego. Freud did not always distinguish clearly between these two aspects of the personality, so that the fundamental break-down of the psyche is oppositional (id versus ego states). When he filled in this picture of opposed psychic identities representing different aspects of life—the id our organic-animalistic side, the ego and superego our sociocultural side—Freud employed psychic energies as kinds of “precious material” that the three identities maneuver over to command and to use. A wish becomes a cathexis or a fixing of libido upon a desired object's image in the mind—literally occupying this image with precious energy that then orients the psychic structure to attain this end. A repression of this wish becomes a counter-cathexis, or an application of one psychic force against the other. Sublimation involves raising the sociocultural levels of the ends sought, so that, say, rather than engaging in copulation the artist expends libido to produce a painting. Projection involves disowning one's wishes by attributing them to others. Rationalization means finding a psychic explanation other than the real reason for why one is doing something relating to the wished-for end (object). Reaction-formation is doing something directly opposite to the real end being sought, and so forth.

In time, Freud's complete theory of psychosexual development was expressed in terms of instinct theory. The basic theory always contrasted two instincts, each of which

presumably had its own energies to bring to bear. Initially, the sexual was opposed to the self-preservative instincts. Later, Life was opposed to the Death Instinct. It was also possible to fuse instincts from each of these sides into a kind of (dialectical?) synthesis. Freud never coined a name other than libido for his instinctive energy. Development was therefore explained in terms of psychosexual stages framed around the progression and/or fixation and regression of libido. Everyone moves through a course of psychosexual development in the oral stage and then passes consecutively through the anal, urethral, and phallic stages until latency holds the psychic structure in abeyance for a time. With the onset of puberty, the progression of psychosexual development continues, and in the ideal case, terminates in full development at the genital stage.

Developmental progression through the stages is never perfect and hence a series of more or less pronounced fixations occur, explained by Freud as pockets of libidinal retention that can, later in life, be recouped thanks to the operation of regression. Individual differences in personality are accounted for by the nature and extent of fixation, so that personality styles are analogized to the predominant concerns of the psychosexual stages. Thus, the adult oral personality is most likely to be passively receptive, the anal personality orderly, the urethral personality ambitious, and the phallic personality narcissistic. Male-female differences are explained in light of the dynamics of the Oedipal situation, which supposedly leaves females with a less well-formulated superego than males.

Freud's theory of illness moved through several formulations but settled finally on a three-stage compromise formulation that combined his diphasic model of sexual mat-

uration with his fixation-regression thesis. Though he always accepted the possibility of biologically based (actual) neuroses, he viewed the majority of illnesses seen by psychiatrists as caused by the return of memories once repressed to avoid acting them out or even facing up to the fact that they were entertained. For example, as an infant the neurotic may have wished to kill a same-sexed parent and copulate with the opposite-sexed parent. All neurosis begins, Freud thought, in an unresolved or poorly resolved Oedipal conflict. Psychosis is merely a more extensive type of mental deterioration, one in which the fixations have begun earlier in life and have involved more extensive pocketing of libido than is true in neurosis. Pathological symptoms are always the result of *two* wishes—both the repressed and the repressing—so that we can speak of them as transforming the libidinal cathexes into a symbolical manifestation of the meaning mental illness has for the person.

Though he had arrived at his theory through analogies to physical energy, Freud obviously retained his telic emphasis. He spoke of symptoms as conversions of libido, but these signs of illness have an “organ speech,” in that they can express the reasons for the illness. Psychosomatic symptoms tell us what is bothering the person. An ulcer patient wants to be fed and cared for even though there may be a facade of independence in his or her behavior. A constipated person is holding back not simply fecal matter but the love that he or she feels has been withheld in turn by others. Neurotics continue trying to adjust to their external world of real interpersonal relations. Psychotics, on the other hand, regress and never return to reality, because their delusions and hallucinations serve as substitutes for real living. Both neurotics and psychotics avoid looking into themselves. They want to retain the status quo of their lives and use anxiety as a kind

of instrumental means of avoiding insight into what must be done.

In his theory of cure, Freud suggested that only those patients who can form an artificial neurosis in the therapeutic relationship can be treated by psychoanalysis. Psychotics who have what Freud termed a very severe form of narcissistic neurosis cannot be treated because, in order for psychoanalysis to work, the client must be capable of removing libido from all other aspects of life and fixing it onto the person of the psychoanalyst. This is the core of the artificial neurosis, and if the person is too narcissistic, this becomes impossible. Once the libido is removed from outside the therapy room and fixed upon the therapist, it becomes possible for the client to redirect it inwardly, to restructure his or her ego by way of the transference reactions to the therapist. This all takes place as insights are provided and resistances worked through. The analyst uses various means, such as free association, dream interpretation, and the analysis of both positive and negative transference, to provide the client with insight.

Thus, as a transitional figure in the history of thought, Freud seems to have done a remarkable job of retaining the shell of natural-science description even as he framed an image of the person as more self-directing (telic) than his colleagues would ordinarily accept. Although he would have liked to comply with the demands of traditional science, Freud had the courageous skill to describe human behavior in a way that was helpful to the understanding of his patients. He seems to have achieved this remarkable feat by winding biological and psychological metaphors together into a mix which the modern personologist still puzzles over, wondering "Was Freud a psychological teleologist or a biological reductionist?" This debate will doubtlessly continue unresolved in the future, but there can be no debate over

Freud's genius as the father of modern personality theory.

Outline of Important Theoretical Constructs

Biographical overview

The Breuer period

- pathognomic situation • strangulated affect • absences, waking dreams
- abreaction • catharsis • hypnoid state
- defense hysteria

Personality theory

Structural constructs

Dualism of mind versus body

- dualism • psyche • soma

The early mental structural constructs:

depth emphasis

- conscious • unconscious • preconscious
- censorship • hedonism • unconscious derivatives • act out • progression versus regression

The final mental structural constructs:

dynamic emphasis

- topographical model • dynamic • repression • id • ego • primary versus secondary process • superego • ego ideal

Motivational constructs

Instinct and energy

- instinct • aim • pressure • source
- object • homeostasis • principle of constancy • principle of neuronic inertia
- vicissitudes • pleasure principle

Freud's Promethean insight:

the sexual instinct

- autoerotic • organ pleasure • erotogenic

- zone • libido • cathexis • anticathexis
(countercathexis) • bisexuality
- History of Freud's instinct theories*
 primal instinct • compound instinct
 • self-preservative instinct (ego instinct)
 • sexual instinct (object instinct)
 • narcissism (ego-cathexis) • ego
 libido • object libido • repetition com-
 pulsion • Eros (Life Instinct) • Death
 Instinct (Thanatos) • fusion of instincts
- Defense mechanisms or mental mechanisms*
 repression • primal repression (see fixa-
 tion) • derivatives • repression proper
 • displacement • substitution • sublima-
 tion • projection • reaction-formation
 • rationalization • isolation
- Time-perspective constructs
- Psychosexual stages*
 fueros • psychosexual • pregenital stages
- Oral psychosexual stage*
 oceanic feeling • oral erotism • incor-
 poration • primary narcissism • wish
 fulfillment • identification • introjection
- Anal psychosexual stage*
 frustration • prohibition • privation
 • sadistic-anal
- Urethral psychosexual stage*
 urethra
- Phallic psychosexual stage*
 phallus • ontogeny recapitulates phy-
 logeny • origin of society • primal horde
 • exogamy • complex • male Oedipus
 complex • law of talion • castration fear
 (anxiety, complex) • female Oedipus
 complex (Electra) • penis envy
- Latency psychosexual stage*
 latency • diphasic sexual development
- Pubescence and adolescence*
- Adulthood and genitality*
 genital
- Fixation and regression*
 fixation • regression • topographical
 regression • temporal regression
 • formal regression
- Individual-differences constructs
- Adult character or personality styles*
 character • personality
- Oral personality*
 passive • receptive • external supplies
- Anal personality*
 orderliness • parsimoniousness
 • obstinacy
- Urethral personality*
 ambition
- Phallic personality*
 self-centered • masculinity complex
 • homosexuality
- Latency, adolescent and genital personalities*
 imago • genital character
- Psychopathology and psychotherapy**
- Theory of illness
- Antithetic ideas and counterwill*
 intention • expectation proper • dis-
 tressing antithetic idea • counterwill
 • fixed idea (Charcot) • dissociate
- Coitus interruptus and childhood molestation*
 coitus interruptus • sexual noxa
 • sexualized fantasy • infantile
 sexuality
- Three-stage compromise model of
 mental illness*
 three-stage compromise model • deflec-
 tion • actual neuroses • psychoneuroses
 proper • after-repression • return of the

repressed memories • conversion
• organ speech

Differential diagnosis

flight into illness • secondary gain
• obsessive-compulsivity • hysteria
• psychosomatic • neurosis • psychosis
• delusion • hallucination

Anxiety theory

biological emotion • transformed libido
• instrumental role of anxiety • realistic
anxiety • neurotic anxiety • moral
anxiety • guilt

Culture as a prime agent of abnormality

severity of ego ideal or superego

Theory of cure

The role of insight

insight • causal therapy

*Fundamental rule of psychoanalysis,
and free association*

fundamental rule • free association
• psychic determinism

Resistance and transference

resistance • transference • imago
• positive transference • ambivalence
• uncovering process • negative transference
• re-education • overcoming
resistance • countertransference

Final theory of cure

libidinal anticipatory idea • transformed
(artificial) neurosis • transference illness
• transference neurosis • narcissistic
neurosis • insight

Extent and permanence of cure

Social revision

Therapeutic techniques

Evolution of the relationship

hypnosis • pressure technique • screen
memories (associations)

View of therapeutic change

Client prognosis and trial analyses
prognosis

*Interpretative techniques in dreams
and parapraxes*

dream interpretation • manifest content
• latent content • symbol • day residues
• wish fulfillment • dream work
• condensation of dream image • displacement
of dream image • overdetermination • reversal • means of
representation • parapraxes • Freudian
slips

Some procedural details

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Chapter 3

The Analytical Psychology of Carl Jung

Biographical Overview

Carl Gustav Jung was born in 1875 in a small Swiss village (Kesswil) but was re-located while an infant to the Rhine Fall near Schaffhaused where he spent his boyhood as the only child of a country parson. There were churchmen on both sides of Jung's parental family—six parson uncles on the mother's side, and two paternal uncles as well—but his own father was really more attracted to philology and classical studies than to the ministry.¹ Economic necessity forced him to enter the ministry, and he married the daughter of his former Hebrew professor. Jung seems to have been his father's son.² Though his mother was the stronger parental personality, he found her puzzling and even eccentric in manner.³

Jung's classical education began early in life, for when he was six his father introduced him to the study of Latin. Throughout later life Jung could read ancient texts, and this training doubtless helps to account for his historical approach to humankind. In

a real sense he was a classical scholar. When Jung was roughly twelve years old, his family moved from the Rhine Fall to the more urban community of Basel. He had developed into a physically large, solitary person, active, yet secretive and self-reliant. Going to school was never a particular joy for him; he disliked athletics, mathematics, and the competition for grades among classmates. Jung tells us that he deliberately settled for a second-in-the-class standing which he found "considerably more enjoyable" ⁴ than competing for first. Even so, his father's tutoring had put him ahead of the urban classmates he confronted in Basel, and this superiority led to a rather difficult hazing. He was kidded as a country bumpkin, teacher's pet, and so on. He came to despise school, using sickness as an excuse to avoid attending, and for a time he actually experienced a period of neurotic fainting spells of which he eventually cured himself through self-discipline. ⁵

When he grew to young manhood Jung attended the University of Basel. He was interested in historical, classical, anthropological, and philosophical subjects, but decided on medicine because it was a distinguished profession offering various alternatives for a career. Thanks to a selection he read by Krafft-Ebing, the famous German neurologist, Jung settled on psychiatry as a specialty that could combine his more humanistic and his scientific interests. ⁶ Following graduation from medical school, Jung took a position at the Burgholzli Hospital in Zürich, Switzerland, serving under Eugen Bleuler, the noted psychiatrist who had coined the term *schizophrenia*. Bleuler was a professor of psychiatry at the University of Zürich, and Jung was also to hold a lectureship there while he conducted studies on the nature of schizophrenia. It was at the Burgholzli Hospital (from 1900–1909) that Jung reached maturity as a scientist and became a world authority

on the psychology of the abnormal and the normal individual. He furthered the technique of *word association* there, coined a term, *complex*, that played a central role in all of his later theorizing, and published his first book.

Jung recognized Freud's genius from the outset, and he felt that his own studies had confirmed the undoubted existence of an unconscious sphere in the human being's mind. Their first meeting took place in Vienna in 1907, and it was memorable because Freud and Jung talked for thirteen consecutive hours. In using the method of word association, Jung would ask a patient to respond to a stimulus word with the first word coming to mind. For example, Jung would say *garden*, and the patient would be free to say anything. Jung then noted certain disturbances in the patient's word associations, such as taking a long time to speak, blocking on a word and not thinking of anything, or thinking only of a repetition of the stimulus word. ⁷ By going over a series of words several times, Jung gradually established that certain of these words hung together, interlaced in the patient's associations, and formed a *complex* of ideas with a common core of meaning. Since these *idea masses* were always tied to emotional concerns of the person, Jung called them *feeling-toned complexes*. ⁸ The repressed memories and conflicts of the Freudian school were thus experimentally verified by the word-association method.

Jung did not come to Freud as a psychiatric novice. He was a man who had made his own reputation, one that in academic circles was even more important (because of its acceptability) than Freud's. Furthermore, Jung was too much of a loner and an independent thinker ever to play a submerged student role to Freud. It is clear from early



Carl Jung

reactions that Jung, like Adler before him, was never completely accepting of Freud's views, especially those on sex.⁹ In 1909 they made their famous trip to Clark University in Massachusetts and it was this extended contact that led to their break.

There were three major reasons for this split. First, Jung was unable to accept the concept of libido as limited to sexual energy. As we shall see, Jung based his energizing theory on a *principle of opposites*, and at one point he urged Freud to suggest an opposite balancing energy to libido.¹⁰ Since this

criticism was necessarily a threat to the sexuality thesis, as we can recall from Chapter 1, Freud could not comply. Related to this matter was the question of how sex was to be interpreted symbolically. Did every unconscious dream symbol refer to a lustful interpersonal memory in *this* person's life, or was there something far more profound and even extraindividual about certain symbols? Drawing on his classical studies, Jung argued that a mother imago (motherly image) cannot be tied to a single patient's life, for such mother symbols have made their appearance in too many cultural myths to be seen as the reflection of a *personal* conflict.¹¹

Jung wanted to include a *collective* aspect to the unconscious, and though Freud held to this view in principle, he could not revise his theory to formalize this idea. The collective aspect of the unconscious would require a theory of inherited racial influences, and Freud felt that he could not let this obviously controversial suggestion take further attention away from his already notorious sexuality thesis. When Jung formalized these views on a collective psyche in his book *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, he sealed his fate, for by his own admission this work cost him Freud's friendship.¹² The final major cause of their split stemmed from an incident on the trip to Clark University. Apparently the two men fell into analyzing one another's dreams—possibly as an exercise in mutual learning, although Jung hints that Freud actually referred to personal problems.¹³ At one point, Freud stopped free-associating with the observation that were he to continue, he would lose his authority in their relationship. This attitude surprised Jung, who had been relating to Freud out of respect but *not* as the lesser authority. Jung felt they were equals.

The relationship between the two cooled noticeably after the trip to America, even though Jung was by then president of the International Psycho-Analytical Association (thanks to Freud's direct influence). Following a stormy convention of the association in Munich in 1913 when Jung's "heretical views" on the (collective) unconscious were the focus of debate, Freud and Jung went their separate ways. Though Jung was re-elected to a two-year term as president, future conventions during his tenure were made impossible by the developing World War I, and the two men never faced one another again. There followed a very difficult period for Jung, during which he analyzed himself much as Freud had done (see Chapter 1). His only satisfactions at this time came from

his wife's emotional support and their growing family. He describes this period, from roughly 1913 to 1917, as one of inner uncertainty and disorientation.¹⁴

It was as if he were being assaulted by fantasies from his unconscious, and he tried to hold them in check through yoga and other means. He began to record these fantasies and eventually to work out a means of communication with his unconscious. He literally came to talk to a "person" within his identity, one he was to call the anima.¹⁵ In a manner reminiscent of his childhood, he once again found that he had to conquer the hold this person had on his psyche, and by way of regaining his self-command, to single out or individuate a new personality more representative of what he was really like than the original.

After World War I Jung continued to attract a wide circle of followers. He once studied a group of Navajo Indians in America. He canvassed various tribes in field trips to North, East, and Central Africa. He spent time in the Sudan as well as Egypt and India. What Jung sought in each of these trips was further confirmation of his views on mankind. He thus not only saw his own patients in psychotherapy and read widely, but he actually did the work of an archaeologist-anthropologist when the opportunity presented itself. On one occasion, while in America, he made a special study of black patients at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C. He became recognized as a scholar of the first rank, was awarded honorary degrees by eight universities, and was made an honorary fellow of the Royal Society in England.

Although he had actually spoken out against the rise of a war psychology in Germany as early as 1936,¹⁶ some misunderstandings of his other writings and his acceptance

in 1933 of an editorship of a German journal of psychotherapy resulted in Jung being criticized as a Nazi sympathizer.¹⁷ Yet as Jung himself noted, his books were burned by the Nazis, and he had it on good authority that he was on the Nazi blacklist.¹⁸ In time, it was established that not only was Jung unsympathetic to the Nazi cause, he provided significant aid to Jewish psychiatrists and psychologists who had fled the Nazis to settle in England. A thorough study of the entire matter cleared Jung's name without question, if any such exoneration was necessary.¹⁹

In addition to his academic appointment at Zürich, Jung once served as professor of medical psychology at the University of Basel. He remained a productive worker and writer throughout his life, and his collected works are second in size only to Freud's. He spent the years following World War II putting together his finished autobiography and meeting the requests of students and interested laypeople to make his thoughts known. His students organized an institute, and for a time his approach was referred to as *complex psychology*. However, the name Jung preferred and the one we shall use is *analytical psychology*. He died at Küsnacht, Zürich, in 1961.

Personality Theory

Structural Constructs

Dualism of Mind versus Body

In the *Psychology of Dementia Praecox* (Volume 3), published before his meeting with Freud, Jung proposed that “the affect

in dementia praecox [schizophrenia] favours the appearance of anomalies in the metabolism—toxins, perhaps, which injure the brain in a more or less irreparable manner, so that the highest psychic functions become paralysed.”²⁰ This view was advanced very tentatively while under the influence of Bleuler and other medical colleagues, but even so it has convinced many that Jung was a theorist who favored physical explanations of abnormal and, therefore, possibly all behavior. Actually, if we review what he said about this speculation over a lifetime, it seems clear that Jung was highly ambivalent if not actually embarrassed about it altogether. In what is probably his final (1957) statement on the matter, he took a moderate position, saying:

*I consider the aetiology of schizophrenia to be a dual one: namely, up to a certain point psychology is indispensable in explaining the nature and the causes of the initial emotions which give rise to metabolic alterations. These emotions seem to be accompanied by chemical processes that cause specific temporary or chronic disturbances or lesions.*²¹

Jung was in fact highly critical of his medical peers for their exclusive reliance on physical explanations. He complained that too many of his colleagues presumed that just because the psyche relies on brain physiology it can be understood and explained in physical terms.²² It cannot, anymore than dancing can be explained by examining the biological structure of the leg on which dancing depends. Physical explanations cannot ensure us an understanding of mental life.²³ In the above quotes Jung gave emotional factors a prominent position in speaking about what might be termed “mental” illness. Unlike Freud, who theorized that mind qua mind is free of emotional content (see p.

46), Jung's psychology lumped both affective (emotional) and rational intellectual contents into the mind from the outset. According to Jung, primitive people were moved to behave not by intellect but by emotional "projections" of images and moods which they attributed to the world around them.²⁴ Rather than bringing them on personally, thoughts simply "happened" to a primitive individual, who, like a modern person caught up in emotions, could not tell an idea prompted by feelings and projected onto reality from an idea prompted by independent facts of reality.²⁵ When primitives began to recognize the contribution to experience made by their emotions, they moved from being exclusively part of a collective identity to being *also* a single identity. Personal consciousness was born, and the person could then direct his or her thinking apart from influence solely by the group (via the emotions). We could even say that rather than *being thought* the person could *think* (*directed thinking*).²⁶

Psyche as a Region

In Freud's theory the structures of mind are fixed in relation to the levels of mind, so that, for example, the id is constantly in an unconscious segment of the psyche. The id never leaves the realm of unconsciousness to take a self-directed turn around consciousness. It sends its derivatives (ideas or images) into consciousness by way of cathexes which are themselves often symbolized to fool the conscious side of the ego; but the "id as an identity" remains rooted in the depths of the mind. For Jung, the psyche is a *region*, a kind of multidirectional and multitemporal housing within which identities of the personality like the ego can move about. In this case an id-like structure (complex) *can* move up into the conscious realm out of the unconscious and initiate behavior to suit its

own purposes (that is, outside of the control of consciousness!).

Though Jung did not stress physical explanations of human behavior, he did emphasize hereditary factors. However, his meaning here was more historical (idiographic) than physical (nomothetic) (see p. 23 of Introduction for a discussion of this distinction). Humanity's heredity is psychic as well as physical in nature, and psychic heredity is not identical to the physical development of the body in evolution. The mind-body distinction is too often used as an excuse for the theorist who wants to detract from the importance of the psyche by saying "Oh, that's only a mental phenomenon, it's not real." Jung was always quick to point out that the psyche has as much validity and reality as the (physical) body events on which it is based.²⁷ The person begins life with *both* a physically ordered structure (hands work much the same for all people) and a psychically ordered structure (people think and create meanings in much the same way). The psyche has also developed in a purposeful or *teleological* line.²⁸ This is one reason why Jung found it wrong to speak of behavior in *only* biological-instinctive terms. If we were only instinctual creatures we would have no need of a psyche, because the essence of mentality is that it *modifies* such exclusively reflexive responses.²⁹ The human is an intentional animal which infuses life with meaning *from birth* even as it takes into consideration the strictly environmental influences located in the facts of reality.³⁰

Jung once said: "The psyche is not of today: its ancestry goes back many millions of years. Individual consciousness is only the flower and the fruit of a season, sprung from the perennial rhizome [root system] beneath

the earth. . . .”³¹ There are potentials for almost any kind of meaning to be expressed in the psyche, including those that according to a traditional logic would strike us as inconsistent and contradictory. We can make sense of this seeming confusion if we realize that the psyche operates according to a *principle of opposites*, which means that for any tendency in one direction there is a countering tendency. For any meaning that we might think up or that pops into our minds, the opposite meaning *also* has validity in a psychological sense.³² If a person says “I hate lilacs,” it is psychologically true that at another level of mind he or she is saying “I love lilacs.” We just have to appreciate the inevitability of this mental process. As psychologists we cannot let the rules of traditional logic blind us to the fact that meanings expressed mentally are bipolar and hence one mind can entertain *both* ends of such a dimension of meaning—in this case, love-hate (see p. 8 of the Introduction for a discussion of dialectical meaning).

Figure 9 is a schematization of Jung’s model of the psyche. There are essentially three points to consider in Figure 9, separated by two arrow bands—a double-headed arrow between points 1 and 2, and a single-headed arrow between points 2 and 3. Note that a directionality from out of the past is suggested by presenting the psyche as a vortex (point 1). The *primordial past* refers to our roots in a primitive state, evolving as we did from a lower animal both physically and psychologically. The purposiveness of humanity’s psychic descent is symbolized in the teleological line of advance from the vortex, going “this” way and then “that” down through time: human intellect has selected *alternatives* in the directions taken. The region of the psyche at which Jung framed

his personality constructs is the open-ended front of the vortex. Assume that a membrane (dotted portion offset at point 1) stretched across this open end and that we can slide it off to give an egg-shaped diagram of the psyche at point 2. Note that the psyche is now divided into halves, an upper half labeled *consciousness* and a lower half labeled *unconsciousness*.³³ Recall from the biographical overview that Jung believed each of these two major subdivisions of the psyche (mind) could be said to have a collective and a personal aspect. This is what we have schematized at point 3 by a double set of egg halves, one of which (collective) can slide over the other, making for a combined collective psyche and a combined personal psyche laying one over the other. These are not mutually exclusive regions, however. The contents of one can interpenetrate and interfuse with the contents of the other. In other words, if we snapped the overlaying halves of the egg shut over the core beneath at point 3, we would have the same figure as at point 2, with the exception that now the upper and lower halves of the egg would combine collective *and* personal mental contents.

Even though we have allowed for the *collective conscious* at point 3 of Figure 9, Jung never used this precise phrase. He did speak of a *collective psyche*³⁴ which combined unconscious and conscious features, and he also referred to the *empirical psyche*³⁵ when considering aspects of the personality one might think of as involving a collective consciousness. Jung introduced the phrase *collective unconscious*, but he never seemed to need a paralleling collective term in the conscious sphere of psychic life, preferring to cover ground in consciousness under the *ego* and especially the *persona* constructs, both of which we will be taking up in the next section. For this reason, we have put the term *persona* in brackets within the egg-




Figure 9 Jung's Psyche Model

half labeled *collective conscious*. For all practical purposes these two are one.

According to Jung, during the descent of humanity as our brain evolved physically, a parallel evolution of the psyche was also taking place.³⁶ As subhumans we were totally instinctual creatures, responding mechanically and without the ability to decide for ourselves through use of a personal will. There was no personal aspect to the psyche at this time because we were immersed in a collective psyche which was for all practical purposes completely unconscious. That is, people were awake. They moved about and did the chores necessary to keep alive. But their actions were entirely communal because subjectivity did

not exist. People had common instincts like seeking food or sexual release, and they also had common mental experiences. They had ideas, but these were not their own ideas. They banded together and did things together but they never really knew why or that things could be otherwise than what they were. This is what we mean by *unconsciousness*. This form of unconsciousness was *impersonal* because it was common to everyone—it was therefore an *objective unconscious*.³⁷ The objectivity arises from the fact that all members

of the human species shared *common* meanings (see p. 15 of Introduction for a discussion of subjective versus objective).

Primitives see nature as an undifferentiated mass of which they are a part.³⁸ Things happen to them that they sense but cannot explain. They feel awe when looking at a mountain and therefore ascribe a godlike quality to it; they see witches and devils in thunderstorms or earthquakes, which frighten them.³⁹ Primitives turn nature into human form (anthropomorphize) because they have not yet distinguished between *me* and *it*. Everything in nature has equal validity and integrity to the primitive. This is another way in which Jung approached the definition of *unconsciousness*, as a mental condition in which all things are possible and distinctions have not yet been made between, for example, good and evil. The opposition principle has not yet begun to generate either-or splits in mind. It is from this broad psychic background of collective unconsciousness that consciousness (and by way of it, personal unconsciousness) must eventually emerge.⁴⁰

Consciousness formed through what Jung called *differentiation*, or the development of differences by separating the whole into parts, the one into the many by way of dividing experience into opposites.⁴¹ Occasionally the word *discrimination* is used to describe this process. Jung theorized that consciousness first arose when the human being either had a very intense emotional experience leading to a differentiation of “I am having a feeling now that the others are not,” or when a collectively prompted mental event passed through the mind and the person contemplated, “Say, that is such a powerful notion that I want to mull it over for a time.” In

either case, the impression made by an emotional or intellectual impact jolted the person into realizing that there is a bipolar dimension of *I* in relation to *non-I* (that, them, it, and so on).⁴² The principle of opposition had come into play, and with the newly found identity, the newly born individual began to differentiate (discriminate) a consciousness.

This process of breaking up the unity into relations by way of opposition has continued. It continued across the history of the psyche resulting in the gradual evolution of a collective consciousness (point 1 of Figure 9), and it continues across at least the first half of the life span for every one of us as a personal consciousness. This is how we *know*, by expanding consciousness.⁴³ With the rise in knowledge human beings also stop projecting personal attributes and attitudes onto the environment.⁴⁴ Consciousness cannot project feelings or experiences, and it has little appreciation for the role of projection in life generally. In fact, widening consciousness invariably results in a downgrading of the unconscious; as Jung put it, “Because of its youthfulness and vulnerability, our consciousness tends to make light of the unconscious.”⁴⁵ Yet as, in a sense, the offspring of the unconscious, our consciousness must always remain the smaller identity within the larger,⁴⁶ just as an island sits within the expanse of the sea from which it emerged.⁴⁷ In fact, if we would only appreciate that the unconscious remains the ever-creative principle in life⁴⁸ and that it can help us solve our problems of existence in the same way that our automatic (physically unconscious) instincts (to eat, to flee, and so on) help us survive, we would be far better off.⁴⁹

As consciousness arises and a subjective awareness is made possible, mental contents can be assigned to this personal awareness. Material once conscious in the Freudian sense can now be repressed. This is the *personal unconscious* realm at points 2 and 3 of

Figure 9, and we can equate this completely with Freud's theory of the unconscious (see Chapter 1). But contents of the collective unconscious are never repressed. How could they be pushed back from experience when they have never *been* in the individual's experience at all? Just as in the case of Freudian theory, Jung would place the personal unconscious somewhat less deep in the realm of psychic unconsciousness than is the collective unconscious.⁵⁰ But we have indicated at point 3 in Figure 9 that a complete parallel of the two realms of unconsciousness is possible because Jung always has the contents of one mixing or uniting with the other. Even so, the reason we have the collective unconscious as the outer shell of our egg-shaped figure is so that, as in Figure 10 below (p. 190), we can drop it down deeper in unconsciousness to show that here, in closest union with the primordial past, we have contents of the collective unconscious residing.

The Adhesive Model of Psychic Structure

In order to understand how Jung describes the workings of various "identities" within mind (psyche), we have first to understand an *adhesive model* of mental events that he used. Recall that Jung spoke of *feeling-toned complexes* in mind. He meant that various ideas, attitudes, opinions, and so on, which occur in mind tend to accumulate and combine around a core of emotion. In a sense, these mental contents adhere or stick to this emotional core, they *agglutinate* like so many red blood cells forming clumps to fight off antibodies. This agglutination of mental contents in the psyche is not only a defensive maneuver, of course. This is a process through which we form idea-positions, points of view, and even (one or more) identities in mind. If we have a strong religious commitment, the beliefs maintained by our faith would

combine (agglutinate) into our very identity as a person, resulting in an identifiable totality within the psyche known as the *complex*.

Jung first made use of this adhesive model in his dissertation for the medical degree in 1902 when he was trying to explain the "psychology and pathology of so-called occult phenomena."⁵¹ How does it happen that a medium—a person who mediates between death and life—can seem to have a deceased loved one speaking through his or her (the medium's) vocal cords in conversation with the surviving relatives? Jung did not believe there was always a conscious intent to deceive on the part of the medium. Drawing on the thought of both Bleuler and Pierre Janet, he equated such occult reactions with the dissociative reactions of hysterics and schizophrenics.⁵²

Jung noted that mediums often begin by calling out to a presence they sense during an emotionally charged trance state. It is not unusual for the medium to ask this presence, "Who is there?" and then, of course, to allow a reply by way of the medium's voice, which may change noticeably in tone and inflection. In asking this suggestive question while in an emotional state, Jung argued, an *automatism* formed just as such automatic actions are formed in cases of hysteria. This identity or presence is not from the grave but rather from within the medium's own psyche. It is, in short, a *feeling-toned complex* (sometimes called *feeling-toned train of thought*).⁵³ The dynamics of all complexes are as follows: emotions stimulate mental thoughts (the medium felt close to the dead person, experienced emotions toward the dead person) which then agglutinate around this core of feeling (the dead person's attributes are formed into a total identity combining the medium's identity as well).⁵⁴ The life of a

complex depends on the emotional core, for when this feeling extinguishes so too does the complex.⁵⁵ Returning to the example of a religious faith, the person who loses a feeling for God loses the total meaning this faith has signified in the past. He or she might recall the principles of the faith and possibly even go on attending church services. But this complex of mental attitudes and outlooks no longer exists as a living complex in the psyche.

Jung believed that most complexes formed in life quickly sink back with decreasing feeling tone into the memories we all carry about in our personal unconscious. However, if a complex should encounter some related complex, it can adhere to it, and then, thanks to the added size and importance of this larger agglutination, the older mental contents can begin to return to consciousness as a “new” totality. There is a snowball effect to be seen in complex formation, because the stronger the complex is, the more it will assimilate other contents in the psyche.⁵⁶ As it grows in size and strength, it takes on directive powers in mind, and we begin to notice its influence in dreams, slips of the tongue, and, as Jung first determined (see p. 177), in our association of ideas generally. Whereas Freud believed the dream to be his royal road to the unconscious, Jung concluded, “The *via regia* to the unconscious . . . is not the dream . . . but the complex, which is the architect of dreams and of symptoms.”⁵⁷

Because Jung so often discussed complexes which have been formed around emotional upsets,⁵⁸ many people today think incorrectly that every complex is something “bad.” Actually, the complex-formation process is simply one of the major ways in which the psyche expresses itself, and a complex can have either a positive or a negative role in the person-

ality.⁵⁹ We next turn to a series of important personality constructs which Jung employed, each of which is a complex within the psyche. Keep in mind that Jung did not believe the psyche had to be logically consistent. Unlike Adler (Chapter 2), who saw the totality of mind working for a common end, Jung’s teleology included the possibility of cross-purposes within mind. Two separate mental referent points or identities (complexes) could be seeking to bring about quite different ends in the same personality. We now review four such points of identity before arriving at Jung’s specific definition of personality.

Ego. One of the first major complexes Jung named was the *ego complex*, which is usually shortened to simply *ego*. The ego’s major region of activity in the personality is consciousness,⁶⁰ but, as we shall see, it is not the only complex in consciousness. The ego is that part of our personality that we usually think of as ourselves, containing more of our strong than our weak points.⁶¹ We tend to think of our weak points as mistakes rather than as genuine parts of our personality. The ego is also without front or phoniness, so when we are being fairly genuine and sincere we are expressing attitudes of the ego. The person that we talk to when we are alone, as in driving a car, quietly (“under our breath”) is the ego; that is, the ego does the talking and the answering. The contents agglutinated into the ego complex stem from our personal experience with our physical body, its strengths and weaknesses, and also from interpersonal relations as we mature.⁶² An important factor in ego development is that feeling of success following an achievement. The little girl who wins an award for a poem she wrote achieves a sense of ego development (complex formation) in the good feeling (emotional core) of “I did that.”⁶³

The ego can sometimes be the butt of projections which are sent outward from identities in the unconscious and mirrored in the ego.⁶⁴ We can think our personality is becoming accident prone because we begin breaking things or injuring ourselves in minor accidents. In Jungian psychology, rather than this thought being some kind of Freudian compromise among ego-superego-id, we would instead be witnessing a projection from the unconscious onto the ego—possibly as an effort to make the ego “look bad.” Why should the ego look bad? We will answer this more fully below when we discuss the balancing of personality, but for now we can just suggest that maybe the ego has been looking “too good.” So, by way of the principle of opposites, now the unconscious side of the personality wants to even up the sides a bit. The main point here is that the ego’s influence is kept *primarily* in consciousness in Jungian psychology. It is not free to do unconscious bargaining (compromising) and is more the *moved-by* than the *mover of* unconscious processes.⁶⁵ The ego in Jungian psychology therefore plays a lesser role in the personality than it plays in the personality theory of Freudian psychology.

Persona. The word *persona* is taken from the Greek meaning “mask.”⁶⁶ In ancient Greek drama, actors held masks up to their faces in portraying a part, and this struck Jung as very descriptive of what we all do in social relations. We have our cheery-person face which we put on in the morning as we greet friends. We have our hard-working face as we get down to our jobs in the presence of our boss. There are sad faces too, as when we must show proper sympathy for others who have suffered a setback whether we think they deserve it or not. Though the persona is our cover or front in social relations, we always recognize something else as more representative of our true

identity (usually, we think of this as our ego). The reason we equated the persona with collective unconsciousness at point 3 in Figure 9 is because social masks are defined for us by our group to apply across the board in everyone’s behavior. As Jung himself observed, “. . . what we said of the collective unconscious is also true of the persona’s contents, that is, they are of a general [objective] character.”⁶⁷

It is virtually impossible to avoid forming some masks in life, at least during our childhood and youth. There are so many socially prescribed behaviors to be proper about, or demands to meet the expectancies of others as they look for certain behaviors from us (“Please try to be pleasant!”), we are constantly falling back on these stylized patterns. Our parents, particularly fathers,⁶⁸ help to model many of these masks for us. Our masks are essentially adjustment devices, because they help us get along with others in life.⁶⁹ As with the ego, the persona can take on unconscious projections and even serve as a model for the ego to identify with. When we say of a movie queen that “she believes her press clippings,” we imply that this person’s ego has identified with her persona (that is, public image). Phony, superficial people often do the same thing. Jung explained the tendency for fads to occur in terms of the persona, which takes on the latest dress, food preference, entertainment style, and even sexual practice.⁷⁰ Although it need not always happen, there is the continuing danger that one’s ego will identify with the group-manipulated persona.⁷¹ Jung favored more balanced personalities which could resist such group manipulations or at least be more selective in the behavior to be manifested.

Shadow. There is a side to our personality that we are likely to ignore, because it represents all those attitudes, temptations, fears of failing, and even immoral and uncivilized inclinations that we have rejected and kept from doing in the past. The emotional core of such complexes is often of a negative sort, such as envy (“I want that wristwatch he’s wearing badly enough to steal it”) or hostility (“If she frustrates me again I swear I’ll beat her skull in”). The ego considers such feelings and ideas but rejects them by not furthering them only to have them form into a complex on the darker side of the personality. Jung called this complex of nondeveloped feelings and ideas the *shadow* or the *alter ego*,⁷² defining it as follows: “By shadow I mean the ‘negative’ side of the personality, the sum of all those unpleasant qualities we like to hide, together with the insufficiently developed functions and the contents of the personal unconscious.”⁷³

The shadow is like an inferior personality within the broader personality, a repressed, usually guilt-laden collection of behaviors located in the uppermost layers of the personal unconscious.⁷⁴ We say it is in the personal unconscious, because any person’s actual shadow is formed by being the opposite of those behaviors that have entered into consciousness as a part of the ego and the persona complexes. But there *is* knowledge of shadow tendencies in the collective unconscious as well (that is, the shadow is an archetype; see Table 2 below). The shadow is not as finely differentiated as the ego and persona, making it an agglutination of crude, bumbling, even confused behaviors which would shame us and alarm our friends if it made itself known in consciousness. When we see people change overnight, so that we say “Good old Charlie isn’t himself

lately—messing up everything he does, and cranky as the very devil,” we may be referring to someone who is indeed under the influence of a kind of devil. The shadow may have increased its role in Charlie’s personality, bringing out all those things he is *not* like consciously (principle of opposites). Even so, Jung believed it was important for us to understand our shadows. If we get in touch with our darker side consciously, we do not have to be like it. But if we repress our darker side (like Charlie did!), it can in time get hold of our behavior within consciousness and change us completely.

Having presented the shadow as the negative side of our personality, in his typical oppositional fashion Jung added that occasionally the shadow has a *positive* role to play in the personality. The rarer of the two possible situations occurs when the individual is living a conscious life of crime and/or immorality. In this case, the urges for behaving in a socially acceptable way, caring for the feelings of others, and so on, would be repressed and formed into a good type of shadow.⁷⁵ Thus, even the sinner has a potentially good side, because every time in the past when he or she opted for evil, there was this other course in life that might have been followed. It is such other behaviors that agglutinate into shadow complexes, and they can return to influence how even an evil person behaves via the principle of opposition.

The second way in which a shadow can be said to have positive features is through a more sophisticated understanding of what factors go into evaluations like success, good versus evil, or socially acceptable versus socially unacceptable. Surely these are often biased and shortsighted judgments pressed on the individual by the group. Take the Victorian repression of sexuality, for example. Was this not an unnecessarily harsh judgment being placed upon a perfectly natural

human urge? If the shadow of a Victorian person therefore contained strong sexual urges, would this not be a reflection of honest, even necessary, human needs? In like fashion, Jung claimed, our shadows often contain the germ of "good qualities, such as normal instincts, appropriate reactions, realistic insights, creative impulses, etc."⁷⁶

Self. The final identity point of Jungian theory is a potential complex not formed by every personality system. If we want to locate the meaning of *self* in everyone's personality, we have to begin looking into the collective unconscious, where we will find this *potential for unity* which the self means as a psychic content (that is, the self like the shadow is an archetype as well as an actual identity point in certain personalities; see Table 2 below). Jung viewed the self as the ultimate stage of personality growth, in which the contents of the ego, persona, and shadow are completely acknowledged and dealt with by the self. A person who has developed a self knows that he or she is *both* loving (ego) yet hateful (shadow), socially concerned (ego) as well as selfish (shadow), and energetic (ego) but also lazy (shadow). Jung used terms like *totality*, the *center of personality*, and *wholeness* to capture the basic meaning of selfhood.⁷⁷

Jung once analogized to the ego in defining the self. He said that just as the ego is the subjective point of reference for consciousness, so too is the self the subjective point of reference for the totality of the psyche.⁷⁸ As such, the self is an ideal, something that not all people come to realize in their lifetime. This is why it is only a potential identity point in the personality. We cannot become a complete *individual* unless we have first combined the influences of the historical past with the potentials and aspirations of the future. The point of subjective identity within the flow of time is the self.⁷⁹ The self

is that which unites all opposites in the psyche, so that the self-realized person finds it impossible to overlook any aspect of his or her nature, confusing persona with ego or rejecting the shadow as nonexistent. To quote Jung, "In the end we have to acknowledge that the self is a *complexio oppositorum* [collection of opposites] precisely because there can be no reality without polarity."⁸⁰

Personality. We now have four constructs all of which have something to say about the structure of personality. How do we put them together, and is some comprehensive definition of personality now possible? Figure 10 presents a schematization of Jung's view of personality. It is based on and further elaborates the egg-shaped top of the vortex at point 1 of Figure 9. We have dropped the collective-conscious half of the egg in lieu of the complex of masks we now know to be the persona. The ego is set in the conscious sphere, the shadow sits near the line dividing consciousness and unconsciousness, in what we know as the personal unconscious. And the self is sketched in as a dotted circle down more deeply as *in potentia*, ready to emerge into a definite entity if the conditions are right.

When Jung actually used the word *personality*, his meaning was similar to what we know as the self; for example: "I have suggested calling the total personality which, though present, cannot be fully known, the self. The ego is, by definition, subordinate to the self and is related to it like a part to the whole."⁸¹ It would follow that if a self were to emerge from potentiality to actuality, this subjective point of reference for the entire psyche would then contain much of the meaning of *personality*. The question, therefore, is not what is *the* (single) personality in Jungian psychology. We all have several




Figure 10 The Psyche as Personality

personalities within our psyche, taking *psyche* to mean the functioning of part personalities like the ego, shadow, and persona.⁸² A completely integrated (highly differentiated) personality, a total human being, would be a self-realized human being.

The Stylized-Meaning-Expression Model

In addition to the adhesive quality of psychic contents forming around an emotive core, Jung constantly utilized what we might call the *stylized-meaning-expression* model of mental events. The psyche is intentional by nature, and just as primitive humans might anthropomorphize a rock by projecting their subjectively generated images and beliefs onto it, so too does the modern person express unconscious-to-conscious mental contents as *symbols*. The human being is a symbolizing

animal, which for Jung meant that people always create meanings that express, say, or intend something (see p. 7 of Introduction for a discussion of meaning). Psychic expressions of meaning take on styles, so that in time we can come to know what is being expressed by recognizing the various patterns or forms of the meanings intended.

Symbolism. Jung made a strong point of differentiating between a symbol and a sign, arguing that Freud had blurred this important distinction. A *sign* is a mental content (image, idea) that acts as a surrogate or stand-in for some other mental intention. When we use the word or character for the number 7 as a sign, we intend a shorthand designation for *seven things*. The hardware salesperson counts out seven shovels now in stock and records 7 in the proper slot on an inventory form for such construction tools. Signs are translations of meanings; they are not active agents in the creation of meanings. However, if we now use the number 7 to ex-

press an alternate meaning, a meaning not originally intended by the mathematician in selecting this sign as a shorthand, we begin to get the idea of what symbolizing is all about. The number 7 might now symbolize *luck*.

The most important source of symbolic expression is the unconscious and particularly the collective unconscious. The human's capacity to symbolize is probably based on some physical capability.⁸³ That is, we are simply organisms with this physically based ability, just as our walking is based on the physically based leg structure we have. Symbols are less likely to appear in our psyche as ideas; they are usually images that point beyond themselves to meanings that are still out of our grasp.⁸⁴ A symbolic image can combine with idea thoughts from the personal unconscious, of course, but when we consider it strictly, the symbol is on the side of a picture rather than a collection of words. Symbols are usually analogues,⁸⁵ bearing a relation of similarity to what they are pointing toward. Thus, a symbolic expression flowing from something like a flower conveys a more pleasant meaning than a symbolic expression flowing from a thunder cloud. Symbols can also express more than one intention, even if they are contradictory, and so we have to study an individual for some time before we can get the drift of his or her symbolic expressions.⁸⁶

Dreaming is one of the ways in which a symbol is likely to make its first appearance. Since this symbolic manifestation is likely to have a collective influence behind it, a symbol can even express itself among large masses of people simultaneously. Our myths probably originate as extensions of dream reports or as daydream fantasies which capitalize on an inspirational prompting from the collective unconscious. Myths are never made up consciously; they arise from our collective unconscious.⁸⁷ In the primitive state, be-

cause *thinking* was just *happening* to human beings, a myth was nothing more than the recounting of this dreamlike experience.⁸⁸ In this sense, primitive thinking is similar to hallucinating. Myths can hold great truths for humanity, or they can mislead us entirely because they frequently convey meanings that are two-pronged or oppositional.

In his study of the dream symbols of his patients, Jung first began seeing parallels with mythological motifs. For example, a very young child would recite a dream to Jung that exactly paralleled some ancient Persian myth. The child could not have been taught the myth, for very few people even knew of it who were not classical scholars. Further, in his travels and studies of primitive peoples in America or Africa, Jung found that, though the content of a specific myth might change, the general story line was identical across cultural heritages which had no possible chance of contact. A common, almost instinctual, necessity for all peoples—including civilized peoples—to symbolize the very same theme in their myths seemed to exist. A good example is the masculine hero-figure who comes from out of nowhere to save a tribe or a civilization during a time of drought, moral decay, and so on. Though the specific content of the redeemer figure might vary—he could have been a fish, lizard, man, man-bird, or God-man—the commonalities of the myths were striking in story line.⁸⁹ After considerable study and deliberation, and after he found such common themes spontaneously arising in his own fantasies and dreams during his self-analysis, Jung adapted the Platonic-Augustinian term *archetype* in 1919 to account for such presumed expressions of a collective psyche.⁹⁰

Many people incorrectly conclude that

Jung believed in a fixed or *universal symbolism*. What he actually believed in was a reflection of *universal archetypes* in the psyche of all peoples. Though he admitted that symbols have to take on a relatively fixed content in order for us to grasp their meaning and to recognize them in different contexts—that symbols are relatively objective⁹¹—Jung was careful to point out that this necessity does *not* suggest a universal symbolism. He was very critical of Freud's tendency to ascribe a sexual significance to all elongated objects (male symbol) or enclosed places (female symbol).⁹² Jung believed that “you get caught in your own net if you believe in fixed, unalterable symbols.”⁹³ A sign can have fixed meaning, but never a symbol.

Symbols are what we come to know in consciousness as images (possibly set within a complex of ideas as well). They are what dimly shines through the veil of historical dust from out of our collective past. The archetype, on the other hand, though recognized after much study by its theme, is *never* seen as an image. It stands behind the light in the darkest reaches of the unconscious and expresses its meaning by somehow directing the light thrown symbolically upon our conscious understanding. Hence, the symbolic contents may vary, but the theme or motif (archetype) under expression remains the same. We might dream of a wheel, a cross, or a circle of dancing people; none of these symbols are universal, yet the archetype being expressed from behind such pictorial images (that is, self) would be one and the same, and even universally expressed. That is, in another culture than our own this archetype might tend to appear in dreams as a water lily, a joining of two rivers, or the sun.

Archetypes. We will take up Jung's concept of instinct below in the presentation of his motivational constructs, but it must be recalled at this point that the use of instincts to explain human behavior was very common at the turn of the twentieth century. Jung was no less attracted to this tactic than was Freud. If it is possible to think of the physical body as having evolved certain stylized ways of automatic behavior—called instincts to do this or that in a certain manner—then why is it not also possible for an evolving psyche to have its instinctual counterpart? And so Jung came to think of the recurring dream and mythological motifs as analogous to and based on the instincts. He defined the *instincts* as *typical modes of action* and then added that the archetype might suitably be described as the “*instinct's perception of itself*, or as the self-portrait of the instinct.”⁹⁴ Archetypes are thus typical ways the psyche has of understanding existence; they are stylized psychic behaviors reflecting the very essence of what the psyche intends to bring about, to learn, accomplish, or express.⁹⁵

Since they come from the deepest regions of the collective unconscious, the archetypes are also called *primordial images*.⁹⁶ Jung meant by this that archetypes are just like those collective thoughts that a primitive (primordial) human being had happen outside of directed thought. There is some problem at this point in distinguishing the concept of archetype from that of symbol, and universal from fixed-and-unchanging. That is, Jung at times used definitions of the archetype as innate “pre-existent imagoes”⁹⁷ or inherited “form determinants.”⁹⁸ Yet, he always insisted that, because they lack the language structure within which an idea must be framed (put into words), the archetypes cannot be *inherited ideas*.⁹⁹ Now, it is easy to confuse idea (word content) with image (pictorial content) and to forget Jung's

stress on the distinction between symbol and sign. Jung is saying that in having evolved and differentiated over the centuries, the psyche has become a process in which *symbolizing* takes place. This is the most fundamental nature of mind, as a teleological, symbolizing process. Ideas are framed within those signs that our culture teaches us as we grow up. Hence, the archetypes are at the root of that meaning that is symbolized *through* cultural names for certain images. We name a flower a water lily, but it is the image of this flower through which the archetype expresses meaning and *not* through the words (signs) *water* combined with *lily*. Language terms (signs) are used by mind, but they do not reveal the basic nature of mind, any more than what a hand *does* tells us about the hand's nature or its potentials for expression.

After all, hands are constructed in a certain way, with definite restrictions but also with innate potentials for expression. This hand paints a beautiful picture, and the delicacy of its movements gives us some idea of what its owner's life has been like, while that hand is preoccupied with stealing from others, thereby revealing an alternative possibility for the hand which might have been that of an artist's. Now, if we come upon a hand that steals, would we be justified in concluding that this is what the hand's basic nature *is*—a stealing organ? Hardly, for other hands paint. Clearly, what is inherited by the hand is its grasping and manipulating capacity, but we cannot find this capacity by looking at what the hand has learned to accomplish since birth. In fact, the hand's manipulative capacity is what made this learning possible. In the same way, by looking at the product of the mind's symbolizing nature—the fact that a language framing ideas is learned—we do *not* address the mind's basic nature. The mind uses ideas and is influenced by cultural factors as

people mature. But mind *is* a framer of meanings, and since it begins this process *from birth*, some potential for expressing meanings (archetypes) exists even before cultural influences like learning the alphabet and how to read have been undertaken. The mind does not have to wait on ideas to express meaning. Asking why the mind expresses meaning in the first place is like asking why the hand grasps in the first place.

Continuing our parallel, in the evolution of hands, the precise nature of fingers, how they work, and so on, depended on the use made of these appendages by the animals that possessed them. It would not be too wrong to say that hands mirror the past achievements of the animals possessing them, basing their form on the challenges and threats to survival that were overcome. The same goes for mind. The evolving psyche has had to confront, again and again, certain universal themes or motifs in human experience. These are the most basic themes of life, such as the fact that sexual identities differ in male-female relations, the awe sensed in confronting a superhuman essence (God), or the realization of a darker side to our personality. As the hand brings with it a manipulating capacity from birth, the mind brings a capacity to express the past meaningful concerns and preoccupations of those animals who were fortunate enough to have evolved such higher mentalities. The mind, or psyche as Jung called it, lacks specific contents for these archetypal thematic meanings. The culture within which a psyche meets experience will provide the items (and the words naming them) on the basis of which a symbolical analogy can be drawn—such things as water lilies, the sun, or people dancing in a circle—but it is the nature of the psyche to make such symbolizing possible.¹⁰⁰ And this symbolizing capacity has a

remnant of its past reflected in its very expressions; that is, it has meanings to express *from birth* but *not* ideas!

What then determines when an archetypal meaning will be expressed? Jung said that they must be beckoned forth by circumstances a particular person is facing, so that different archetypes operate in different lives.¹⁰¹ Jung once used the metaphor of a deep riverbed to explain what he meant by the archetype.¹⁰² Though past evolution washed such beds into each of our psyches, not all of us experience their influence. Not until a mental thunderstorm—a challenge, fascination, some problem—empties its contents into all of the available channels will this deepened pocket make itself known, as the shallow stream of mental activity swells into a mighty river, rumbling deep and quite out of its usual character. Possibly the most appropriate phrase Jung used to capture the meaning of archetypes was “*a priori* categories of possible functioning.”¹⁰³ They are *a priori* because they come to us through inheritance before birth, and are already there for possible but not necessary functioning *at birth*.

Over the years, thanks to his study of dreams, mythologies, legends, religions, and even alchemy, Jung came to classify two broad categories of archetypes. First, there were the *personifying archetypes*,¹⁰⁴ which naturally took on a humanlike identity when they functioned in the psyche. For example, there is the *anima* in man and its counterpart in woman, the *animus*. The *anima* represents all of man’s ancestral experiences with woman, and the *animus* represents all of woman’s ancestral experiences with man.¹⁰⁵ Jung believed that the most direct way in which the unconscious can influence us is through an act of *personification* (turning objects, moods, things into persons).¹⁰⁶ When

a primitive man anthropomorphized a rock, projecting unconsciously his subjective mental contents onto objective reality, this was personification; and when we now dream of a “wise old man,” that too is the personification of all of our inherited psychic experiences with wisdom, authority, cunning, and so forth.

The other category of primordial images Jung termed *transforming archetypes*. These are not necessarily personalities, but include typical situations, geometric figures, places, and ways and means that express the kind of transformation that might be taking place within the personality. We will be dealing with transforming archetypes when we take up Jung’s psychotherapy; some examples are the circle, quaternity (a set of four), and most important of all, the *self*. By and large, transforming archetypes emerge when the personality is moving for change and particularly that balancing change that will result in a total personality. Table 2 presents a list of Jungian archetypes.

Note that the shadow is an archetype. It will play an important role in psychotherapy, along with the *anima*. The ego and *persona* are not listed in the table because most of their content is conscious. As complexes framed within the unconscious, the shadow and the *self* are naturally more likely to express themselves (via symbols) archetypally. Jung always insisted that he had *discovered* the archetypes of Table 2. They were not *thought up* by him—as indeed it would be impossible to do—but rather identified and tentatively named only after years of painstaking research. One of the reasons he did not think it wise to memorize a list of archetypes was because new archetypes obviously might be discovered at any moment. Nor are the archetypes mutually exclusive designations. The Wise Old Man might appear in a dream as a wise old cockroach (Animal), or a clever clown (Trickster) who

Anima (including Soul, Life, Goddess, Witch)
Animal (various, as Horse, Snake, etc., including Theriomorphic Gods)
Animus
Child (including Child-God, Child-Hero)
Family
Father
God
Hermaphrodite (including Union of Opposites)
Hero (including Redeemer Figure, Mana Personality)
Hostile Brothers (or Brethren)
Maiden
Mother (including Earth Mother, Primordial Mother)
Order (or Number, Numbers 3, 4)
Original Man
Self (including Christ, Circle, Quaternity, Unity)
Shadow
Soul (including Mana)
Trickster (including Clown)
Wise Old Man (including Lucifer, Meaning)
Wotan (including Daemonic Power)

“It is no use at all to learn a list of archetypes by heart. Archetypes are complexes of experience that come upon us like fate, and their effects are felt in our most personal life.”¹⁰⁷

Table 2 A List of Jungian Archetypes

teaches us the clue to some puzzling problem. Fairy tales usually have interesting combinations of archetypal identities, and Jung often used such children’s stories as examples of his theoretical outlook.

The best approach to an understanding of the archetypes is to take up these constructs as they emerge naturally in the Jungian topic under consideration. One term that we should know at this point is *dominant(s)*. In some of his writings Jung seemed to use this term as synonymous with *archetype*,¹⁰⁸ but with this usage he also had in mind a special instance of archetypal manifestation. He seemed to use it when stressing the actual functioning, the bringing to bear of an archetype into the stream of mental fantasy—as during a dream, reverie, or other form of imagination. Thus, when archetypes are no longer potentialities but actualities underway as mental influencers, we may speak of them

as dominants.¹⁰⁹ It is possible for such an engaged archetype to influence an entire group of people communally. The Nazi swastika, for example, served as a symbolic intermediary for a dominant. Since all who fell under its sway were subject to the meaning it was expressing, we might even think of this as a kind of “daemonic” power of the symbol (the dominant Wotan lying beneath; see Table 2).

Motivational Constructs

Instinct and Energy

Though constructs like *instinct* and *energy* strike many people as mechanical terms and thus nonteleological, for Jung these meanings were quite otherwise. Jung thought of

life itself as an energy process, one that was always directed toward some goal. He said, "Life is teleology *par excellence*; it is the intrinsic striving towards a goal, and the living organism is a system of directed aims which seek to fulfill themselves."¹¹⁰ Energies are therefore expended in relation to goals, presumably even in the physical sphere, but unquestionably so in the psychic sphere. Self-direction or subjective direction implies a capacity for conscious, willful choice.¹¹¹ Jung saw this as an ego function in the personality,¹¹² and in opposition to the *will* he suggested an *instinct* concept. "According to my view, all those psychic processes over whose energies the conscious has no disposal come within the concept of the instincts."¹¹³ We say that our behavior is instinctive when our ego does not willfully direct it, so that it appears to be happening automatically.¹¹⁴ It rarely occurs to us that there may be *other* complexes with their own intentions bringing this "automatic" behavior about.

Jung rejected Freud's narrow definition of *libido* as the psychic energy of a sexual instinct. He acknowledged that medicine typically used the term *libido* to refer to sex, particularly to sexual lust; but Jung preferred to think of it in the sense first used by Cicero, as capturing "passionate desire, want, wish, or excited longing."¹¹⁵ In some of his writings Jung even used the term *hormé* (rather than *libido*), which is the Greek word for "attack, impetuosity, urgency, and zeal."¹¹⁶ All of these usages are highly telic in meaning. Even though he occasionally fell into this usage,¹¹⁷ Jung stated quite explicitly that *libido* was not to be hypostatized (made into a physical reality) and considered a psychic force.¹¹⁸ Admitting that he was at fault for seeming to use it in this sense on occasion,

Jung tried to clarify matters by noting that "technically, we should express the general tension in the *energetic* sense as *libido*, while in the *psychological sense relating to consciousness, we should refer to it as value.*"¹¹⁹ Thus, if we value something highly, it may be said to have a high concentration of *libido* attached to it. A woman who loves to knit, for example, has invested this activity with much *libido*. This is not to say that *libido* really exists as a physical or quasi-physical (psychic) energy, but it may be called an energy to help us understand the workings of the psyche. We have schematized Jung's views on psychical versus physical energy in Figure 11.

Note the mind-body dualism in Figure 11. Issuing from the mental region there is a psychic energy (*libido*) which in turn is experienced by the individual as a value intensity (desire) which in turn goes into the mental activities of symbol formation, thinking, willing, and so forth. Issuing from the body region there is a physical energy which in turn exerts a certain force intensity on the formation of actions we call behavior, the doing of things physically (including internal processes like digestion or breathing). At the extreme left side of Figure 11, we have the instinct that—as in all psychoanalytical theories—unites the mutual influence of mind and body within the personality. Jung makes it plain that instincts are partly psychic and partly physiological in nature.¹²⁰ But unlike Freud, who set *libido* loose in the mind by way of the sexual instinct and then explained all behavior on the vicissitudes of that *libido*, Jung has his instinctive counterpart (archetypes) built *directly* into the mind from the outset. Here is the heart of Jung's position.

Instinct is not an isolated thing, nor can it be isolated in practice. It always brings in its train archetypal contents of a spiritual nature,




Figure 11 Jung's Views on Psychological versus Physical Energy

which are at once its foundation and its limitation. In other words, an instinct is always and inevitably coupled with something like a philosophy of life, however archaic, unclear, and hazy this may be. Instinct stimulates thought, and if a man does not think of his own free will, then you get the compulsive thinking, for the two poles of the psyche, the physiological and the mental, are indissolubly connected. . . . Not that the tie between mind and instinct is necessarily a harmonious one. On the contrary it is full of conflict and means suffering.¹²¹

What instincts *really* are we shall never know, for they are in large measure nothing but convenient labels for organic and psychic factors about which we must honestly claim ignorance.¹²² But insofar as there is a tie between the physical and the mental, Jung called upon the theorist to admit of more than simply one or two instincts at play in human behavior. There is a sexual instinct, but even before it might come into play, there is surely also a nutritive instinct in operation.¹²³ There are probably also self- and species-preservative instincts to be seen in human behavior.¹²⁴ Jung did not accept the validity of a death instinct as such.

The psychic energy of libido can now be said to reflect itself in *any* of the instinctual ways.¹²⁵ An interest in cooking relates to our hunger, desiring protection from the elements

results from an instinctive wish to live out our days, and so forth; all such human behaviors are goal-directed or teleological. Bergson's concept of *élan vital* and Schopenhauer's concept of *Will* have much the same teleological meaning and it is therefore not surprising to find that Jung equated his concept of libido with these more philosophical notions.¹²⁶ Jung believed that we could get a relative idea of our personal (subjective) libidinal investments by asking ourselves how we *feel*—positively or negatively—about some aspect of life.¹²⁷ If we happen to like some one activity, person, or place more than another, the reason is because there is more libido potentially available for the former than for the latter.¹²⁸ Unconscious value preferences also exist, but our egos cannot put themselves in touch with them. To get at the deeper preference values, we must rely on dream analyses, parapraxes, free (word) associations, and so forth.¹²⁹

If our unconscious psyche begins to form complexes around a core of emotions that have value preferences included thanks to libido, it is possible for our egos in consciousness to be influenced by these values. A person's ego (I, me) can sense this value source as part of the internal psyche or project it

outwardly. This is how Jung believed religions were born. Primitive peoples sensed large concentrations of libido at the unconscious levels of the psyche as *mana*. Jung occasionally used this word as a synonym for *libido*.¹³⁰ To the primitive, *mana* means “extraordinarily potent” in the sense of supernatural or even divine power. A primitive person sensing *mana* (libido) issuing from the unconscious might therefore project it as coming from a mountain, which through personification is turned into a god; or the *mana* might be interpreted as either good or evil spirits (possibly both) that have taken possession of the individual from within.¹³¹

The Principle of Opposites

Jung once observed,

*I see in all that happens the play of opposites, and derive from this conception my idea of psychic energy. I hold that psychic energy involves the play of opposites in much the same way as physical energy involves a difference of potential, that is to say the existence of opposites such as warm and cold, high and low, etc.*¹³²

It is difficult to overstate the importance of the *principle of opposites* in Jungian psychology. If repression was the cornerstone construct of Freudian psychoanalysis, then Jung’s most basic conception was that of opposition. In fact, Jung believed that repression was a product of the psyche’s oppositional tendencies. For any given intention or wish, there is always and immediately an *opposite* wish suggested. Since every good intention has a corresponding bad one, it is only natural that certain of these intentions will have to be repressed.¹³³

Although the principle of opposites remains the basic mover of behavior, by slightly modifying two physical science principles, Jung made it appear—as Freud had before him—that libido behaves something like physical energy. The two principles borrowed from physical science were *equivalence* and *entropy*. Jung’s theory did not initially contain these principles. He introduced them later and devoted a minimal amount of space to them, but in an interesting manner he capitalized on their meaning for his own purposes. Both equivalence and entropy are related to the principle of constancy, which Freud found useful as a theoretical device to unite the psychological and the physical (see p. 52). The *principle of equivalence* states that “. . . for a given quantity of energy expended or consumed in bringing about a certain condition, an equal quantity of the same or another form of energy will appear elsewhere.”¹³⁴

Jung then added significantly to this conception by claiming that as *opposite intentions* (wishes) are conceived in the psyche, potential energy is put at the disposal of *either* alternative. If we repress some bad intention, then the libido of the rejected alternative is not simply lost to the psyche when repression takes place. The repressed alternative has set loose a certain amount of free libido in the mind, even as the chosen (good) alternative puts its libido to work by framing a conscious intention (we usually do what we think is right or good to do). For example, a woman must attend a meeting of an organization and present a report. She would like to avoid this responsibility, and for a fleeting second she imagines herself pretending sickness or quitting the organization. But quickly repressing this negative inclination, she attends the meeting and presents the report. This is the right or good thing to do. But her rejected (repressed) alternative of getting out of the duty has

turned loose free libido in her unconscious like some aimless intention which has potential for directing behavior later on.

This free libido can *constellate* (agglutinate) a complex in the psyche à la the adhesive model. It therefore happens that the more we deny our bad intentions and repress their contents without accepting them as having occurred to us, the more likely it is that free libido will flood the psyche with potential constellating power. By the *principle of entropy*, Jung meant an “equalization of differences” in the psyche, a tendency to vacillate more or less violently between the poles of opposition until a state of equilibrium or balance is reached.¹³⁵ Entropy thus served as a homeostatic rationale for the psychic energy of Jungian psychology. Like the constancy principle, entropy implied that energies seek a common level, but before they equalize there often is a burst of energy release, depending on how far apart the original split of the two opposites (intentions, attitudes, biases, and so on) has been. Jung referred to the extent of disbalance in the psyche as *one-sidedness*.¹³⁶

Note what has happened here: libido is seen to be generated by way of differentiation! As the teleological psyche frames an intention, differentiating the desired alternative (“I am going to help him with his work”) from its opposite alternative (“I wouldn’t help that bum out of this spot for anything”), libido is literally under spontaneous creation thanks to the act of discriminating between opposites. As we pull psychic opposites into independent contents, we turn psychic energy loose as if we had split a mental atom. Freudian libido is not generated in this way, except in the sense of a certain rejuvenation that takes place at puberty (see p. 70). This is an often-cited distinction made between the theories of Freud and Jung. But the more important points to keep in mind are that Jung based

his energy on the principle of opposites, and that teleology (intentional behavior) played a very important role in his view of mind. The *physical* principles of equivalence and entropy were certainly not based on teleology, nor did they require that opposites be involved in the generation or dispersion of any energy that might have arisen.

Complex Formation

Jung felt that the unconscious bears a *compensatory* or counterbalancing relationship with the conscious.¹³⁷ This is yet another reflection of the role of opposition in the psyche—to balance off what has become one-sided by bringing such mental contents into relation with their contradictions. Figure 12 presents Jung’s complex-formation model, broken down into five steps. Note first of all (step 1) that the unconscious should properly balance the conscious in what Jung sometimes called a *reciprocal relativity*. In other words, as the arrows indicate by being aimed in both directions, there is a mutual give-and-take across the levels of mind. A person like this listens to the promptings from his or her unconscious, takes the theme of a dream seriously enough to consider what it might be saying about personal attitudes and behaviors now manifest in consciousness, and so on. Furthermore, this person is openly accepting *all* of those attitudes and intentions which have been considered, those enacted overtly in behavior *and also* those turned aside as unworthy. Rather than repressing these latter, bad alternatives, the individual is accepting responsibility for having considered them. He or she *did* create these possibilities just as surely as the more acceptable ones. By keeping all alternatives




Figure 12 Jung's Complex-Formation Model

in consciousness like this, the person is able to use the free libido from the rejected alternative to shore up the ego. More importantly, this use of free libido consciously *prevents* formation of a complex at the unconscious level.

Formation of a complex would begin with the one-sided development and conscious recognition of only *certain* attitudes and intentions; that is, a person who is likely to develop a complex begins immediately repressing or denying the bad alternatives as if they had never really been considered. This could take place over many years in the development of the personality. Assume that as the ego was developing, the socially acceptable behaviors were being organized (agglutinated via adhesive model) into this ego complex. Over this same period of development, all of those pleasant mannerisms we put on in public—the politeness and cheeriness when we feel rotten, the pretended concern about the health of people whom we basically dislike—would be going to form our persona complex (masks). Since each of the good and stronger aspects of behavior has its opposite possibility, we can think of several behavior potentials which have *not* been incorporated into consciousness. We have symbolized this (step 2) by arrows pointing down into unconsciousness, with no counterbalancing arrows pointing back into consciousness. Many of these behaviors would of course go down and form into our shadow.

Now, unless we are aware that we do indeed *have* a shadow, and that those immoral and unfair behaviors we see in others are actually *in us too* (as rejected alternatives under projection), we will begin to develop a one-sidedness in our psyches. Another type of one-sidedness occurs when we identify our egos with our masks, when we think that the superficial face we show to others is *really* who we are. This also makes us likely to be manipulated by the group (see p. 195),

because the group sets the styles incorporated by the persona complex. We might now believe ourselves to be one of the “in-people” or the “beautiful” (“chic,” “cool,” and so on) people to be admired and accepted by all. At this point, the unconscious as a compensatory—oppositional, balancing—process takes steps to call up our *other* side.¹³⁸ This is not a mechanical but an intentional (telic) process.

On the night of our greatest triumph as an actor or an athlete, we might have a dream in which we suffer stage fright or cause our team to lose in an athletic contest. The next morning we might remark to our friend how strange it is that we should dream of failure at precisely the time when everything is going so well for us. If only we knew! This dream could be an oppositional-meaning expression, warning us like an alarm bell from the unconscious that says, “Look, don’t go overboard and think you are extra special because you had this great triumph. You aren’t so perfect, there is a side to your nature that is anything but admirable.”

If some such change in mental attitude does not occur, greater one-sidedness continues to develop, which means that more and more free libido is set loose in the psyche. The additional libido set loose by this vicious cycle is symbolized at step 2 by the phrase “extra libido via disbalance.” Now, all of this free libido is eventually drawn into the unconscious, because the intentions to which it has been attached have not and are not consciously acknowledged. It is important to stress that Jung never said all psychic intentions must be overtly *acted out* by the individual. If we have a socially inappropriate prompting, he is not saying that we must actually do the immoral thing that has

occurred to us. What we must do to avoid complex formations of an abnormal type (using these very intentions!) is consciously to recognize that we have created them, been tempted by them, and put them aside for reasons we value above them. This keeps their libido in consciousness where it can be used constructively, rather than going into unconscious-complex formations. Consciousness can always use free libido, as to lend support to the ego when the person occasionally tries to “go at reality” *without* persona masks. It takes courage (feelings drawing on libido) to “be your own person” or to “know who you really are.”

If we do not have some means for becoming aware of and admitting consciously to our shadow or alter ego, and if we continue to repress and ignore the warning signs contained in our dreams or parapraxes (slips of tongue, and so on), then in time the free libido that constellates unconscious contents must necessarily form a large, potent complex of some sort. We have symbolized this at step 3. Note that as the complex forms, as the contents of the unconscious agglutinate, all kinds of mental contents may go to make it up. Thus, a complex might include not only those things we never were—never did before—but also various archetypal identities can form into the complex by way of symbolical expression. The archetype at step 3 is the small star-burst moving up from the collective unconscious to agglutinate with the other contents of the complex. We will have more to say of how archetypes do this when we take up Jung’s theory of psychopathology (see especially Figure 15). The shadow does not always combine into the complex, but usually it does and so we present it this way for simplification. Since the newly forming com-

plex has considerable libido at its disposal, thanks to the extensive repressions and the one-sidedness of the individual, it can now emerge into consciousness under its own power (step 4). This is what we were alluding to above (p. 188), in referring to the sudden change that came over “good old Charlie.” When the shadow-in-combination with other unconscious factors comes into consciousness, it presents the *other side* of the personality. At this point the actor may indeed suffer a case of stage fright or an athlete might in fact perform some uncharacteristic error to lose a contest for the team. We are no longer in the dream world but in reality, but even so the unconscious is still attempting to compensate the conscious. The complex would in this case still be trying to bring the person down from the inflated level.

Step 5 completes the schematization of Table 12, showing the complex now fully established within consciousness but outside of the control of consciousness. Neither the ego nor the persona have any control over the complex. Things are not necessarily in a very bad way as yet for the personality. There is still time to rectify what we might now call a mild neurosis. The former man’s man (mask) may cry easily now, or the mild-mannered schoolteacher (mask) might begin losing her temper rather frequently. If such behaviors can be accepted by these individuals, all may go reasonably well for their personalities, which now have color if not eccentricity. A final word: we have sketched the course of complex formation around the nondevelopment and repression of conventionally negative behaviors. But in theory, a subcultural deviant, like a delinquent or criminal who denies his or her better promptings, could also form a good or guilt-laden complex in time. The model should work with any coupling of behaviors, as long as those behaviors are oppositional.

*Psychic Determinism:
Causality versus Synchronicity*

Surely the complex that emerges into consciousness, popping up from below as a cork might break water level if released from one's grasp beneath the sea, must be thought of as a completely self-contained, *determined* entity. Jung cautioned against the naive view that we humans are what we consciously think we are as a personality. "The truth is that we do not enjoy masterless freedom; we are continually threatened by psychic factors which, in the guise of 'natural phenomena,' may take possession of us at any moment."¹³⁹ Not only are we influenced by unconscious personal forces in Jungian psychology, but the psychic inheritance from antiquity enters in to direct our fate to some degree. Racial-historical promptings within the collective unconscious that have been differentiated but denied consciousness *also* may form into a complex. Regardless of how a complex arises in consciousness, once it is there we can confront it and deal with it as if it were another personality within our personality.

We do not *have* to submit to our complexes any more than we have to be only one sort of conscious person in the first place. We can understand and admit to all of our attitudes, even the less desirable ones, yet ultimately direct our own fate by coming to know the unconscious ground plan written for us collectively—and then *modifying* it to suit our unique purposes. As Jung once said of himself: "I had to obey an inner law which was imposed on me and left me no freedom of choice. Of course I did not always obey it. How can anyone live without inconsistency?"¹⁴⁰ This paradoxical outlook makes Jung a *hard determinist* in the psychic sphere, but a *soft determinist* in the sphere of overt behavior. A hard determinist believes that everything takes place as it *had to* happen, and that events could not have gone

otherwise than they did. A soft determinist claims that although many things *had to* happen as they did, at least some of the events that took place could have gone otherwise (see Chapter 4, p. 262 for a discussion of determinism).

Even better evidence justifies the claim that Jung actively rejected the hard determinist's position. Probably more than any other psychoanalyst, Jung wrestled with the problems of whether or not it is possible for the cause-effect principle to explain all that we know of human behavior. When Jung used *cause-effect* here, he referred to *efficient* causation (see p. 2 of the Introduction for a discussion of the various forms of causation). How can this deterministic view explain the strange and eerie experiences we know as "psychic phenomena," like telepathy, clairvoyance, or extrasensory perception? For example, what do we say when a train ticket purchased in the morning on our way into the city bears the identical six-digit number that a theater ticket purchased in the afternoon bears? And then, upon returning home in the evening, we find a message to return a telephone call—once again, with the same six numbers!¹⁴¹

We probably call such events chance occurrences, yet they have such meaningful impact that they can be among the most important determiners of our life's style. Take the case of a daughter who dreams of her mother's death at the exact hour this parent is killed in an automobile accident. The impact of this chance experience is of monumental importance to the daughter's life thereafter, yet cause-effect theories of physical science must dismiss these coincidences as happenstance and hence of no theoretical importance. Jung could not accept this shortsighted view, and as if to give such paranormal




Figure 13 Jung's View of Synchronicity

happenings acceptability, he coined a term to cover them.

The term he selected was *synchronicity*, a concept stressing the fact that meanings can emerge in the patterning of events when we disregard the before-after determiners of actions in (efficient) causation. Thus, Jung referred to synchronicity as *meaningful coincidence*, *acausal orderliness*, or *meaningful cross-connection*.¹⁴² These cross-connections are not cause-effects, but rather a kind of falling into pattern which cuts across the antecedent-consequent succession of events over time. Indeed, synchronicity is an effort to explain events with time left out of the explanation as a cause of anything. Such causes are going on, and time can be said to be slipping by, but the patterning within time that is synchronicity has nothing specifically to do with time. We have tried to get this idea across in Figure 13. Note that there are four arrows running from left to right:

these represent a chain of cause-effect lines over time. The "time dimension" heading at the top of the figure represents a series of before-after, A-to-B causal connections over time. The inscription on the extreme left indicates a series of four such A-to-B causal connections running over time. These four time dimensions can be thought of as running along, parallel to each other but without affecting each other in the A-to-B causal sense.

Think of these as four lines of events taking place over time. These could be the life events of four different people. Or two lines could represent people's lives and the other two could refer to inanimate events like the passage of the sun across the sky during the day and the passage of the moon at night (actually, both planets continuing their passage throughout the lives of these people). Anything at all might be represented as long as these are seemingly four independent series of causal events (A-to-B, A-to-B, and so on). Using *S* to symbolize

synchronicity, we can now demonstrate that this refers to the cross-connections between any two (or more) time dimensions: S-to-S' or vice versa. Rather than cause-effects, these interrelated and highly meaningful patterns emerge within the time series but not in a space-time sense. One happening (S) interlaces meaningfully with another happening (S'), neither of which can possibly be explained on the basis of before-after or proximity (closeness) to one another.

We have symbolized the synchronistic pattern by showing three dotted circles. Suppose a young woman experiences a sudden sense of alarm at 9:10 A.M. (S) on a certain day, only to learn subsequently that at precisely that instant (accounting for time changes) her fiancé had sustained a battle wound (S') halfway around the earth from her. This would be a perfect example of synchronicity that occurred simultaneously at two different points in space. We can think of this as the center circle of Figure 13, because the girl's life (top line) touched her fiancé's life (bottom line) at a precise moment of danger and injury, creating a meaningful cross-connection. However, it is not necessary for synchronous events to occur at the identical time like this.¹⁴³ Time is not germane to the explanation. We might dream of a friend's good fortune after he or she had experienced some great success but had not yet found the time to contact us by telephone. Or we might also dream of something that had not yet happened, but that will in fact take place some time later. In either of these cases, the S and S' connections of Figure 13 might vary over time, and tilting the dotted circle backward and then forward in time is our attempt to illustrate this conception of a pattern entirely beyond time factors. It is immaterial which way we think of the S and S' occurrences, but we do not believe that one *causes* the other in any case. Nor is it a matter of one S predicting the S',

because the issue is not A-to-B (efficient) causality.

Adjustment Mechanisms

Repression versus Suppression. Jung believed that *repressions* start as voluntary *suppressions*, that we actively try to keep something disliked (bad) out of consciousness, and then in time the boundary between consciousness and unconsciousness is crossed by the negative mental content and a repression results.¹⁴⁴ The reasons for repression were as varied for Jung as they were for Freud (see Chapter 1), but of course, Jung did not find quite so many sexual involvements in repressed material as Freud did. Sometimes we might dislike feeling guilt over our behavior and actually repress a *moral* impulse to do the right thing for past sins and take our medicine. In this case, the right impulses become a bad alternative because we do not want to be punished, so we end up repressing our better side.

Projection versus Introjection. We have already seen that Jung made extensive use of the *projection* construct. He viewed this as unconscious and automatic,¹⁴⁵ in most cases resulting when one individual transfers psychic contents onto another.¹⁴⁶ Only the unconscious can project, and this mechanism is one of the oldest in the history of humanity.¹⁴⁷ What we actually do in projection is to blur the distinction between subjective and objective experience. The "in here" becomes the "out there" as we attribute our subjective beliefs to objective reality. *Introjection* is the other side of the coin, since it blurs or fails to differentiate between object and subject; in this case the "out there" becomes the "in here" as we accept the beliefs or behavioral patterns of others as our own.¹⁴⁸

Compensation, Balance, and Wholeness. Jung admitted that he had borrowed the idea of *compensation* from Alfred Adler, who had introduced the concept (see Chapter 2).¹⁴⁹ As we noted in the discussion of complex formation above, the unconscious is said to compensate and help *balance* off the personality. Once the personality is balanced Jung spoke of it as having achieved *wholeness*, so that all three of these meanings interrelate. Jung also used the term *compensate* in a special way, as when he suggested that the anima could compensate the persona.¹⁵⁰ We will take up this usage below, when we discuss Jung's approach to psychotherapy.

Differentiation (Discrimination) and Opposition. Since Jung used these terms to explain the adjustment mechanisms, we should consider them as such. Repression was further explained as a loss in *differentiation* between the conscious and unconscious, or projection was said to be a failure in discrimination between subjective and objective experience. Jung believed that the human being's ability to make such differentiations is due to the principle of opposites. Since we can readily see duality in experience, we can always split it up into *that* and *not-that*, many times over. A period of time in the bathtub is enjoyable, but when the water is too hot the experience *is not* what it *is* otherwise. As infants and children, we break up our experience through such *oppositional contrasts* even before we have words to name things hot or cold.

Identification, Possession, Numinous, Assimilation, and Inflation. In the classic psychoanalytical sense, Jung would accept *identification* as one type of introjection, and he even referred to it as *unconscious imitation*

—as when we take in (introject) a parental attitude and make it our own.¹⁵¹ However, when Jung used this term in the context of analytical psychology, he was usually referring to imitations of one aspect of the personality by another. We have already seen this above, where we said that the ego could identify with the persona (see p. 187). It is also common in Jungian psychology to hear of the ego identifying with a potent complex that has emerged from unconsciousness into consciousness (combining the shadow).¹⁵² Since this complex might also bring an archetype into its constellation, Jung occasionally referred to an *identification with the archetype*.¹⁵³ When this happens, Jung would say that a *possession* has taken place, in that now the personality is under direction by unconscious meanings which have fixed on a symbol to almost hypnotize the person. To capture this idea of a power under which the individual falls, Jung borrowed a term from Rudolf Otto: *numinosum*.¹⁵⁴ A numinous mental content occurs to the person as an idea, hunch, or even an image of what something is or is about to become in some really important sense. Something *big* is always taking place in a numinous mental event, so that it is sensed as containing a power beyond reason. These are superhuman conceptions which often imply that something divine is being expressed. The idea, which arose in ancient Jerusalem, that “God is born on earth” was an example of such a numinous idea. A less-benign example was the one mentioned above (p. 195), of how a community fell under the dominant in the Nazi swastika. This symbol had a numinous quality about it. Almost always, when we have a numinous experience developing in a single personality or in a collective group, there is an archetype involved.

If the ego identifies with the complex or the archetype contained within it, an *inflation* of the personality can take place.¹⁵⁵ In

other words, the ego can presume that it has the superhuman power (numinosity) of the complex causing it to inflate its importance.¹⁵⁶ Assume that a man has the idea that he is the son of Satan. Jung would say that this man had, upon forming a complex through the steps of Figure 12, constellated a daemonic power (Lucifer) archetype in it and now has identified with these contents to presume that he is an offspring of the devil (or is the devil himself). The same would go for a woman who thinks she is the Blessed Virgin Mary (that is, a variation of the Earth Mother archetype; see Table 2). Another term that Jung sometimes used to describe a special type of identification—really a unification—was *assimilation*. By this he meant the enveloping of one psychic identity by another, so that the engulfed identity is literally no longer differentiated in the personality. Thus, Jung said the self could assimilate the ego in toto, which would *not* be a good thing for the personality.¹⁵⁷

Progression versus Regression. Jung took these terms from Freud but modified them to suit his own purposes (see p. 47). *Progression* was interpreted teleologically “as the daily advance of the process of psychological adaptation.”¹⁵⁸ *Regression*, on the other hand, was the “backward movement of libido” that takes place when the person is trying to recapture something important in his or her past.¹⁵⁹ Although he referred to something like it in a few of his writings, Jung did not really make use of the concept of *fixation*. Regressions happen all right, and libido (life energy) is blocked resulting in a re-experience of early memories—even reaching back into the racial history—but this is seen differently from Freud due to Jung’s teleological interpretation of libido. Something that is telic works forward, as a reason that is being expressed or an end (telos) toward which life is progressing. If libido flowed

backward at some point, it would seem to be reversing the usual course of telic advance.

Why then does regression take place? The reason for the return of libido is not to recapture pockets of fixated libido as Freud would have it; rather, the individual in regressing is attempting to rekindle a self-awareness that he or she lost in the past.¹⁶⁰ Regression is a compensatory attempt on the part of the personality to return (regress) to that point in time when healthy progression was forsaken and a one-sided development began. The going back is only the first step in a total effort to reinstate more balanced progression. The perfectionist now admits to occasional errors and laziness, the pessimist now confesses having a spark of optimism from time to time, and so on. Life’s progression is now more whole than before.

Constellation and Mobilization. By *constellation* Jung meant: “. . . the fact that the outward situation [external life circumstance] releases a psychic process in which certain [psychic] contents gather together and prepare for action. . . . The constellated contents are definite complexes possessing their own specific energy.”¹⁶¹ This definition stresses the energetic potential, the fact that a significant amount of libido is made available for an organizing of psychic contents. In terms of our adhesive model, however, we can say that the psychic meanings that are constellated have been *mobilized* into a single body of importance or significance.¹⁶² This is so because Jung did in fact speak of the mobilization of complexes like the shadow, for example, or he referred to the mobilization of one’s psychic virtues as a first step toward self-realization.¹⁶³

Individuation and Transcendence. These mental mechanisms will be considered in great

detail under the psychotherapy headings. But we will now simply observe that in Jungian psychology the process of self-realization involves differentiating a totality called the self from the different parts of the personality, including the collective unconscious. This process of differentiating the self is termed *individuation*.¹⁶⁴ Life is teleological, and its most treasured goal is this final emergence of a completely total individuality. To accomplish this desired end, we must *transcend* (rise above) what we are, consider what we are not (opposition), evaluate the pressures put on us by the collective to follow its dictates, and then emerge as a uniquely individuated totality. Jung used this concept of transcendence to describe the process whereby all of the opposites and group pressures are finally united in the personality.¹⁶⁵

Time-Perspective Constructs

Jung did not work out the elaborate psychosexual levels that we find in Freud (Chapter 1). He was critical of Freud's efforts to explain behavior by tracing it to early fixation points. This criticism stems from his telic interpretation of progression, libido, and so on.¹⁶⁶ If life is oriented toward goals in a purposive sense, then what does it add to retrace our theoretical steps in order to find the presumed meanings of the past? Even so, Jung did outline some general periods in the life cycle.

Presexual Period

Jung accepted as Freud had the Darwinian-Lamarckian principle that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny (see Chapter 1, p. 65). He thus believed that children re-enacted in their growth of consciousness after birth the

prehistoric development of consciousness by humanity.¹⁶⁷ He stressed the influence of our racial history enough to suggest that our true fathers and mothers are not our parents but our grandparents.¹⁶⁸ Children are not born empty-headed or tabula rasa, said Jung (see p. 11 of the Introduction for a discussion of this concept). We find mythological themes in the dreams of three- and four-year-olds which belong more properly in the dreams of grown-ups.¹⁶⁹ Of course, in the very early days and months of life, children cannot report their dreams to us because they lack consciousness as well as language.

Recall that consciousness begins in the child's differentiation of *I* or *me* (subjective identity) from *that* or *it* (objective reality). This is the first step in acquiring knowledge, and it occurs through the principle of opposites. But the second step in acquiring knowledge takes place when the infant puts two psychic contents into a (meaningful) relation, such as tying the visual image of mother to the sensations of satisfaction from taking in nourishment (drinking milk).¹⁷⁰ The child learns "mother brings milk to me" even before this insight can be put into actual words. For the rest of life, knowledge continues on this basis of first drawing oppositional discriminations and then uniting delineated items into meaningful relationship in consciousness. Jung did not believe that the sexual instinct is active in the presexual stage. This period of life is characterized almost entirely by the processes of nutrition and (both physical and psychological) growth.¹⁷¹ It is a time of no real problems for the person, because serious contradictions have not yet arisen in consciousness.¹⁷²

Prepubertal Period

This period sets in around ages three to five, depending on the particular child's tempo of development. The sexual instinct begins

to develop in this period, and it is a time of rapidly expanding consciousness because the child will be entering school. Education is a major means of extending consciousness.¹⁷³ The prepubertal period remains a fairly carefree time of life, because the child is still heavily identified with the parental family and many of the problems in life are thus answered for him or her, thanks to what might be termed dependency.¹⁷⁴

Jung could never bring himself to believe in the legitimacy of incestuous desires on the part of all children, as Freud's theory called for. Jung felt the word *incest* has a definite meaning, describing an individual who cannot direct sexual promptings to a proper object. But to use this term to describe a child who has not yet attained mature sexual functioning was for Jung a gross misuse of language.¹⁷⁵ He did not deny that cases of incestuous desire for parents could be found in any clinical practice. He merely pointed out that in such actual cases of incest the child was brought into an abnormal relationship through the attitudes of his or her parents.¹⁷⁶ As to the normal person who might "recall" having fantasied sexual relations with a parent, Jung said these reminiscences were merely the repressed half of an intention that passed through the individual's mind while he or she was learning about sex. When we learn about sexual intercourse around pubescence, it is only natural for us to think of this act in relation to our opposite-sex parent as well as other potential objects. A fleeting "possible intention" of this sort is repressed because of its inappropriateness; later in life it might come back as a "memory." Actually, we had never fantasied sexual copulation with our parent in infancy at all. Jung stressed that we should not feel guilty about an incest memory when it arises; we should merely accept it as the mind's ever-ready capacity to suggest possibilities, even unacceptable ones.¹⁷⁷

Pubertal Period

Puberty, of course, has its onset sometime between the tenth and the thirteenth year of life. Jung felt that most females leave their pubertal phase around age nineteen or twenty. Males were said to continue on to age twenty-five before they have seen the last of their pubertal phase.¹⁷⁸ Physiologically speaking, the estimates of a completed puberty are usually much earlier (ending in the middle teens). We note here a tendency on Jung's part to stretch out the life span considerably, so that a person is not psychologically "complete" in life nearly as early as the infantile bias of psychoanalysis would suggest.

Because of the many challenges facing the individual in this period, Jung felt that "true psychic birth" takes place in the pubertal time of life.¹⁷⁹ Not only does the sexual instinct mature to place a major burden on the person for gratification, but also there is the problem of having to settle on a work or career goal. The range of social relations also extends, so that there are all sorts of problems concerned with establishing a proper identity among gang peers. Although this shift to peers aids in the differentiation from family ties, there is sometimes a too-great reliance put on the persona at this time. There is always the threat of identification with the persona. Parents may object to friends, proposed marital partners, or the choice of an occupation. Decisions have to be made and put into effect, and loyalties have to be decided upon. For the first time in life, the person is seriously threatened by the likelihood of a one-sided development.¹⁸⁰

Youth

The next period sets in at roughly twenty to twenty-five and runs to about thirty-five

or forty. By this time the separation (differentiation) from family dependency should have been completed, or the person is in for serious psychological trouble. For example, Jung felt that a problem like male homosexuality is crystallized during this period, because of the fact that a man is unable "to free himself from the anima fascination of his mother."¹⁸¹ But for most of us youth is the time of marriage, the rearing of offspring, the purchase and establishment of a home, and the striving for a modicum of success in a career or occupation. In short, it is a time of increasing responsibilities and increasing consciousness (meanings, knowledge).

Middle Life

At about age forty we enter the second half of life, and now there is an entirely new psychic challenge for the individual, based in part on the fact that he or she has already lived this long, and in part on the fact that the meaning of life is not *only* on the side of consciousness. That is, in line with his opposition principle, Jung believed that people spend this first half of life enlarging consciousness by way of learning, acquiring possessions (including offspring) and experiences, investing themselves in the world of affairs, and so forth. This is right and proper, but as we are fashioning this one side of our psyche, we must necessarily be slighting the other side, *unconsciousness*. Thus, without turning his back on the realities of consciousness, Jung said that the individual past middle life must *also* now further the knowledge of that inner nature that he or she has been neglecting. And the proper time to begin it is now, in middle life, when the rewards of

an active growth to this point begin to bear fruit. Children are now grown and leaving home to fashion their own lives. Work has begun to pay off with positions of responsibility allowing for some delegation of the actual work load to other, younger people. Social demands are lessened. This is the beginning of a new life order.

Old Age

Once past sixty or sixty-five we have to accept a time of life in which the term *old age* is appropriate simply because this is the reality of the life cycle. Jung took more interest in the psychology of the aged than any other major personality theorist. He believed that the older person must live by different ground rules than he or she had thus far been observing. The older person must never look back, but rather "look inward." People at this age have a marvelous chance for individuation because they have now lived long enough to experience many different situations as well as their opposites. Jung believed that it was necessary for a balancing counterweight to express itself in the latter half of life because "man's values, and even his body, do tend to change into their opposites."¹⁸² Physiologically, the male becomes more feminine and the female masculine, and psychologically too there is a counterbalancing of psychic attitude by the anima or animus between the sexes.

Jung believed that a life directed toward a goal is in general one that is better, richer, and healthier than an aimless life, or one that is discouraged about the future. As he expressed it, "I am convinced that it is hygienic—if I may use the word—to discover in death a goal towards which one can strive, and that shrinking away from it is something unhealthy and abnormal which robs the second half of life of its purpose."¹⁸³ This is where the primordial image of a life

after death plays such an important role in humanity's existence, as a goal reaching beyond the grave. If an older person were to consult Jung and complain of a depression or an anxious emptiness (loss of identity), Jung might well say after a period of studying the patient, "Your picture of God or your idea of immortality is atrophied [wasting way], consequently your psychic metabolism is out of gear."¹⁸⁴ The individual's archetypal prompting was being denied, and he or she had to pay the penalty of such repression. Thus it is that in Jungian psychology religious expressions are not taken lightly, as sublimated parental dependencies or the like, but rather are considered extremely important manifestations of the collective unconscious. In continuing the teleology which is life into an afterlife, these archetypal symbolisms are to be cultivated, personified, and understood as important psychic necessities.

Immaturity Rather than Fixation

Jung admitted that there is a tendency for people at all ages to look back to an earlier time in life when things seemed to be working out better for them. The teen-aged boy wishes that he could have that feeling of simple certainty and security that the protection of the parental home had given him. The married woman of thirty wishes she had the freedom of her teen-age years. The aging man of sixty wishes he had the vigor of his thirties. All of these natural desires for a replay of the life cycle are normal enough. Life is challenging, there are constant decisions and commitments to be made, and one might easily sentimentalize about a bygone day.

If the individual has not actually become free from the childhood environment with its dependency upon parents and other adults, leading to an immature outlook on life in adulthood, Jung would call this *immaturity*

rather than *fixation*.¹⁸⁵ It is a failure on the part of the individual to develop rather than a damming-up of libido into pockets of fixation. How can something that never was underway become blocked? Hence, as we noted above, the phenomenon of regression was for Jung a teleological attempt to return to an earlier time in life and thereby rekindle that opportunity for self-growth (progression) that had been overlooked or shunted aside by the individual.

Individual-Differences Constructs

Jung was very sensitive to the problems of typing people, and he undertook the task with some reluctance. He felt that when we name a type, we are speaking about statistical averages and not about people.¹⁸⁶ The danger in this is that the theorist may force his conceptions onto others in an arbitrary way, more to justify a point of view than to capture the accuracy of the individual case. For his part, Jung wanted a scheme that could capture the obvious complexity of behavior yet also not lose the open-ended features of the psyche. He was interested in the general problem of how it was that we came to type personalities in the first place. Jung therefore turned to history, and he studied a number of earlier typologies to find some common thread among them. Thanks to his scholarly approach, Jung moves us in his book *Psychological Types* (1946, first published circa 1920) over the ages from the early Greeks like Plato and Aristotle, through the thought of churchmen like Tertullian and Origen, down to the more recent views of psychologists like Friedrich Nietzsche and William James.

Running through this history of personality description, Jung found that a common

dimension of opposition was suggested. He named this bipolar dimension the *introversion versus extraversion* polarity in psychic attitude. Thus, for example, Nietzsche's Apollonian and James's tenderminded types were introverted in psychic attitude, and the opposite types of Dionysian and toughminded were extraverted.¹⁸⁷ This classification was helpful, but Jung also needed a way of explaining how the various psychic behaviors we know of as thinking, seeing, or feeling were ordered mentally even before we could speak of them as taking place in an introverted or extraverted manner. Basing his line of theoretical development on the nature of the psyche as an active agent, Jung then named a series of what he called *functions*.

Basic Functions of the Psyche

Jung's construct of *function* can be thought of in two ways: as a psychological or an energetic (libidinal) tendency to remain constant in order to judge the changing conditions of experience. Judgment always calls for a fixed standard or frame of reference against or within which to relate what we are considering. For example, we use a standard measuring unit (ruler) to judge whether one fish is really longer than another. Knowing that our finances are fixed by a certain level of income, we can judge whether some desirable item (like an imported sports car) is to be considered a potential purchase or not. The psyche needs its set of fixed coordinates within which to evaluate and order the many sensations, feelings, hunches, and ideas that arise in the course of life. That is, as consciousness is expanding through differentiation and the drawing of relationships between items in experience, a few fixed frames of reference permit the (unconscious

as well as conscious) psyche to judge what is taking place, whether events change, what the potentials of any item are for the future of the person, and so on.

As Freud could do (see p. 44), Jung occasionally gave his constructs both a psychological and an energetic interpretation. Thus, Jung defined the *function* psychologically as "a certain form of psychic activity that remains theoretically the same under varying circumstances."¹⁸⁸ Considered energetically, a *function* was a constant libido expenditure, a means of keeping libido channeled into a fixed activity. If we need some basic continuity in the psyche so that we can recognize changes by way of contrasts to these regularities, then how many such functions are necessary to cover our psychic needs? Since these needs are like structural features of the mind, we might have taken them up under our structural-construct discussion. We did not do so because they were written specifically for individual differences. Jung felt that four functions could properly account for the basic psychic equipment of human beings, as follows:

There are four aspects of psychological orientation, beyond which nothing fundamental remains to be said. In order to orient ourselves, we must have a function which ascertains that something is there (sensation); a second function which establishes what it is (thinking); a third function which states whether it suits us or not, whether we wish to accept it or not (feeling); and a fourth function which indicates where it came from and where it is going (intuition).¹⁸⁹

The functions are part and parcel of the psyche. In one sense they define the psyche in action. In theory, all four functions begin as conscious psychic activities,¹⁹⁰ but in short order we begin to rely on one or two in consciousness rather than all four. Before

we take up this question of function selection, let us give more extensive consideration to the functions as such. Note first of all that they are paired opposites, and two such pairs make up the total model. Thinking is the opposite of feeling, and sensation is the opposite of intuition. *Thinking* is the function that allows for thought to take a direction, to begin with a premise then follow it through to a conclusion only to infer another premise, and so forth, in what we call *reasoning*.¹⁹¹ Thinking therefore permits us to understand the nature of things, to assess their meaning, and to infer their usefulness. Its opposite, *feeling*, can also be brought to bear in assessment. However, unlike directed thought, feeling is a process that takes place between the subjective ego and another mental content based on *value*.¹⁹² Does the ego like or dislike the item under consideration? If liked, then more libido is involved and an idea might be taken on without thinking it through logically. Thought demands evaluation by way of clear-cut statements, but feeling tones allow us to settle questions without deliberation. In buying a house, the thinker-type person evaluates the construction of the building, interest charges, the neighborhood and so on, whereas the feeling-type person walks through the door and “knows” whether it is suitable or not. In this sense, thinking and feeling must always contradict each other.

Even so, Jung considered both thinking and feeling to be *rational functions*.¹⁹³ We tend to think of emotional decisions as prone to be illogical and to that extent nonrational. But Jung was driving at the fact that both thinking and feeling are concerned with judging the worth, truth value, significance, or import of a mental content. This always involves a subjective factor, because what is valuable to one person may not be valuable to another. Thinking emphasizes truth versus falsity or plausible versus implausible, and

feeling emphasizes like versus dislike or attraction versus repulsion, but in either case the *point* of the function is to judge or assess, and the very essence of rationality is judgment, the making of decisions, or the choosing of an alternative.

The other set of opposites Jung called the *irrational functions*. He did not mean that they are contrary to reason but merely outside of the province of reason. They are not psychic functions that have as their role the directed judgment and assessment of mental contents, but rather they make psychic material available so that such reasoning processes can be carried out. They are to that extent more on the automatic, reflexive side of mental life. *Sensation* is that psychological function that transmits physical stimuli to psychic awareness.¹⁹⁴ We can think of this as meaning “conscious perception,” that is, being directly aware of objective reality as sensed by our organs designed to register such incoming stimuli from the environment. Seeing, hearing, touching—all of those psychic activities that put us in touch with the objective world are aspects of the sensation function.

In contrast to this way of knowing experience, Jung defined the *intuition* function as “unconscious perception.”¹⁹⁵ Just as consciousness takes in sensory data, so too can the unconscious automatically perceive the inherent possibilities of a situation as a kind of unconscious perception.¹⁹⁶ The intuitive-type person buys a house that the sensation-type individual has “seen” to be very plain and uninteresting, but with a few structural changes and some exciting color combinations on renovation, turns the place into a beautiful home. The intuitive person perceived what the sensation person did not—the possibilities inherent in this house! Sometimes the intuited input goes contrary to the

sensory input of the same person, so that even though we might consciously perceive no danger in a situation, our intuition tells us that something “bad” is going to happen. The fact that Jung accepted an intuitive function in human behavior places him in a unique position among personality theorists, most of whom would attempt to reduce this intuitive knowledge to something else in the psyche. Jung took intuition at face value, recognizing that yet undiscovered stimuli may account for these reactions which do seem to occur to people.

We come back now to the question of function selection. This arises because we have to keep our conscious style of behavior consistent in interpersonal relations.¹⁹⁷ It would not do to jump about in consciousness from a thinking to a feeling to a sensation to an intuitive style of behavior. Not only would we be confused about ourselves, but our social relations would be strained to the limit; people would find us maddening. Thus only one function can be uppermost in consciousness at a time, and thanks to our unique experiences in living, we differentiate the particular function to emphasize what has proven most effective in the past. We develop the one that works best for us, and Jung called this the *primary* or principal function.¹⁹⁸ He occasionally referred to it less formally as “the most differentiated function”¹⁹⁹ or “the more favoured function.”²⁰⁰ The ego identifies with this primary function and it comes to color our consciousness, which in turn makes it possible for a clinician to typologize the typical personality style.²⁰¹ In the meantime, the function in opposition to the primary function is removed from open display by repressing it into the unconscious. Jung named this undesired opposite the *inferior function*.²⁰²

Speaking in this depth fashion, of con-

scious versus unconscious functions, we can now consider the primary (favored) function the *superior function* of the personality.²⁰³ This gives us a superior-inferior contrast, which is another reflection of the principle of opposites active in the psyche. The less-preferred psychic tendencies that are repressed constellate (agglutinate, combine) into the shadow complex, and so the shadow identity takes on the character of our inferior function. What has happened to the remaining two functions as the superior versus inferior functions are being differentiated across the levels of consciousness?

Since they are not diametrically opposed to the most differentiated (primary, superior) function, these functions drop into an intermediate level of differentiated consciousness. They settle as poles of opposition just below consciousness in a kind of twilight position where they can come into play as complementary functions for *either* the superior or the inferior function.²⁰⁴ Jung called these the *auxiliary functions*.²⁰⁵ Usually, *one* of the auxiliary functions is used in consciousness as a supplementary way of knowing reality. It can be thought of as assisting the primary function and Jung viewed it as a *secondary function* in the apparent personality which people display consciously. The other auxiliary function may or may not then be repressed further into the unconscious to supplement the inferior function by constellating into the shadow complex. In order to help the reader visualize the rather intricate relationships now under presentation, Figure 14 schematizes the four functions.²⁰⁶

Note in Figure 14 that the primary function of thinking is at the highest point of differentiation, dominating consciousness. We have not put the ego in here, but someone with this psychic arrangement would surely be described as a thinking type. The inferior function of feeling is shown down in the personal unconscious, where of course it




Figure 14 The Four Basic Functions of the Psyche

could form into complexes with the archetypes and other unconscious contents. The shadow is not a part of the figure, but as we have already suggested, it would be identified with the inferior function. Across the intermediate levels of decreasing consciousness (which means decreasing levels of differentiation), we have our two auxiliary functions. Sensation is tilted up toward a higher level of consciousness to symbolize the fact that it has come to serve as a supplementary function to the primary function in the personality. As such it can now be referred to as the secondary function. The tandem of thinking-sensation would now represent what we might call the *conscious personality* of this psyche. An individual with a primary function of thinking and a secondary function of sensation would surely have a precisely ordered, logical, and efficiently running mental style of coming upon the world. For example, we might consider the

person here who likes to think things through carefully, to weigh arguments by spelling out details and repeatedly checking logic, referring to “the facts” at every turn and possibly using statistics to project the best probabilities discernible. This conscious-personality type might make a good detective, lawyer, or stock-market analyst.

At the same time, depending on how one-sidedly (repressively) the conscious personality is developed, this individual could have a tremendous impulse at times to cast logic to the winds and play a hunch which, it is “felt,” cannot miss. This would tell us that the feeling-intuition functions were trying to compensate the conscious style. This impulse might first appear in a dream. If the person does not respond to these promptings, then of course he or she might

end up acting impulsively, amazed with such foolishness yet unable to do otherwise (in consciousness the complex operates under its own direction; see Figure 12). In Jungian psychology the principle of opposites must always be satisfied.

Since either auxiliary can serve as the secondary function (we can have a thinking-intuition type rather than a thinking-sensation type), it is theoretically possible to classify people into eight distinct conscious-personality types on the basis of Figure 14. Jung had something to say about these eight possibilities, but we could carry this out even further because any one of these primary functions and its secondary (auxiliary) function can orient itself toward life in either an extraverted or an introverted attitudinal manner. This raises the possibilities of cataloging people into sixteen different conscious-personality types on the Jungian model. Jung did not go this far in his writings, and in fact nothing would have interested him less than hanging such labels on people.

Introversion versus Extraversion and the Psychological Types

We have already noted how Jung came to identify the two major constructs of extraversion and introversion in his review of history. Here again, we can think of these constructs in either psychological (attitude) or energy (libido) terms. The latter is the simplest in that extraversion may be considered an outward flow of libido and introversion an inward flow of libido.²⁰⁷ This does not tell us much, actually, since it is the practical effect of the supposed libidinal flow that gives the concepts meaning.

The introversion-extraversion dimension ties into what Jung called the subject-object dichotomy in developing consciousness. As

the person is differentiating and relating items in the growth of consciousness, he or she can take an interest in the subjective (the “I” pole) or the objective (the “that” pole) side of life. This is a more psychological interpretation of introversion-extraversion, and Jung called this the *attitude* taken toward subjectivity or objectivity. How much choice the person has in this attitude tendency is debatable. Jung hints that nature may supply the psyche with one or the other of these attitudes and that an underlying physiological tempo may be the actual determiner of the course any one person will follow in the psyche.²⁰⁸ In fact, Jung felt that to try and change one’s natural attitude into its opposite could be physically dangerous. At least, he found that in those few cases where people did try to exchange attitude styles they suffered from extreme physical exhaustion.²⁰⁹

Turning to the specific psychological behaviors of the *extraverted* type, Jung noted that such individuals fix their attention on people and things in their external environment.²¹⁰ A woman of this type would be seen giving her time and interest to projects in the community, such as working with a political action group or trying to raise funds for an art gallery. Her thinking would be practical and realistic, so that her interest in political causes or art would not be so much philosophical or aesthetic but rather devoted to getting things accomplished in the world. She would find her greatest sense of worth in interacting with concrete, no-nonsense, solid happenings. She would know current events well and keep up on the latest developments in the news; her view of history would be as the dead past. Her general outlook on life and morality would be quite conventional.

This woman’s husband, on the other hand, is an *introvert*. He is a loner rather than an activist, who prefers to conserve himself and find within his own identity satisfactions

comparable to those his wife gains by moving her libido outward.²¹¹ He is interested in her efforts to fund an art gallery because he loves to contemplate paintings and experience the effects they have on him. This man likes to abstract and play with ideas; his wife finds them to be unreasonable and extreme. In social situations he strikes others as shy or egg-headed (intellectual). This man tends to forget appointments, and he has to count on his wife to keep the bills paid on time. He can be stubborn at times and is not always worried about what others think when he gets this way. His impractical ideas often give his behavior a childlike quality, but here again he is not upset when others consider him to be eccentric in any way. As we might recall from his biographical overview, Jung was himself an introverted type, and he believed the twentieth century is an age of extraversion, a difficult time for the introvert to live.

By claiming introversion or extraversion is fixed by nature, Jung may appear to have built a one-sidedness into his theory. This is not really correct, however, because the principle of opposites is used in the case of the attitudes as in the case of the functions. Thus, if the superior function—whether by nature's prompting hand or otherwise—adopts an extraverted attitude, then the inferior function offsets the tendency by adopting an introverted attitude.

Reaching back through history, Jung contrasted Plato (introvert) with Aristotle (extravert) and then later Kant (introvert) and Darwin (extravert).²¹² Aristotle and Darwin surely placed considerable emphasis on the importance of external fact-finding, whereas Plato and Kant were more concerned with the internal workings of mind per se. Jung also gave examples of personality types that combined his functions and the extraversion-introversion attitudes, and we will next survey a number of these observations.

Good leaders would be extraverted thinking types, and this personality is found more often among men.²¹³ Women are more likely to be extraverted feeling types; this personality reflects considerable reasonableness and a concern for good manners.²¹⁴ The most reality-oriented personality of all is the extraverted sensation type; found most often among males, one might consider this personality hedonistic, for there is a great attraction to receiving pleasures through the senses, such as eating, drinking, viewing liked objects, mixing with others socially, and so forth.²¹⁵ Politicians, businessmen and women, and clubpeople are likely to have the extraverted intuitive personality, for this type is excellent at anticipating the politics of a situation and capitalizing on them for personal prestige, power, or advantage.²¹⁶ The absent-minded professor would be an introverted thinking type; these persons can think individually, hence either reach genius status or fumble miserably into a quack status.²¹⁷ When we use the phrase "still waters run deep," we capture the style of an introverted feeling type—found most often among women.²¹⁸ The childlike, innocent person, responding almost impulsively to felt emotions is the introverted sensation type.²¹⁹ Finally, the introverted intuitive type can range from the mystical seer at one extreme to the social crank or creative artist at the other.²²⁰ Keep in mind that when we typologize a personality in this fashion, we are doing so on the basis of its superior function. Obviously, all of these personality types have other personality potentials as well.

Transcendental Function and the Mana Personality

We have already seen how Jung spoke of transcendence in connection with his concept

of individuation (see p. 207). He also viewed transcendence as an actual function of the psyche, along the lines of the four basic functions we have just discussed. The *transcendental function* is concerned with the human being's tendency to combine consciousness and unconsciousness into a balanced totality,²²¹ and to that extent it stands for all unions of opposites within the psyche.²²² Jung referred to it as a "process of coming to terms with the unconscious"²²³ or a "process of getting to know the counterposition in the unconscious."²²⁴ As we have seen in the discussion of the four basic functions, though we might live by them, they do not prevent the development of one-sidedness in the total personality. In order to balance off any tendency to one-sidedness, we have to confront the other side of our conscious personality and see that we are also what we *are not!* We accomplish this balanced overview by way of the transcendental function.

How do we achieve this confrontation with the unconscious? The transcendental functional process involves "a sequence of fantasy-occurrences which appear spontaneously in dreams and visions,"²²⁵ which act as pacers of the individuation process in psychotherapy. If we were to take this discussion further, it would carry us into Jungian psychotherapy, so let us now put the concept of transcendence aside until we once again pick it up in the relevant section. However, this would be the appropriate point at which to introduce another personality term that Jung uses and that we will also take up in the general context of individuation during psychotherapy. The *mana personality* is a kind of inflation of the conscious personality. Consciousness becomes puffed up when a mana personality forms, and there is a decided rejection of unconscious factors at this time

because the person mistakenly assumes that he or she knows all there is to know about the psyche. In actuality, consciousness has been possessed by this very unconsciousness.

Primitives often acquire this sense of personal power in their tribal rites.²²⁶ In a war dance the primitive man can work himself into a state of frenzy and literally feel the surge of power (mana) taking over his consciousness as he dashes off to do battle. Jung argued that even the modern individual can lose his or her identity in the reality of the moment as a crowd member, and then in response to the collective promptings (archetypes), swell up into a self-proclaimed superperson. In fact, this is what occurred during the rise of Nazi Germany, when crowds not only fell under the sway of a Wotan (war god) archetype but the mana personality dominant as well (see p. 195).²²⁷ Another time when an individual is likely to develop a mana personality is when the individuation process misfires.

Individual as Collective Identity

Jung made it clear that he could not think of the life of a people as in any way different from the life of an individual. "In some way or other we are part of a single, all-embracing psyche, a single 'greatest man,' the *homo maximus*, to quote Swedenborg."²²⁸ This collective identity has a history, one that is "written in the blood" but also shows itself through individual behavior, so that it is the person who moves history rather than vice versa.²²⁹ To differentiate between individual people, we must at times differentiate between the groups of people to which they are historically related. Personality constructs cannot be limited to individual referents, even when speaking of one person's behavior. The term *race* for Jung had a very broad meaning, combining not only physical (blood line) factors, but historical, socio-

cultural, climatic, and even theological considerations as well. For Jung, Christianity was just as much a part of European “races” as were their skin color and the shape of their skulls.²³⁰

This is the reason Jung claimed that a Jewish psychology could not fully appreciate the psychology of a European. He did not say that a Jew (or any Semite) is incapable of understanding Europeans. He merely claimed that in order to do so, the Jew would have to make use of a psychology written specifically for the European’s unique history. Jung’s supposed anti-Semitism stems from a misunderstanding of what he was claiming about the psychology of collectives. Thus, Jung made the point that the Jewish people—because of a history of suppression by other “races” (nationalities, and so on)—had never acquired that tie to the land that the European had achieved. The Jews were unable to own land in many of the countries where they were allowed entry, making them fluid and mobile in both the economic and the psychological spheres of life. Even as they moved about without ties to the land, the Jewish people were acquiring a high level of culture, so that Jung said they are more civilized as a people than are Europeans. Now here is the point of confrontation between Freud and what Jung considered his Jewish psychology. Since the Jew is not as barbaric as the European, he can look into his unconscious with less threat of a dangerous upheaval than can the European.²³¹

Whether Jung was correct in his claims about the Jewish character and its supposed weakened tie to the land—particularly since the establishment of the state of Israel—is not nearly so important for our purposes as the recognition that Jung was applying a construct to a people in the same way that we are accustomed to apply such constructs to an individual. Jung was prone to do this in many of his writings. For example, he was

critical of the tendency of the European person to ape the mental exercises of Eastern peoples. Many people wrongly think that Jung advocated the study of yoga or Zen Buddhism as a balancing tactic in their lives. Actually, Jung was opposed to the practice of yoga for a European, because the latter’s problem is not one that will respond to a greater control over consciousness—which is yoga²³²—or to the utter submission to the unconscious promptings of nature—which is Zen Buddhism.²³³ Europeans must find their own “way” (Tao), because they have evolved a certain history, one that stamps their peculiar nature, and one that cannot be borrowed from another historical tradition.

*Therefore it is sad indeed when the European departs from his own nature and imitates the East or “affects” it in any way. The possibilities open to him would be so much greater if he would remain true to himself and evolve out of his own nature all that the East has brought forth in the course of the millennia.*²³⁴

The most serious problem facing modern humanity is its one-sidedness. Not only was Jung a man of the West, but two savage world wars seemed to convince him that the problem of disregarding unconscious forces was becoming severe in the West. The rise of Nazism, the decline of moral fiber, even the conflicting schools of modern art were seen by him as early signs of the unconscious upheaval closing in on the one-sided materialism of Western society. Jung was not opposed to one-sidedness in principle, since only through complete commitments of this sort are great achievements brought about.²³⁵ However, he also believed that it is a sign

of advanced culture for diversities in outlook to balance one another. It is not good for everyone in a civilization to develop an *identical* one-sidedness,²³⁶ which seems to be happening in modern society, according to Jung. By denying our darker side on a massive scale, we ensure that retaliations from the unconscious in the form of collective complexes—including mana-personality inflations—will take place. Jung even referred to this modern plight as the “sickness of dissociation.”²³⁷ This development is not irretrievably negative, however, since the beckoning counterbalance of modern complexes suggests a rebirth impulse. Modern Western humanity still has time to turn its attention inward and thereby not only recoup lost possibilities but extend its level of self-realization.²³⁸

Male versus Female Psychology

The final individual-difference constructs to which we might refer in Jungian psychology concern masculinity and femininity. Considering the conscious personality first of all, Jung claimed that women are ruled by the *principle of Eros* (Love), whereas men are ruled by the *principle of Logos* (Logic). Women are thus guided as conscious personalities by a capacity for relating to others. Eros relates to the binding, uniting, and also loosening and separating of portions from the whole. This includes not only life-giving (birth) activities, but interpersonal contacts as well. Marital love for the woman is a union, not a sexual contract. “For her, marriage is a relationship with sex thrown in as an accompaniment.”²³⁹ A man’s consciousness, however, is ruled by logical objectivity, interest in specifics, discrimination,

judgment, and insight (which is why the thinking function is more often superior in the male). Logos relates to thought, confidence in finding solutions, and certainty in drawing conclusions.²⁴⁰ Judging from these conscious principles, it would follow that as a compensating manifestation, the unconscious should present us with a contrasting psychological picture. And so it does.

Jung found rather early in his studies that male patients often reported feminine-like moods in their dream symbols, and conversely, women reflected opinionated masculine styles of symbolic expression. He viewed these as tied to the archetypal manifestations of the *animus* (Latin for “mind”) and the *anima* (Latin for “soul” or “life-giving principle”). The animus, which is therefore found in the unconscious of the female, arises at times in symbols to compensate for the female’s conscious attitude as usually manifested in the principle of Eros. This is why women seem so puzzling to men. Though obviously reasoning on vague (unconscious) grounds, the woman seems perfectly certain in her animus-based conclusions.²⁴¹

The man, on the other hand, is likely to develop a *mood* (rather than an opinion) of some sort when under the compensating activity of the anima.²⁴² When the he-man Army sergeant breaks down and “cries like a woman” under severe stress, he is paying the price of one-sidedness and reflecting the anima possession under which he suffers at the same time. The anima plays a very important role in Jungian psychology, because not only is it an archetype that represents man’s historical relationships with women and to that extent compensates for his conscious-personality principle of Logos, but it is involved in spiritualizing and life-giving symbolism as well. The symbols of life, birth, rebirth, rejuvenation, and so forth, are all likely to take on anima colorings.²⁴³

Psychopathology and Psychotherapy

Theory of Illness

Incompatible Opposites, Complex Formation, and Assimilation-Dissociation

The fundamental theory of illness used by Jung follows the model of complex formation we already outlined in Figure 12. Jung once said that he considered *normal behavior* to mean that an individual can somehow exist under all circumstances in life, even those that provide a minimum of need satisfaction.²⁴⁴ Of course, few of us are this competent. The real truth is, we all develop more or less one-sidedly. The extent of disturbance we eventually suffer from will depend on the number of incompatible opposites we generate in living, and how soon it is before we attempt to compensate for our lack of balance. According to Jung, “the vast majority of mental illnesses (except those of a direct organic nature) are due to a disintegration of consciousness caused by the irresistible invasion of unconscious contents.”²⁴⁵ He never totally rejected his early theory that certain mental disorders—particularly those in the family of schizophrenias—might someday be traced to a metabolic toxin of some sort.²⁴⁶ But Jung’s unique theoretical contribution lay, as had Freud’s, in the explanation of the functional disorders.

Jung traced the autonomy of complexes to their emotional core (feeling tone). He emphasized that emotions behave as the more primitive thought processes once had for early humanity; that is, they are not willfully produced by people but simply happen to them. We can even see this happen to us if we are under a great deal of emotional stress, as when character traits that shock us emerge against our will. We later say, “I don’t know

what came over me,” as we recall behaving in an excessively jealous, spiteful, or self-pitying manner following a frustration in life.²⁴⁷ If this sudden change takes place in our normal behavior, imagine what it must be like for the abnormal person. No wonder paranoid schizophrenics feel they are under the control of people from another planet! We find the psychotic paranoid saying, “Someone has me under electronic control, trying to force me to do things I don’t want to do.” Insanity is thus an invasion from the unconscious of contents that are flatly incompatible with the intentions of the ego. Therefore, the intentions of these shadow contents (complexes) cannot be *assimilated* into consciousness. By assimilation, Jung meant accepting and integrating (constellating) these formerly repressed contents with the more familiar elements of consciousness.²⁴⁸ The opposite of assimilation is *dissociation*, which is another way of expressing the fact that the personality is being split apart by conflicting intentions.

When a complex is active within consciousness, we are as if in a dream state, with conscious and unconscious factors mixing together without assimilating each other. A dramatic example of this would be the multiple personality forms of hysteria, in which two or more personalities seem to take over consciousness in turn; actually, the original conscious personality (the one fashioned before the illness) remains out of direct contact with the emergent personalities (the ones formed via the illness). The latter, secondary personalities (complexes) invade consciousness and push the original personality aside, keeping it therefore in the dark as in the Jekyll-Hyde conflict of the classic tale. In the same way, lesser complexes as part-personalities within consciousness can make themselves known to the ego even though the ego

may feel they are not part of its identity. The person may say, “I know that at times I lose control and do some pretty crazy things. But I am not myself at those times. Something ‘clicks’ in my head and I can’t control myself.” At other times, the ego may not even be aware of the operation of a complex within consciousness side by side with its very routine behavior. Such a person may black-out for brief periods and not recall his or her atypical behavior during this time.

One sure way in which the ego *can* be made aware of a complex is through the mechanism of projection. Recall that only the unconscious can project! By putting its contents onto the external world, where the ego now takes them to be properties of “that” rather than “me,” the complex finally opens an avenue for its own defeat. That is, by putting its constellated contents onto the world, the complex makes it possible for the ego to enter into a relationship with the meanings of these contents. Take a dream, for example, which is a simple type of projection: by putting its contents into the dream, the unconscious makes it possible for the ego (consciousness) to learn—with the help of the therapist—what “that” dream means to “me.” In time, through such study, the ego may be able to assimilate the incompatibilities of the complex as projected into the dream. The ego learns that the meanings of the dream are not foreign to the personality, but merely represent another side to the personality. As we shall see in discussing Jungian therapy techniques below, other means of projection include artistic representations.

Role of Morals, Evasion, and Denial

In trying to understand the nature of mental illness, the analytical psychologist asks, “What

is the task which the patient does not want to fulfil? What difficulty is he trying to avoid?”²⁴⁹ Jung viewed the Freudian superego as a collective body of ethical beliefs, similar to what Lévy-Bruhl meant by “collective representations”; he believed that such collective views, although not infallible and not always to be routinely followed, can often allow us to discover the basis for our judgments and decisions in life. If we were to reflect on the problem of “how ought we to treat one another?” for example, our collective symbols would help provide the answer if given a chance to express themselves—as by way of a dream analysis.

When an individual for any of a number of reasons no longer attends to the promptings of the collective (superego) to balance, let us say, a one-sided pattern of selfish behavior, serious consequences are likely to develop. This person is essentially saying, “I know what I am doing is wrong by conventional standards, but I don’t give a damn.” Maybe, were he or she to examine the behavior further, only modest changes would be called for. But by refusing to look into the question, the selfishness can only increase, and in time a complex will form à la the steps of Figure 12.²⁵⁰ We note an interesting duality in Jung’s theory of the collective here. Though he was suspicious of the collective mentality and did not want the individual to be easily swayed by it, he also believed that there was much wisdom in certain collective promptings born of past ages in meeting life’s challenges. Though we do not have to give in to every collective prompt or conventional standard, we had better listen to our conscience when it calls us down in order to see just what is implied.

Jung even described clients who developed their neurosis for *want of a conscience*.²⁵¹ Denying a superego admonition was no small thing for Jung. For example, he considered the rigidly stylized behavior of some obses-

sive-compulsives as merely the surface appearance of a profound moral problem. These obsessive-compulsive patients are meticulous and ceremonial in behavior because there is an internal struggle with evil underway in their psyche.²⁵² A bad conscience can be a heaven-sent compensation, if used in the interests of higher self-criticism.²⁵³ It balances our natures and puts us back on the track of life.

Jung was critical of both Freud and Adler for downgrading the spiritual needs of human beings. He felt that they had too readily accepted the premises of nineteenth-century science and thus had become overly materialistic in outlook.²⁵⁴ Human beings are morally responsible, they have an intellect which evaluates and strives for a *better* purpose in life, no matter what that judgment of *better* is based on.²⁵⁵ In fact, Jung drew a parallel between the conception of *sin* and that of *repression*. Once the human mind had invented a sin concept, people had no alternative but to conceal or repress their sinful promptings.²⁵⁶ And since they invariably see alternatives open to behavior which are sinful, a psychic division into conscious good and unconscious bad choices is possible. These latter, repressed contents take on the coloring of a *secret*, which of course means that the individual nursing secrets is likely to be cut off from the support of other people.²⁵⁷ Secrets are divisive mechanisms which permit individuals to shrink back from external reality and remove themselves even further from the ethical tenets of their society. Evasion always plays a role in neurosis. "If we follow the history of neurosis with attention, we regularly find a critical moment when some problem emerged that was evaded."²⁵⁸

In addition to suggesting that people may fall ill for lack of a conscience, Jung said also that some people develop neuroses because they fail to live up to their potentials. He said these are usually people of a higher type,

who simply have never gotten themselves underway in life so that they have much more to give than they now reveal.²⁵⁹ For example, a young person with exceptional intellectual skills gradually loses interest in college, drops out, and drifts into a period of living aimlessly, relying heavily on alcohol and drugs to get through the day. The individual eventually conquers this addiction, but from then on lives a simple life of menial work, never thinking about anything. Gradually, the person begins to feel uneasy and complains of nightmares in which he or she is being given the "weight of the world" to shoulder. The person also questions everything to be done and cannot seem to make the simplest decisions anymore. Jung would say this complex formation was due to the young person's "retarded maturation of personality."²⁶⁰ People like this need to achieve self-realization so that their above-average potential may be realized. Average people can live average lives successfully, but a naturally superior person is living one-sidedly at the average level.

Meaning Creation and Symbols in Illness

One of the reasons why some people develop a neurosis is because they have no proper symbol through which an archetype can express meaning in consciousness and thereby facilitate a balancing of the personality. Symbols are like *bridges* between the conscious and unconscious portions of the psyche. Recall that for Jung a symbol was something in psychic life that expresses meaning, even helping to formulate—put into a meaningful form—what is at first inexpressible. Figure 15 is a schematization of Jung's symbolic-meaning-expression model, framed in libido terms.


Symbols Create Meaning from Stored Libido (Numen)

Figure 15 Symbols Create Meaning from Stored Libido (Numen)

Note that the archetypes are presented as starbursts located in the collective unconscious (this is the same as in Figure 12, step 3; see p. 200). This is meant to suggest that the archetype has no exact form in its natural psychic location (starbursts are flashes of indefinite shape). But the archetypes *do* signify that a store of libido is present at their location in the collective unconscious. This stored-up unit of libido is called *numen*.²⁶¹ It has a potentiality for being used in the psyche, so it can be thought of as a reserve of life energy.

Figure 15 shows archetypes with numen nestled in the collective unconscious. Assuming that the conscious portion of the psyche—where we find the ego at the top of the egg-

shaped figures—has developed one-sidedly because of a “retarded maturation of personality,” how then might we hope for a balancing compensation to come about? If it were possible for an archetype to seize upon some *given* symbol (recall that archetypes take on various specific symbolic contents), then in expressing their meaning by way of a dream or fantasy symbol, the ego could come to grips with the unconscious prompting and possibly begin an offsetting counterbalance. Thus, if a young woman asks “What is the point of life?” or “Why was I born?” she might conceivably receive an answer to this question from out of her own psyche. That is, she could know the answer if she had a symbol to cloak it in.

Two possibilities are represented in Figure 15, each of which could take place in her case. On the left, we have archetypal identi-

ties with stored libido (numen) releasing this libido in the act of compensation with the goal of answering the question posed (“Why was I born?”). However, since no symbol in consciousness is available through which archetypal promptings in the form of libido release are expressible, the only alternative is for the libido to reflow or *regress*. Regression is not giving up the compensation, but rather cycling back again to the roots of the collective in hopes of achieving a rebirth.²⁶² On the right-hand side of Figure 15, we have the other possibility in which a bridging symbol is available, so that now the libido released by the archetypes (numen) *does* achieve a conscious-meaning expression. The woman can now communicate with her unconscious, assuming that she has the insights of analytical psychology to help her. Her collective unconscious has something to say about why she is living and what is to be expected of her as a member of the human race.

Symbols that act in the way just outlined were termed *symbols of transformation*, because they transformed the libido from a potential (numen) to an actual expression of meaning.²⁶³ Jung believed that human beings need to symbolize like this just as much as they need to eat and drink.²⁶⁴ If we can no longer find meaning in the symbols of our forefathers, then we must find new symbols or risk falling out of touch with our roots—as embodied in our primordial images which define for us the very nature of our humanity.²⁶⁵ This can be very dangerous.

Not all symbols are of the transforming variety, of course. As we can recall from our discussion of complex formation, an archetype can constellate into a complex which is forming and then make its effects known in consciousness, even though it is, strictly speaking, of the unconscious. This occurs when the ego identifies with the complex active in consciousness. In a manner of speaking, the ego slips into unconsciousness by way

of identification. Jung referred to this as *identification with the archetype*.²⁶⁶ This invariably produces an inflation of the ego for either good or evil in the life of the personality. The archetype comes to direct the ego, which is itself then said to be *possessed* by the archetype. For example, the psychotic young man who thinks himself a great savior of mankind by senselessly killing a popular political figure might have fallen under the numinosity of a hero archetype, possibly constellated (agglutinated) with the wizard archetype because of the supposed cunning involved in laying his murderous ambush. In this instance, the poor deluded ego would have no understanding of the meaning of its actions. It would have been the tool of a shadow complex dominated by the archetypal themes of salvation, retribution, and deviousness. Of course, not all outcomes of numinous experiences are so horrible. Anything that acts on the individual ego with a great intensity and urgency is numinous.²⁶⁷

Neurosis versus Psychosis

Precisely *when* a neurosis will appear depends on the degree of one-sidedness evolved in living and the consequent possibility of keeping the constellated complexes under repression. Jung did not feel that all neuroses have their beginning in the first five years of life. He approached each neurotic patient with the following question in mind: “What is this person attempting to avoid in his or her development or general life responsibility at *this* point in time?” Neuroses have a role to play in the present, and we must not allow the patient to flee into the past and remain there safely in preference to confronting life in the present.²⁶⁸

Jung believed that the Freudians had been taken in by the maneuvers of an *adult* personality which, in its attempts to avoid responsibility and because of its infantile character generally, had concocted absurd sexual fantasies and projected these onto the past in an effort to evade the counterbalancing changes called for by the neurosis in the present. For example, after one of his female patients had “recalled” that her father once had supposedly stood at her bedside in an obscene pose, Jung remarked coolly: “Nothing is less probable than that the father really did this. It is only a fantasy, presumably constructed in the course of the analysis. . . .”²⁶⁹ Yet even as the neurotic is retreating into regressive fantasy, the teleologically oriented search for health has begun. The *neurosis* is two-pronged, consisting of both an “infantile unwillingness and the will to adapt.”²⁷⁰ Through regression a rebirth, a fresh start, is always possible. Thus neuroses do cleanse us, and they are not in themselves undesirable or meaningless diseases of the mind.

*We should not try to “get rid” of a neurosis, but rather to experience what it means, what it has to teach, what its purpose is. . . . We do not cure it—it cures us. A man is ill, but the illness is nature’s attempt to heal him. . . . in the long run nobody can dodge his shadow unless he lives in eternal darkness.*²⁷¹

There is a decided advantage in being neurotic.²⁷² If nothing else, this inner cleavage can prompt a balancing of one-sidedness before a more serious, total invasion of the conscious by unconscious forces takes place.²⁷³ Recall that there can be more than one complex forming in the same personality. Com-

plexes can also be larger depending on what enters into them—as, for example, the number of archetypes. When a complete flooding of consciousness by complexes takes place, we have a *psychosis* taking place.²⁷⁴ Jung’s theory of psychopathology was clouded by the fact that he did speculate on the possibility of a toxin in schizophrenia, suggesting that psychoses might be qualitatively different from neuroses. However, because of his psychological explanations of all mental illness based on the stylized-meaning-expression model (complexes, dissociations), Jung must actually be counted as holding to the quantitative view as regards neurosis and psychosis (see p. 87 of Chapter 1 for a discussion of this issue). Jung saw many patients move from neurotic to psychotic states in their lives, and he rejected the suggestion that they might have been latently psychotic all of the time.²⁷⁵

Psychosis is therefore an extension of the division of personality that begins in complex formation as a neurosis. A term like *dissociation* is used more often in describing psychotic than neurotic conditions. The neurotic patient finds himself or herself acting strangely, but the psychotic is completely dissociated from the other side of familiar reality. Hence, the neurotic patient can still understand his or her predicament, because it has some rational ties to what is going on in the personality otherwise.²⁷⁶ The psychotic, on the other hand, is like a sleepwalker, living out the most bizarre kind of dream which has been put together by promptings from the darkest levels of the unconscious psyche. The contents of a psychosis can never really be completely understood, not even by a psychiatrist.

Neurotics are therefore likely to have a better prognosis, because they can acquire insight (meaningful understanding) whereas psychotics cannot. Jung was a great believer in the benefits of insight, even when dealing

with the most severe clinical syndromes.²⁷⁷ He found that insight often softens the total impact of the psychosis. At the same time, he did not place much stock in the finer points of differential diagnosis for the functional disorders. He said that we are “not dealing with clinical diseases but with psychological ones.”²⁷⁸ The major discrimination to make is that of the clearly organic versus functional disorder, but after that it seemed pointless to go on categorizing patients.

Theory of Cure

Growth, Balance, and Symbolic Assimilation of Opposites

Over the years, Jung found that a certain percentage of his patients simply outgrew their problems. Even though he realized that time heals some wounds, what was unique in these cases was the fact that these people seemed to have evolved a new level of consciousness.²⁷⁹ They somehow learned to live within life’s inner contradictions, and they did not assume that it was possible to solve every one of life’s problems in any case. Sometimes all we can do is recognize their existence. Life depends on *polarities*, and the major problems of living stem from the need to decide or choose (differentiate) one side of a future course rather than the other.²⁸⁰ We take a job far from our home town because it is a tremendous promotion and a sign of success, which means we now have the problem of how to keep in contact with our family and friends. Had we decided to stay close to our loved ones in the home town, we would always have the realization that we could have been more successful and happy in our work. Either way, we have a problem! In fact, every time we decide something in life, we solve one problem only to create another. But this is not a cause for

worry or regret, because such differentiations are what create libido which then gives life its power and zest. All we have to do is understand both sides of all that we do and in that way we avoid one-sidedness. Thus, the *wrong* thing to do would be to deny our dependency on friends and family when we move, or should we stay, to deny our great desire to be successful in our work.

It is the polarization of seemingly incompatible opposites in the personality that brings on mental illness, so what therapists must do is to bring the two halves of the client’s psyche back together again. This goal is very difficult to achieve because the two halves (conscious and unconscious) cannot easily make themselves known to one another. In a situation like this *any* communication—whether hostile and erratic or controlled and reasoned—is better than none. As Jung put it, “Every form of communication with the split-off part of the psyche is therapeutically effective.”²⁸¹ Thus, the main strategy of analytical therapy is to bring about a *confrontation with the unconscious*. This permits the individual to get to know aspects of his or her nature that have previously been denied, and therefore are at the root of the one-sidedness. Once such factors are admitted, a state of *wholeness* is possible.²⁸² If we can personify the shadow half of our psyche and come to terms with it, then an assimilation is possible.²⁸³ We would have to first engage the personified complex in some kind of dialogue, and then win out in the discussion and debate to follow. Jung referred to the defeat of the personified complex as a *de-potentialization*—a depowering—of the unconscious (daemonic) forces of psychic life.²⁸⁴

Jung cautioned that merely providing the client with an intellectualized insight would not result in a cure.²⁸⁵ We cannot simply outline for the client the steps of his or her




Figure 16 Centering of the Personality

neurotic complex formation and expect this insight to result in cure. The only way consciousness can be liberated from its possession by the unconscious forces is through a painful recognition and an experiencing of the feelings that initially prompted the complex formation. This is no easy matter, and a risk is involved because we can lose our conscious ego identity in a confrontation with the unconscious.²⁸⁶ This happens when the ego loses out in the discussion and debate with the personified (neurotic) complex. As we shall see, even the psychotherapist runs the risk of losing his or her mental health in the great effort which coming to terms with the unconscious demands. This is so because, though the confrontation begins with the shadow features of the personal unconscious, in time the client descends into the collective unconscious with tremendous effort not un-

like a Faustian descent into the underworld.²⁸⁷ All manner of fearful possibilities emerge as we come face to face with our primordial past and hence admit to the influence it has exerted in our supposedly consciously directed lives.

The aim of psychotherapy is to convince the patient to give up the naive belief that life is exclusively directed by consciousness and to find a new midpoint in the personality halfway between consciousness and unconsciousness. This process begins with a recognition of the ego-versus-shadow polarity and settles into an eventual balance at what we have labeled in Figure 16 as the *midpoint of the personality*. The ego is not given preference in this balancing assimilation nor is the shadow. As Jung said, "Assimilation is never a question of 'this or that,' but always of 'this and that.'" ²⁸⁸ One grows only by becoming whole.

To accomplish the balancing of opposites,

Jung relied on two general tactics: (1) symbol creation and (2) verbal confrontation with the personified complex. Jung called this therapy a form of *hermeneutic* treatment.²⁸⁹ The root of this word is from Hermes, the messenger of the Greek gods. Hermes thus brought meanings (information, messages) to the gods from various places. During the Middle Ages, theologians adopted the term *hermeneutics* to convey what they were doing in the Holy Scriptures. That is, they were trying to find every bit of information that was presumably there, including semihidden meanings in symbols and the import of things that might *not* have been said when they should have. In like fashion, the Jungian therapist helps a patient extract from his or her unconscious all of those meanings that are potentially there, seeking expression through symbols of transformation in compensation for the one-sidedness of consciousness (see Figure 15). Symbols therefore “compensate an unadapted attitude of consciousness.”²⁹⁰ They are an essential ingredient of the curative process, but they can cure only when experienced as a living phenomenon in psychic life.²⁹¹

It is not enough to know the meaning of our dream and other fantasied symbols. We must confront the implications of the symbol and make a decision as to which side of the question we will live on, preferably accomplished by turning the complex that troubles us into a person (personification). For example, if the person discussed earlier had *failed* to move to a better job location and denied that this was due to a strong dependency on family and friends, the neurotic complex that might then have developed would have dependency as a central theme. The conscious ego would consider itself success-oriented and independent, but when the neurotic complex appeared, it would have definite signs of dependency and fearfulness involved. In order to clear up this split in the

personality, it would be best if the neurotic complex could be turned into a person (personification) with whom consciousness (ego) could openly debate and discuss the course of life to be followed (confrontation with the unconscious). By personifying our other half, we can speak with it and hash out all of the attitudes it represents and come to some form of balanced overview which takes both sides into consideration and accepts them more or less. This solution is not always completely satisfying to either consciousness or unconsciousness; but then, that is the nature of life! Jung once referred to the course of analytical treatment as “rather like a running conversation with the unconscious.”²⁹²

The Stages of Psychotherapy

In order to help the client achieve a state of psychic balance, Jung encouraged the analytical therapist to promote a kind of dialectical process in the therapeutic relationship (see p. 8 of the Introduction for a discussion of dialectic).²⁹³ By permitting a completely free and equal climate to emerge in the relationship between therapist and client, spontaneous and open confrontations should emerge between participants. Not only does the relationship take on dialectical coloring, but the internal dialogue between conscious and unconscious contents are also viewed as dialectical in nature.²⁹⁴ Jung insisted that the prime rule of his therapy was to consider each case uniquely and to give a patient completely equal status in the two-person encounter.²⁹⁵ Indeed, the therapist is constantly in therapy with each client and can therefore make no claims to superiority except in the sense that he or she has devoted more hours to personal insight and therefore may be somewhat more balanced than the average

person. But this experience is never to be used as a club over the client's head.

The course of analytical psychotherapy can be broken down into four stages. These are not clear-cut, nor is it necessary for a person to carry out all four steps in order to get a positive outcome from therapy. In the opening sessions with a client, the therapist finds the stage of *confession* developing quite spontaneously. Jung said this was the goal of the cathartic method introduced by Breuer and Freud (see Chapter 1). Cathartic release proves that a neurosis is more than just an intellectual problem. To clear it up there must be some involvement of the emotions as well. Doubtlessly catharsis—making confessions—was the means employed by people for centuries to balance. A sin is really the beginning act in a move to split the personality between what ought and what ought not be done in life. In then repressing the guilt over sinning, we ensure that a complex will someday arise around these very denials. Confession alone will not serve to balance the personality of everyone, but Jung felt that certain rather uncomplicated personalities can actually gain full therapeutic benefit from regular use of the confessional (for example, the Catholic sacrament).

As the sessions slip by, the therapist will find the client moving out of a confessional mood and wanting to explore his or her past life. This gradual change signifies that the second stage of therapy, called *elucidation*, is beginning. To elucidate is to make clear or explain something, and this is what the therapist begins doing. This explanatory process stirs up the client's psyche and in short order he or she begins projecting (positive and/or negative) unconscious contents onto the therapist. This is *transference*, and a therapist

knows for certain that elucidation has begun when such projections appear.²⁹⁶ Jung had many things to say about transference over the years. He began his theorizing rather traditionally, viewing transference as a special type of projection in which parental (maternal or paternal) *imagoes* are attributed to the therapist.²⁹⁷ He also spoke of libido cathexes which had been fixed on the therapist and needed to be removed and reinvested in the patient's personality after transference had been resolved.²⁹⁸ This is all very similar to traditional Freudian theory (see Chapter 1). However, Jung was to expand on the construct of transference, and in time, he even dismissed its importance in cure. As we know from Chapter 1, for Freud a transference was the sine qua non of psychotherapy. Jung, on the other hand, eventually said that he did not think transference onto the doctor was a necessary precondition for therapy to take place.²⁹⁹ Other forms of projection could serve the course of therapeutic insight equally well.

Jung viewed the client's sexualized efforts to relate with the therapist as a gross distortion of the fundamental social bond uniting all people.³⁰⁰ Neurotics do not want sex with the therapist, but rather a true social relationship which they cannot take responsibility for establishing. In the positive transference, we therefore see neurotics giving love in hopes of receiving direction in their lives as children do. Because they are adults, they sexualize this love. The patient submits to the therapist as a slave to the master. Since regression also accompanies the projection of unconscious contents, there is often considerable infantile acting-out in the relationship. The therapist can be made into a father, mother, or even a combination of parental figures. In the Jungian view, it is even possible for a patient to project himself or herself as an *imago* onto the therapist.³⁰¹ This intensified tie to the doctor thus acts as a com-

compensation for the patient's faulty attitude toward reality.³⁰²

The aim of transference is clearly the re-establishment of rapport with reality, the uniting of the split in the personality that has forced the neurotic into a continuing retreat from life. If the doctor and the patient lack mutual understanding, the break from life is not likely to be restored. Once the patient realizes that he or she has been projecting onto the therapist, the transference is resolved, and the stage of elucidation comes to an end. Before this can happen, however, any *countertransferences* which may exist must also be resolved. It is inevitable that countertransferences will develop in the relationship because "*all projections provoke counter-projections.*"³⁰³ This is why Jung claimed that the therapist is constantly working at his or her own therapeutic advance with each client seen. Jung once observed that "a therapist with a neurosis is a contradiction in terms."³⁰⁴ This must be the case, because a sick therapist would have no ability to sense the unconscious projections likely to pass between doctor and patient. Incidentally, in Jungian therapy a patient has as much right to identify (interpret) countertransference as the doctor has to identify transference.³⁰⁵

The third stage is that of *education*, in which the therapist helps the client to learn about all of those personal and extrapersonal things he or she has found lacking as knowledge or behavioral alternatives in the past. The emphasis shifts now to the present, where concrete efforts are made to change behavior. Naturally, such changes are dependent on value judgments, and the client has as much to say about what will be changed as does the therapist.³⁰⁶ Jung believed that Adler actually began his therapy at about this stage of education, whereas Freud had been content with ending his therapy at the close of elucidation. Since Jung believed that we seldom get rid of an unhealthy psychic state by simply

understanding it, he felt it was necessary to train the client to live a more satisfying life after we had provided insight about the past.³⁰⁷ Jung did not offer any set recipe of training aids at this point. Whatever needs doing in the unique life history will have been made plain by this time. The selfish or timid person will make concrete efforts to meet and lend aid to others. The narrow person will begin reading more widely, earning a broader perspective on life. The too interpersonal activist will learn to enjoy solitude, and so on. The therapist will have to lend moral support to the client at this time, encouraging him or her as a person would coax any friend to develop more fully.

For many clients these first three stages will suffice, and therapy will normally be ended. However, occasionally a therapist will discover a special client whose problem is not curable by a therapy that aims at normalizing people. These individuals have potentials beyond the average, and hence, "that it should enter anyone's head to educate them to normality is a nightmare . . . because their deepest need is really to be able to lead 'abnormal' lives."³⁰⁸ When a client of this type appears, the therapist has to move to the fourth and highest stage of therapy, *transformation*.

Selfhood and Individuation via the Transcendental Function

The stage of *transformation* is a completely unique view of the therapeutic process, which no other major therapy has ever quite captured. It demands that we bring together many of the terms learned above to describe the process of self-realization or self-emergence. The general process by which we accomplish this self-realization Jung called *individuation*. It is the first conscious inkling that *we do have* a shadow complex which brings

he individuation process on.³⁰⁹ In order to assimilate and integrate these shadow contents, we have first to bring them into consciousness in a form that will allow us to confront them meaningfully and in time defeat them as rejected alternatives which should not be given the chance to take over the personality.³¹⁰ But we do not want to destroy the shadow complex for all time, because in the first place, this is impossible due to the polarity in psychic events, and second, the shadow plays a necessary role in the psychic economy. Thanks to the libido generated by the tension of opposites between shadow factors and consciousness (ego sphere), there is an enlivening of psychic processes.³¹¹ It does no good to try to destroy the shadow completely or to project it off onto others. We must learn to live with our shadow and even take strength and direction from an interpersonal association with it by way of personification.³¹²

One might reasonably expect Jung now to claim that the shadow must be personified and confronted in the process of transformation. Yet, this is not precisely how the confrontation with the unconscious comes about. Rather, it is the anima, standing directly behind the shadow, so to speak, and directing the shadow's actions in the psyche, that must be confronted in personified form.³¹³ Jung's usage of the term *anima* in this sense is captured in the following: "I have defined the anima as a personification of the unconscious in general, and have taken it as a bridge to the unconscious, in other words, as a function of relationship to the unconscious."³¹⁴

Why does the anima complex now take on the meaning of our entire unconscious life in place of the shadow? There are two reasons for this technical adjustment. First of all, Jung did not want the ego confronting

and defeating the shadow during transformation because—in line with his view of its utility—the shadow must continue to have a role in the psyche *following* individuation. Second, and doubtlessly more important, Jung had the anima stand as representative for the unconscious during transformation because this is what he discovered happened in his own case, during his personal self-analysis. In describing his self-analysis, Jung said that he was prone, when under a state of tension, to do something with his hands—to paint a picture, hew a stone, or record something (a fantasy) in writing. This creative urge made his moods concrete, for he literally made them come alive in this seeming artistic activity. One day, while he was writing down some fantasies which had been actively pressing upon his consciousness, Jung was prompted to ask himself a question. Something happened then which brought home his theory of complex formation in a most dramatic and uniquely personal way; that is, a voice independent of his conscious control answered his query, as follows:

When I was writing down these fantasies, I once asked myself, "What am I really doing? Certainly this has nothing to do with science. But then what is it?" Whereupon a voice within me said, "It is art." I was astonished. It had never entered my head that what I was writing had any connection with art. Then I thought, "Perhaps my unconscious is forming a personality that is not me, but which is insisting on coming through to expression." I knew for a certainty that the voice had come from a woman. I recognized it as the voice of a patient, a talented psychopath who had a strong transference to me. She had become a living figure within my mind.

Obviously what I was doing wasn't science. What then could it be but art? It was as though these were the only alternatives in

the world. That is the way a woman's mind works.

I said very emphatically to this voice that my fantasies had nothing to do with art, and I felt a great inner resistance. No voice came through, however, and I kept on writing. Then came the next assault, and again the same assertion: "That is art." This time I caught her and said, "No, it is not art! On the contrary, it is nature," and prepared myself for an argument. When nothing of the sort occurred, I reflected that the "woman within me" did not have the speech centers I had. And so I suggested that she use mine. She did so and came through with a long statement.

I was greatly intrigued by the fact that a woman should interfere with me from within. My conclusion was that she must be the "soul," in the primitive sense, and I began to speculate on the reasons why the name "anima" was given to the soul. Why was it thought of as feminine? Later I came to see that this inner feminine figure plays a typical, or archetypal, role in the unconscious of a man, and I called her the "anima." The corresponding figure in the unconscious of a woman I called the "animus."³¹⁵

This remarkably candid account of his personal analysis gives us some firsthand knowledge of how Jung arrived at his finished theory and terminology. When adult males confront their unconscious, what better figure to stand in as representative for the unconscious than the other half of their sexual identity? It is obviously the animus a female patient would confront in personification during the transformation stage of therapy. Note also that it was a question—"What am I really doing?"—that first prompted the personified anima to make her appearance. This is similar to the theory of complex formation that Jung had used to explain the appearance of spirits in the voices

of mediums whom he had studied for his medical degree. Just as the medium called up a voice by posing the question "Who is with us?" or some such, so too did Jung encourage a personification of a living complex within his identity. Once out in the open of consciousness, the anima was found to have decided opinions in opposition to those of Jung—that is, his *ego*. She told Jung that he was doing something "arty," an aesthetic exercise which had no real significance except possibly as a kind of pleasurable pastime.

Jung did not accept this view. If all he was doing was "art," then the balancing process would have no personal significance. In other words, the anima was resisting individuation by detracting from its importance. And since the anima *was* Jung—that personality which he *was* unconsciously—what we see here is one part of Jung resisting therapy. His conscious personality, his *ego*, would have no part of this resistance and countered with an argument of its own. In time, the anima accepted Jung's vocal cords and responded to his counter with the logic of the female. And so it goes—the constant struggle of opposites, separated into polarized identities over the years and now coming to a confrontation by way of an internal debate of the attitudes to be taken toward life.

The anima is a great threat to consciousness because in this internal debate she *could* emerge the victor. If consciousness is to win out, then it must press its case unflinchingly. Very often the shadow side of such arguments are illogical and therefore because of such inconsistency they can be shown to be impractical. Even so, the conscious viewpoint (of the *ego*) must accept the fact that these *are* arguments of the personality system, coming back today because they were rejected and unrecognized earlier. Take Jung's anima

attitudes, for example. Since the anima discredited Jung's psychological efforts to balance as art, we might surmise that she was returning all of those nonscientific attitudes that Jung may have rejected in the past. Jung may have, as a younger man, been so anxious to appear the perfect scientist that he repressed any suggestion that his analytical psychology was even slightly "tainted" by art. Now, when the complex that had formed around this and other attitudes returned, it had *precisely* this formerly rejected point of view to express. He was doing art and not true science after all!³¹⁶

Many of the anima's arguments hit home, and they alter our conscious attitude (speaking now from the perspective of a male client) toward our parents, our careers, our very selves. But since the anima is at this point necessarily one-sided, we cannot submit to her pronouncements completely. We must depotentiate her lest we simply move from one type of one-sidedness (conscious) to another type of one-sidedness (unconscious) by identifying with her value system (be possessed by her). What we need is a balancing wholeness and therefore transformation is always concerned with educating the anima (or the animus for the female).³¹⁷

How does Jung get the individuation process underway? He tells us that he asks a patient to take some aspect of a dream or possibly just any fantasied image which has occurred to him or her and then to elaborate or develop it spontaneously. "This, according to individual taste and talent, could be done in any number of ways, dramatic, dialectic, visual, acoustic, or in the form of dancing, painting, drawing, or modelling."³¹⁸ For example, a client might take an image of a mountain which keeps coming into his or her dreams, and then paint it or sculpt it, or try to capture its monumental impact by

writing about it or dancing about it in some spontaneous fashion. Quite often this reduces the frequency and vividness of the mountain image in dreams. Why? Because now the meaning coming through this symbol of the mountain (hermeneutically) is being dealt with *directly*. By creating the "artistic" production, we are creating the meaning that presses on our consciousness from the other side of consciousness. The mountain is that symbol of the right-hand side of Figure 15 that creates meaning. In time, we will be able to personify the anima or animus, and then the balancing effort to depotentiate it begins and hopefully ends with totality rather than further one-sidedness. When this totality is achieved we have successfully individuated, that is, become a new individual! Thus Jung referred to *individuation* as a "process of differentiation,"³¹⁹ or as the "process by which a person becomes a psychological 'in-dividual.'"³²⁰ Since it balances all sides including potentialities not yet realized, we can also think of it as the process "in which the patient becomes what he really is."³²¹

The purpose of the dialectical process of confronting the anima is to bring these contents into consciousness, but then we must also break up these personifications for they are autonomous complexes with their own supply of libido (numen).³²² If we can break them up, then we can make use of their libido stores in a healthy, balancing way. Libido is set free by the anima or animus (and other archetypes constellated into the complex) which can then be used to form a connecting link between the conscious and unconscious regions of the psyche. It is the *transcendental function* that makes this connecting link possible, and it is the *self* as the symbol of unity that permits the libido to be constantly at the disposal of consciousness. We transcend what we had been, we unite all sides, and then we enter into a new personality constellation by way of the self-




Figure 17 The Individuation Process

emergence. To demonstrate this process of individuation we must build on the model for symbolic-meaning creation in Figure 15 and the centering of the personality of Figure 16. Figure 17 combines these two features into a schematization of the individuation process.

We have our familiar egg-shaped psyche in Figure 17. Note that at point 1 we show libido regressing into unconsciousness where the shadow is being joined by the anima archetype with its numen (stored libido) to constellate into a potentially autonomous complex. The more one-sided the personality becomes the larger is this unconscious complex (which could include other archetypes as well as the anima archetype and the shadow). When this unconscious complex gets large enough, it will emerge into the conscious realm, particularly when prompted to show itself as by Jung's question or by a symbol of transformation like the mountain image. In the latter case, the mountain image might be personified via the Wise Old Man of the Mountain, such as a leprechaun or a gnome from a children's fable (see Table 2). This is what we have pictured at point 2 of Figure 17. Now, the anima and the ego confront each other as opposites. The series of six lines looping between the ego and anima at point 2 signify the tension of dialectical exchange as these opposites wrestle for control of the personality.

At point 2 the shadow is for all practical purposes included within the anima archetype. The anima is actually now equated with unconscious contents and the ego is equated with conscious contents of the psyche. By the time we reach the stage of transformation, most of the persona factors would have been confronted and removed during

elucidation and so forth, so we have not included the persona complex at point 2. The task now facing the ego, which has essentially invited the anima to a confrontation by asking it to assume a personified form, is to depotentiate the anima and thus balance the personality. The dialectical confrontation (debate, discussion, feeling-toned expressions of preference, and so on) between these two identities continues over points 2 and 3.

Note that at point 3 we show the self beginning to take form, emerging as an archetypal symbol from the collective unconscious. But before the self can really emerge (be realized) as an actual point of identity, the anima will have to be depotentiated. If the anima *is* depotentiated, then its numen will be used by the emerging self archetype to form an identity point at the very center of the personality (à la Figure 16). If the anima is *not* displaced, then of course a self-bridge would not form to center the personality. We show at point 3 that a depotentiation has indeed occurred by having a kind of bursting of the anima complex, with its energy gravitating to the emerging self which now is actually constellated into an identity. At the same time the shadow leaves to return to its customary level of unconsciousness. Point 4 is then a schematized version of a successfully individuated personality.

Note at point 4 that the self acts as a bridging pipeline through which libido can now flow in *both* directions. Instead of having free libido regressing as at point 1 into the unconscious each time the conscious personality opts in favor of one behavior pattern over its opposite, we now have formed a major identity which can accept both sides to the personality. We have retained the polarity of the personality. There is still an ego in consciousness enacting the good behaviors (that is, the chosen alternatives we show to others) and a shadow in the unconscious constellating the bad behaviors (those

only we know about ourselves completely). The self looks in both directions, accepts both sides, takes strength from the multiplicity and contradictions of the personality which both "is" and "is not" at the same time. Note also that the individuated person no longer needs to use a persona complex. The individuated person is a genuine human being who no longer hides behind masks.

The emergence of the self presents some problems for the ego, which is in many ways displaced and itself defeated by the arrival of a new focal point for the personality.³²³ The self is closer to the inferior than the superior function on the basis of which the ego has been operating; with this shift in emphasis the ego is threatened.³²⁴ Similarly, if the ego-dominated consciousness has taken on an extraverted coloring it must now find meaning in the introverted characteristics brought to light by self-emergence.³²⁵ This is all very upsetting to the ego, which in fact does not always give up its important position without a fight. There is often a dialectic carried on between the ego and the self, except that in this case there is no depotentiation and in fact the self always prevails.³²⁶ The point is, our ego is a very biased, short-sighted psychic complex. It has no proper appreciation of the historical antecedents of humanity.

The self, on the other hand, takes a much larger view of things. In fact, Jung once referred to it as an objective ego, meaning that the self has a more universal character.³²⁷ The self originates in an archetypal prompting and then emerges into consciousness by way of a symbol, or else the libido, set free by the depotentiation of the anima, and the numen of the self archetype will not be put at the disposal of consciousness to solidify the self-bridge. Jung called a symbol that converts energy in this fashion a *libido analogue*.³²⁸ The libido analogue is thus a special case of the symbol of transformation, which

emphasizes the role of self-emergence in the personality. Libido analogues channel libido and change the form it takes from the form of the anima to the form of the self. We refer to libido analogues when we are concerned with symbols of the self, which we will take up below.

Another benefit of individuation, in addition to balancing the personality, is the widening of consciousness that occurs, even though the individual now appreciates the import of unconscious factors in his or her life.³²⁹ This is a typical Jungian paradox: we enlarge consciousness through recognizing the importance of the unconscious (especially the collective factors). Jung once defined the *transcendental function* as "getting to know the counterposition in the unconscious" and he gave an example of how some such insight could be mentally helpful in the following comment: "A Christian of today, for instance, no longer ought to cling obstinately to a one-sided credo, but should face the fact that Christianity has been in a state of schism for four hundred years, with the result that every single Christian has a split in his psyche."³³⁰ Thus, someone with a religious problem is not out of step with history. The collective schism for all Christians would simply be making itself known in his or her life and time.

The anima is not always unseated so easily in its battle with the ego as we have made it appear. Sometimes, when it is near defeat the anima can deceive the ego by appearing to depotentiate, only to have at this precise point in time a substitute archetype take its place with the express purpose of so fascinating the ego with its power of insight that the ego will be possessed (that is, identify with the substitute). By doing so, the anima succeeds in having the unconscious direct the

conscious after all. Jung called this replacement for the anima the *mana personality* (see Table 12 where *mana* is listed as an archetype). Recall that *mana* conveyed extraordinary potency (numinosity) to the primitive intellect. The ego inflation resulting would usually come about as follows: at the point when the anima seems to be depotentiated several insights are achieved by the ego. The ego has benefited from the creative efforts during the fourth stage of therapy. It now feels as if it had conquered the unconscious and that it now knows a great deal about all aspects of the psyche. Sometimes these insights are frightening, so that Jung speaks of a positive or a negative type of inflation.³³¹ But the point is: the ego becomes drunk with power over its success in forcing the anima to withdraw and seeming even to depotentiate.

What may *really* be happening is that in taking credit for the defeat of the anima, the ego has actually identified with a *mana* archetype and slipped into a state of the *mana* personality. This is most likely to happen if the ego has become deeply involved in mythological themes, which hold great fascination (numinosity) for human beings.³³² Tales in which a person is said to have made a pact with the devil in order to acquire daemonic power are essentially based on this dynamic of an identification with the combined *mana* and devil archetypes. Manics or paranoids who try to convince us that they have unusual talent in business or political leadership might seem very convincing—since they are, after all, speaking from an unusual perspective (out of the unconscious)—yet something smacks of the extreme, the excessive, and the overly pat in their urgent requests for our money or votes, and we instinctively draw back from them. Some peo-

ple do not. They follow such *mana* personalities believing them to be *charismatic* leaders.

If the *mana* personality evolves in therapy, the client begins once again to make projections onto the therapist, thereby reviving transference. This is one of the signs the therapist uses to recognize this setback in therapy.³³³ The client might begin to idealize the therapist as a magical healer (positive transference) or criticize the therapist in any of a number of ways (negative transference). Sometimes this criticism seems warranted, so that in either case, if the therapist is unfamiliar with the *mana* personality dynamic, he or she may be fooled into believing that the neurosis has been cured. Sometimes these *mana* personalities profess to be analytical therapists and extend the Jungian therapy to lengths that offended the founder of analytical psychology. In several of his writings, Jung expressed concern over these supposedly enlightened healers, many of whom have a social action program in mind to “make this a better world.” They are *not* conscious of their unconscious direction (possession), and hence it is a case of the blind leading the blind.

The correct way to handle a *mana* personality is first, to recognize it, and second, to repeat the process already outlined in Figure 17, only this time with the aim of depotentiating the *mana* personality rather than the anima. The best defense here is simply to admit that there will always be promptings from the collective unconscious in our lives.³³⁴ In this way, we differentiate the ego from the *mana* personality by way of personifying the latter and simply recognize its numinous qualities. As Jung observed,

The mana-personality is on one side a being of superior wisdom, on the other a being of superior will. By making conscious the con-

*tents that underlie this personality, we find ourselves obliged to face the fact that we both know more and want more than other people. . . . Thus the dissolution of the mana-personality through conscious assimilation of its contents leads us, by a natural route, back to ourselves as an actual, living something, poised between two world-pictures and their darkly discerned potencies.*³³⁵

The reference to a poised balance between two world pictures is to the self, which has now once again emerged according to the Figure 17 dynamic. The ego falls to the background with this new focus of the personality. When conscious insights occur to it as lucky ideas, the ego no longer takes direct credit for them, but realizes how dangerously close it has come to an unresolvable inflation.³³⁶ The ego can no longer claim the central place of the personality, but must be satisfied with the position of a planet revolving about the sun.³³⁷ Figure 17 presents both the ego and the shadow as equal counterparts of conscious and unconscious psychic living, circling about the self at point 4 as if they were planets revolving about the sun. This representation is true to Jung's principle of opposites, which continues to operate after individuation is completed. As noted above, having depotentiated the anima—and possibly also the mana personality—the ego still needs its polar opposite against which libido may be generated. The self acts as the continuing vehicle (bridge, pipeline) for the balancing of this dialectically generated libido, and the contrast provided actually vitalizes the personality as a whole.³³⁸

The question remains: is it possible to individuate the personality in other than an analytical setting? Could a person self-realize in a general life setting, for example? Jung felt this was possible. In fact, he thought of the individuation process as *quickened maturation*, a term he borrowed from G. Stanley

Hall.³³⁹ He meant that just as many people mature into a far-reaching wisdom over their life span, particularly in the latter half of the life cycle, so too does the individuated patient in analytical therapy acquire a vision of life beyond his or her years. Such people mature before their time, but they might have done so in any case.

Symbols of Transformation in Mythology, Religion, and Alchemy

We come now to a part of analytical psychology that has probably done more to give Jung the reputation of being mystical than any other aspect of his theory. Believing as he did that symbols cured through their molding of insight by way of transforming libido,³⁴⁰ Jung was fascinated by the many ways in which he found humanity trying to correct for its collective one-sidedness through the manipulation of archetypal symbols—that is, symbols through which an archetype may be seen expressing its particular meaning. The main archetypes of transformation discussed by Jung are the *quaternity* and the *mandala*, and we shall limit our consideration to these two because not only are they in a sense identical, but they include in their meaning virtually all of the organizing, unifying, or balancing symbols he discussed.

The word *mandala* is Sanskrit for “circle,”³⁴¹ and *quaternity* (from the Latin *quatre*, meaning “four”) refers to geometrical figures having the property of being divisible by four, having four sides or four directions, and so on. If we consider a circle or a four-pointed (-sided, and so on) figure, it is easy to see that analogies to totality or wholeness are relatively easy to come by. Circles impel us to consider their centers, as we draw our attention within the circumference, hence inward

to the heart of the figure, very naturally. Assuming now that a personality needs to symbolize a centering tendency, as stylized in Figure 16, for example, what more appropriate image could we select than a circle? And so it is that in analytical psychology any circular, spherical, or egg-shaped formation which appears in dream or waking fantasies is considered a mandala symbol. Some common examples of mandalas are wheels of various sorts, eyes, flowers, the sun, a star, rotation (including a swastika!), snakes holding their tails, enclosed places like courtyards, and whirling about centrifugally (like the dervish dances). Bringing mandala and quaternity symbols together, Jung said the most common forms of mandalas are the flower symbol (twelve or sixteen petals focusing our attention on the pistil) and the wheel symbol (eight or twelve spokes focusing attention on the hub), but he also noted that a frequent symbol for the mandala was the cross (focusing attention on the union point of the four-sided structure).

The number four is a common quaternity symbol, of course, including all numbers divisible by four (as the flower and wheel examples just cited). Thus if a patient dreams of four ugly witches mixing a pot of some sort, we might interpret it as a quaternity (four) and a mandala (the round pot) constellated into one dream theme. The fourth point is said to express a balancing tendency in the psyche. One is single, two is only half-complete, three adds a tension calling for a complete coverage, but only four gives us that well-rounded, spatially complete image as the four points of a compass (direction), the four sides of a box (complete enclosure), and so forth. Jung claimed that the primary colors of red, blue, green, and yellow reflect a quaternity, as did the early speculations on the nature of the uni-

verse in terms of the supposed basic elements of earth, fire, water, and air.³⁴² It is no accident that Jung has four steps in his therapy, with the fourth being the one during which balance occurs.

Jung reminded us that primitive peoples often insist on a more fantastic explanation of birth than their own good sense would suggest. For example, they might go on claiming that sexual intercourse has nothing to do with pregnancy, even in the face of their personal experience or the proof being given them by civilized peoples. Jung also underscored a tendency that any mother might find true of her child. That is, children not only seem to prefer a mythological explanation to a scientific or a truthful one, but they often simply “forget” the scientific explanation when it is forced on them. A seven-year-old child will not always give up his or her belief in the stork or Santa Claus simply because a modern parent does not want the child to believe in fairy tales and therefore informs the offspring about the facts of life. Jung believed that this fascination with myth is basic to the human being’s capacity for abstraction. People are not really organisms designed to fit their thought to the facts of life. Besides, if we must someday realize a self that is not itself real (factual) but merely a possibility, then we have to develop a background of experience with mythologies of various sorts so that we can transform when the opportunity arises. This is a vital human process, one that needs practice, and one that might be termed *spiritual* because it is not involved with reality at all. As Jung summed its importance up, “Side by side with the biological, the spiritual, too, has its inviolable rights.”³⁴³ Hence the gremlin was a symbol of a modern myth, but the archetypes that went into its fashioning might have included the Trickster, Daemonic Power, and possibly even the Devil (Lucifer) (see Table 2).

Thus myths have a compensating role just

as dreams do. Myths arise from our unconscious, and they often make their first appearance in the form of a dream.³⁴⁴ Jung defined this feature of his theory as follows: "Mythology is a pronouncing of a series of images that formulate the life of archetypes."³⁴⁵ Since archetypes express meaning about all kinds of experience, it is possible to have mythologies reflected in science, religion, or political ideologies, that is, literally anything humanity finds itself doing. We do not make up myths, they are like the primitive thought forms that simply happen to us independently of our conscious will.³⁴⁶ The compensating balance that results when they make their appearance can actually be thought of as an elongated individuation process.³⁴⁷ Interpreting the mythological symbol is thus an important part of individuation in this sense. Jung did precisely this with flying saucers, a post-World War II phenomenon which he interpreted as the emergence of a modern myth.³⁴⁸ Flying saucers were viewed as projected mandalas, put up in the sky by people needing a new balance within their psyches. In this age of science, when the old symbols (myths, religions) are losing their capacity to transform libido and thus balance the personality, a new symbol and its underlying myth is taking form. Since there is often a religious twist given to the saucer myth, Jung took this to mean that people's spiritual needs are being projected in an effort to find a new relevance for the nonmaterial side of life in this materialistic age.

Jung said on several occasions that the Roman Catholic church, with its wealth of symbolic rites and its liturgical dogma, holds a decided advantage over the Protestant sects (of which he was once a member) when it comes to promoting individuated balance.³⁴⁹ Religious belief systems excel the more rationalistic systems of thought because they alone consider *both* the outer and the inner person.³⁵⁰ The appearance of a papal bull

(an official document issued by the pope) was for Jung a happy development, because this suggested that some of the older religious symbols might not be dying away completely.³⁵¹ Nothing is more dangerous to modern humanity than the disappearance of such symbols, for they act as the media for compensating archetypal themes. Furthermore Jung held that people who deny the patent fact that they *are* often moved by what can only be called a religious prompting are just as likely to slip into a one-sided neurosis as those individuals who refuse to admit that their religious faiths are occasionally shaken by doubt.³⁵²

As to specific religious beliefs, Jung suggested that the concept of an eternal *soul* serves a good purpose. In the first place, by believing in a hereafter, the individual retains his or her teleological approach to life and thus maintains a sense of personal advance throughout the years on earth. Secondly, the average person's belief in a soul reflects the underlying possibility he or she entertains that a unity can be achieved in the personality.³⁵³ In this sense, the soul is the bridge we can utilize to achieve that totality of personal being most people refer to when they speak of *God* (an archetype signifying unity).³⁵⁴

Since, as we know, individuation calls for the emergence of a self symbol, religions might be expected to have created a self-symbol. And so they have: *Christ* is the symbol of selfhood, combining such opposites as God and man, inner and outer, divine and corporeal.³⁵⁵ Christ also meshes with the Hero archetype,³⁵⁶ balanced by the opposite fact that he was also a victim. We can see in the myth of a man made into God the rise of the self, the realization of the most noble aspects of our human nature now personified in the figure of Christ. The symbolism of the

Catholic mass captures this in *transubstantiation*, which refers to the turning of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ. In the same way that a man was transformed into God, a priest now transforms material of one sort into material of another, higher sort. The resultant sharing of this body by all the faithful in the act of communion brings about a totality which is in all essentials a direct parallel to individuation in psychotherapy. Thus Jung can say, "In this sense . . . we can speak of the Mass as the *rite of the individuation process*."³⁵⁷

Jung had some very interesting, unusual views on the nature of religion and its mythology. He did not appreciate the decline in ritual and dogmatic symbolism that had set in among the Protestant sects and was eventually to extend to the Catholic church. But there were aspects of dogma he could *not* appreciate as well. One of these was the Augustinian view of the trinity (three persons in God),³⁵⁸ which falls one short of a quaternity; Jung believed that for a complete totality we must have four identities represented in a God concept. Related to this was the issue of evil. Is evil an active principle in the world, as one might say that goodness is? If so, what is the relationship between God and the obvious existence of evil? The early Gnostics (theologians) had speculated on this problem, and they had accepted the fact that God was *both* good and evil in His impact on human beings. Later, St. Augustine and others defined *evil* in the negative sense as the "absence of good," but Jung could not accept this definition because it seemed an obvious denial of what we know to be the case.

Writing in his autobiography, Jung tells us that as a very young man he had the

following insight regarding the God concept: "God is not human . . . that is His greatness, that nothing human impinges upon Him. He is kind and terrible—both at once—and is therefore a great peril from which everyone naturally tries to save himself."³⁵⁹ Jung was thus prone to refer to the "dark deeds of God,"³⁶⁰ and his interpretation of the biblical account of Job, who suffered though he was a good man, was that God simply had no appreciation of the supposed evil He was inflicting upon Job. God gives and He takes away, and from His vantage point there was no real understanding of why Job complained so. Thanks to His confrontation with Job, God decided to become human—that is, He sent His Son down to earth in the form of a man. This action provided God with a view of things from the human being's slant. Job thus served as a vehicle for God's Self-conscious development—in a sense, for God's individuation.³⁶¹

Coming back to the fourth point of the quaternity, if we now think about a complete totality in the God concept, we might oppose the Son to the Father, and in opposition to the Holy Spirit, it would be appropriate to oppose the active principle of evil as personified by Lucifer.³⁶² The Devil should round out our quaternity, but thanks to the Augustinian influence, neither evil nor Satan are acceptable counterparts of the theological God concept. Yet there was a time when theologians did speak of Christ as the brother of—and in some texts as even identical to—the Devil. It is probable that, at a very early stage in the church, the real man named Christ vanished behind the emotions and projections that swarmed about him from peoples all over the world. It is often true in history that a given personality will act out in life the unconscious promptings of an entire people. In the case of Christ, the historical man became the religious myth because it was *necessary* for such a projection

to take place as a compensation from the collective unconscious.³⁶³ Initially, the projection of a self symbol (Christ) had the archetype of the Devil combined with it, but in time the opposites were made a bit clearer, and then two figures emerged.³⁶⁴

The early churchmen commonly spoke of an *Antichrist* coming to life, and Jung took this to stand for the shadow of Christ.³⁶⁵ Gradually, thanks to the drift of theology, the Devil and Antichrist symbols fell from potency (lost their numinosity), and the concept of the Holy Trinity was fixed ever more rigidly in the Western mind. However, as must inevitably take place in the act of individuation, a tripartite identity was simply not satisfying because it did not fulfill all sides as a quaternary symbol would. Jung believed that, in dropping the Devil as one of the quaternary, it was only a question of time before the substitution of the Blessed Virgin was accomplished as the new "fourth."³⁶⁶ Thus, the trend to what is sometimes called Marianism (after Mary) in the Catholic church Jung took as evidence that a quaternary symbol of totality was not to be denied. Yet, for his part, Jung would have preferred the retention of the Devil as the fourth identity of the religious quaternary. He liked to point out that even Jesus taught us to pray the Lord's Prayer in the most quizzical fashion, and said, "Lead us not into temptation—for is not this really the business of the tempter, the devil himself?"³⁶⁷

Because he viewed religion as an important part of human living, and he was also willing to talk about religious beliefs in the way that he did, many people honestly feel that Jung believed in the existence of God as a *formal* hypothesis within his theory. Others think that he was deviously trying to bring psychology back to the older religious beliefs. Neither view is correct. Jung made it quite plain that God is not real, for nowhere can He directly touch our lives. He is

sensed as a power within, but as we have already noted, such a numinosity could just as well be considered daemonic as divine.³⁶⁸ Psychology is in no position to make metaphysical statements of this nature in any case. Analytical psychology can establish that the symbolism of psychic wholeness coincides with the God archetype, but it can never prove the existence or lack of existence of a true God.³⁶⁹ Jung stated flatly that "it would be a regrettable mistake if anybody should take my observations as a kind of proof of the existence of God."³⁷⁰ Jung regarded the psyche as real, *not* the God-image as such.

In addition to his writings on mythological and religious symbols, the charge of mysticism has been leveled at Jung because he tried to explain the nature of alchemy. He often dealt metaphorically with the symbols of alchemy, leading critics to think that he had developed an esoteric view of some sort. Actually, boiled down to its essentials, the Jungian interpretation of alchemy is identical with the individuation theory we have been reviewing in terms of mythologies and religions. Alchemy drew its roots from pagan beliefs, supplemented by borrowings from the Gnostics as well as from the more conventional church dogma of Western history.³⁷¹ The alchemists are sometimes said to be the first scientists, because they stressed the pursuit of empirical evidence rather than faith in the A.D. world.³⁷² However, Jung was to show rather clearly that in its early history alchemy was predominantly a religious movement. One could say that its prototype was something akin to transubstantiation. The alchemists drew an analogy to the transmutation of a natural, soiled, imperfect material state (bread and wine) into a spiritual state of perfection (body and blood of God) and claimed that they too sought to convert

something baser (lead) into something higher and more valuable (gold).³⁷³ Occasionally this higher substance was taken to be quicksilver (mercury) because this remarkable “liquid-metal” readily symbolized a union of opposites. Alchemists also searched for the basic substance that went to make up all things, thinking of this physical matter as a kind of divine prison in which the God spirit was confined; this was called *lapis* or the *stone*, or sometimes combined as the *lapis stone*.

Alchemists thus set out to find the secrets of matter, which they believed contained the divine soul (self symbol) as a captive waiting for release. As Jung said of the alchemist, “His attention is not directed to his own salvation through God’s grace, but to the liberation of God from the darkness of matter.”³⁷⁴ These men were extremely devout, and the aim of changing lesser metals into gold or quicksilver was not to acquire riches. If such a discovery could be made, then we would have an empirical demonstration of the existence of God! During their pseudo-chemical work, alchemists often had hallucinations and other hysteroid states in which complexes of various sorts would emerge and confront them in personified form. They projected their unconscious contents onto matter to such a degree that the product to be extracted from matter as a divine essence was called *cogitatio* (having to do with thought).³⁷⁵ A clear indication that an individuated self was being sought in the symbols of alchemy can be seen in the statement of Dorn, one of the famous alchemists Jung studied, who once urged his peers to “transmute yourself from dead stones into living philosophical stones!”³⁷⁶ In short, just as the patient in psychotherapy works through art forms to individuate, so too did the alchemist

work at his experiments in an effort (unknown by him) to find his unique self-identity. He looked outward to matter in an effort to find what was really going on within him psychically.

Alchemy as a spiritual practice flowered through the Middle Ages until roughly the seventeenth century when it began its decline, thanks to the offsetting rise of modern natural science. The alchemists began to make a distinction between the psychological (*mystica*) and the material (*physica*) aspects of their study.³⁷⁷ The older symbols lost their fascination (numinosity), and men calling themselves alchemists were no longer seeking individuation so much as they were literally trying to turn lead into gold. Materialism replaced spiritualism, and this unfortunate distortion of the original aims of alchemy brought on its current decline and disgrace.

Mental Health and Modern Times

Beginning around World War I and running through the rest of his life, we note a mounting concern in the writings of Jung with what he called the *sickness of dissociation* in the twentieth century.³⁷⁸ One can see this splitting-up in the political and social conditions, the fragmentation of religion and philosophy, and even in the contending schools of modern art. Since he believed that art reflected the psychic state of humanity, Jung was alarmed by the detached quality of modern art. The creations of a Pablo Picasso or a James Joyce did not enthrall him.³⁷⁹ He felt the meaninglessness and the deliberate aloofness from the spectator or the reader in such art products express only too well what is taking place in the psyche of modern humanity.³⁸⁰ Symbols are no more alive in modern art than they are in modern religion. And for Jung, when we lose our symbols, we have lost the potential for balancing any one-sided state that may develop in our per-

sonality. The irony of modern times is that, though we profess an almost religious conviction that consciousness is all there is to psychic living, we are steadily falling more and more under the direction of unconscious collective forces.³⁸¹

As his example, Jung took the horrors of two world wars in his lifetime.

*Nobody realized that European man was possessed by something that robbed him of all free will. And this state of unconscious possession will continue undeterred until we Europeans become scared of our "god-almightiness" [inflated convictions]. Such a change can begin only with individuals, for the masses are blind brutes, as we know to our cost.*³⁸²

If the vast majority of people suffer dissociation from their darker side, which in turn leads to possession, inflation, and the projection of these problems onto others, then the stage is set for *external* solutions when *internal* solutions are called for. Such external solutions tend to be collective in nature, which means they will be ineffective because the problem is an internal, *individual* one. Though Jung favored listening to the collective promptings of the unconscious, to learn from what these group symbols had to say, he rejected the reliance on collective solutions so many people advocate in modern times. He once observed, "The steady growth of the Welfare State is no doubt a very fine thing from one point of view, but from another it is a doubtful blessing, as it robs people of their individual responsibility and turns them into infants and sheep."³⁸³

Lest Jung seem an archconservative and reactionary, we should add that he had an ethical view of how people ought to behave which, if followed, would lead to a social order in which variations and even contradictions in personal behavior would be welcome

as uniqueness and individuality. Jung called behavior that is accepted from the group without a personally reasoned basis *moral behavior*. As we are growing, our parents and other important social influencers provide us with the mores of the group, and we accept these principles emotively, based entirely on the feeling-toned fact that they are considered appropriate by everyone we know. In a sense, moral behavior is automatic. *Ethical behavior*, on the other hand, comes into play when we *reflect* upon our moral inclinations. Sometimes our automatic moral tendencies come into conflict with one another, and when we do not think about it we might overlook an inconsistency of this sort in our morally conflicting behaviors. At other times a conflict between our moral duties ushers in a severe test of our ethical judgment or character.³⁸⁴ It was Jung's firm belief that unconscious promptings, taken seriously and studied for what they suggest, could function by way of our conscience to help us settle such ethical questions, and even more basically, to know precisely who we are in relation to them.³⁸⁵

Unfortunately, we moderns are too busy doing things to take time for contemplation and introspection of this sort. We wait on science to solve our problems and adjust us psychologically. But only we, as individuals, can through meditation and fantasy-production stop the tendency so rampant today to project our shadows onto others.³⁸⁶ If we confronted the personified evil that exists below awareness and assimilated it as *our self* (individuation), there would obviously be little need for the social reformers, because everyone would see things more clearly and work to further rather than to hinder the adaptations of community life.

Therapeutic Techniques

Dialectical Equality in the Relationship

The prime rule of analytical psychotherapy is that it is a *dialectical* procedure, in which the individuality of the sufferer has as much right to existence as do the theories and individuality of the doctor.³⁸⁷ The analytical procedure is dialectical in two ways: (1) the patient and therapist have equal rights in the dialogue,³⁸⁸ and (2) the conscious and the unconscious square off on equal terms in their confrontation.³⁸⁹ Real change demands openness and equality with an opportunity for either side to express a point of view.

As an exercise, Jung once showed how the theories of either Freud or Adler could be used satisfactorily to explain the dynamics of the same patient.³⁹⁰ This admission has implications for client *resistance*, of course, because if the therapist admits that any of a number of theories can account for the client's problems, then when the client rejects a given interpretation, how can the therapist call this an act of resistance? Jung therefore concluded that analysts make entirely too much of resistance, which places him quite opposite to Freud, who stressed the overcoming of resistance as a major job of the analyst.³⁹¹ Jung insisted that his students take a self-critical attitude and wear their theoretical prejudices lightly by not dismissing all patient objections as resistance.³⁹² Of his own practice, Jung stated, "I am inclined to take deep-seated resistances seriously at first, paradoxical as this may sound, for I am convinced that the doctor does not necessarily know better than the patient's own psychic constitution, of which the patient himself may be quite unconscious."³⁹³

Jung borrowed his dialectical procedure

from the ancient Greeks, who called it the Socratic method. He felt that its strength lay in the fact that it encourages new points of view to emerge as a synthesis of the views expressed by the client (thesis) and the therapist (antithesis).³⁹⁴ Furthermore, in a dialectical exchange the analytical therapist does not have to worry about what to do or where to go next, because the client has equal responsibility for direction and in fact always sets the stage for what will be considered. Jung admitted that suggestion plays a certain role in all therapies, but he distinguished between conscious and unconscious suggestion. *Conscious suggestion* he took to mean following out a preconceived line of development or argument in making interpretations to the client.³⁹⁵ Though the therapist cannot entirely avoid making unconscious suggestions to the client, he or she can and should avoid all such conscious forms of suggestion.

The therapist must be the model of a balanced individual if he or she is going to help the client. Clients do not make themselves similar to the therapist in a specific sense. They do not take on the likes and dislikes of the therapist in food, art, politics, and so on. But on the issue of wholeness and totality, there will be an identity between client and therapist, for this is what *self-realization* means. The therapist must show the way in his or her own adaptation, and Jung can thus say, "The great healing factor in psychotherapy is the doctor's [balanced] personality."³⁹⁶ The so-called transference relationship is nothing more than a running series of projections sent the therapist's way from the unconscious of the client. Interpreting the origins of these imago projections is helpful, but this alone can never produce an attitude of healthy adaptation toward life in a teleological sense. By reducing today's relationship attempts to yesterday's imagoes (see p. 230), we constantly frustrate that which the patient needs most—a feeling of rapport

with people in the present.³⁹⁷ And so Jung once again uses his bridge metaphor to say that in the human ties of the therapeutic relationship, the abnormal individual can find the way back to the corpus of humanity. The neurotic person does not have to deny, lie, sin, keep secrets, or fight the mores of the group anymore, because the path from which he or she had strayed so long ago has been rediscovered.

*Hermeneutic Techniques of
Amplification and Active
Imagination*

Jung always believed that the free-association procedure used by Freud led to the uncovering of the same type of complex that he had discovered in his association experiments.³⁹⁸ He therefore used various kinds of association techniques in therapy, at times giving the client clue-words or images to respond to and also adapting the completely free associative approach in which the client says whatever comes to mind spontaneously. In time he came to the conclusion that free association is not enough for a complete elaboration of the complex through the symbols involved. We can get at the repressed complex through free association all right, because mental events are linked together in the mind with 100 percent necessity (see Chapter 4, p. 266 for a discussion of hard determinism).³⁹⁹ In fact, we could probably start the association procedure with a line taken from a newspaper.⁴⁰⁰ All roads lead to the complex in the psyche. But what we want in addition to this identification of the complex is a means of understanding what it is the unconscious wants us to do about the client's problems, the kinds of compensations to be made, and the change in conscious attitudes called for.

What the therapist needs is some way of understanding messages being sent from out of the unconscious to consciousness. Here is

where we now appreciate what Jung meant by the "hermeneutic treatment of imaginative ideas."⁴⁰¹ Symbols are not to be thought of as defensive maneuvers on the part of a client. Rather than covering up or hiding unconscious meanings, the symbol tries—as Hermes did for the gods—to convey this meaning. Freud was wrong to distinguish between manifest and latent dream content, because: "The 'manifest' dream-picture is the dream itself and contains the whole meaning of the dream. When I find sugar in the urine, it is sugar and not just a facade for albumen. What Freud calls the 'dream-facade' is the dream's obscurity, and this is really only a projection of our own lack of understanding."⁴⁰² Dreams are not only or even primarily defensively constructed false fronts, hiding what they really mean to say. Dreams are full of symbols, and we must devise hermeneutic techniques not only to recognize the collective meaning they embody but also to make this assimilatable to the client's consciousness.⁴⁰³

There are two, somewhat related, hermeneutic techniques used in analytical psychotherapy. The first, tied more closely to free association, Jung called *amplification*. He took this term from alchemy, where it referred to the fact that an alchemist would often let flow a series of psychic images and analogies while concentrating on his chemical studies.⁴⁰⁴ Though he failed to appreciate what was occurring, the alchemist was in fact enlarging upon the context of some archetypal symbol which was expressing itself in his ritualized experiments and the theory he was following to justify them. This process of "taking up the context" is what Jung meant by amplification.⁴⁰⁵ The client takes up each prominent point of his or her dream, and then lets a spontaneous flow of imagery

occur while focusing on it—essentially amplifying or enlarging the meanings therein. This is not the same thing as free association, because the client is not allowed to go from dream image to thought and then ramble on away from the dream images as such. For example, if as Jung’s patient we dreamed of a mountain scene, and then by concentrating on this dream image we were reminded of a vacation last summer during which time we had a dreadful argument with our spouse, Jung would not consider it proper amplification if we were to go off and rehash our marital problems—letting the dream per se slip from view. This would be a freely associated identification of a complex or problem area, but what he would hope to do in having us amplify is find out what the unconscious is saying to us. Jung would therefore encourage us as follows: “Concentrate on the mountain scene. What is happening? What comes to mind? Describe it all in full detail, including any changes that might occur as you experience the succession of images.”

If we were to follow Jung’s instruction, we might be surprised that our mind’s eye will indeed begin to witness a scene of some sort, either limited to the dream as recalled or possibly even extending beyond it. The mountain might change its shape. Someone might begin falling down the mountain. We might find that from behind the mountain the sun was beginning to emerge, and so forth. Based on the recall of the dream and any additional action that might occur in the reactivated scene, Jung could now help us learn the broader meaning of the dream symbols that have emerged. He might draw a parallel with the fantasied mountain scene and some relatively obscure Norse legend about mountain folk who had great strength of will.⁴⁰⁶ This may strike us as very odd

because not only are we rather timid and unable to get hold of our life, but we have always been somehow ashamed of our Scandinavian lineage. In time, Jung would show us that this is precisely what our collective unconscious is trying to cure through compensated dreaming. It is telling us essentially to balance attitudes, to drop the one-sided timidity and advance on life even as we take pride in our national roots (the pride we could have taken years back but did not). The meaning of the dream is right there in the manifest story line. One dream of this sort might not convince us, but if we were to have a number of them like this, all relating in some way to our personality problems and making the same point through dream symbols, we might begin taking our unconscious seriously. This is what Jung meant by hermeneutics, and in time he was to extend this technique to go beyond simply a dream context as such.

This broader hermeneutic application is *active imagination*, which Jung defined as “a sequence of fantasies produced by deliberate concentration.”⁴⁰⁷ In a sense, this is a highly sophisticated form of daydreaming, which is what Jung was doing when he stumbled upon his own complex (see p. 232). Once a theme emerges in active imagination it can continue for weeks and even months or years, possibly falling from view only to return again. The medium used to fantasize differs, of course, so that some patients use paintings and put on canvas what preoccupies them, others put their fantasied symbols into written form. Themes might include painting certain scenes (for example, mother-daughter relations) with variations, or recording in writing thoughts or images that arise spontaneously about anything from interpersonal relations between peoples to an examination of the anxieties of loneliness. Jung taught his patients to use this technique as a kind of barometer for the psychic state

of balance, and he was known to diagnose the follow-up adjustments of his clients based on the kinds of paintings they continued to come up with in active imagination after they had left him.⁴⁰⁸ Jung believed that when we concentrate on our unconscious content productions in this fashion, we literally charge them with more psychic energy and thus vitalize their symbolism.⁴⁰⁹ In this way, we ensure that symbols of transformation will solidify and effect a cure through balance.

Insight, Symbols, and the Strategy of Interpretation

Jung once said that the psyche needs to know just like the body needs food—and not just any food or knowledge but that which is appropriate and necessary for existence.⁴¹⁰ The symbol is the groping means by which the mind comes to know its new meanings.⁴¹¹ Symbols are made up of cultural contents used as analogies and metaphors through which they can express meanings never stated before. It is as if the archetypes were by nature dumb, and in order to express their compensating significance, they had to reach out and fix on whatever it was that the mind had learned in its particular culture. For example, if the theme of birth or rebirth is being pressed by the Self archetype during individuation, a fish image may be used symbolically in the dream as an analogy to a fetus *in utero* (both organisms surrounded by water; see Table 3, p. 250). The dream would be about fishes, but the archetypal theme involved would be (re)birth (individuation). The cultural contents change and hence there are no fixed, unalterable meanings to be found in true symbolical expression.⁴¹² Yet surely within a given culture for a given period of time, common symbolic meanings might emerge, recognized as meaningful by the entire collective.⁴¹³

The important point to keep in mind is that “every symbol has at least two meanings.”⁴¹⁴ One *never* exhausts the meaning of a symbol with a single interpretation. Take the supposed sexual meaning of a dream, for example. Must we assume that every sexual theme is aimed at a literal wish fulfillment of a sexual prompting, or can there be other meanings to the *union* formed in copulation? Jung felt that there could indeed be, as in the frank eroticism of many coital symbols found in the otherwise reserved symbolism of the Middle Ages, where kings and queens were occasionally pictured copulating in artistic sketches.⁴¹⁵ The symbolism here was not sexual lust, but the unity of the nation (or two different nations joining through marriage)—a form of totality and wholeness. In like fashion, it is often true that human beings symbolize their need for a return to social intercourse (relationship) with others by dreaming of sexual intercourse. The latter serves an analogical function for the former, so to speak.

Over the years Jung had many opportunities to make interpretations of symbolic content—both in dreams and other mythological, religious, and alchemical contexts. In order to give the reader some flavor of his style of symbolical interpretation, we have listed a number of symbols taken from his works in Table 3. Note the decided lack of sexual interpretations.

Coming now to the practical style of interpretation, Jung would usually begin by having his clients free-associate to a dream image on the order of Freud’s approach, to whom he gave credit as his teacher.⁴¹⁶ He departed from the classic free-association procedure by voicing his own free associations in the dialogue to supplement the thinking of the client’s.⁴¹⁷ Since the therapist is in therapy and many symbols have a collective

Symbol	Interpretation
Albedo (Light)	consciousness ⁴¹⁸
Animal(s), Aggressive	untamed libido ⁴¹⁹
Ascent, Climbing	sublimation, transformation ⁴²⁰
Dark, Darkness	chthonic, i.e., concrete and earthy ⁴²¹
Descent	psychic setback, confrontation with unconscious ⁴²²
Eye	consciousness ⁴²³
Fish	unborn child (in utero) ⁴²⁴
Gold	union of opposites ⁴²⁵
Leftward Movement	moving to the unconscious ⁴²⁶
Lightning	sudden, unexpected, overpowering psychic change ⁴²⁷
Mercury, Quicksilver	uniting all opposites ⁴²⁸
Moon	in man, unconscious; in woman, conscious ⁴²⁹
Nigredo	unconscious ⁴³⁰
Sun	in man, conscious; in woman, unconscious ⁴³¹
Theriomorphic Snake, Dove	male vs. female ⁴³²
Tree	personality, especially growth of ⁴³³
Water	unconscious or wisdom ⁴³⁴

Table 3 Some Jungian Symbolical Interpretations

implication, his or her spontaneous ideas are just as legitimate as the client's. Furthermore, the Jungian analyst knows more about mythological and other historical symbols than the client, and we must bring out all such information from the objective psyche, if possible. Jung was also prone to report his own dreams to the client, particularly if these seemed relevant to their relationship. He once had a dream in which one of his female patients was standing at the balustrade of a castle. He had to look up at her, for she was standing high in the air because of the rise of the castle walls, and he felt a crick in his neck as he fixed his gaze upward. This therapy series was not going well, and the next day he told the client that probably the reason it was not moving along was his fault. He had been thinking less of her than of other people, and his unconscious was now trying to compensate for his conscious atti-

tude of looking *down* on her by forcing him to strain in the opposite direction of looking *up* at her. The client admitted that she had felt this countertransference attitude on his part, and from then on the therapeutic relationship improved considerably.⁴³⁵

Jung agreed with Freud that no permanent harm results if a therapist makes an incorrect interpretation at any given point during therapy. Soon enough, the continuing flow of unconscious influences will make the error known. The therapist should use several dream contents before settling on a given interpretation, and Jung frequently based his insights on a dream series extending into the hundreds.⁴³⁶ He told of a patient whose dreams reflected the water motif twenty-six times over a two-month period.⁴³⁷ Though suggestion may operate, the therapist ensures by giving enough leeway and opportunity for self-expression that only those suggestions the patient is ready to accept in any case will be assimilated by consciousness.⁴³⁸ Hence,

Jung did not lose sleep over the accuracy of individual interpretations. As he summed it up, "I do not need to prove that my interpretation of the dream is right (a pretty hopeless undertaking anyway), but must simply try to discover, with the patient, what *acts* for him—I am almost tempted to say, what is actual."⁴³⁹

Jung defined *dreams* in various ways, as "impartial, spontaneous products of the unconscious psyche, outside the control of the will,"⁴⁴⁰ as "the hallucinations of normal life,"⁴⁴¹ or even as free associations, taking place without consciousness.⁴⁴² The emphasis here is obviously on spontaneity and autonomy. Basically, dreams have two functions: a *prospective* function, in that they help to prepare the dreamer for the following day,⁴⁴³ and a *compensatory* function in that they balance off one-sided conscious attitudes, such as Jung's condescension toward the client at the balustrade.⁴⁴⁴ Jung took each dream as a kind of self-portrayal, giving us in the conscious sphere of the psyche a look—through symbols—at the state of our psyche *as a whole*. For this reason Jung believed *every* dream actor is representative of some aspect of the dreamer's personality needing balancing. A dream might compensate the conscious attitude without conscious awareness (by the ego), but ordinarily people need conscious understanding for a compensating balance to take place.⁴⁴⁵ Jung also spoke of *big dreams*, analogizing to the highly significant dreams that primitives report to their group as visions. The biblical story of Jacob's dream in which he saw the staircase to heaven would be an example of a big dream, for the significance of this imagery on his life—and hence on the life of other people—was monumental.

In approaching an interpretation of some dream, the analyst should ordinarily consider two points.⁴⁴⁶ First of all, enlarge on and come to know the context of the dream:

Where is it set? What seems to be going on now? How does the action proceed? Second, establish what compensation is being suggested by the unconscious. In studying the symbolical manifestations of the dream, Jung once observed, "Our position is more like that of an archaeologist deciphering an unknown script."⁴⁴⁷ We will now review three dreams which Jung used as examples of his interpretation technique. They will provide an opportunity to see how his approach differed from that of Freud.

A favored example of a prospective dream mentioned by Jung in several of his writings⁴⁴⁸ was told to Jung by a male colleague who used to chide him about making up interpretations of dreams. One day the two friends met in the street and Jung was told the following dream: His friend is climbing a particularly steep mountain precipice. At first the ascent is very exhausting, but as he moves upward he seems to be drawn to the summit with increasing ease. Faster and faster he climbs, in a state now of ecstasy, until it feels as if he is actually soaring to the top on wings. When he reaches the top of the mountain he seems to weigh nothing at all, and the dream ends as he steps off lightly into space. Jung advised his friend to be especially careful in his future expeditions because this was a rather ominous dream (particularly since the truth was that the man's marriage was going poorly and his conscious outlook was not a happy one at that time). The friend scoffed at this advice and rejected any thought that the dream was a message from his unconscious. A few months later he was observed to have actually stepped out onto space while descending a rock face, taking himself and a friend to their deaths below. The dream had him

ascending and stepping up, the life actuality had him descending and stepping down. A Jungian could not dismiss this grim reflection of the principle of opposites as merely a coincidental happening.

Jung provided an excellent example of a compensatory dream in his case accounts. This dream was told to him by a young adult male. The dreamer and his father are preparing to leave their home by way of a new family automobile. The father takes the wheel of the car but begins to drive in a very clumsy fashion. He moves the car forward with a jerk, then backward, zigs to the left and zags to the right until finally he crashes the machine into a wall, damaging it rather badly. The dreamer is highly irritated with his father's behavior, and he begins to scold the parent only to find that his father is laughing—and obviously very drunk, a condition he had not noticed until after the accident. A classic Freudian interpretation of this dream would involve an Oedipal theme of some sort. In fact, the automobile as an enclosed place might actually symbolize mother, and the dream theme could be something like “this no-good bum is mistreating my mother, and he feels no remorse.” In making this interpretation, we would naturally be relying on the manifest versus latent content distinction. Jung, on the other hand, took this dream at face value. The dream was aimed at taking the father down a peg or two. “. . . The unconscious resorts to a kind of artificial blasphemy so as to lower the father and elevate the son.”⁴⁴⁹ Knowing something about the client helps us to make this interpretation, of course, and in point of fact, this young man did tend to put his father on a pedestal. The dream was simply compensating for

this attitude and asking that the conscious attitude be given more balance in outlook.

The final example of Jung's dream-interpretation approach is the report of a ten-year-old girl who, Jung cautioned, had absolutely no possibility of ever hearing about the quaternity of God. This is important, because Jung here drew an archetypal parallel with biblical themes and thus presents us with the sort of evidence he accepted as an indication that an objective collective unconscious exists in portions of the psyche. The little girl wrote the dream as presented in italics, and then Jung's comment follows to close the section.

Once in a dream I saw an animal that had lots of horns. It spiked up other little animals with them. It wriggled like a snake and that was how it lived. Then a blue fog came out of all the four corners, and it stopped eating. Then God came, but there were really four Gods in the four corners. Then the animal died, and all the animals it had eaten came out alive again.

This dream describes an unconscious individuation process: all the animals are eaten by the one animal. Then comes the enantiodromia [running to the opposite]: the dragon [matter] changes into pneuma [fog, spirit], which stands for a divine quaternity. Thereupon follows the apocatastasis [restoration], a resurrection of the dead. This exceedingly “unchildish” fantasy can hardly be termed anything but archetypal.⁴⁵⁰

Some Procedural Details

Jung did not believe in taking a detailed case history of the client from the outset, feeling that through free association one would get at the problem soon enough.⁴⁵¹ By and large, Jung's view of therapy techniques was broad. He felt that all therapists are eventually forced to borrow from each

other, because no one will go on using that which is less effective than an alternative technique just to be a purist in outlook.⁴⁵² Any one of a number of theoretical outlooks (Freudian, Adlerian, and so on) can provide the rationale for understanding a patient's dynamics. Jung therefore played down the specific technique a therapist might use,⁴⁵³ suggesting as we have already seen that the doctor's personality is more important than his or her particular therapeutic gimmick. He cautioned against trying to live the patient's life.⁴⁵⁴ Jung approved of the patient modelling himself or herself after the therapist, who has come to a higher level of adjustment by way of individuation. But if a therapist who has not individuated wants to manipulate the life of a client, a crisis will soon develop because in this case a therapist might in fact be identified with and directed by a *mana* personality. Similarly, Jung was not attracted to group therapy approaches. He felt that group interactions merely prevent the individual from a painful confrontation with the unconscious.⁴⁵⁵ In the Jungian world view, all of our troubles flow from within, so it is merely a furtherance of the one-sidedness to pretend that we can rectify the situation by focusing on the outward, interpersonal situation.

Since he believed it to be a means for individuation, Jung was not above sending his Catholic clients off to the confessional where they might cleanse their souls through recognition of their shadow side.⁴⁵⁶ By the same token, once balance of a sort was restored through communion, Jung would not necessarily enter into a dialectical procedure with such a client. Anything that would aid in providing a meaningful balance for the individual would be acceptable to Jung. "If he [the client] can find the meaning of his life and the cure for his disquiet and disunity within the framework of an existing credo—including a political credo—that

should be enough for the doctor. After all, the doctor's main concern is the sick, not the cured."⁴⁵⁷ Of course, with the more sophisticated client, it would be essential to carry on therapy through a dialectical tactic on into transformation by way of individuation.

At the outset of therapy Jung saw his clients four times weekly.⁴⁵⁸ As time slipped by and he moved ever more into the hermeneutic phase, he began cutting back the appointments to one or two hours per week. As this reduction in contacts was taking place, Jung would be encouraging the client to analyze dreams for himself or herself. He acted as consultant to the client's self-analyses. As long as proper assimilation was taking place, there was no need for sessions more often than once weekly. Regarding the kind of patient he saw in therapy, Jung observed: "About a third of my cases are not suffering from any clinically definable neurosis, but from the senselessness and aimlessness of their lives; I should not object if this were called the general neurosis of our age. Fully two-thirds of my patients are in the second half of life."⁴⁵⁹ This is in striking contrast to the general characteristics of Freud's patients, who were considerably younger as far as we can judge. It seems clear that Jung's outlook on life was much different than Freud's, and his entire view of balance and of self-realization doubtlessly made it likely that he would carry a message well suited to the older person.

Summary

Jung is known in psychology for his introduction of a *collective unconscious* construct, but we have found in Chapter 3 that

his concept of the persona is a *collective consciousness* notion as well. Jung's principle of opposition, through which he always seemed able to find one contrasting or contradicting mental content to offset another, is reflected in this division of the psyche. We also have the ego opposed by the alter ego or the shadow, and every type of behavioral style manifested on one side of the psyche has its opposition on the other side. If the ego is introverted, the shadow is extraverted, and if the thinking-sensation functions predominate in consciousness, the feeling-intuition functions color unconscious life with a style quite the opposite. It is out of this totality of opposites that Jung could eventually weave a balancing nodal point in the emergence of the self, that unifying identity of the complicated psychic realm, the *one* among the *many*.

Jung's adhesive model of the psychic structure was prompted by his early work in free association, in which he felt that he had proven the existence of feeling-toned complexes. This theoretical notion of a complexity of mental contents—a complex—was then to provide the basis for all of his mental conceptions. Complexes were said to function psychically under their own direction, and they could form anew over the life span of an individual. Some complexes like the ego, persona, and shadow seemed to form quite readily, thanks to the very fact of living. In living, we have to affirm certain behaviors (ego, persona) and deny others (shadow). The denied behaviors never simply go away. The difficult thing in life is to somehow bring about an understanding and even a communication between the affirmed and the denied sides. This is what the self complex affords because it acts as a go-between and a representative of both sides

of the psyche—the conscious and the unconscious. As Jungians, we always stress both sides of the psyche, because there is a sense in which the person begins life totally under the sway of unconscious thought, but not only a *personal* realm of unconsciousness.

Here is where Jung built on the concept of the unconscious that Freud and Adler had employed. Keeping his principle of opposition in mind, Jung essentially said that just as we have group influences on our conscious thought so too do we have group influences on our unconscious thought. Our family, social order, and civilization influence what we think about the world we now live in. But so too does our historical heritage of others who have “thought before us” influence how we think today. This objective, impersonal style of thought is just as much a part of our natural make-up as the fact that everyone's hands work in a certain way, with fingers bending and closing to form the same essential fist for everyone when they are clenched tightly. The working of the hand and the working of the psychic apparatus have this common influence from out of the past. Hence, in the collective aspects of our psyche there are general forms of expression, vaguely framed archetypes, which can be brought to bear in expressing some needed thought—a bright idea, a stroke of insight—at the right time. These primordial images are a priori categories of possible functioning. We can personify them, turning them into living figures in our mind, or we can get to understand them through other forms of symbolical mediation. For example, in an overly masculine man the anima archetype may enter into a dream calling him back to his feminine possibilities; in an overly feminine woman the animus archetype can provide the opposite (masculine) balancing outcome for her. The difficult aspect of such internal balancing is finding the common tongue—a symbol of some

type—through which one side of the personality (unconscious) can make itself known to the other (conscious).

Just as Freud was able to describe his theory in both psychological and energetic terms, so too was Jung able to move back and forth between such contrasting types of explanation. Jung, however, disliked Freud's limitation of the libido conception to the sexual instincts. He viewed libido more broadly, as a hormic life energy, an impulse the human being has to move toward valued goals of both a sexual and nonsexual nature. Jung's libido is teleological, a life-giving force directing the psyche which primitive peoples referred to as *mana*. Libido is that constellating force in the psyche that makes the formation of complexes possible. It works through the basic functions of the psyche to organize personality along both rational and irrational lines. Extraversion can either be thought of as the outward flow of libido, or in psychological terms, it can be described as the person's valuing external over internal life experiences. A reverse theoretical statement is possible for introversion. Jung's conception of the life stages was much more extended than Freud's, in the sense that he viewed developmental changes as taking place right through maturity. Youth is a longer span of time in Jungian than Freudian psychology. Jung did not accept the Adlerian claim that a life plan was fixed into place by age five. There is a grand play of opposites over the life span in analytical psychology, a counterbalancing of the one-sidedness of youth by the greater vision and understanding of midlife and old age.

Jung dismissed the Freudian fixation-regression hypothesis, preferring to believe that so-called fixated individuals have simply stopped moving forward in development. Hence, they are immature and can be brought forward again through a progression in development. One of the major

things to avoid in life is the development of one-sidedness. When this occurs for any of a number of reasons, libido that is generated through the tension of opposition created by the one-sidedness drops into the unconscious to form complexes. This is the theory of illness that Jung worked out to account for abnormal behaviors of various sorts, that is, the emergence of complexes that function in consciousness outside of the control of consciousness. The natural balance of the psyche is disturbed accordingly, and the extent of this disruption defines for us whether we are speaking of neurosis or psychosis. Though Jung did speculate at one point on the possibility of schizophrenia as being due to a toxin in the blood, his primary view of psychosis was as a complete flooding of consciousness by the contents of the unconscious. Neuroses begin in an effort by the personality to rectify its one-sidedness, so that when libido surges forth from the unconscious, taking an additional source from the numen of the archetypes, it is aiming to express something useful to consciousness (the archetypal theme). It is at this point that a transforming symbol must be gleaned or the free libido will simply regress again to unconsciousness.

If a transforming symbol is found, a balancing of opposites in the personality can begin. If this balancing is successful and a complete individuation occurs in time, this always means that a self will emerge. The self individuates from all sides of the personality, once the primary neurotic (or psychotic) complex has been depotentiated. Jung called this major-problem complex the *anima* complex, thanks to its appearance in his self-analysis. But a comparable complex in the female would be called the *animus* complex. The complete process of analytical

therapy moves through four stages: confession, elucidation, education, and transformation. Individuation occurs in the last of these four stages, and not everyone who enters analytical therapy necessarily individuates. When individuation does occur it is due to the transcendental function, for now the person can rise above all sides (the *many*) of his or her psyche to form a unifying centering point (the *one*) in the personality. This is a sensitive period in psychotherapy, for it is possible that the *mana* personality will deviously assume command of the personality if the *anima* complex is not depotentiated properly.

When individuation begins, we witness the appearance of mandala or quaternity symbols in the dreams or free fantasies of patients in Jungian analysis. Cultivation of these symbolical expressions is all-important to the curative process. The Jungian techniques of amplification and active imagination are designed to promote the formation of symbols. Jung stressed that effective therapy demands equality in the relationship between the participants. He believed that the Freudians had made entirely too much of resistance. The client ultimately knows what is best. Transference, which arises during the second stage of elucidation, is not to be misunderstood as a true genital effort on the part of the client toward the therapist. Transference behaviors are caricatures of the social bonds that hold peoples together. The client behaves in this way because he or she is trying to regain a sense of rapport with reality, not to re-enact an Oedipal complex from out of the past. Indeed, Oedipal themes are transpersonal manifestations, mythical motifs that take their force of meaning from archetypal materials. Jung underscored the dialectical nature of the therapeutic relationship as well as the dia-

lectical nature of individuation, in which the split in the personality caused by one-sidedness is confronted and allowed to play itself out.

Jung was very concerned about the sickness of dissociation which he saw developing in modern times. People are being cut off from their unconscious side of the psyche thanks to the idolatry of science, which can admit of no true psyche, much less of an unconscious psyche. The more we deny the darker forces at play in our nature, the more we project these factors onto others, and in turn, fall under their sway as neurotic complexes. Jung hoped that modern culture could become sufficiently enriched to accept what might be called an irrational component of human nature. In the final analysis, the serious problems of humanity are not “out there,” in some kind of hard fact pattern. The serious problems of humanity are “in here,” within our very identities as teleological animals who create our own circumstances. We have to learn more about the unknowable, and that most difficult task of all, learn to take direction from our unconscious. If not, the outlook for humanity is ominously self-dissociative if not self-destructive.

Outline of Important Theoretical Constructs

Biographical overview

Personality theory

Structural constructs

Dualism of mind versus body
directed thinking

Psyche as a region

teleological direction • principle of opposites • primordial past • consciousness

versus unconsciousness • empirical psyche
as collective conscious • collective un-
conscious • persona • objective uncon-
scious • differentiation (discrimination)
• personal unconscious

The “adhesive model” of psychic structure
adhesive model • agglutinate • com-
plex • automatism • feeling-toned
complex • ego (ego-complex) • persona
(persona-complex) • shadow (shadow-
complex) • (*alter-ego*) • self (self-com-
plex) • (*complexio oppositorum*)
• personality

The “stylized meaning expression” model
symbolism • (*symbol versus sign*)
• archetype • universal symbolism • uni-
versal archetypes • instincts as typical
modes of action • archetypes as instinct’s
perception of itself • primordial image
• archetypes not inherited ideas but mean-
ings • *a priori* categories of possible
functioning • personifying archetypes:
anima versus animus • personification
• transforming archetypes: self
• dominant

Motivational constructs

Instinct and energy
instinct • libido as life energy or value
estimates • instinct and archetype • telic
nature of libido • mana

The principle of opposites
principle of opposites • principle of
equivalence • constellate (agglutinate)
• principle of entropy • one-sidedness

Complex formation
compensation (counterbalance) • com-
pensation of consciousness by unconscious-
ness

*Psychic determinism: causality versus
synchronicity*

hard versus soft determinism • syn-
chronicity

Adjustment mechanisms

repression versus suppression • projection
versus introjection • compensation, bal-
ance, and wholeness • differentiation
(discrimination) and opposition
• identification, possession, numinous,
assimilation and inflation • (*identifica-
tion with the archetype*) • progression
versus regression • (*view of “fixation”*)
• constellation and mobilization • in-
dividuation and transcendence

Time perspective constructs

Presexual period

Prepubertal period

Pubertal period

Youth

Middle life

Old age

Immaturity rather than fixation

Individual differences constructs

Basic functions of the psyche

function • thinking • feeling • rational
functions • irrational functions • sensa-
tion • intuition • primary function
• inferior function • superior function
• auxiliary function • secondary function

*Introversio versus extraversion and the
psychological types*

attitude • extraverted attitude • intro-
verted attitude

*Transcendental function and the mana
personality*

transcendental function • mana per-
sonality (inflation)

Individual as collective identity

Male versus female psychology

principle of Eros • principle of Logos
• anima • animus

Psychopathology and Psychotherapy

Theory of illness

Incompatible opposites, complex formation, and assimilation-dissociation

Role of morals, evasion, and denial

conscience • secret

Meaning creation and symbols in illness

symbols as bridges • numen • regression of libido • symbols of transformation
• possessed by archetype (identified with archetype)

Neurosis versus psychosis

neurosis as two-pronged • psychosis as flooding of consciousness

Theory of cure

Growth, balance, and symbolic assimilation of opposites

polarities of life • confrontation with the unconscious • wholeness • depotentiation (depowerize) • midpoint of the personality • hermeneutic techniques in treatment

The stages of psychotherapy

confession • elucidation • (*transference, imago, countertransference*) • education
• transformation

Selfhood and individuation via the transcendental function

transformed into selfhood • individuation
• transcendental function • libido analogue • mana personality (via anima or animus maneuver) • depotentiate mana personality (if not anima or animus initially)

Symbols of transformation in mythology, religion, and alchemy
quaternity • mandala

Mental health and modern times

sickness of dissociation • moral versus ethical behavior

Therapeutic techniques

Dialectical equality in the relationship
dialectical procedure • resistance

Hermeneutic techniques of amplification and active imagination

amplification • active imagination

Insight, symbols, and the strategy of interpretation

symbol formation • prospective dream
• compensatory dream

Notes

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8. Jung, Vol. 8, p. 96. 9. Jung, Vol. 3, pp. 3–4.
10. Bennet, 1961, p. 43. 11. Jung, Vol. 5, p. xxiv.
12. Evans, 1964, p. 89. 13. Bennet, 1961, p. 40.
14. Jung, 1963, p. 171. 15. *Ibid.*, pp. 185–186. 16. Jung, Vol. 9i, p. 48. 17. Fromm, 1963. 18. Bennet, 1961, pp. 58–60. 19. Harms, 1946. 20. Jung, Vol. 3, pp. 36–37. 21. *Ibid.*, p. 272. 22. Jung, Vol. 8, p. 8. 23. *Ibid.*, p. 7. 24. Jung, Vol. 11, p. 312.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 83. 26. Harms, 1946, p. 566. 27. Jung, Vol. 8, p. 325. 28. Jung, Vol. 5, p. 58. 29. Jung, Vol. 9ii, p. 4. 30. Jung, Vol. 4, p. 287. 31. Jung, Vol. 5, p. xxiv. 32. Jung, Vol. 16, p. 77.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 90. 34. Jung, Vol. 7, p. 279. 35. Jung, Vol. 9i, p. 43. 36. Jung, Vol. 5, p. xxix. 37. Jung, Vol. 7, pp. 269–270. 38. *Ibid.*, p. 204. 39. Jung, Vol. 13, p. 45. 40. Jung, Vol. 16, p. 170. 41. Jung, 1946, p. 539. 42. Jung, Vol. 16, p. 155. 43. Jung, Vol. 8, p. 390. 44. Jung, Vol. 13, p. 92. 45. Jung, Vol. 9i, p. 280. 46. Jung, Vol. 16, p. 177. 47. Jung, Vol. 17, p. 52. 48. *Ibid.*, p. 115. 49. Jung, Vol. 7, p. 183. 50. Jung, Vol. 15, p. 80. 51. Jung, Vol. 1, pp. 3–92. 52. *Ibid.*, p. 44. 53. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
54. Jung, Vol. 3, p. 67. 55. *Ibid.*, p. 43. 56. *Ibid.*,

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Chapter 9

Applied Phenomenology: The Client-Centered Psychology of Carl R. Rogers

Rogerian personality theory is based on phenomenology and gestalt psychology, and so we will want to familiarize ourselves with the major thinkers in these earlier points of view. There is also a tie between phenomenology and the philosophy of existentialism, which is surveyed in Chapter 10 (see pp. 619–630).

Background Factors in Rogerian Thought

Edmund Husserl (1859–1938)

Husserl is often called the father of phenomenology, though he was not the first to speak of phenomena nor was he the first philosopher to refer to his outlook as phenomenological (that distinction belongs to Hegel). Yet he did more to define the issues and to stimulate the general phenomenological point of view than any other theorist.

Recall from the Introduction (p. 14) that Kant had divided experience into two spheres: the *noumena* (what something is in itself, independent of our sensations of it) and the *phenomena* (our sensory knowledge of things or actions in the external world). Fay holds her favorite comb in her hand. She feels its heavy plastic weight in her palm and runs her fingers along its teeth. These feeling sensations are phenomenal experiences, but does Fay ever really know the comb as a reality independent of these sensations—know it noumenally? Though he believed that noumenal reality really exists, Kant argued that we can never know such “things in themselves” directly, and that, in fact, our mind through its categories of the understanding frames-in the *meaning* of the noumenal world for us.

Husserl’s philosophy begins in this distinction between noumena and phenomena. Since meaning resides in the phenomenal realm, the only way for a science of psychology to understand anything is to see it from the person’s subjective point of view. We cannot hope to find an independent noumenal reality existing objectively someplace; all it can mean is the agreement reached phenomenally by a number of subjects—individual people. Thus, even Fay cannot prove that her comb *really* exists unless she finds several other people to agree that they too see and feel its presence. Husserl called this approximation to general agreement *intersubjectivity*. Thus his formal position on psychology was idealistic, as suggested in the following:

Everything that in the broadest sense of psychology we call a psychical phenomenon, when looked at in and for itself, is precisely phenomenon and not nature [that is, noumenal existence]. . . . A phenomenon, then,

is no “substantial” unity; it has no “real properties,” it knows no real parts, no real changes, and no causality; all these words are here understood in the sense proper to natural science.¹

The physical scientist can properly define things materialistically as “really existing” and can see things in terms of antecedent events pushing consequent events along in mechanistic fashion. But can we as psychologists define the natural scientist *as a human being*, who must therefore behave from within a phenomenal understanding of reality in similar terms? Husserl said that we could not. Human beings are moved by intentions, by goals and aims which they strive to realize in a peculiarly nonmechanistic fashion. Husserl argued that we need a new language of description as well as a new *method* of scientific investigation if we are to capture this distinctively human course of action. What sort of method is this to be? Husserl devoted much of his life to working out a proper phenomenological method, one that would capture experience as known by the man or woman subjectively *within* phenomenal experience rather than from *without*, as science pretends to accomplish.

Since the question of independent, noumenal existence is irrelevant (who can know it?), Husserl argued that a phenomenological method must capture the *essence* of meaning. This essence is the conceptual significance of the words we use to describe our phenomenal world through an act of intuition; it involves the immediate, unbiased knowing of what is going on in our phenomenal experience.² This method is not precisely introspection, because the introspective psychologists of Husserl’s time felt that they were studying the body’s *real* or noumenal processes. *Phenomenology* focuses exclusively on the phenomenal aspects of experience.³ If we were to have asked

Husserl, "What can phenomenology teach us?" he would have answered:

Phenomenology can recognize with objective validity only essences and essential relations, and thereby it can accomplish and decisively accomplish whatever is necessary for a correct understanding of all empirical cognition and of all cognition whatsoever: the clarification of the "origin" of all formal-logical and natural-logical principles (and whatever other guiding "principles" there may be) and of all the problems involved in correlating "being" (being of nature, being of value, etc.) and consciousness. . . .⁴

Scientists can only be objective through use of their subjective cognitions (thoughts); hence, they need a more personal method to complement the impersonal method employed when they study things other than themselves. This demands a study of consciousness, which always involves consciousness of something else.⁵ Consciousness is fundamentally intentional; it seeks to know things beyond itself yet in patterned relation to the self. Phenomenology seeks to clarify how we become *conscious* of these related events in experience.⁶ In the phenomenological method, we are not studying *that* but *this*, our very existence as conscious, meaning-creating beings. Hence, Husserl can say of his proposed science, ". . . we meet a science of whose extraordinary extent our contemporaries have as yet no concept; a science, it is true, of consciousness that is still not psychology; a phenomenology of consciousness as opposed to a natural science about consciousness."⁷

Kant was alert to the seeming fact that human beings are able to turn mental attention to themselves—to reflexively study their own mind as a process. If humans have machine properties, then unlike other machines in nature, they can turn back on themselves and observe their own parts and

processes at work. To describe this ability Kant employed the term *transcendental*. We transcend when we go beyond the usual flow of our thoughts (cognitions) and see things as they happen from the vantage point of an observer outside this flow. This is more than simply feedback (see our discussion of cybernetics, p. 479); a machine that is feeding back portions of output as new input does not transcend and *know* that it is feeding back. It never gets outside of its processes to know that it is a process of knowing. Husserl borrowed Kant's construct of transcendence to speak of the new method of personal study as *transcendental phenomenology*.

The success that Husserl achieved in these phenomenological studies is debatable. His career seemed more a critical introduction to the possibilities of a phenomenological method than an actual demonstration of the fruits of that method. He presented insights into the nature of consciousness, particularly as it relates to the dimension of time, but we cannot point to a systematic body of knowledge in this area as we can point to a body of knowledge in gestalt psychology—an approach to psychology that acknowledged the role of phenomenological description.

**The Gestalt Psychologists:
Max Wertheimer (1880–1943),
Wolfgang Köhler (1887–1967), and
Kurt Koffka (1886–1941)**

When psychology began as an independent branch of science, a major interest of its founders was sensation and perception. How does a person come to know his or her environment through the senses, and how can we explain the higher thought processes

in light of these sensory receptors? John Watson's (see Chapter 6) emphasis on the observed motions of behavior was not in vogue during the last few decades of the nineteenth century and the first decade of this century. The founding fathers of experimental psychology, Wilhelm Wundt and Hermann von Helmholtz, were trained in physiology and physics. They assumed that their role was to explain human behavior in the general style of all natural scientists which meant finding the underlying (atomic) basis and source of the physical energies that were *really* the cause of overt behavior.⁸ This actually became a search for the noumenal reality! Psychological study was therefore aimed at breaking down the structure and function of the nervous system and its receptors (eye, ear, skin, and so on) into the neurons and nerve impulses that supposedly make observable behavior happen in the first place.

Many young men entering the field of psychology could not accept this form of material reductionism which seemed bent on ignoring the totality of human experience, a totality that simply could not be found in the underlying building blocks of atomic energies. Looking back, Köhler spoke of the excitement generated when an alternative to the reductionistic approach was first suggested:

. . . it was not only the stimulating newness of our enterprise which inspired us. There was also a great wave of relief—as though we were escaping from a prison. The prison was psychology as taught at the universities when we still were students. At the time, we had been shocked by the thesis that all psychological facts (not only those in perception) consist of unrelated inert atoms and that almost the only factors which combine

these atoms and thus introduce action are associations forged under the influence of mere contiguity [contact]. What had disturbed us was the utter senselessness of this picture, and the implication that human life, apparently so colorful and so intensely dynamic, is actually a frightful bore.⁹

The man who was to father this new look was Max Wertheimer (1945).

In 1912, one year before Watson's epic call for a behaviorism, Wertheimer published his classic paper on *phenomenal movement*, or more simply, the *phi-phenomenon*. Essentially, this perceptual phenomenon accounts for our seeing motion solely as the temporal displacement of perceived objects in our visual field, even when no actual external movement is taking place. For example, in viewing a motion picture, what we "see" is a series of pictures *without motion* flashed in rapid succession, each of which shows a person or object in relatively different proportion to the background. The same thing applies to music, wherein melodies emerge as total impressions from individual notes combining into certain tempos. The point Wertheimer was making and the criticism his students and collaborators, Köhler and Koffka, were to continue throughout their eminent careers was that "we can never find these qualities of experience in reductive experiments." Thus, the meaning of *gestalt* is that of the "total, whole, essential nature of." Just as Husserl argued that an essence cannot be found in reality, so too the gestalt psychologists argued that the human being is an organizing animal, one who arranges an incoming physical (*distal* or removed) stimulus into a unique totality at the level of phenomenal experience (*proximal* or close-by stimulus). Humans therefore do as much to reality in shaping experience as reality does to them.

Thus the first major reaction to an ele-

mentistic psychology, or a mechanical psychology, occurred in the field of perception. Gestalt psychology takes root in perceptual study, though its founders were to extend their descriptions to higher mental processes, personality, and even social organizations.¹⁰ And in doing so, they specifically advocated the use of phenomenology, which they defined as follows: "For us phenomenology means as naive and full a description of direct experience as possible."¹¹ This emphasis on naive (simple, unsophisticated) description is a typical phenomenological caution, that we as scientists not allow our assumptions regarding what is "good" science or "factual" description to get in the way of the human experience we are trying to understand.

For example, science teaches us that some things are sensations and other things are realities. A cloud may appear threatening to us as it approaches from across the sky, but this threat is not really being *seen*. The cloud is just a collection of liquid material particles. It has no intrinsic quality of threat. Yet, says Köhler, to the primitive mind a phenomenal experience of threat *is* perceived directly in the cloud.¹² Primitives have no science to tell them otherwise. They can only perceive (see, understand) what they perceive, and hence the natural environment is experienced in quite other terms than it appears to a modern person. Indeed, Köhler once suggested that modern people cannot be completely naive about their phenomenal understanding of life, so biased have their perceptions become, thanks to the influence of natural science.¹³ The primitive belief in spiritual forces, such as *mana* (see Jung, Chapter 3), can thus be taken as a directly perceived *phenomenal* experience.

Making an analogy to physical science, the gestaltists spoke of a *field* of vision, organized into a *molar totality* (unitary mass) and acting as a gestalt. Though it is a

constantly changing field, the relative properties within the field of vision remain somehow constant and obey certain *laws of organization*. The subparts of the total are *articulated*—that is, divided into distinctively recognizable suborganizations—but the overall effect of the molar totality cannot be predicted from a study of the separate parts. The whole is something uniquely different from or greater than the sum of its parts. We might say the whole transcends reduction to the parts. Over a period of years the gestaltists named a series of laws that describe how this *phenomenal field* is organized, as follows:

Law of unit formation and segregation. Uniform stimulation produces a cohesive (united) field, whereas inequality in level of stimulation produces articulation (division) in the field.¹⁴ A circle or ring would be an example of the very cohesive field, unbroken by articulated inner parts. If we now begin drawing lines through the circle, making it into a cartwheel design, we are increasing the complexity of articulation. Generally, the geometric form having the most cohesive properties is the one that is most likely to be "seen" and the easiest one to remember. Thus, we can recall a circle easily, but in recalling the cartwheel, we might forget exactly how many spokes it had, and so on.

Law of closure. If we perceive a straight line, it remains as such until it may begin to curve and return to its point of origin—at which time there is great cohesive pressure to close the line into an actual figure of some sort.¹⁵ Thus, a circular line that is not completely closed into a ring will be seen as a closed ring by the average person,

especially if he or she merely glances at the incomplete figure. Closed areas are more stable than open areas because they have the cohesiveness of a uniform field or articulated subfield.

Law of good shape. The shapes that emerge perceptually—as in closure—will be those having the best balance and symmetry.¹⁶ An unbalanced, asymmetrical figure is not cohesive and will not be perceived as readily as a nicely balanced figure. A blob, with its disbalanced, uneven edges, is difficult to picture or describe accurately, whereas a nicely proportioned outline like a teardrop shape is quickly recognized and readily recalled.

Law of good continuation. Straight lines or the contours of geometric figures seem to follow their natural or “internal” tendency to continue as they “are.” A curve will proceed in the direction of its arc, an ellipse will continue as an ellipse, and so forth.¹⁷ In addition, this principle can be discerned in a melodious tune which continues in the direction previous notes have taken it. There is a certain demand placed upon the melody to flow in the line of best continuation.

Law of proximity and equality. Items in the perceptual field that are equal or similar in nature will be grouped together, as will items that are simply placed close to one another.¹⁸ In viewing this series of dots we are prone to see three groups of three dots, rather than nine dots in a row. So long as each articulated subpart of three dots is fairly close to the others, we tend to relate the total as a gestalt, because after all, they are all equally dots. However, if we extend the distance between the subparts, we would eventually see three different totals rather than three subparts of one total.

These laws of organization are not mutually exclusive categories of description. They can interact as, for example, when a good continuation either might combine with or might counter closure in order to bring a melody to a close or keep it going for several more notes. In the final analysis, all of the laws are referring to the *same* gestalt phenomenon. The gestaltists formalized this commonality by saying that a *law of pragnanz* subsumed or was the most general phrasing of all the other laws of organization. Pragnanz holds that “psychological organization will always be as ‘good’ as the prevailing conditions allow.”¹⁹ By *good*, the gestaltists meant regular, symmetrical, simplified, and perfect articulation of what they called the *figure*—that is, the content on which we fix attention when we perceive anything (what we see, hear, smell, touch, and so on). Furthermore, it is possible to speak of such figures only if we also consider the *ground* on which they rest. A closed circle, for example, closes a cohesive figure set against a background of cohesiveness, as when we draw a circle on a blackboard. The blackboard acts as the ground for the circle. The contour of the circle is defined inwardly, so that the only way we see *any* figure—the circle or a friend—is as a figure framed-in by a ground. We can thus name another all-embracing *law of figure-against-ground formation*: “. . . if two areas [of the perceptual field] are so segregated that one encloses the other, the enclosing one will become the ground, the enclosed the figure.”²⁰ When we now add that this figure will tend to be as simple, well articulated, and cohesive as possible, we have rephrased the law of pragnanz in figure-ground terms.

The gestaltists now had these principles, plus several others which we need not go into, to oppose to the reductive explanations of their theoretical opponents. In fact, Wertheimer was to suggest that the actual motions of the

molecules and atoms of the brain, insofar as they move about, conform to the patterns of gestalt laws. As molar processes, both the actions of physiological structures and the very way in which we go about thinking are *isomorphic*—that is, identical as to form.²¹ This *principle of isomorphism* was the supreme gestalt response to the reductionistic theories of Wundt and Helmholtz. Isomorphism claimed an *identity in pattern* for the phenomena (thought) and the noumena (the swirling atoms and molecules in matter). In this sense, gestalt psychology takes on a nativistic tone. Experience following birth can influence figure-ground relations, of course, but this innate tendency to think and perceive in a certain patterned way is *given* by our very natures—much in the way that our hearts and livers function in a given way from the outset of life.²²

When it came to describing personality, the gestaltists simply extended their laws to a description of the ego as a figure set within the ground of the social field. As Koffka said, “. . . the Ego seems to behave like any other segregated object in the field.”²³ When disbalances occur in the total field, the ego does what is required to re-establish harmony (symmetry, balance, closure, and so on). Feelings of pleasure and pain, wishes, desires, and all such needs were considered articulated subparts of the ego organization. The ego, in turn, was viewed as in articulated relations with and a subpart of other divisions of the field, such as the family, neighborhood, social class, and so on. Each of these divisions of the total field has its own organization following the laws of organization. To gain some impression of how gestaltists discussed group formation, we might turn to Koffka:

Groups are more or less closed, with more or less defined boundary lines. Consequently, the more closed they are, the more difficult

*it is to introduce new members into them. . . . It seems that the degree of closure and of resistance to innovations vary directly with each other. Thus the rural group is more conservative than the city group.*²⁴

Koffka went on to break down group formation into the articulated subunits of leader, follower, class levels in the social hierarchy, and so forth.²⁵

Kurt Lewin (1890–1947)

Though he was not an orthodox gestalt theorist, Kurt Lewin, as the founder of field theory in psychology, received considerable stimulation from the work of Wertheimer, Koffka, and particularly Köhler—all of whom were his colleagues for a time at Berlin University.²⁶ Lewin took the concept of a perceptual phenomenal field and drew it out into a theory of the *life space*, the total psychological environment that each of us lives within. Everything that might be said to have an influence on our behavior is nestled within the articulated parts of the life space.²⁷ Lewin drew the equation $B = f(LS)$, or, behavior is a function of the life space. Rather than seeing behavior as an *incoming* process of stimulus-to-response in the manner of the behaviorists, Lewin emphasized that behavior takes on field properties as an *outgoing* process of organization and interpretation.

The life space is thus a phenomenal field.²⁸ In order to predict an individual's behavior accurately, we must know the patterned structuring of the total life space. In defining the articulation and resultant structure of the life space, Lewin did not fall back upon specific laws of organization as the

orthodox gestaltists did. He and his many students worked out a number of alternative concepts, some of which directly overlapped the traditional gestalt theory, though others did not. One such concept was the *level of aspiration*.²⁹ Lewin's field theory emphasized that human behavior is directed toward goals and that people set their own expectations for what they will take to be success or failure in life. For some—even talented—students, a grade of C will be considered successful attainment, whereas others will be as crushed by this “low” grade as if it were an F. The former have acquired the habit of setting low levels of aspiration for themselves, whereas the latter have come to project high levels of aspiration—at least in this one sphere of possible achievement.

Lewin called the course of behavioral action carried out in the life space the *path* or *pathway*. When Juan makes his way from home to his job as a lathe operator, he follows a pathway from one articulated *region* of his life space (home) to another (job). Juan likes working on a lathe so this job goal has a *positive valence*, but he dislikes having to go into the main office and speak with his head boss. The main office bears a *negative valence* for Juan when he must direct his path of behavior to it as a goal. As we noted in Chapter 6 (p. 401), Neal Miller's researches on frustration and conflict were based on these Lewinian constructs of goals, pathways, and valences, as well as *barriers* to the attainment of goals. Of course, Lewin always kept the valence of a goal *in* the life space of the person who is essentially making the environment what it is. The negative meanings of the main office are in the final analysis due to Juan's psychological outlook. In his theory, Miller

had these valences as stimuli nestled *in* the environment. Miller would have Juan under the control of these independent factors rather than somehow responsible for them.

If behavior is the result of a total life space functioning constantly in the present, combining features from the past, and projecting a directedness into the future, then figures within this field other than the person might influence the action taking place at any point in time. For example, if we pass by a mailbox on our stroll to our place of work each morning, that mailbox is *not* quite the same item in our life space each morning. On the morning when we have no letter to drop, it is merely a potential obstacle in our path like any other object—a tree, a post, or whatever. But on those mornings when we have a letter to mail—and especially when it is an important letter—the mailbox takes on quite a different figural status. Rather than being something to be stepped around, the box literally beckons us to use it (acquiring great positive valence). Phenomenologically speaking, it takes on what Lewin called a *demand character*, so that it would be as correct to say that the “box brought us to it” as it would be to say “we went to the box.” We usually say the latter only because of our egocentricity, but the field forces of our life space play no favorites. The stresses and strains of disbalance when one aspect of the field beckons must be thought of as acting in a molar fashion “all at once” to re-establish harmony (*pragnanz*). The person is merely one figure among other figures set against an environmental ground.

Lewin hoped that one day a mathematical system could be adapted to measure the molar activities of the life space. He thought that the nonquantitative form of geometry known as topological geometry would have the best chances to handle the structural and positional factors in the life space. Actions in the life space were not always identical to those

of the *foreign hull*, which is what Lewin called the nonphenomenal, palpable reality (a derivative notion of the noumena). Sometimes the shortest phenomenal distance between two points is to move *away* from the desired goal, as any girl knows who has played hard to get with a potential boyfriend. But how to measure this kind of complex psychological behavior with mathematical precision was quite another matter; though Lewin pinned his hopes on topology for this purpose, it cannot be said that they were ever realized.

Lewin considered the articulated regions of the life space to be separated or *differentiated* by more or less permeable membranes, so that some are in contact with each other and some are isolated and cut off from influence. Someone who conducts an active religious life on Sundays but engages in unscrupulous business practices during the rest of the week would be a person with no internal *communication* between "work" and "church" regions. In moving from one life region to another, the person is said to *locomote*. We must also consider the person himself or herself as a region, because internal differentiations and articulations occur, such as motivations to achieve some goals and avoid others. There is a limit to the differentiation of the life space. Lewin called this the *cell*, but rather than viewing it as a building block of the life space in the reductive style of Wundt and Helmholtz, he considered the cell a cohesively stable organization which requires no further subparts.

At the upper reaches of organization, we can begin speaking of the social group entering the organization of our life space. Actually, during the last decade of his life, Lewin was moving away from personality theorizing toward the role of social theorist. He probably did more for the establishment and development of social psychology than any other theorist in the history of psychology.

In 1939 he coined the phrase *group dynamics*, and in the early 1940s he established the Research Center for Group Dynamics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (later moved to the University of Michigan following his death). He and his students performed the first controlled studies of leadership, in which they contrasted democratic, authoritarian (autocratic), and laissez faire (indifferent, weak) types of group leadership.³⁰ The model that underwrote this new area of group dynamics featured the typical gestalt emphasis on totality, organization of social roles, and the resultant channeling of hostile tensions outward to scapegoats, and so forth. Lewin also worked on propaganda and the role of prejudice in the control of human relations. Indeed, his life work always bore the stamp of relevancy and practical application. Yet he was fond of saying, "There is nothing as practical as a good theory."³¹

Thanks to his open mind and practical approach, Lewin and his associates (Ronald Lippitt, Leland Bradford, and Kenneth Benné) initiated the interpersonal activity that has been called T-groups (Training groups) or sensitivity training or *encounter groups*.³² In 1946 the researchers from MIT were holding a summer workshop aimed at training leaders to become more capable in the battle against racial and religious prejudice. The project was sponsored by the Connecticut State Inter-Racial Commission, and it eventually led to the creation in 1947 of the National Training Laboratories. The workshop brought together some forty-one hand-picked professional educators or social agency workers, about half of whom were minority group members from the black and Jewish segments of the population.

The strategy of the workshop was to begin with open discussion among participants and then to reach group agreement if possible on various social issues, such as the nature of prejudice, its causes, and how to counter it. A research staff observed and recorded these group discussions and then later that evening discussed their findings with Lewin in a kind of second group exchange. Apparently some of the subject-participants also attended these evening reporting sessions, which were conducted on the campus of Teachers' College, New Britain, Connecticut. When the point of view being expressed by the research psychologist conflicted with that of a subject-participant's memory of what had taken place that day, a kind of spontaneous group dynamic took place in the often heated discussion that followed.

Rather than discourage such commentary from his subjects and the debates that resulted, Lewin in typical spontaneous fashion pounced on the opportunity and literally began a second study of group interactions based on the feedback from earlier interactions. The discussion in these evening sessions became increasingly personal, and a participant necessarily gained insights concerning his or her impact on others in the group. In effect, the evening sessions had become group therapy, with tremendous potential for personality change among participants—subjects and researchers alike. Lewinian advocates were to refine this tactic of group confrontation into a device for the promotion of personal and social change. As we shall see below in this chapter, Carl Rogers picked up on the importance of such encounter groups for therapeutic purposes. Therefore, though he was not a psychotherapist, Kurt Lewin has left us with an extremely important legacy having far-

reaching implications for the healing of social ills.³³

Otto Rank (1884–1939)

Along with Adler and Jung, Otto Rank is generally considered one of Freud's most talented and important coworkers. Unlike them, however, Rank was not a physician. He joined the psychoanalytical circle while still a young man of roughly eighteen years. He served as the secretary to the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society while attending the University of Vienna. He was to stay with Freud for approximately twenty years, until the appearance of his first major book, *The Trauma of Birth* (1922–1923). As he had been moved to do in other instances (see Chapter 1), Freud parted with his younger colleague—though the split with Rank was not nearly as bitter as were others. This separation between teacher and student became a symbolic manifestation of Rankian theory, for Rank's entire outlook was colored by the necessity for human beings to express their own will, to shift for themselves, and to be *independent* persons.

Rank left Vienna in 1926 for Paris, followed by several trips to America; in 1935 he moved to the United States permanently. He died in 1939. While in America Rank became quite influential in the area of social work, where he and his major student Jessie Taft helped promote what has been called the *functional* school—as opposed to the *diagnostic* school—of social case work. Essentially, in Rank's view, a social worker takes a dynamic approach to the client and through relatively short-term therapy contact, effects a cure by helping the client to exert his or her own will in assuming responsibility for life actions. Diagnosis or problem definition is thus secondary to actual change in living. It was while he was

director of the Rochester Guidance Clinic that Carl Rogers came into contact with the philosophy of treatment advocated by Rankian social work, and we shall see definite parallels in the two outlooks.

It is essential that we grasp Rank's convictions regarding the purpose of psychotherapy. He never tired of saying that the therapy relationship is for the client and *not* the therapist. If a therapist insists on pressing a pet theory onto the client, generalizing from past clients to the human being now present, he or she can never cure what is wrong in the life of *this* neurotic. Rather, says Rank, "In each separate case it is necessary to create, as it were, a theory and technique made for the occasion without trying to carry over this individual solution to the next case."³⁴ The effective therapist always knows the client's individualized outlook on life and is able to discuss it in the client's own language.³⁵ Technical jargon is to be shunned. It is the spontaneity and the uniqueness of the therapeutic relationship which is the precious aspect of therapy—and that which cures—rather than the fanciful, high-blown theories of the therapist.

The central problem facing the neurotic is the problem of every one of us as we grow to maturity. We must learn to express our personal *will* and thereby take command of our own life. If we fail to attain this independence from mother and father, we will go through life defeated and miserable, hating those who repress us and hating ourselves for not willing positively. By giving up, the neurotic expresses a negative form of will, opting essentially for a flight from responsibility. After experiencing feelings of complete defeat, the neurotic person enters therapy and sees the therapist as a symbol of all that is positive in the sphere of willful behavior. This idealization occurs because the neurotic projects his or her positive will onto the therapist. Rank believed this is

what Freud meant by transference. But there is ambivalence in this transference, because the neurotic would like to become a positively willing person like the therapist and therefore resents the therapist to an extent. Being fundamentally afraid to will positively, the client puts this effort off and submits dependently to the therapist's will. One can see glimmerings of a client's more positive will when he or she stands up to the therapist and argues against this or that interpretation made in the course of the analysis. Freud incorrectly referred to this as resistance,³⁶ considering it frustration of therapy. For Rank, so-called resistance is the very heart of *successful* therapy, for it signals the fact that the client—long subjugated by the wills of others (parents, peers, teachers, and so on)—has finally begun to express his or her own *positive* will.

Of course, the time it takes for a client to come to this stage of independence ("resistance") in therapy varies. If therapists assume that clients are slaves to their past, unable to shake off the mistakes of their childhood, so that much time is devoted to searching about for these long-forgotten fixations, then clients may never gain the maturity to do their own thinking in psychotherapy. Even worse, the client's occasional "resistances" are likely to be crushed as childish re-enactments by the authority of the therapist. Rank once observed that therapy is like a battle, a dynamic clash between participants, but it is a battle that *the client must win!*³⁷ The therapist simply aids in this process of finding independence. An innovation that is usually credited to Rank—at least in the sense that he developed this tactic to its fullest extent—is setting a definite time for the *termination of therapy*. A host of short-term therapy approaches have evolved from this general strategy. However, as a theoretical development,

Rank viewed the termination as the high point and most crucial phase of therapy. He drew direct parallels between the anxiety generated in the client at this point and the *separation anxiety* the child experiences in being born (*birth trauma*), in leaving mother to attend school as a child, in leaving the family to take up an independent life in young adulthood, and so forth.


These are the clear acts of commitment to life we all must make. In growing to adulthood by degrees and thus expanding our consciousness, we all take on the responsibility of self-direction, which means we exercise our positive will function. Rank found his clients reliving all of these separation situations during the end stages of therapy. In their dreams he saw birth symbols and came to view therapy termination as a form of *rebirth*—paralleling the religious acts of baptism which have for centuries been characterized as being “born again.” As such, particularly since the client plays a major role in directing this rebirth, Rank considered it a *creative* act. In the Rankian world view, each person constantly creates his or her own reality. Here is a definite tie to phenomenology and existentialism. Just as a person must perceive things phenomenally and never know them directly, so too must he or she believe in some things that are illusory—points of view that are more or less socially acceptable opinions. Hence, said Rank, “The individual often lives better with his conception of things, than in the knowledge of the actual fact, perhaps is able to live only with his own conception of things.”³⁸ Since life is fraught with opinions, what better than to live by *our own* opinions? It is therefore not important that we as therapists discover the real facts of how the client became neurotic. It is of secondary concern that we have a unifying, single theory of the neu-

rosis. What is important is the decision on the part of a neurotic to create his or her own cognitive-phenomenal world and to live within it with willful commitment from day to day. When this commitment is made, the neurosis ends.

There are other influences on Rogers’s thought that could be detailed, such as Lecky’s (1945) self-consistency construct or Snygg and Combs’s (1949) view of the phenomenal self. However, the major drift of phenomenal theory has been captured in the positions reviewed to this point, and we can turn to Rogerian thought with sufficient background for a proper understanding.

Biographical Review of Carl R. Rogers

Carl Ransom Rogers was born 8 January 1902 in Oak Park, Illinois, a suburban community in the metropolitan area of Chicago. He was the fourth of six children, five of whom were males. His father was a civil engineer and contractor who achieved considerable success in his profession, so the family was financially secure throughout Rogers’s childhood and young manhood. When he was twelve, Rogers’s parents bought a large farm thirty miles west of Chicago, and it was in this essentially rural atmosphere that the founder of client-centered therapy spent his adolescence. Though the family was self-sufficient and dependent upon each other, one does not get the impression of actual joy and lightheartedness among its members.³⁹ For one thing, the parents, although sensitive and loving, were devoutly and rigidly committed to fundamentalist religious views—at least, the mother was. Rogers’s parents seemed to foster independence and common sense in their children,



Carl R. Rogers

offering them opportunities which might stimulate growth whenever possible. Rogers could never recall having been given a "direct command on an important subject" over his span of maturing years.⁴⁰

Rogers was a dreamy boy who loved books and spent much time in solitary pursuits. He could read before he attended grammar school which prompted the school authorities to start him in the second grade, and he remained a top student throughout his preparatory years. All of the children had farm chores, and Rogers was often up at 5 A.M. to milk several cows before breakfast. Summers were spent cultivating the fields and learning to be responsible; the family's most central belief was that hard work could straighten out any of life's problems. Rogers attended three different high schools and did little dating. He was apparently a rather lonely person who felt that

his next older brother was favored by their parents.⁴¹ Even so, Rogers drew strength from and even sought a "very positive kind of aloneness" at times in his life.⁴²

Rogers attended the University of Wisconsin, the school that both his parents and three siblings attended. He selected scientific agriculture as his initial field and roomed in the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) dormitory. He became active in various Christian youth groups. During his sophomore year, following a conference of young people who had as their motto to "evangelize the world in our generation," Rogers decided to drop agriculture and study for the ministry. A major event at this point changed the direction of his life: in his junior year he was selected as one of

ten students from the United States to participate in a World Student Christian Federation Conference in Peking, China. He was gone for more than six months and had an opportunity to witness a broad range of human behavior in cultures far different from his own. The experience liberalized his outlook, and on the ship enroute, he first seriously entertained the thought that “perhaps Jesus was a man like other men—not divine!”⁴³ From this point onward his letters home carried a different tone, one that was to upset his parents; but partly because of the geographical distance between parents and their son, the emancipation was achieved with a minimum of emotional upheaval.

Though his religious views had altered, Rogers was still drawn to Christian work. He had, in the meantime, begun corresponding with a young lady whom he had known since childhood in the Oak Park area. By the time of the voyage to China a decided romance had blossomed. Upon graduation from college Rogers opted to attend Union Theological Seminary, a liberal religious institution quite at variance with the fundamentalism of his youth. Against the advice of both their parents, he and Helen Elliott were married in August of 1924, just before setting off for New York City and a life of their own. It was in a course at Union Theological Seminary that Rogers was first extensively exposed to psychiatrists and psychologists who were applying their skills to individuals needing help. Realizing the commonality of the ministry and the mental health professions, Rogers began taking psychology courses at Teachers College, Columbia University, which was located across the street from Union Theological Seminary. His entire outlook on life began to change. In

about his second year of graduate study, a group of students put together a seminar on “Why am I entering the ministry?” in which instructors were not permitted to influence the directions taken. As a result of this early group experience and the soul-searching that followed, most of the participants including Rogers “thought their way right out of religious work.”⁴⁴

He then turned to psychology and over the next few years managed to keep himself, his wife, and their first-born child together on modest fellowship stipends. There was no single, outstanding figure in his education, and Rogers was to look back somewhat thankfully that he never had a mentor to defend or to react against as he came to intellectual maturity.⁴⁵

After taking the Ph.D. in clinical psychology in 1928, Rogers accepted a position with the Rochester Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. He remained in Rochester, New York, for the next twelve years, a highly productive time in which he developed his approach to the treatment of both children and adults in what was then called *nondirective therapy* and is better known today as *client-centered therapy*. It was there that he came into contact with social workers who were greatly influenced by Otto Rank. He heard Rank speak in a workshop and, though not impressed at first, gradually began to see the value of these new conceptualizations. Educated in an eclectic theoretical atmosphere with fairly heavy doses of Freudian theory, Rogers needed a few years to find that therapist insights—even when acceptable to the client—often failed to help the client materially alter his or her lifestyle. The Rankian emphasis on shifting creative self-definition to the client began to cement with Rogers’s heavy personal commitment to the ideals of individual choice and freedom.

Rogers found the typical brand of psy-

chology reported on in the professional meetings of the American Psychological Association (APA) too far removed from his interests as a clinical psychologist to become active in that organization. Consequently, he turned to the professional organizations of the social workers and held both state and national offices in this wing of the helping professions. Later, he was to be very active in the American Association for Applied Psychology (AAAP), a splinter group of psychologists who had organized to press their interests in a more practical form of psychology. He became president of AAAP, and later he played a central role in bringing the APA and AAAP together into a single organization which is known today as simply the APA. Rogers served as the president of the APA and received its Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award in 1956. He also played a leading role in forming the American Board of Examiners in Professional Psychology (ABEPP), a group commissioned by the APA to protect the public from malpractice in the areas of clinical, counseling, and industrial psychology. Rogers tired of professional activities per se and withdrew from them as his interests ranged beyond psychology to education, industry, and social issues of all sorts.

While in New York, Rogers founded a new Rochester Guidance Center and had his first experience with interprofessional tension with psychiatry over the fact that he—a psychologist—was to direct what appeared to be a medical facility. Working with children and their parents in psychotherapy seemed no more medical than psychological to Rogers—and to thousands of psychologists since—so a professional confrontation came about which Rogers “finally won.”⁴⁶ In the closing years of the 1930s Rogers published a book on the *Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child* (1939), and as a result of this highly successful work,

he was offered a position as full professor at the Ohio State University. Though reluctant to accept because of his affection for the new guidance center, Rogers had always found the idea of an academic affiliation very attractive. He had lectured at Teachers College for a summer and found the experience rewarding and broadening. Hence, with the encouragement of his wife, he moved to Columbus, Ohio.

It was while he was at Ohio State that Rogers achieved his initial worldwide recognition. He brought to the academic setting a new kind of practicality and direct study of what clinical psychologists do as psychotherapists. He was one of the—if not *the*—first clinicians to work out a scheme for the study of the interpersonal relationship that evolves during therapy. He attracted numerous talented students, and a series of breakthroughs in clinical research began to issue from Ohio State University. To order his thoughts concerning a proper client-therapist relationship, Rogers wrote the manuscript of *Counseling and Psychotherapy* (1942), a clear and thorough statement of how the therapist should proceed if he or she hopes to bring about changes in the client. By this time he had also completed his family—a son and daughter—and life seemed to be settling into another phase of successful achievement.

In 1944 Rogers spent the summer teaching a course at the University of Chicago, and out of this contact came an unusual offer. He was given the opportunity to establish a counseling center at the University of Chicago, using those practices and procedures he felt were necessary without concern about interference from other sources of influence in the academic or professional

community. Rogers took up these duties in the autumn of 1945 and established a center in which professional staff, graduate students, clerical help, and related faculty members worked as complete equals. Rogers was then working out the details of what he has called the helping relationship, and in his major work, *Client-Centered Therapy* (1951), he provided a first statement of the theory underlying his approach to interpersonal relations. This book and a paper written subsequently⁴⁷ provide the two primary theoretical statements of his career, although there are many less technically oriented papers which add to these fundamental statements. A collection of the latter papers were published under the title *On Becoming a Person* (1961). The Chicago period was once again highly successful, as the nondirective approach was being shown empirically to be as effective a method of psychotherapy as any other approach.⁴⁸ Rogers not only had an outlook on therapy and a theory of personality, but he constantly sought to prove the merits of his thought empirically. It was this interest in research and a desire to extend his approach to the highly abnormal person that took him away from Chicago to the University of Wisconsin and an unpleasant period of his professional life.

Returning to his undergraduate university in 1957 was naturally a sentimental occasion for Rogers. A seemingly excellent position was arranged for him which carried joint appointments in the departments of psychology and psychiatry. Unfortunately, things did not turn out as he had hoped. He initiated a large-scale research project on the schizophrenic patient which involved a staff of two hundred and extensive arrangements with a local state hospital, but problems developed among the staff—not all of whom

had a point of view amenable to client-centered philosophy. Data mysteriously disappeared, and considerable tension mounted, but after much heartache among all concerned, the project was completed.⁴⁹ It was not an entirely successful piece of research. The abnormals showed little improvement, and there was little evidence to support the contribution of a course in client-centered therapy over and above the typical hospital routine (which was modern and efficient in its own right).⁵⁰ However, other aspects of the study supported the fact that therapists with the proper client-centered outlook facilitated more improvement in their patients than did therapists who lacked the proper outlook.⁵¹

It was not such tepid research findings that discouraged Rogers at the University of Wisconsin. What destroyed his confidence in that school's psychology department and in all such "typical" programs of education in that period of psychology's history was the narrowly restrictive and punitive approach taken to the education of aspiring doctoral candidates. Rogers found that graduate students in psychology were given an extremely detailed form of preliminary (pre-doctoral) examination, which usually meant that they had to devote themselves entirely to so-called scientific courses which in fact required them to memorize vast amounts of useless information. As a result, some of the most talented clinicians and creative individuals left the program in disgust. Rogers claimed that only about one graduate student in seven ever attained the doctoral degree under this rigid, laboratory-oriented program.⁵² In a "passionate statement" of dissent from the then-current trends of graduate education in psychology, Rogers fired his parting shot and resigned from the department of psychology at Wisconsin.⁵³ Shortly thereafter he resigned from the department of psychiatry as well, and in 1964

he took a position with the Western Behavioral Sciences Institute (WBSI) of La Jolla, California. He was once more out of an academic setting—forgoing his professorship and tenure at a university for the third time in roughly two dozen years.

The WBSI acted as a bridge for Rogers, since, after a few years of affiliation with this organization which was devoted to humanistic studies of the interpersonal relationship, he helped found a new group which is called the Center for Studies of the Person, also located in La Jolla. A developing interest in the needs of the group, organizations, school systems, and indeed, the common problems of humanity were to preoccupy him. He became a major spokesperson for the use of encounter groups in resolving human tensions.

Personality Theory

Structural Constructs

Mind-Body, Phenomenal Subjectivity, and the Wisdom of Organic Evidence

Rogers avoids separating mind from body by having both forms of experience united in his conception of the *phenomenal field*. Figure 22 contains a schematization of the Rogerian phenomenal-field construct. The phenomenal field proper is at the right; at the left we have an expanded version of it with certain forms of experience listed from top to bottom. Arrows direct our attention from left to right because we are suggesting that all of the things listed in the enlarged version of the phenomenal field are present in the phenomenal field proper.

A dotted plane separates the experiential processes in the upper half of the figure that are usually called *mental* (thoughts, con-

sciousness, and so on) from experiential processes in the lower half, usually called *bodily* (feelings, biological processes, and so on); all of these processes are shown via the arrows to be related to the phenomenal field proper (the right-hand side). What we are demonstrating in this coned-shaped figure is that though we might single out *mind* versus *body* distinctions (on the left), when it comes to the phenomenal field (on the right), no such distinctions are possible. The organismic experience summarized at the right-hand side of the figure combines *both* mind and body experiences into a single gestalt organization. Of course, the actual firing of the neurons in the central nervous system or the chemical reactions taking place in ongoing biological processes like digestion are *not* part of the phenomenal field.⁵⁴ This is why they are placed outside, to the left of the enlarged version of the phenomenal field. We sense the satisfaction of a delicious meal as it is being digested, but never literally know the chemical reactions that make this satisfaction possible.

Rogers hoped to avoid the pitfalls connected with reducing behavior to some underlying physical determinant, even as he hoped to preserve a central role for the biological organism in his theory. He did not want to lose the meaning of phenomenal experience in the mechanisms of the organic body. Those theorists who seek atomistic physical causes of behavior rarely provide us with a satisfactory understanding of personality.⁵⁵ The reason a physicalistic theory is almost useless to the phenomenologist is that physical processes *bear* phenomena. A physical illness like an upset stomach indicates malfunction, and to that extent it is represented in the phenomenal field (see “biological processes” in Figure 22). But the person cannot through introspective effort become aware of the




Figure 22 Rogerian Uniting of Mind-Body in the Phenomenal Field

physiological processes that have malfunctioned. He or she can only report the effects of the malfunction and submit to proper medical treatment. It is quite another thing when we speak about phenomenal fields, for now we are dealing with not the bearer of behavior but literally with the internal meanings of this behavior as known (or potentially known) by the person. This is not unlike moving from the noumenal realm (chemical malfunction) to the phenomenal realm (feeling of stomach pain). And as we do so, our values enter in to compound the picture all the more, as in the case of a person

who will not accept medical treatment because of religious convictions.

Though it may be impossible to experience the noumenal-like physical actions of neurons firing or chemicals reacting, this does not mean that everything in phenomenal experience forms into conscious awareness. As Rogers said, the phenomenal field: “. . . includes all that is experienced by the organism, whether or not these experiences are consciously perceived. . . . only a portion of that experience, and probably a very small portion, is *consciously* experienced. Many of our sensory and visceral sensations are not symbolized.”⁵⁶ A *symbol* is a cognitive (mental) reflection of some state of

affairs in the ongoing life of a person. We can think of it as a word or image having meaning for the person, as when we either use the word *hate* or see ourselves mentally in a state of extreme irritation caused by another person's actions toward us. We symbolize hatred when we are aware of this state in our phenomenal field. But sometimes we have physiological *feelings* of hatred that go unsymbolized in our phenomenal field.

Each time Lisa enters the room, Karen feels a tension of irritation flow through her body, because Karen has symbolized the fact that she dislikes (hates) Lisa. Karen has symbolized her attitude accurately, but it would be possible for her to feel her irritation organismically (that is, running through her body) and yet fail to symbolize the emotion actually being sensed. The raw feeling would be phenomenally experienced, but its *meaning* or the significance of its pattern would not. Thus, Karen might complain to friends that Lisa "makes me feel uncomfortable." As a physical being, Karen's biological processes—the firing of her neurons and the release of her hormones into her blood stream—would be identical, whether she had symbolized what was taking place in her relations to Lisa or not. Thus, in a sense, Karen's bodily reactions are always in line with the proper attitude toward Lisa, but her consciousness or mental awareness may be out of kilter with what is actually taking place. Hence, the feelings we have in relation to all aspects of life are very important in defining what its various situations and circumstances *mean* to us (potential symbolization).

Indeed, the phenomenal field defines the person's *subjective reality*.⁵⁷ "Man lives essentially in his own personal and subjective world, and even his most objective functioning, in science, mathematics, and the like, is the result of subjective purpose and subjective

choice."⁵⁸ Behavior is always goal oriented, organized by the phenomenal field and carried out as a total gestalt.⁵⁹ What we call objectivity in science is merely a special instance of *intersubjectivity*, in that individuals called scientists have agreed to use a common terminology and means of observation which makes sense to each of them *subjectively*. The agreement is intersubjective and never truly objective, if we mean by the latter some kind of realm of knowing that is independent of the individuals concerned. It is literally impossible for us to know another person's phenomenal field or to know anything free and clear of our own phenomenal field. As already noted above, we have trouble enough getting to know our own phenomenal field completely. The more open and unafraid we are to experience all that we feel in relation to the changing circumstances of life, the more likely that we will know ourselves—that is, our phenomenal field—and feel free to communicate this genuine state of being to others.⁶⁰

The only way we can learn about ourselves this genuinely is to do what Karen may not have been able to do when she complained of Lisa making her feel uncomfortable: we have to turn our attention to our feelings and really get in touch with their meaning! We do this because, as we noted above, our feelings are always what they *are*. Feelings define our (necessarily subjective) reality. The trick is to symbolize feelings accurately if we are to know who we really *are*. Symbolization is more a mental act, whereas feelings seem to be completely organic or physical. How do we cross the bridge from one (organic) realm to the other (mental) realm? Rogers had these two

realms interfusing in the phenomenal field, but what is the process by which he describes how we can know our true feelings? As a neogestaltist, Rogers fell back on the construct of differentiation or discrimination here. He suggested that people have the ability to *subceive*, a process that enables the person to know something emotively which is not yet distinctive enough to be a full-blown perception.⁶¹ This is akin to seeing something before it is a clearly differentiated and articulated figure on the ground. We can feel things before they are good perceptual figures in our phenomenal field. Rogers defined *subception* as “a discriminating evaluative physiological organismic response to experience, which may precede the conscious perception of such experience.”⁶²

Thus, our very organic processes as feelings can instruct us, often dealing in subtleties of which our intellect falls short. In his first book on the nature of emotive, organismic learnings in psychotherapy, Rogers sounded the note he would continue to express over his long career: “They are learnings with deep emotional concomitants, not learnings of intellectual content, and hence may or may not find clear verbal expression.”⁶³ We cannot always state the reasons for our feelings. Karen will not know immediately why it is that she feels hostility for Lisa. But in mulling over her relations with Lisa in light of her new understanding, in time these reasons will be found. The important thing for Rogers is that our total being includes an “organismic valuing process.”⁶⁴ We can and do judge our relations with others in terms of our “personal organic evidence.”⁶⁵ And what is most important of all, there is *wisdom* in such *organic evidence*.⁶⁶ To be a fully functioning person we

have to take stock of such evidence and profit from the understanding that results.

*The Self as a Conscious
Articulation of the
Phenomenal Field*

Rogerian theory is sometimes referred to as self-theory because of the importance placed on coming to know oneself accurately and thoroughly as a complete person. The terms *self-concept* and *self-structure* are both used to describe the self, with slightly different emphases. The *self-concept* refers to the conscious self-definition we give to ourselves when we speak of *I*, or *me*.⁶⁷ The term *self-structure* is a more technical concept, used when speaking about individuals from an external frame of reference. As a conscious or potentially conscious aspect of the phenomenal field, we can think of the self as a differentiated and articulated figure on the ground of the phenomenal field.⁶⁸ We are not always aware of ourselves as an identity as we go through the day; we may lose ourselves in work, for example. But given the right circumstance, we can always fix attention on self-identity and come up with a rough estimation of who we are or what we are doing at the moment. This is not always the case with an abnormal (psychotic) person.

But when the self emerges into awareness, we have a figure on the ground of experience, just as any life experience now in awareness may be said to take on figural properties. “. . . most of the individual’s experiences constitute the ground of the perceptual [phenomenal] field, but they can easily become figure, while other experiences slip back into ground.”⁶⁹ Thus, as Joel strolls down the street feeling quite pleased with the fact that he has the time to enjoy the beautiful weather, this self-awareness heralds the fact that his self has emerged as a figure on the ground of experience. When he now




Figure 23 The Self as a Conscious Aspect of the Phenomenal Field

sees Camille strolling by across the street and begins to make hurried steps in her direction, this heralds the fact that she too has emerged as a figure on the ground of his phenomenal experience. Figure 23 presents a schematization of the self as an organized subportion of the phenomenal field. Note that we have taken the tip of the cone-shaped figure in Figure 22 (what we call the phenomenal field proper on the right-hand side) and turned it outward in Figure 23, so that the phenomenal field now takes on an elliptical shape.

In the very middle of Figure 23 is the self, which is also an organized (differentiated and articulated) configuration of subparts, set within the broader context of experience known as the phenomenal field. Note that this self is also differentiated and articulated into subregions, each of which can be seen as other figures on the ground of the total self. There are two heavily cross-checked (articulated and differentiated) subregions within the self. These might rep-

resent two important (strong, cohesive figures) preoccupations of Joel as a self (I, me). One of these regions might represent his self-image as a doctor someday, which is why he is currently attending medical school, and the other might reflect his desire to marry Camille someday. He literally identifies himself as her future husband. Each of these subregions is itself a figure on the ground of the total self-concept. That is, we could remove the inner circle and consider it as a separate configuration with inner regions. Note further that the self nestles within a region of the phenomenal field defined by a continuous line labeled "other conscious experience." This too would be a generalized figure in Joel's experience, representing possibly the nice weather he is experiencing on his walk. The other large circular areas with broken lines symbolize "potential experience," which Joel may have as he continues his




Figure 24 The Self as Ground, as a Potential but Absent Aspect of Conscious Experience

walk. We then have a firm outer line to define the limits of phenomenal experience.

If something were to turn up in the outer regions of the phenomenal field, such as Joel's seeing Camille or even more emotionally arousing, Camille in conversation with Marshall—a rival for her affection!—Joel would suddenly lose himself as figure and focus attention very specifically on the newly emerging figures in his phenomenal field. Figure 24 schematizes this circumstance. Note that the "self" has become an indistinct pattern, withdrawing more into the ground of the phenomenal field, and the "other people" have emerged from the ground of potential experience to rivet Joel's attention. He is no longer aware of the attractive weather. He forgets about himself as a person. He has one preoccupation now and one only. What to

do? Should he walk over to Camille and Marshall, who have not yet seen him? Should he keep his distance unobserved and follow them to see how friendly they really are? What to do?

Joel will eventually make a goal-oriented decision and act accordingly. His self-concept will also reappear as he brings himself back consciously into the deliberations and recommended course of action. In judging what to do, it is almost certain that Joel will have to consider himself as a potential suitor and mate to Camille. In a real sense, his self-concept is a series of hypotheses about himself, his strengths and weaknesses in relation to Marshall and other young men, the likelihood that he can actually succeed in obtaining the M.D. degree, and so on. Only in the sense that such hypotheses take on organization phenomenally is it possible to speak of a structural construct in Rogerian theory. Actually, Rogers was diametrically opposed

to all personality theories that see humans as fixed by typologies and related personality structures. He preferred to think of human behavior in fluid, process terms. Yet, in the sense that we now consider the term, we find Rogers saying, "We may look upon this *self-structure* as being an organization of hypotheses for meeting life—an organization which has been relatively effective in satisfying the needs of the organism"⁷⁰ [italics added]. We may think of this organization as a *self-gestalt*.⁷¹

Motivational Constructs

Organismic Enhancement as Life's Master Motive

Rogers took it as a basic assumption that all living organisms strive to maintain, further, and actualize their experience.⁷² He found from his earliest days as therapist that when given a chance the client would spontaneously begin a positive course of action to correct some life problem.⁷³ People just naturally want to know more about themselves and their world, including a knowledge of others. This comes down to a single, master motive—to enhance their phenomenal field by enriching its range, articulation, and differentiation. Rogers termed this motive *organismic enhancement*, a goal-directed activity,⁷⁴ which he described as follows:

*The directional trend we are endeavoring to describe is evident in the life of the individual organism from conception to maturity, at whatever level of organic complexity. It is also evident in the process of evolution, the direction being defined by a comparison of life low on the evolutionary scale with types of organisms which have developed later, or are regarded as farther along in the process of evolution.*⁷⁵

This evolutionary concept is a subtle but important point in Rogerian thought which we must keep in mind.

Rogers made use of a *need* construct, which he defined as "physiological tensions which, when experienced, form the basis of behavior which appears functionally (though not consciously) designed to reduce the tension and to maintain and enhance the organism."⁷⁶ Our subjective feeling of need is therefore rooted in our physiology, but what is specifically need-generating in our lives is influenced by our unique experiences and personal understandings. For example, hunger is not experienced identically by all people. Some people view any sensation of hunger as very uncomfortable, even threatening. Others care little for food and eat primarily to keep their energy level up in order to do other things. A drive theory as employed in behaviorism (see Chapter 6) would simply not be able to capture these important phenomenological differences in what it *means* to be hungry. It is this meaning in the *current* and *ongoing* processes of the phenomenal field that determines the behavior of a person.

*Behavior is not "caused" by something which occurred in the past. Present tensions and present needs are the only ones which the organism endeavors to reduce or satisfy. While it is true that past experience has certainly served to modify the meaning which will be perceived in present experiences, yet there is no behavior except to meet a present need*⁷⁷ [emphasis added].

This currency emphasis means that we do not have to dig back into a distant past in order to find out why a person behaves as he or she does. The meaning of the behavior is current and knowable if we but relax the pressures on the person and let him or her

express what is there for the expressing. Rogers emphasized that emotional tones always go along with need-satisfaction efforts, and they can be used to achieve this goal if we are but sensitive to our feelings in an open and honest way.⁷⁸ The more intense an emotion is, the more important is the goal being sought by the individual. There are both pleasant and unpleasant emotions, reflecting the contrasts of satisfaction or frustration in ongoing behavior. A complicating factor in human behavior is the fact that the needs that have been taken on by the self-concept or the self of Figures 23 and 24 are not always in agreement with the needs as felt directly in the body—or as we might now call it, the organism.

Rogers would therefore say that the *needs of the organism* are not always consonant with the *needs of the self*.⁷⁹ The organized subportion of the phenomenal field we know as the *I* or *me* may not have it as a goal to enhance the organism by moving in the directions spontaneously felt (emotions) to be the natural, correct ones. Darleen is with a group of popular neighborhood girls with whom she would like to be identified, when they begin poking fun at another girl, Martha. Martha is being painted as a drudge and a bore. Darleen does not really agree with this assessment, and she feels uncomfortable making fun of others in any case. But she goes along with the ridicule and overlooks the fact that she feels terribly ingenuine and even guilty in playing the game of popularity. Her *self needs* to be popular have come into conflict with her *organismic needs* to be true to herself. If she were genuine in this instance (organismic need), she would risk her opportunity to be known as one of the popular girls in her neighborhood (self need).

This takes us into what Rogers calls the *valuing process*. In defining his or her self-concept, an individual differentiates certain preferences articulated with ideals and feelings of commitment to certain ends.⁸⁰ Often a value is sensed directly by way of “sensory or visceral reactions.”⁸¹ We know instinctively or intuitively that “this I like” or “I have never really felt right doing that sort of thing.” Many of our formal values as encompassed in our self-concept are handed to us by our culture as reflected in the attitudes of our parents. We are taught what is right and what is wrong in behavior. We come to value certain religious and political views. The trouble is, sometimes what we sense viscerally (deep, in our internal organs or guts) does not coincide with what we tell ourselves consciously. When this happens, we witness a confrontation of the needs of the organism with those of the self. Faced with personal inconsistency, we are forced to ask ourselves, “What do I really believe in anyhow?”

The reason we invariably ask ourselves this question is that, along with a need for organismic enhancement and growth, the individual has a need to be *self-consistent*. “The only channels by which needs may be satisfied are those which are consistent with the organized concept of self.”⁸² In other words, in organizing the configuration of the self-concept, we do not simply accept and articulate within it all of the evidence available to us. A person who considers himself or herself brave may have a fleeting sense of fear in a dangerous situation which he or she does *not* articulate and combine into a self-concept. This sincere organismic reaction is therefore ignored because it is not consistent with the self-concept being furthered. Any such self-inconsistency is experienced as a *threat* by the individual.⁸³

Rogers noted how we like to think of ourselves as a finished product, complete and

unified through a reliable outlook on life. If we change in any way, this completed structure alters to some degree over time. To think of ourselves as a fluid process of continuous change is upsetting, especially since these changes when they come on us often contradict what we have assumed our completed identity to be. Yet Rogerian theory is saying precisely this: the self is never finished, it is a constant process of change within spells of sameness. Hence, it is correct to say that *both* the organism (biological being) and the self (psychological being) are pitched toward actualization—that is, growth, enlargement, enrichment, and diversity.⁸⁴ They may not always agree on *the* goal of importance, but both sides to our being are agreed on the gestaltlike necessity to develop into a totality. One does not move in this enlarging direction without sensing ever-recurring periods of inconsistency in that totality. When this happens, new tensions develop and a sense of needing to be whole—self-consistent—once again is renewed. This is exactly comparable to the way in which *pragnanz* operates, and so it is not wrong to suggest that this principle underwrites Rogers' fundamental theory of motivation.

Congruence versus Incongruence and Positive Regard

It is freedom from inner tension that indexes the extent of psychological adjustment a person has achieved. As Rogers expressed it in his first theoretical statement, "We may say that freedom from inner tension, or psychological adjustment, exists when the concept of self is at least roughly congruent with all the experiences of the organism."⁸⁵ If Stanley tells us that he enjoys a marvelous life and we can see in his general mood that he is vibrant and alert, we tend to admire him for the good personal adjustment he has achieved. But if Stanley tells us this and we

see in his general mood that he is depressed and defeated, we begin to suspect that he has a picture of himself (self-concept) which is at variance with how he is actually living organismically. There is a lack of *congruence* between his emotional life (organism) and his psychological outlook (self). Congruence is defined as follows: ". . . when self-experiences are accurately symbolized, and are included in the self-concept in this accurately symbolized form, then the state is one of congruence of self and experience."⁸⁶ A more personalized definition would be: "The term 'congruent' is one I have used to describe the way I would like to be. By this I mean that whatever feeling or attitude I am experiencing would be matched by my awareness of that attitude."⁸⁷

To be *incongruent* is thus to be out of kilter with what one truly is as a human being. This condition can come about entirely accidentally, as in the case of growing up with parental values which one never truly commits himself or herself to; one just goes along because it is expected. Or one might actually bring on this state personally by refusing to be open to experience, by playing a role with others, by never being sincere with oneself, and so on. There is a range of congruence-to-incongruence, so that the extent of inner tension (*psychological maladjustment*) can vary. In its more extreme form the state of incongruence can be quite harmful. "This state is one of tension and internal confusion, since in some respects the individual's behavior will be regulated by the [organismic] actualizing tendency, and in other respects by the self-actualizing tendency, thus producing discordant or incomprehensible behaviors."⁸⁸

Thus, in a real sense, the directionality taken by the self-concept strains against the spontaneous organismic actualizing tendency.

A depressed Stanley is bravely trying to be the optimistic person his mother taught him to be, but the deception is beginning to break down completely for everyone to see. Intuitively, Stanley has the organismic capacity to turn his life around and admit to various frustrations and hostilities which he has been suffering through with a phony smile and pretended optimism. It would be best for him to admit to these sincere feelings, and motivated by their negative prompts, set a course in his life that could realistically correct things. If he actually would do this, then we would all notice a *change in his personality*, a change Rogers would call a *growth* because now, rather than working at cross-purposes, his total phenomenal being (his personality gestalt) would be congruent. It would still have problems to work out in relation to the world, of course, but it would be underway again. What has changed in cases like this is the inner alignment. A fixed structure has not been altered. Rather, a process has once again begun to flow forward to accomplish goals, including difficult ones.

In his studies of what it takes to be congruent, Rogers hit on the factor of *positive regard* in human relations. This is defined as follows: "If the perception by me of some self-experience in another makes a positive difference in my experiential field [that is, phenomenal field], then I am experiencing positive regard for that individual. In general, positive regard is defined as including such attitudes as warmth, liking, respect, sympathy, acceptance."⁸⁹ Drawing on the work of one of his students,⁹⁰ Rogers was to add to his enhancement principles and the need for self-consistency, a "need for positive regard" which each person is said to possess.⁹¹ We cannot have a feeling of self-regard—a sense of personal acceptance—unless we feel positively toward our entire organism and accept

it for *what it is*, rather than merely what someone has told us it is. Before we can sense congruence we must first sense "I am worthy" or "I can be what I feel myself to be without shame or apology." At heart, Stanley's incongruence is due to the fact that he has not come to accept himself as a unique person. His pretended optimism is therefore a defensive act, done to appease others and earn their positive regard. As in the case of most defenses, the brittle adjustment they permit for a time tends to break down.

Defensiveness versus Spontaneity in Human Behavior

Defensiveness is brought on by a growing sense of *anxiety*, which in turn indicates that there is a disparity between the concept of self and the total organismic experience pressing through to awareness.⁹² An attitude at variance with the symbolized belief system is differentiated as a figure from out of the ground of the phenomenal field. In order to maintain the picture of self as symbolized, the individual now begins several maneuvers which are comparable to the classical defense mechanisms. Thus, Rogers is likely to speak of *introjection* when he is referring to the fact that we take in values from others, usually our parents, and thus make it appear that these are our personal values when in fact they may or may not be.⁹³ He also used *repression* but gave this defense or adjustment mechanism a uniquely Rogerian interpretation. ". . . it would appear that there is the organic experience, but there is no symbolization of this experience, or only a distorted symbolization, because an adequate conscious representation of it would be entirely inconsistent with the concept of self."⁹⁴

This notion of a *distorted symbolization* is central enough to be considered a Rogerian mechanism of defense. It is closely related to what Rogers sometimes called *denial*, and

both of these concepts rely somewhat on the phenomenon of subception (see p. 584). A good summary definition is, "When an experience is dimly perceived (or 'subceived' is perhaps the better term) as being incongruent with the self-structure, the organism appears to react with a distortion of the meaning of the experience (making it consistent with the self), or with a denial of the existence of the experience, in order to preserve the self-structure from threat."⁹⁵ For example, if Cora, a college sophomore, thinks of herself as a poor scholar but earns an unexpected A on an examination, she can retain her low level of positive self-regard by distorting the symbolized conceptualizations of this success experience and saying, "The professor is a fool" or "It was pure luck." Rogers would occasionally refer to such distortions as *rationalizations*.⁹⁶

The final Rogerian mechanism that can be used defensively deals with *locus of evaluation*. Each person acquires values in life; the locus of this valuation bears directly on the responsibility an individual will take for his or her behavior. What is the source of a person's values? Rogers observed: ". . . an internal locus of evaluation, within the individual himself, means that he is the center of the valuing process, the evidence being supplied by his own senses. When the locus of evaluation resides in others, their judgment as to the value of an object or experience becomes the criterion of value for the individual."⁹⁷ A "mama's boy" who never manages to untangle himself from mother's apron strings would be putting his locus of evaluation into her identity. He would think as mother thinks and value what mother values. Though it would be difficult to see how organismic enhancement or self-enhancement might be achieved in this flight from independence, the young man would attain a short-term advantage by shifting his locus of evaluation from his self to his mother. She

would be deciding things for him, freeing him from the responsibility of making choices in life. To that extent, this maneuver would represent a type of defense.

Running through Rogerian theory on the matter of defensiveness is an opposition between the status quo and spontaneity. Individuals caught up in defensiveness are not truly free to be spontaneous. They live by distorted preconceptions of themselves. A pre-adolescent boy may subceive "I would like to 'punch' my younger brother" but deny this potential symbolization from awareness—that is, fail to differentiate and articulate as a figure on the ground of the self—because he already thinks of himself as a good boy. He is therefore too rigidly fixed to accept the new understanding of what he is truly like. This distorted symbolization need not involve only negative behaviors like striking others. It would be just as possible for this boy to subceive the warmly emotional feeling of "I want to tell baby brother that I love him" and yet fail to do so because of his self-concept as a "tough little boy who does not act sissified." The repression of a positive experiential prompting proves, said Rogers, that it is not *only* evil promptings that are denied to awareness.⁹⁸ Indeed, the relative goodness or badness of an experiential prompting is irrelevant. It is the consistency or inconsistency of an experience with the self-concept that determines whether it will be made conscious (symbolized) or not (denied or distorted symbolization).

Time-Perspective Constructs

Although Rogers did not theorize in detail about development, he did try to sketch the process of maturing in terms of his personality constructs. He stressed the fact that a

human infant is a valuing organism. The child begins life with a “clear approach to values.”⁹⁹ Hunger is negatively valued, and food is positively valued as are security and an urge for new experience. Pain, bitter tastes, and sudden loud noises are negatively valued by the infant. This *organismic valuing process* is never fixed into a rigid routine. Children can shift their value judgments from positive to negative or vice versa as they mature. In time, some foods will be disliked and certain levels of pain in vigorous play may well be liked. The growing organism is constantly responsive to experience, promoting whatever tends to actualize it and halting that which fails to do so. The valuing process is a kind of regulatory system which keeps the organism on the proper course of need satisfaction.¹⁰⁰

In a true sense, we all create our own world beginning in our infancy. Someone may have picked us up from our cribs intending to cuddle us and show us love, but if for some reason we perceive this action as hostile, we may respond with fright. This fright is for us *reality*, and from that point onward our expected relations with this person and others will be colored by our unique perception of the phenomenal realm. As Rogers said, “. . . the effective reality which influences behavior is at all times the perceived reality.”¹⁰¹ Rogers believed that it is pointless to catalogue the supposed behavioral equipment a child brings into the world, such as the various reflexes. He considered these to be secondary factors in the understanding of personality, because no matter what inborn structures may be present they all serve the master motive of organismic enhancement in any case.

Out of a general tendency for organismic

enhancement and actualization, the child gradually differentiates a self-concept. Self-identity is grasped along with a personal locus of evaluation in the interpersonal relations carried on with parents, siblings, and other people. Precisely what the nature of this interpersonal style will be—whether shy and uncertain or bold and outgoing—is up to the child’s unique subceptions and perceptions in the articulation and differentiations being organized into the total gestalt of the phenomenal field. Each life is subjectively unique. In Rogerian terms, the *personality* would include this unique totality of the phenomenal field—self-concept, style of relations with others, important goals differentiated as figures toward which behavior is oriented, and so on. Personality involves one’s entire life, the developing changes that result and the present changes that are called for in this continuing process of evaluation and fluid movement to the next, most enhancing situation or state.

If all goes well, self-enhancement will parallel and be congruent with organismic enhancement, resulting in what Rogers called the *fully functioning person*.¹⁰² This is an unlikely probability for most individuals. As self-awareness emerges, the child develops a need for positive regard, which may be learned or may be innately given to all humans.¹⁰³ Children need such positive regard from others, but also from themselves in assessing their own worth. Just as we can frame a hostile environment when people pick us up from the crib, so too can we look at our selves negatively. With such poor self-regard, it becomes difficult for us ever to sense the values of real achievement when we accomplish things, or acceptance when others show us attention. Many problems for maturing children stem from the fact that they try to keep their self-concept in line with the projected positive regard of others. Derek’s father wants him to excel in athletics and

so the boy makes every effort to do so with only bad results for he is simply not well coordinated. Derek's excellent talent as a scholar does not bring much sincere praise from father, however. As a result, we see the development of a boy who foolishly devalues himself for not being what he really does not want to be in any case. Too often, Rogers noted, adults make their positive regard for the child *conditional*—that is, depending on whether the child will first do something or achieve something the adults want accomplished or conformed to. They are unable to provide the young person with *unconditional positive regard*, which requires an acceptance of the individual exactly as he or she is.

Language enters here as well. As he moves from infancy to early childhood, Derek must symbolize (name, develop a system of ideas about) his experience. In line with our discussion of the defense mechanisms, he is likely to symbolize only those valued behaviors and attitudes his parents and other adults consider valuable. He will necessarily think of himself as a failure in life because he cannot fulfill his father's phenomenal-field expectations, even though if he had been left to his own spontaneous phenomenal differentiations and articulations, he would have found positive self-regard in his good school work. This incongruent state of affairs, in which the valuation process has been repressed organismically in favor of an inaccurate self-estimation, is called distorted symbolization. Instead of symbolizing what he really *is*, Derek has distorted the self-concept which he now carries through life and which ensures his low self-regard.

Rogers is a great believer in the superiority of learning by actually experiencing things, rather than by simply being told or taught them. A parent who expresses his or her own views of things yet allows the child leeway to test out a position at variance with the parental view will—in the long run—

facilitate a congruent adjustment for the offspring. This is where Derek's father has been short-sighted if not actually selfish. He is unable to change his perspective on what is or is not a successful "son," probably because he was never given the chance by his own father to be himself and do his own thinking and evaluating. Rogers once described the correct approach for a parent to take who has an offspring misbehaving in some way and who therefore needs talking to:

I can understand how satisfying it feels to you to hit your baby brother (or to defecate when and where you please, or to destroy things) and I love you and am quite willing for you to have those feelings. But I am quite willing for me to have my feelings, too, and I feel very distressed when your brother is hurt (or annoyed or sad at other behaviors), and so I do not let you hit him. Both your feelings and my feelings are important, and each of us can freely have his own.¹⁰⁴

Note the consideration given to the child in this free and open exchange, wherein each side can negotiate further as the discussion continues. By behaving in this manner a parent would not allow a phony relationship to develop with the child. Derek's father would give the boy a chance to express his feelings about baseball and football in relation to school work, and in the sincere exchange that would follow, a more genuine self-concept would emerge for the boy, as the father would now know his son in a new way. Having a competent scholar, a sensitive and insightful young man as offspring has its positive features too. On the other side of the coin, once Derek really understands what

his father's feelings mean in their relationship, a new perception of athletics might arise on his part. Derek enjoys pleasing his father, and it is possible that he has overestimated what his father expects of him. Possibly he could be less than a star in one of his favorite sports and still earn dad's respect.¹⁰⁵ Note that when Derek came to this point, he would be taking over the locus of evaluation. No longer would he routinely be doing what he thinks dad insists that he do. He would now be working through an alternative more pleasing to himself and yet acceptable to his father. Rogers believed that this type of sincere, open, interpersonal exchange encourages the taking of responsibility on both sides and thereby furthers the growth-as-enhancement that human development always is.

Individual-Differences Constructs

Rogers is opposed *in principle* to pigeonholing people into personality classifications of any sort. He once said, "The client is the only one who has the potentiality of knowing fully the dynamics of his perceptions and his behavior."¹⁰⁶ In a sense, Rogers permits each individual to write his or her own personality theory in order to describe the unique nature of the person's phenomenal field. To force our concepts on others is to do violence to the fundamental Rogerian outlook on interpersonal relations. This is why non-directive or client-centered theory has always treated lightly the need for a fixed series of personality constructs. In his first book on individual therapy, Rogers avoided the question of a personality theory altogether, only to be criticized later because his views failed to proceed from a coherent formulation of this sort.¹⁰⁷ This interested and amused

Rogers, who felt that such formulations are unnecessary until and unless clear phenomena call for explanation.

One therefore looks in vain for a series of technical theortypes in Rogerian psychology. At the same time, however, generalized commentaries on certain types of adjustment, and even descriptions of definite personality traits, can be found in Rogers's writings. With full appreciation for his theoretical position, we will now review a handful of the more informal constructs used by Rogers to account for individual differences.

Dependent versus Independent. A clear theme in Rogerian writing deals with the matter of whether or not the person takes on an independent or a dependent pattern of behavior. We can see decided Rankian influences emerging here. Speaking about the most difficult client to deal with through his therapy approach, Rogers noted:

*The attitudes which most frequently seem to be ineffectively handled are those which might be called "aggressive dependence." The client who is certain that he is incapable of making his own decisions or managing himself, and who insists that the counselor must take over, is a type of client with whom we are sometimes successful, but not infrequently unsuccessful.*¹⁰⁸

When he discussed the kind of client best suited for his therapy, Rogers suggested that he or she should have achieved a reasonable level of independence.¹⁰⁹ It seems clear that this dimension of personality held great significance for Rogers, and it related to the question of locus of evaluation. A dependent person surely does not, and often cannot, assume responsibility for the locus of evaluation that has been framed internally. Dependent people look outward for standards to introject uncritically.

Self-Ideal versus Self. In some of his researches, Rogers used a concept of the ideal self or self-ideal, which he defined as "the self-concept which the individual would most like to possess, upon which he places the highest value for himself."¹¹⁰ The ideal self is essentially a goal toward which the person would aspire if all things were equal in the sense of opportunities being available to achieve the valued level of behavior. Unfortunately, people often have differentiated and articulated various barriers to the attainment of their ideal selves. Sometimes their ideals are not really theirs, and they can in time change this side of the ledger as well. But in the main, Rogers assumed that people have a reasonable understanding of what they would "like to be like" if all things were equal.

Rogers and his students have made use of a sorting procedure adapted from Stephenson's Q-technique (1953) to measure the extent of relationship between perceived self ("how I am") and self-ideal ("how I would like to be"). The procedure followed is quite simple. Clients about to enter therapy sort several statements which may or may not describe them accurately as individuals. Each statement is printed on a separate card, and it might read "I feel pleased to meet other people" or "Rather minor things tend to upset me." There is no fixed type of statement. The main point is that a client must sort these cards according to certain statistical assumptions (approximating a normal distribution), usually on a seven-point scale from "like me" to "not like me." Having completed this sorting (taken as the conscious self-concept), the client re-sorts the same cards into a scale of "most like an ideal person" and "least like an ideal person." The definition of what *ideal* means is of course made clear to the sorter ("someone you think would be near perfect and like whom you would want to be"). The two sortings can

then be statistically intercorrelated and even factor analyzed. Rogers's studies usually employed a simple correlational measure indicating to what extent a self-concept and an ideal-self concept were identical. The assumption is that the greater the positive correlational value, the more highly a person thinks of himself or herself. Clients have been shown to acquire higher correlations following psychotherapy than before therapy.¹¹¹ Rogers therefore used this scale as a measure of therapeutic improvement.

Vulnerability. "Vulnerability is the term used to refer to the state of incongruence between self and experience, when it is desired to emphasize the potentialities of this state for creating psychological disorganization. When incongruence exists, and the individual is unaware of it, then he is potentially vulnerable to anxiety, threat, and disorganization."¹¹² Hence, just as we can draw distinctions between people on the basis of how similar they are to their self-ideals, so too can we speak of differences among people in degree of vulnerability to maladjustment.

Mature Behavior. It is also possible to think of individuals as more or less mature in their behavior.

*The individual exhibits mature behavior when he perceives realistically and in an extensional [that is, flexible and alert] manner, is not defensive, accepts the responsibility of being different from others, accepts responsibility for his own behavior, evaluates experience in terms of the evidence coming from his own senses, changes his evaluation of experience only on the basis of new evidence, accepts others as unique individuals different from himself, prizes himself, and prizes others.*¹¹³

This abstract conception gives us a succinct picture of what Rogers's personal ideal type might represent.

Fully Functioning Person. This phrase is a special case of the maturity construct. However, since Rogers did name the ideal person as a worthwhile goal for humanity, we could do no better than end our consideration of his individual-differences concepts by citing his definition. "It should be evident that the term 'fully functioning person' is synonymous with optimal psychological adjustment, optimal psychological maturity, complete congruence, complete openness to experience, complete extensionality, as these terms have been defined. . . . The fully functioning person would be a person-in-process, a person continually changing."¹¹⁴ Further, the fully functioning person is:

*. . . more able to live fully in and with each and all of his feelings and reactions. He makes increasing use of all his organic equipment to sense, as accurately as possible, the existential situation within and without. He makes use of all of the information his nervous system can thus supply, using it in awareness, but recognizing that his total organism may be, and often is, wiser than his awareness.*¹¹⁵

Psychopathology and Psychotherapy

Theory of Illness

Maladjustment as the Clash of Organismic versus Self-Actualization

To *actualize* in Rogerian terms means to grow, enhance, or enrich. We tend to believe that only our selves are capable of actualizing,

but Rogers insisted that our organisms—our physical beings independent of our self-concepts—also seek such actualization.¹¹⁶ Indeed, as we have already suggested, thanks to their tie to our physical feelings, our bodily organisms are literally more in touch with who we are and what we want from life than are our self-concepts. However, if a person's self-concept is incongruent with the organismic valuing process, so that he or she holds to a self-concept that is not truly reflecting the underlying organic feelings, then we find increasing tension developing in the personality structure. Lorie feels surprisingly unenthusiastic and confused about herself. Her mood should be one of excitement and satisfaction because she leaves for the big city next week to take up her new job. She has always said she wanted to go off to the city like her older sister. This is her chance to do so. What could be wrong? Rogers defined *psychological maladjustment* as arising when the personality system "denies to awareness, or distorts in awareness, significant experiences, which consequently are not accurately symbolized and organized into the gestalt of the self-structure, thus creating an incongruence between self and experience."¹¹⁷

Given the proper circumstances and enough time, Lorie could examine her feelings in light of what she is thinking about at the moment and come through subceptions and eventually perceptions to find out what is really going on in her personality. Since behavior is always current, we can find out what it means by taking the proper attitude of openness and genuineness. But what usually happens is that a person like Lorie who believes that her self will be actualized in the big city and who senses thereby incongruence between her self-aspirations and her spontaneous feelings about these aspirations, begins to develop an overlay of threat. Rogers defines *threat* as a state of anticipation ("Something's coming that I won't like")

that is due to the subception of an incongruence between the self-structure and life experience.¹¹⁸ The person cannot say what it is that is anticipated, but he or she knows that it will not be anything good. When the underlying incongruence approaches awareness—is close to being a perception—the person moves from threat to outright anxiety. *Anxiety* is a heightened state of fear with an emphasis on anticipation of disaster. Lorie is sensing threat in the present, but on the day when she is scheduled to leave home, feelings of anxiety will pass like waves through her body.

This anxiety, however, is likely to pass, and in time Lorie will work out her adjustment problems, either coming to like the city after all or, more probably, returning home to build a life in the smaller community. In the case of a more serious maladjustment, the person will not examine the underlying reasons for feelings of threat or anxiety. Instead, defenses will be tightened and symbolization will be distorted even more. The young man who subceives a homosexual impulse becomes touchy about jokes implying he is sexually interested in his male friends or reacts with disgust at the effeminacy of certain men, and so forth. As long as a defensive separation of emotion from conscious intellect can be sustained, the young man will go on functioning reasonably well. However, it is likely that in time so much insincere deception will take place that profound psychological maladjustment will develop.

It is when the person begins to sense (subceive) that he or she cannot resolve the growing *tension of incongruence*, so that neither self nor organismic actualization is taking place, that help is sought in the form of psychotherapy.¹¹⁹ The extent of behavioral disorganization (symptoms) varies, but one thing all neurotic people have in common is this sense of ineptness or low positive self-regard. With each passing day they find it

more difficult to understand what is taking place in their lives. It is almost as if one were living with a stranger but in this case the stranger is oneself. Put another way, the individual has lost communication within his or her personality system, and this breakdown affects interpersonal relations as well. As Rogers summed it up, “The emotionally maladjusted person, the ‘neurotic,’ is in difficulty first because communication within himself has broken down, and second because, as a result of this, his communication with others has been damaged.”¹²⁰ Internal incongruence always breeds external incongruence.

The Irrelevancy of Diagnostic Distinctions

In the same way that Rogerian theory dismisses categorizing people into preselected, hence arbitrary and unnatural, designations of personality, so too does it argue that diagnosis is unnecessary. Since our behavior is presumably caused by the ever-recurring present of the phenomenal field, how can anyone really tell us what we have as a problem in the way that a physician can tell us what our biological sickness is? As Rogers said: “Behavior is caused, and the psychological cause of behavior is a certain perception or a way of perceiving [present circumstances]. The client is the only one who has the potentiality of knowing fully the dynamics of his perceptions and his behavior.”¹²¹ Any changes in perception that result from therapy must be brought about by clients themselves.¹²² So, why diagnose, categorize, and run the risk of once again distorting what the client can spontaneously know if he or she simply turns inward to re-estab-

lish proper communication between feelings and conscious ideas? Anything that might pressure or control a psychotherapy *client*—the term Rogers preferred to the more passive designation, *patient*—is thus to be shunned.

Rogers did speak in broad terms of neurotic and psychotic behavior. A *neurosis* can actually begin organismically as a prompt to accept an attitude in contradiction to the self-attitudes consciously accepted. Randy enters psychotherapy and says, “I don’t know what has come over me. I just can’t concentrate on my studies, yet I know how important they are to me. All my life I have wanted to be an engineer, just like dad.” The question is: are these consciously accepted engineering goals congruent with the organismic valuing process (feelings), or are they introjected and distorted values pressed onto the self-concept by others? Randy is merely aware of a symptom: he cannot concentrate, he cannot sleep, and so on. The thought that he should work at cross-purposes with what he wants stymies him. As Rogers noted, “. . . the neurotic behavior is incomprehensible to the individual himself, since it is at variance with what he consciously ‘wants’ to do, which is to actualize a self no longer congruent with experience.”¹²³ At other times, a neurosis may represent the defensive maneuvers of the individual to avoid becoming aware of his or her lack of self-consistency. All of the defense mechanisms discussed above may enter here.

When efforts to keep up incongruence in the personality lead to *excessive* distortions in reality, then we can begin speaking of a *psychosis*. An example of a mild distortion of reality might be when the individual refuses to accept responsibility for a misadven-

ture in life which was clearly his or her fault. The person senses this guilt organismically (via feelings) but denies it, asserting that “that was not due to anything I did.” If this insincerity continues and extends into all aspects of life, rather than preserving the brittle structure of the self, in time a complete split from reality might result. Now the person says, “Other people are always blaming me. Everyone seems to be out to get me, maybe to kill me” (paranoid delusion). Other forms of escapist fantasies can then intrude, so the thoroughly disjointed personality now takes refuge in some preposterous insight: “They want to capture and torture me because I’m really the reincarnated Jesus.”

An individual who has slipped over the brink of rationality to this extent might begin hearing voices or seeing images as well (hallucinations). Since the phenomenal field is organized by all factors active from moment to moment, it follows that perceptual distortions can become great if the falsification somehow holds things together. If we inwardly feel that things are about to explode with terror, then “seeing” an evil figure lurking about with clearly hostile intentions helps us to account for our extreme anxiety.¹²⁴ During this entire course of deterioration, the individual’s relations with others suffer. One cannot speak of neurosis and then psychosis without thereby speaking of interpersonal relationships. Rogers made quite clear that, to the extent one individual in an interpersonal relationship is incongruent, the relationship suffers in that it encourages incongruity in the other; it distorts the nature of the true interpersonal experience, and it seriously handicaps any form of genuine communication emerging.¹²⁵ Once again, internal incongruence breeds external incongruence. Fortunately, through proper interpersonal relations, this process can be reversed.

Theory of Cure

The Nature of a Healing Relationship: The Client-Centered Hypothesis

From the first, Rogers approached counseling and psychotherapy with the view that a therapist's responsibility is to provide a climate that furthers the personally directed change of the client. It is the client who must change, and the therapist must trust him or her to do so. In his earliest phrasing of what he then called the *therapist's hypothesis*, Rogers wrote, "Effective counseling consists of a definitely structured, permissive relationship which allows the client to gain an understanding of himself to a degree which enables him to take positive steps in the light of his new orientation."¹²⁶ The key word in this statement of therapist values is *relationship*. Rogers made clear that the most essential ingredient in therapy is the creation of a free and permissive relationship having the characteristics of warmth, acceptance, and freedom from coercion.¹²⁷ Certain limitations had to be placed on the client, of course. The therapist could not be assaulted or office furniture broken. But all such restrictions in the structuring of the client-therapist relationship were to be kept to a minimum. Rogers expanded this therapist hypothesis into what he called the *client-centered hypothesis*, as follows:

*... we may say that the counselor chooses to act consistently upon the hypothesis that the individual has a sufficient capacity to deal constructively with all those aspects of his life which can potentially come into conscious awareness. This means the creation of an interpersonal situation in which material may come into the client's awareness, and a meaningful demonstration of the counselor's acceptance of the client as a person who is competent to direct himself.*¹²⁸

Over the years, since first expressing this client-centered hypothesis, Rogers moved gradually to espouse the therapist's growing openness in revealing himself or herself as a person. There was good reason for his change in approach, and we want now to capture those reasons. In the earlier formulations, the relationship was pitched entirely in the direction of the client's identity.

*... the relationship is experienced as a one-way affair in a very unique sense. The whole relationship is composed of the self of the client, the counselor being depersonalized for purposes of therapy into being "the client's other self." It is this warm willingness on the part of the counselor to lay his own self temporarily aside, in order to enter into the experience of the client, which makes the relationship a completely unique one, unlike anything in the client's previous experience.*¹²⁹

Rogers was careful to emphasize that there should be no evaluation of the client by the therapist (to parallel his dislike for diagnosis in general), no probing, no interpretation of what the client is supposed to be doing, and "no *personal* reaction by the counselor."¹³⁰

The relationship is thus *client-centered* because it is the client who needs to reopen an inner communication between organismic and self-evaluations of what is worthwhile and important in life and what is not. The therapist begins by simply accepting the client as he or she *is*, which in turn prompts the client to re-evaluate things.¹³¹ There is no effort made by the therapist to control the client or to positively reinforce behaviors made by the client. As Rogerian therapists, we simply ask of our clients to be completely natural, to assume responsibility for being

who they *are* and not who we might wish them to be. We trust our clients to know organistically—based on their genuine feelings as they explore themselves—what is best for them in life. Although it is not the whole answer, part of the therapeutic cure stems from the fact that a client is likely to introject our accepting attitude.¹³² Rosa, a stammering teen-aged girl with many fears and expressions of helplessness, finds the therapist's attitude totally different from what her parents and teachers display toward her. In time, the idea will occur to her, "If this 'doctor' can accept me as I am, even with my obvious shortcomings, why can't I accept myself *as* myself?" This attitude is often the first step toward change.

As Rosa increasingly puts herself in touch with her organismic values (reflected in feelings about the various things considered) and rejects those values of the self that are distorted and ingenuine, she will promote congruence. She might think, "Some of what I can't accept about myself is what mother always expected of me. She wants me to be letter-perfect in my speech and to always make a good impression. I've never felt comfortable trying to be in the spotlight. So what if I am a little awkward with others? I'm a shy person. At least I am sincere with others and never phony." As this corrective process is taking place, we might think of it as the congruence *in* the relationship between therapist and client leading to congruence *within* the client's personality. In fact, Rogers was to take this general theory of change and raise it to a *law of interpersonal relations* which he felt had relevance to *all* human interactions, inside of therapy or out.

Assuming a minimal mutual willingness to be in contact and to receive communications,

*we may say that the greater the communicated congruence of experience, awareness, and behavior on the part of one individual, the more the ensuing relationship will involve a tendency toward reciprocal communication with the same qualities, mutually accurate understanding of the communications, improved psychological adjustment and functioning in both parties, and mutual satisfaction in the relationship.*¹³³

This interpersonal prescription has occasionally been termed the *helping relationship*,¹³⁴ and it is also a significant aspect of what is called the *process equation* of psychotherapy.¹³⁵ The basic idea is that one person in a relationship—be it therapeutic or simply social—intends that there should come about in another person "more appreciation of, more expression of, more functional use of the latent inner resources of the individual."¹³⁶ The Rogerian world view has every person a therapist for every other person. Therapy is life and life is therapy, both involving a succession of relationships with others—relationships that can either make or break the participants who enter into them. Indeed, it is better to speak of a *facilitator* than a therapist in interpersonal relations when speaking of the helping relationship.

An interesting question that arises is, if a therapist-facilitator is 100 percent congruent, without facade and completely accepting of personal organismic values, how can he or she avoid expressing strong feelings that *naturally* arise in the relationship? How can the Rogerian therapist keep from intruding in the relationship in a personal way? The therapist really cannot avoid this eventuality, of course, and so it is that we witness in the development of Rogerian thought an increasing willingness to permit personal expressions from both ends of the therapeutic relationship. One can see this gradual shift in Rogers's writings, and it is especially promi-

ment in his later work with the basic encounter group. "When a young woman was weeping because she had had a dream that no one in the group loved her, I embraced her and kissed her and comforted her."¹³⁷ He also noted, "If I am currently distressed by something in my own life, I am willing to express it in the group. . . ."¹³⁸

This change in manner over some thirty years as therapist did not make Rogers inconsistent. He frankly admitted that his manner in the group differed from that in the individual psychotherapy session, but he quickly added, "In no basic philosophical way, so far as I can see, does this approach differ from that which I have adopted for years in individual therapy."¹³⁹ The basic philosophical outlook remains one of genuineness, openness, congruence, and a client-centered focus of concern. The therapist remains a facilitator of client growth through congruence.

Insight and Transference

One of the clear implications of the client-centered approach as first conceived was that clients have to find their own explanations for why they suffer from psychological maladjustment. As subjective identities, clients are basically responsible for what occurs in their phenomenal fields. Rogers defined therapeutic *insight* as "the perception of new meaning in the individual's own experience."¹⁴⁰ An insight permits the client to understand new relationships of cause and effect or to see the pattern of his or her behavior in a new light. But there are also many things to learn at the emotional level where, though insights may not be easily put into words, they are taking place if the therapeutic relationship is a good one. Hence, "insight is a highly important aspect of counseling treatment, and as such deserves the closest scrutiny."¹⁴¹

Since the classical analytical theories make much of the relationship in terms of transference and countertransference, Rogers had to take a position on these topics. The caressing and kissing of clients could easily be taken as an instance of countertransference. Because Rogers rejected—even in principle—the pressing of what he considered arbitrary theories of personality onto clients, he did not have to concern himself with such questions on an abstract level. However, on the more practical plane, Rogers discussed the issue of *transference* in terms of client-centered counseling. He admitted that transference phenomena seem to come up in client-centered therapy but at a much reduced level when compared to that of psychoanalysis. As he put it in 1951: "Thousands of clients have been dealt with by counselors with whom the writer has had personal contact. In only a small minority of cases handled in a client-centered fashion has the client developed a relationship which could in any way be matched to Freud's terms."¹⁴² Rogers meant that surely infantile attitudes are not transferred onto a therapist who presents himself or herself as another human being of equal status in face-to-face contact with the client.¹⁴³ There is plenty of feeling expressed in the relationship, but the realistic approach and equal status of client and therapist prevent the sort of distortion, regression, and projection that so typifies psychoanalysis, with its therapist as authority and client reclining on a couch approach to therapeutic change.

If Dolores is being counseled by a Rogerian therapist and somehow develops a transformed neurosis (see p. 98), Rogers would say that this has occurred because the therapist she was seeing mishandled the case.

The therapist may have been too authoritarian, forgetting that only Dolores can know her subjective feelings, which in turn help her to differentiate and articulate her phenomenal field through the organismic evaluations she makes. The therapist may have unknowingly supported value statements issuing from the self-concept, a body of attitudes and beliefs that are not congruent with the spontaneous feelings that Dolores is having about her life. Rather than accepting feelings of love or hostility from Dolores for what they were—honest reactions in the here and now which could be explored to see what they mean—her therapist probably tried to relate these to past figures in her life, such as her father or mother.¹⁴⁴

Emotional displays toward a therapist are often just what they are. Assuming that Dolores had a male therapist, his manner in the relationship may have been sexually attractive or even seductive. By taking the authority role, such a therapist could invite through a display of power all kinds of subservient and sexually flirtatious behaviors from a female client. If the therapist was a woman, it could be that she had mannerisms which *in fact* were like Dolores's mother, and that a parallel between therapist and mother was perfectly natural and in no way a repetition of the past. Rogers liked to point out that so-called negative transference is often used as an excuse by ineffective therapists who refuse to take responsibility for the irritation and frustration they have brought about in their client. As Rogerian therapists, we fix on the present relationship, make all feelings and attitudes clear, avoid incongruence, and in time things begin falling into place for Dolores who essentially constructs her *own* theory of why she has certain problems and what seems called for to correct them.

Just how much a therapist should reveal himself or herself as a person was a slowly developing position for Rogers. In 1941 he thought of counseling primarily in terms of a one-way emphasis on the client. This had changed by 1959 to the view that sometimes the therapist has to speak out personally in the relationship. This is especially called for when certain emotions are pressing onto the therapist's subjective awareness.¹⁴⁵ In this case, to ignore the feelings generated by the organismic valuing process would be to promote interpersonal incongruence. The therapist might be feeling something like "You sadden (surprise, shock, and so on) me by your attitudes," but would not communicate this to the client. How could satisfactory therapy take place in a context of such insincerity? By 1970 Rogers was prepared to be as open as his organismic valuing process spontaneously suggested, to the point of venting great anger and irritation to other members of the encounter group.¹⁴⁶

Psychotherapy as a Process of Change

An interesting outcome of the fact that Rogers desired to keep therapy free and open is that his writings contain much more about a theory of the therapist than a theory of the client. As client-centered therapists, we do not wish to judge or evaluate the client, but we have rather decided ideas about the proper manners and *attitudes a therapist* should hold to and display in behavior. In the early writings, the emphasis is on a selfless style of therapist interaction. "In client-centered therapy the client finds in the counselor a genuine alter ego in an operational and technical sense—a self which has temporarily divested itself (so far as possible) of its own selfhood, except for the one quality of endeavoring to understand."¹⁴⁷ Therapists behave like the clients' other selves, helping

them to differentiate and articulate their phenomenal fields more openly and accurately.¹⁴⁸ Summing up this process, Rogers essentially defined *psychotherapy* as follows: "Psychotherapy deals primarily with the organization and functioning of the self. There are many elements of experience which the self cannot face, cannot clearly perceive, because to face them or admit them would be inconsistent with and threatening to the current organization of the self."¹⁴⁹

The therapist acts as a companion, as an acceptant alter ego who helps the client work his or her way through a dark forest of misunderstanding and confusion.¹⁵⁰ In making this passage, clients come to experience themselves in new ways even as they reject the older ways of self-definition.¹⁵¹ In a very real sense, psychotherapy is a "learning of self."¹⁵² Of course this learning will not take place if the proper relationship is not formed. From the outside, psychotherapy might be defined as the "alteration of human behavior through interpersonal relationship."¹⁵³ It was when he attempted to name the essential elements in this relationship that Rogers made it most clear that he put more trust in attitudes than formal theories. One cannot teach psychotherapy in textbooks. Every research study he did convinced Rogers more that "personality change is initiated by *attitudes* which exist in the therapist, rather than primarily by his knowledge, his theories, or his techniques."¹⁵⁴ The true *facilitator* achieves therapeutic ends by approaching interpersonal relations with the nondirective attitude that permits others to be themselves.¹⁵⁵

Figure 25 schematizes the *process of change* taking place in a client's self-concept (removed from the phenomenal fields of Figures 23 and 24) as he or she progresses through nondirective therapy. Let us think of this in terms of a specific client: Jesse is a young man who did not finish high school, has had a poor work record, and is at present

very undecided about what to do in life. He has moved through various personality phases in the past, playing the lady's man and the tough guy, including a few scrapes with the police. He has recently lost his driver's license through an arrest following a minor automobile accident in which he was discovered driving while intoxicated. He enters nondirective therapy expecting to hear another series of lectures from authority. This does not happen, of course, and in time, thanks to the permissive therapeutic climate, Jesse begins to talk more and more about himself. At point 1 of Figure 25 we see Jesse's self-concept upon entering psychotherapy. It is a poor gestalt, with pieces that do not fit together well, as they are distortions of the real organismic valuations he was making years ago. Jesse is not as tough or as sure of himself with the opposite sex as he has pretended to be in the past. He is actually uncomfortable with these pretenses, as symbolized by the poorly differentiated and articulated self-gestalt at point 1. Note also that there are some potential aspects of Jesse's self-concept which have never been brought out into a clear figure; these are symbolized by the dotted subparts of the self.

As he goes along in therapy, Jesse quite naturally takes himself apart, looking over his personality from different angles. The therapist is essential here, encouraging self-exploration and supporting Jesse when admissions become difficult. Point 2 of Figure 25 symbolizes this sorting out and specific examination of portions of the self. Jesse's self-concept is like a poorly put-together picture puzzle, and now he is moving the pieces apart again to see if there is not a better fit, including the discarding of some pieces. Elements of the phenomenal ground that have been denied symbolization as figures in




Figure 25 The Process of Change in Figure-Ground Terms

the past may now be differentiated clearly and examined in great detail. Jesse will come to admit that he has sensed the idiocy of his ways wherein he has let his life slip by aimlessly, but he has been confused about what it means to grow up and be a man.

When things went wrong in the past, he blamed others, but deep down he always knew that he was the only person to blame for his frustrations in life (organismic valuing processes have been repressed). He has been running away from a responsible life for some time now, making jokes about those who live conventionally, and yet it was only his deep feeling of inadequacy that supported

his sarcastic and flippant manner. Actually, he envied those who have their lives pulled together. The therapist's acceptance of him *as he is* reassures Jesse, who in time, if therapy is successful, will come to know and accept himself as he genuinely feels himself to be. He will now admit to his drawbacks and weak points, but he will also accept responsibility for some strong points and potentials for growth. Point 3 of Figure 25 symbolizes the better gestalt organization achieved by Jesse's self-concept if therapy proves successful. We see a well-articulated self now, one that is congruent with the organismic values with which Jesse has now been put in touch. He is no longer fooling himself.¹⁵⁶ He accepts the locus of evaluation as within himself and leaves therapy with an honest sense of personal responsibility for his

future life, which he now has tied to certain realistic goals he has set for himself.¹⁵⁷

The process of change taking place across Figure 25 is even more detailed than we have pictured it. Actually, Rogers and his colleagues worked out a scale measuring *seven stages of movement* in therapeutic cure.¹⁵⁸ The specific points on this scale are not relevant for our purposes, but we might note the general scheme as an example of Rogers's theory of cure. The first stage is fixity and remoteness of experience, like our client Jesse who is not even sensitive to his feelings. He is rigid and unbending at this point, unwilling to admit to personal problems of any sort. Here is where other people are blamed for his plight. Gradually, in stages two and three, Jesse begins to become aware of himself as a feeling organism, sensing his evaluative reactions in relation to life's experiences. At stage four, Jesse's outlook on life is more relaxed and objective, enabling him to become aware of the contradictions existing between his feelings and his everyday experience. He is amazed at the greater understanding achieved by honestly letting his feelings point the way. As a result of the confidence stemming from the accuracy of his feelings, Jesse begins to trust his spontaneous emotional sensations more and more. By the fifth stage, feelings of great importance are beginning to well up in Jesse's awareness, surprising him and teaching him a great deal about himself. He is fascinated by this process of spontaneous change and tries to understand the meanings of these feelings. Once he has an understanding of the feelings, he also has an idea of what must be done about them, what they are suggesting to him as a course for the future.

Occasionally a feeling tone fails to make itself known clearly to Jesse. He has a "kind of" feeling about his high school principal which is not clear as to its meaning. A working-through of such partially known feelings

is necessary at this point until, along about stage six, they break loose and flood Jesse's awareness with insight. This is about the time when Jesse begins putting things together again, reorganizing his self-concept in the process. He is now fully aware of the locus of his feelings and of the evaluations they imply. He no longer thinks of himself as an object to be moved about by others or by circumstances, but takes responsibility for self-direction. Subjectivity is no longer a threat. In the final or seventh stage, Jesse becomes a fully functioning person.

There are a half-dozen or so essential ingredients that must be present if Rogerian therapy is actually to work like this. First, two people must be in *contact*, which means that there is communication between them. One of them, the client, must be *incongruent* though he or she may experience this incongruence as anxiety and not see the actual problem. The other person, the therapist, must be *congruent* in the *relationship*. Further, the therapist must be experiencing *unconditional positive regard*, which is defined as follows: ". . . if the self-experiences of another are perceived by me in such a way that no self-experience can be discriminated as more or less worthy of positive regard than any other, then I am experiencing unconditional positive regard for the individual."¹⁵⁹ This is essentially the attitude of nonjudgmental acceptance Rogers always insisted upon in the therapist's behavior. Another requirement is that the therapist genuinely feel an *empathic understanding* of the client from the latter's frame of reference. Empathy is seeing another person's point of view without forgetting that his or her subjective feelings in their entirety can never be known. Finally, for therapy or the process of change outlined above to be successful,

the client must personally perceive the unconditional positive regard and the empathic understanding of the therapist, "at least to a minimal degree."¹⁶⁰

*Mental Health: The
Characteristics of a Therapized
Individual*

Over the years, Rogers wrote extensively about the benefits of counseling or therapy for the individual. However, because of the extent of this literature, we will only consider selected aspects of his writings as examples of what Rogers understood to be mental health.

In his earliest papers, as he was working out the essentials of a therapeutic relationship, Rogers stressed the necessity for the individual to be more objective in self-perceptions.¹⁶¹ This does not mean seeing oneself as an object, something acted upon and manipulated without internal control. Rather, it implies a more willing, honest, and open acceptance of whatever our feelings indicate. Another characteristic of mentally healthy people is that they lose their self-consciousness as they develop greater self-awareness. We are self-conscious when we are out of touch with our genuine being. Once we accept who we are, there is no reason to be concerned about ourselves in self-conscious fashion.¹⁶² Neurotics are symptom-laden because they are continually on guard and sensitive to the reactions of others. Their symptoms are their defensive shields. A healthy person is not concerned with the rigid requirements that others hold out as bait or reward for what they want done. Healthy interpersonal relations are not achieved by such unyielding manipulations of one person by another.

A healthy person is not entirely without defenses, of course. Threats will naturally arise, and even the most self-enhanced individual will from time to time exhibit a certain defensiveness.¹⁶³ But the mentally healthy person is more aware of this protective maneuver when it arises, and in most cases, will drop its use as soon as possible. If more openness in life were the rule, it would be easier for all of us to drop our defensiveness. As long as we recognize when we *are* being defensive, we have not slumped to the level of the first stage of the process of change, wherein the individual is unaware of feelings altogether. Hence, in defining mental or psychological adjustment, Rogers was to say, "Optimal psychological adjustment exists when the concept of self is such that all experiences are or may be assimilated on a symbolic level into the gestalt of the self-structure."¹⁶⁴

Awareness thus continues to be the central concept in Rogerian definitions of mental health. Mentally healthy people are open to experience, trusting of their organism, accepting of their subjectivity as evaluators of their phenomenal experience, and willing to be a process of change.¹⁶⁵ Taking a phrase from the existential philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, Rogers said that to be fully functioning is "to be that self which one truly is."¹⁶⁶ This state necessitates dropping facades, moving away from rigid compunctions, meeting experience as it is and not doing things simply to please others, accepting responsibility for self-direction, and moving always toward new aspects of life with an acceptance of others and a trust in one's self.¹⁶⁷ These are the essentials of what Rogers was finally to call *existential living*, a concept that combines his phenomenological approach and his emphasis on the changing processes of life. *Existential living* is thus to live with "a maximum of adaptability, a discovery of structure *in* experience, a flowing, changing

organization of self and personality.”¹⁶⁸ An individual following this advice would live fully, “in the moment,”¹⁶⁹ and from moment to moment as a fully functioning person.

An Evolutionary Theme and a Natural Ethic

Rogers had us evaluating our lives spontaneously and, through considering our feelings in relation to various alternatives, opting in a direction that will inevitably promote the welfare of everyone. Yet, can we really trust our feelings like this? Rogers would seem to need additional theoretical justification for this optimistic view of people, who supposedly fall back on subjective feelings to opt unselfishly for the betterment of all. Interestingly, though it was not given prominent emphasis in his earlier writings, we can indeed find a theoretical justification for this positive outcome of the organismic valuing process in Rogers’s theorizing. This justification stemmed from an *evolutionary view of human nature*, in which values are carried by the organic processes of life. We might even say that these processes are the essence of life, the truest reflection of what we are as human beings, because they are closest to nature.

Hence, as in his wisdom-of-the-organic assumption discussed above (see p. 584), we find Rogers essentially contending that when we are mentally healthy, our tie to physical organic nature is closest. Congruity is a genuine tie to *natural* processes, a tie that is never made or shaped or controlled into existence by cultural (made by people) artifacts. There is no way for human beings to manufacture congruity, because it can only arise naturally, as a process of being in touch with and consistent with one’s organic totality. This unity with perceived experience is what Rogers meant when he wrote in 1951, “From an external point of view the impor-

tant difference [following reorganization of the self] is that the new self is much more nearly congruent with the totality of experience—that it is a pattern drawn from or perceived in experience, rather than a pattern imposed upon experience.”¹⁷⁰ There is no way in which to create a sense of congruence artificially. Congruence is the very opposite of artificiality. It is actually a movement back into nature as spontaneously experienced by an organic being. Rogers brought this point home as follows: “Thus the therapeutic process is, in its totality, the achievement by the individual, in a favorable psychological climate, of further steps in a direction which has already been set by his growth and maturational development from the time of conception onward.”¹⁷¹

Client-centered therapy is thus not a form of human engineering nor a method of controlling nature to meet an arbitrary end. The only end acceptable to Rogers is that spontaneous state of uncontrolled—literally natural—living. In 1959 he stated, “. . . psychotherapy is the releasing of an already existing capacity in a potentially competent individual, not the expert manipulation of a more or less passive personality.”¹⁷² We now begin to see what Rogers considered the human’s capacity for self-enhancement. As congruence is fostered both intrapersonally and interpersonally, the potentials for a broadened experience are of necessity enhanced since people do not need to act defensively, to turn off sincere promptings. If nature prompts, why should we deny this prompting? Drawing on more than thirty years of experience as therapist and consultant, Rogers in his mature statements began to see that *all* people move in the same general direction of enhanced experience, provided that they are allowed to be free in their relationships. “. . . There

is an organismic commonality of value directions.”¹⁷³ These common-value directions are of such kinds as to enhance not only the individual and the members of his or her community but also “*to make for the survival and evolution of his [or her] species*”¹⁷⁴ [italics added].

Rogers has seen clients in many different countries and engaged in therapy or encounter groups with therapists of quite differing personalities, all moving toward the common organismic values he outlined in such detail. Putting this commonality in natural terms, he observed, “I like to think that this commonality of value directions is due to the fact that we all belong to the same species—that just as a human infant tends, individually, to select a diet similar to that selected by other human infants, so a client in therapy tends, individually, to choose value directions similar to those chosen by other clients.”¹⁷⁵ When people are free to choose, they choose alike, and the valued goals selected are goals that make for their “own survival, growth, and development, and for the survival and development of others.”¹⁷⁶ This is to say that *in any culture, at any time in history*, the mature individual would opt for these very same values.¹⁷⁷ Thus, Rogers defended a *universal natural ethic*, rooted in the very fabric of organic life and transcending cultures. He makes this plain in the following excerpt:

Instead of universal values “out there,” or a universal value system imposed by some group—philosophers, rulers, priests, or psychologists—we have the possibility of universal human value directions emerging from the experiencing organism. Evidence from therapy indicates that both personal and so-

*cial values emerge as natural, and experienced, when the individual is close to his own organismic valuing process. The suggestion is that though modern man no longer trusts religion or science or philosophy nor any system of beliefs to give him values, he may find an organismic valuing base within himself which, if he can learn again to be in touch with it, will prove to be an organized, adaptive, and social approach to the perplexing value issues which face all of us.*¹⁷⁸

Techniques of Therapy and Life Processes

The Early Technique Emphasis: Nondirective Therapy

Thanks to the great interest he took in the nature of a relationship and the resultant attention paid to the therapist’s manner, Rogers frankly admitted that his early writings were heavily technique oriented.¹⁷⁹ This emphasis was a paradox of sorts, because the value system on which his approach was based *rejected* all attempts to manipulate or control the lives of clients. Yet the great stress placed on a therapist’s approach (avoiding making decisions for clients, turning the discussion lead over to the client at all times, and so on) seemed to impress some of Rogers’s colleagues as shrewd “how to” steps of client manipulation. Rogers was merely trying to demonstrate the essentials of an effective therapeutic relationship, and he had developed some scoring procedures on the basis of which recorded interviews could be coded and analyzed for empirical study. It was therefore possible to operationally define the difference between a *directive* and a *nondirective therapist*. Table 5 lists the characteristics of these two types of therapists, as found by Rogers in his experiments.

When we list such points as Table 5 contains, it is always possible to view either side

Directive Counselor-Therapists	Nondirective Counselor-Therapists
<i>Most Frequent</i>	<i>Most Frequent</i>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Asks highly specific questions, delimiting answers to yes, no, or specific information. 2. Explains, discusses, or gives information related to the problem or treatment. 3. Indicates topic of conversation but leaves development to client. 4. Proposes client activity. 5. Recognizes the subject content of what the client has just said. 6. Marshals evidence and persuades the client to undertake the proposed action. 7. Points out a problem or condition needing correction. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Recognizes in some way the feeling or attitude the client has just expressed. 2. Interprets or recognizes feelings or attitudes expressed by general demeanor, specific behavior, or earlier statements. 3. Indicates topic of conversation but leaves development to client. 4. Recognizes the subject content of what the client has just said. 5. Asks highly specific questions, delimiting answers to yes, no, or specific information. 6. Explains, discusses, or gives information related to the problem or treatment. 7. Defines the interview situation in terms of the client's responsibility for using it.
<i>Least Frequent</i>	<i>Least Frequent</i>

Table 5 Frequency of Techniques Used by Directive and Nondirective Approaches¹⁸⁰

—directive or nondirective therapist approaches—as simply alternative techniques to be used in bringing about (controlling, shaping, manipulating) changes in our clients' behaviors. This is what seems to have happened to Rogers and why at one point in his career he was known as the “mmm-hmm therapist.” One of the least directive or leading statements a therapist can make is simply to nod his or her head or murmur an encouraging “mmm hmm” as if to say, “yes, go ahead, I am listening” to the client. Although most of Rogers's advocates stressed the nonauthoritarian values underlying this nondirectiveness, some viewed the tactic as a cleverly subtle way of controlling the client's topics of conversation. As we have already seen in Chapter 7 (p. 446), the classic study by Greenspoon (1955) was done to prove that a therapist could indeed verbally condition a client through something as subtle as a nod of the head or an “mmm

hmm.” The awareness issue was to enter in the years following Greenspoon's original work (we have covered this question in Chapter 7).

Rogers believed that by taking the nondirective approach to people, we are more likely to *validate* them as human beings. By this is meant that the therapist responds to others with questions or comments that show immediately his or her respect for their presence, their view, and their problems.¹⁸¹ Only when the therapist can *trust* others is this kind of interpersonal validation possible.¹⁸² If as Rogerian therapists we nod our head and say “mmm hmm” or make a more extensive comment bearing on the problems of the person, we are not covertly trying to manipulate events to some preconceived solution that we have in mind. We are simply being as spontaneous and natural in the

situation as possible. We always avoid interpreting client behavior via our pet theories, and we try to learn from the client—a valid factor in our phenomenal field—what he or she would prefer to see as the problem and its eventual solution.

Generalized Principles for Interpersonal Behavior

The interpersonal concern for the “other” should not be limited to therapy. Rogers extended his view of the relationship to all manner of interpersonal and even institutional situations. An effective facilitator in the classroom sets an open climate, helps the class choose its goals, trusts the students to direct their own self-actualization, and becomes a participant learner within the total process.¹⁸³ Rather than filling the heads of students with facts, as in the mug-and-jug view of learning, Rogers saw the teacher working as a resource person for the student body. Effective teachers share themselves with their students, recognize and accept their own limitations, and encourage the expression of emotions as well as intellectual insights in the classroom. They organize and help make things available, but do not forfeit trust in others in favor of a kind of military regime or obstacle course. Learning is another natural process, and it will be entered into spontaneously if the learner is given the right climate in which to grow.

Rogers emphasized that material must be relevant if we expect people to learn it. Engaging the person’s interest is easy if what we have to offer is seen as a potentially enriching phenomenal experience. One of the poorest tactics for a teacher to use is to threaten a student. All this does is promote rigid defensiveness. By reducing threat and encouraging spontaneity, new experience can

be differentiated and articulated. Learning is greatly enhanced when students share in the responsibilities of the classroom, including selection of topics and decisions concerning their final grades.¹⁸⁴ Self-evaluation is one of the most important things we must learn in life, and yet how many teachers view this as one of the skills they must develop in their students? Rogers felt deeply that effective education like effective therapy must teach the person about life as a continuous process of change. Hence, he drew this parallel: “*To my mind the ‘best’ of education would produce a person very similar to the one produced by the ‘best’ of therapy.*”¹⁸⁵

This would seem to make every teacher a therapist. Yet an even more fundamental truth is that *every person is a therapist!* Many of Rogers’s later papers are taken up with discussions of how congruence can be promoted in various interpersonal settings. For example, parents must be congruent in their relations with their children and acquire that sense of trust that will permit the child at a certain time in life to be a separate person.¹⁸⁶ Every member of a family must be allowed the dignity of separation from time to time, with the freedom to have solitude and his or her own preoccupations. Rogers was not seeking a world of hand-holders with smiling faces who place the group above the individual. In fact, his view was that one cannot be creative unless he or she has the capacity to accept the feeling, “I am alone.”¹⁸⁷ The creative individual hopes to communicate with others in time, but in order to be capable of independent thought, he or she must retreat to a psychological if not literal corner in life from time to time.

Rogers proposed a few rules which might facilitate congruence in interpersonal relations. For example, what if a family discussion or a labor-management arbitration were to follow the rule, “Each person can speak up for himself only *after* he has first re-

stated the ideas and feelings of the previous speaker accurately, and to that speaker's satisfaction."¹⁸⁸ If all group participants honestly followed this rule (given the limitations of subjective phenomenal fields), Rogers believed that improved communication would necessarily result. Not that an easy solution would then follow; but at least one side would not be manipulating the other, forcing it to support predetermined prejudices, and so forth. Each side would validate the other. Rogers felt that even organizations and nations might consider some such principle in facilitating change.¹⁸⁹ It is unfortunately true that sometimes the individual person changes, but the institutional framework within which he or she lives and works *does not*.¹⁹⁰ This is one of the reasons that Rogers became heavily involved in the encounter group, a technique that he felt could change (cure?) institutions.

The Basic Encounter Group

As we have noted above, Rogers's approach is more personally revealing and open in the encounter group than it is in individual psychotherapy. The basic philosophy of congruence and relationship remains the same, but encounter groups have demands of their own which require special techniques.

There is really no adequate definition of an *encounter group*. Recall that the first such groups were essentially post-mortems on Lewinian researches (see p. 573). These evolved into an attempt to treat several individuals together in what is tantamount to group therapy. The number of clients in a contemporary encounter group can vary from three or four up to as many as fifteen or twenty, but the usual size is from six to ten. Some group therapists have taken strictly Freudian views of illness and cure, and the level of interpretation in such approaches is virtually identical to interpretations in indi-

vidual therapy. Other group therapists have relied more on gestalt psychology or Lewinian small-group theory to provide the rationale for what goes on when people get together, motivated by an interest in self-knowledge and greater facility for relationships. Rogers found himself trying to maximize everyone's freedom in the groups he conducted. "In an encounter group I love to give, both to the participants and to myself, the maximum freedom of expression. . . . I do *trust* the group, and find it often wiser than I in its reactions to particular situations."¹⁹¹

Encounter groups are customarily held at a somewhat removed hotel, motel, or resort area. They may continue for a few days or as long as a week. The group sessions may take up a half-day or an entire day; it is not unusual for so-called marathon groups to last for twenty-four and more hours, with participants taking catnaps along the way to termination. There are many different rationales given for each of these approaches, but the essential point is that in time a peculiar phenomenon emerges in which the identification among members is strengthened, and the false faces come off or at times are ripped off by fellow participants. Coretta tells Lennie, "You always hide behind that 'I'm so defenseless' mask of yours, but you aren't fooling anybody in *this* group. You are about as defenseless as a cobra. You use other people's pity like some people use alcohol." This would be termed a *confrontation* between group members. Many times the exchanges between members are positive, expressing love and concern as in the case of Rogers's embracing and reassuring the woman who felt rejected.

Rogers did not believe in leading groups

by assigning the members tasks or lecturing them (unless asked about something as a resource person); everyone shares responsibility for what is accomplished.¹⁹² He opens the group with a minimum of structure and then listens to others—validating each in turn.¹⁹³ He hopes to make the climate of the group psychologically safe, so that no one will feel threatened and real learning can proceed. It is vital to accept the group and each individual within it as they now *are*. Effective facilitators never push the group, but neither do they go along with the group when no real effort is being made to work toward the therapeutic goal by having sincere interactions. Rogers has been known to walk out of a therapeutic session and go to bed when the group members are relating superficially.

Though he devoted little space to the topic of *resistance* in his writings on individual therapy, Rogers did take up this phenomenon in regard to groups. “Silence or muteness in the individual are acceptable to me providing I am quite certain it is not unexpressed pain or resistance.”¹⁹⁴ It would appear that if a group facilitator does sense resistance in a group member and then expresses this feeling to the member, he or she would essentially be *interpreting* or providing *insight* of sorts to the client. Rogers would have no argument with this suggestion. He would merely stress that the focus of his interpretative comments is always on the ongoing behavior of group members, specifically as these behaviors impinge on his personal phenomenal field. He is also cautious when it comes to the use of more aggressive confrontations with members. He is prepared to say, “I don’t like the way you chatter on” to a participant, but this does not mean he will try to pull down a per-

son’s typical defensive style. “To attack a person’s defenses seems to me judgmental.”¹⁹⁵ By focusing on a specific behavior and the present relationship, he makes points concrete for the participant and avoids the distortions in symbolization that often result when interpretations become subtle and abstract.

The approach that entails discussing how the group as a whole is functioning can also be overdone. The Lewinians called this dynamic interaction *group process* and studied it in great detail. Rogers said: “I make comments on the group process sparingly. They are apt to make the group self-conscious; they slow it down, giving members the sense that they are under scrutiny.”¹⁹⁶ Rogers does not schedule *group exercises* beforehand or think that he simply has to use certain techniques if the group is to work. This attitude is too mechanical and gimmicky for Rogers’s taste. But if a facilitator spontaneously thinks of trying role playing, bodily contact, psychodrama, or various other exercises aimed at promoting group interaction, then such exercises are likely to flow into the process naturally and prove beneficial. Rogers has used all of these group exercises.¹⁹⁷

When a group begins to settle down to its task and people loosen up enough to say what they honestly feel, a number of problems may arise as certain members find this frankness and openness unbearably threatening. The skills of the facilitator enter at this point to know exactly when an encounter is getting out of hand, and so on. Many psychologists oppose the encounter-group movement because of the harm such experiences can have on people, sometimes even with the most experienced facilitators present. Rogers admitted that he had known people who developed psychotic breaks following their encounter experience.¹⁹⁸ However, he felt that these were rare enough occasions to be worth the

risk, considering the thousands of people he had seen helped by their encounter experience.

Rogers cited several characteristics of certain encounter-group facilitators as *nonfacilitative*.¹⁹⁹ In general, Rogers was suspicious of the person who appears to be exploiting the purposes of the group, using it for his or her subjective needs. Facilitators who manipulate the group, make rules for it, or covertly direct it toward preconceived ends are *not* recommended. The histrionic facilitator, who judges success by how many participants weep, is also to be avoided. Rigid facilitators, who have some one thing to achieve like "drawing out the basic rage in everyone," are not going to help a group become what it otherwise could. Rogers would not recommend facilitators who have such severe personal problems that they constantly turn the center of attention on themselves. He also did not favor the type who doles out dynamic interpretations at every turn. Finally, Rogers did not advocate facilitators who withhold themselves from personal emotional participation in the group—which would be the other side of completely dominating the group with personal hang-ups. It is often the expert type who keeps aloof, feeling that he or she can analyze the group processes or the dynamics of the participants by remaining on the sideline.

Summary

Chapter 9 begins with a review of the gestalt-phenomenological school of thought that Rogers was to base much of his theory on. It was Husserl who coined the term *phenomenology*, taking his lead from the Kantian distinction between noumena and phenomena. The first area of study in which phenomenology had an impact was in the

sensory investigations of the gestaltists—Wertheimer, Köhler, and Koffka—who with their colleagues were to provide empirical justification for a number of laws of organization: unit formation and segregation (via articulation), closure, good shape, proximity and equality, and good continuation. The law of *pragnanz* held that the figure-ground relations will always be as good, symmetrical, and stable as the prevailing conditions will allow. It is this figure-against-the-ground conception that personologists were to borrow from the gestaltists, making the person a figure on a field of interacting factors, all obeying gestalt laws. Though not a strict gestaltist, Lewin used a similar idea in his construct of the life space—a region which he saw as differentiated and articulated within the person's phenomenal awareness and within which the person both communicated and locomoted. Even more removed from traditional gestalt psychology was Rank, who influenced Rogers through concepts like separation, independence, and the need to become one's own person in maturing to adulthood.

Rogesian personality theory therefore begins on the assumption that each of us lives within our own phenomenal field, which combines unique mental and bodily experiences into an overall understanding of subjective reality. We have important physical reactions—feelings, moods, emotions—which define this reality and with which we may or may not be in touch. When we are cognitively aware of a feeling, Rogers would say we have symbolized it. Sometimes we can subceive a personalized emotion—a meaningful indication of how we are framing a life circumstance—even before we have given it symbolical form, or symbolization. The identity of the person in Rogerian theory is

termed the self, and our subjective self-concepts or self-structures are differentiated and articulated from out of the total mass of our subjective phenomenal fields. It is impossible in principle for anyone else to know our selves the way *we* know our selves, because to do so, the other person would have to *be* in our subjective reality. Hence, even so-called objective descriptions of behavior are in reality intersubjective accounts. The self-concept emerges from the phenomenal field as a figure from the ground, and when we are not focused on our selves, it can lose articulation and become an undifferentiated aspect of the ground. We can lose ourselves for a time as we focus on other figures of interest in our subjective phenomenal fields.

There is a single, master motive in life which Rogers called organismic enhancement. This is a desire on the part of all living organisms to extend the range of their phenomenal fields and to enrich them through further articulations and differentiations—much as we enrich diamonds by cutting more facets into their totality. A problem arises, however, in the fact that this enhancement takes two forms. There are needs of the organism and needs of the self which must be satisfied. The former are essentially natural and personal, whereas the latter are taught to us by important figures in our lives—parents, teachers, and the society in general. The person organizes his or her self-concept according to a valuing process which strives to be acceptable to others and internally (self-) consistent. Feelings that may be genuine and accurately reflect the organismic valuing process may be denied in favor of a societal value that implies that the person should not be experiencing such emotions. This results in threat, and the person may then distort the symbolization of the accurately perceived emotion. Ideally, there should be a matching

up or congruence of the organismic (emotional, feeling) and the self-concept (psychological, social) aspects of phenomenal experience. However, a certain amount of incongruence is usually experienced, and when this disbalance is excessive, we can even speak of psychological maladjustment.

Unfortunately, human beings often lack positive regard for each other, so that when one person deviates from a traditional way of behaving, even though this injures no one else, there is a certain amount of pressure to bring this deviant back into line. Parents in particular are likely to ignore a child's individuality and press upon him or her values the child does not sincerely or organismically feel in tune with. According to Rogers, repression occurs when such unacceptable feelings are not symbolized. Such denial can be rationalized away for a time, but eventually the internal locus of evaluation shifts to what others think and feel rather than what the person thinks or feels. The person is now essentially victimized by others, who move him or her about like an automaton. In order to mature properly and become what Rogers called a fully functioning person, the individual must bring back the locus of evaluation to an internal frame of reference, relying on organismic enhancement. In achieving this internal congruence, the person would effectively become more independent in behavior. The mature person in Rogerian terms has achieved independence from parental pressures.

Rogers's theory of illness stems from the incongruence construct and the distortion in symbolization it invariably results in. The person is vulnerable to attacks of anxiety, threat, and disorganization because he or she does not feel up to the events that seem to throw life into one conflict after another. There is also a continuing tension of incongruence leading to lowered confidence in general. Rogers disliked labeling people

through diagnosing a symptom picture, but he did refer to moderate incongruence as neurosis and extreme incongruence as psychosis. Rogers devoted considerable attention to his theory of cure which was based on what he called nondirective or client-centered therapy. The client-centered therapist assumes that a client can deal constructively with all those aspects of his or her life that can potentially come into conscious awareness. The climate of the therapeutic contact is all-important here. Rogers called this a helping relationship, an interest by one person with empathic understanding of and unconditional positive regard for the problems of another person. Effective therapists are congruent individuals who create a process equation in the therapeutic contact which intends that there be more open expression and functional use of the client's inner resources. The client must be encouraged to rely on organismic feeling tones, which reflect sincere values and preferences that would set life on a healthy track if they were only taken into account. Hence, the therapist is a facilitator of this genuine acceptance of what the person *is* rather than an individual striving to mold or shape the person according to some preconceived image or plan. This emphasis on the spontaneous and genuine gives Rogerian theory a decidedly existentialistic flavor.

Rogers considered insight to be the perception of new meaning in the client's own phenomenal experience. He did not dwell on transference in the Freudian sense, feeling that if the person does indeed transfer feelings meant for another onto the therapist, it is the behavioral manner and attitude of the therapist that has invited this transference. The client-centered relationship focuses on congruence—both in the behavior of the therapist and it is hoped, as time passes, in the behavior of the client as well. Psychotherapy is a process of change in which the

self-concept comes more into line with the organismic valuing process, thanks to the open, accepting, positive regard of the therapist in the therapeutic relationship. Rogers broke down this process of change into seven stages of movement. He also conducted extensive empirical studies of these stages. In the final analysis, awareness was the central concept in Rogers's definition of mental health. Psychologically well-adjusted people are open to experience, trusting in their organism, accepting of their subjectivity as evaluators of their phenomenal experience, and willing to be a process of change. The emphasis on organismic trust led Rogers to envision what we have termed a universal natural ethic in human relations. That is, he came to refer to a wisdom in organic feelings, leading to natural valuations made of life which are beyond the social order as such. Organisms that react naturally to their feelings about things enhance their survival chances, and particularly so when considered as a member of a species. The species is likely to survive if its members take organismic valuations into consideration.

This growing emphasis on naturalistic bases of valuation paralleled Rogers's own development as therapist, moving him from a one-to-one therapist in individual therapy to a facilitator of the encounter group. Since Rogers always held that congruence in one person promotes congruence in another and vice versa, in the final analysis, every person becomes a therapist. Hence, even in an encounter group where only one facilitator is present, several individuals may promote through healthy interpersonal relationships of a congruent nature the psychological adjustment of all the members. Rather than focusing on how to be nondirective in therapy, Rogers in his later years focused on the

problems of the encounter group, including the development of trust, the overcoming of resistance in certain members, protecting the individual, and the use or nonuse of certain group exercises. Rogers's lasting influence on psychology will doubtlessly stem from his image of the person and his attitude toward how people develop and change their behavior. His technical theory is more a borrowed product than his own creation. He is, however, a great humanist and a leading innovator in therapeutic technique in the history of psychology.

Outline of Important Theoretical Constructs

Background factors in Rogerian thought

Edmund Husserl

noumena versus phenomena • intersubjectivity • essence of meaning • phenomenology • transcendental • transcendental phenomenology

The Gestalt psychologists: Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Köhler, and Kurt Koffka

phenomenal movement, phi-phenomenon • gestalt • distal versus proximal stimulus • laws of organization • articulation • law of unit formation and segregation • law of closure • law of good shape • law of good continuation • law of proximity and equality • law of pragnanz • law of figure-against-ground formation • principle of isomorphism

Kurt Lewin

life space • level of aspiration • path, valence, barrier • demand character

• foreign hull • differentiation • communication • locomotion • group dynamics • T-groups, encounter groups

Otto Rank

birth trauma • independence • positive versus negative will • separation anxiety • termination of therapy

Biographical overview of Carl R. Rogers

Personality theory

Structural constructs

Mind-body, phenomenal subjectivity, and the wisdom of organic evidence

phenomenal field • consciousness • symbol • subjective reality • intersubjectivity • subception • wisdom of organic evidence

The self as a conscious articulation of the phenomenal field

self-concept • self-structure

Motivational constructs

Organismic enhancement as life's master motive

organismic enhancement • need • needs of the organism • needs of the self • valuing process • self-consistency • threat

Congruence versus incongruence and positive regard

congruence • incongruence • psychological maladjustment • positive regard

Defensiveness versus spontaneity in human behavior

anxiety • introjection • repression • distorted symbolization • denial • rationalization • locus of evaluation

Time perspective constructs

organismic valuing process • personality • fully functioning person • conditional versus unconditional positive regard

Individual differences constructs
 dependent versus independent • self-ideal
 versus self • vulnerability • mature
 behavior • fully functioning person

Psychopathology and psychotherapy

Theory of illness

*Maladjustment as the clash of organismic
 versus self actualization*
 psychological maladjustment •
 threat, anxiety • tension of incongruence

The irrelevancy of diagnostic distinctions
 client versus patient • neurosis • psy-
 chosis

Theory of cure

*The nature of a healing relationship:
 the client-centered hypothesis*
 therapist's hypothesis • client-centered
 hypothesis • helping relationship • pro-
 cess equation • facilitator

Insight and transference
 insight • transference

Psychotherapy as a process of change
 therapist attitudes • psychotherapy
 • facilitator • seven stages of movement
 • contact • congruent relationship • un-
 conditional positive regard • empathic
 understanding

*Mental health: the characteristics of a
 therapized individual*
 awareness • existential living

An evolutionary theme and a natural ethic
 evolutionary view of human nature
 • values of survival and evolution of
 species • universal natural ethic

Techniques of therapy and life processes

*The early technique emphasis:
 nondirective therapy*
 directive versus nondirective therapy styles
 • validating others

*Generalized principles for interpersonal
 behavior*

every person is a therapist

The basic encounter group

encounter group • trust • confrontation
 • resistance • interpretation, insight
 • group process • group exercises
 • nonfacilitation

Notes

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Chapter 10

Existential Analysis or Daseinsanalysis: Binswanger and Boss

Existential Philosophy

Existentialism as a movement in philosophy dates from the first half of the nineteenth century, when Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) began to criticize the heavily intellectualized or rational philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). Kierkegaard believed that human existence is not accurately represented when we leave out the spontaneous and emotional side of life in our philosophies. The spirit of this movement was then advanced by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), but it was not until a series of brilliant people, most of whom read, admired, or actually studied with Husserl (see p. 565), began speaking of *being*, *ontology* (the study of being), and *existence* that the movement really took shape. These were individuals, such as Karl Jaspers (1883–1969), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980). There were other important thinkers like Gabriel Marcel (1889–1973) who advanced existentialism, but we will

focus on those philosophers having a direct relevance for psychology.

Existentialism as a view of the world is *not* a uniform philosophy. Although central to the development of this view, both Jaspers and Heidegger specifically denied that they were existentialists. These men disagreed on major points, and meanings for the same terms change when we read each of them. Yet existentialism is a peculiarly *modern* philosophy which speaks for large segments of the world's populace; it has something to say about our contemporary *predicament* (a term often employed) as we advance into the twenty-first century. Will we make it? Is it all worth it? Do we really have the answers, philosophical or scientific, to enrich life as we once dreamed was possible? Can we discover or create that which we must know to "truly be"? These are the questions existentialism addresses.

The writings of Kierkegaard and Heidegger are probably more relevant to personality and psychotherapy than those of the other men. These two thinkers had the most direct influence on modern psychology. In the remainder of this introductory section, we will review a half-dozen conceptions which best reflect the thrust of existential philosophy and which we will see as prominent themes in the psychology of Binswanger and Boss.

Alienation

As the last philosopher who tried to write an all-encompassing account of our human nature, including our historical development as a people across the ages, Hegel played an important role in the birth of existentialism. An important idea he advanced in his writings was that those things that human beings

create can actually have a "life [existence] of their own." For example, an artist's painting or the writings of an author are really *there* in existence independent of his or her control. If the artist and author change their views—their judgments of what is beautiful or worthy of literary mention—their creations remain as originally conceived. In fact, the creations may take on meanings never intended by the creators! More than one creation has been known to bring pain to its creator as in the fictional case of Frankenstein's monster. Not only the works of major artists and authors but even the most humble statements and activities of everyday life can have a similar effect—like a letter written in haste, an act of seemingly justified revenge, and so forth.

Hegel referred to this independent life of our creations—a kind of existence that is basically foreign to us—as *alienation*.¹ Aliens are foreigners. Kierkegaard used this idea of being alienated from certain aspects of our existence to describe the way in which Christians of his period practiced their faith. Too many Christians, said Kierkegaard, repeated meaningless prayers and nodded in agreement to dogmas of their religion which they never understood, much less put into practice. Religion was no longer a living force in their lives. People had become alienated from their faith. Nietzsche had a similar criticism to make of the established philosophies of his time. The philosopher who mouthed what others had said instead of following the promptings of his or her own reason had become alienated from that very reasoning capacity.² How can thinkers answer today's problems by repeating solutions offered for yesterday's problems?

Heidegger showed how words can be alienated from the meanings they are supposed to convey so that people can twist things to suit themselves in violation of what is known in immediate experience.³ We be-

have cowardly in a time of threat—then point out later that everyone is cowardly at some time in life, hence our actions were perfectly understandable and not unusual. We can actually live out a lifetime of untruth, making our alienated understandings “real” in the sense that we enact them. Marlene is a wretchedly sad and unloved person, who turns all signs of affection into humorous taunts. She belittles what she wants most. Sartre said that psychology as a science of behavior has become alienated from its subject matter because, rather than capturing phenomenal reality in its theories, it has turned human beings into machines.⁴ Sartre also strongly developed the idea first suggested by Kierkegaard—that group pressures like national identities (being an American, German, and so on) have become so great in our time that everyone lives in self-alienation. We cannot be who we spontaneously and phenomenally are because of the many subtle pressures to conform, to be as others would have us be and as everyone around us is.

Authenticity

Kierkegaard was the first philosopher to point out that we become inauthentic if we let the group or culture define who we are (self-alienation). Modern concepts of the mass person, who sells out by submitting to what the system says he or she ought to be, have their roots in Kierkegaard’s attack on the lifeless rituals of the Christian church.⁵ Nietzsche spoke of the *will to power* (see p. 135) as being the human person’s fundamental capacity to be self-creative and hence authentic (real, genuine, spontaneous, and so on). As long as we base our lives on what we *are*—what we think, feel, desire—then we cannot be self-alienated or self-estranged. Our conscience urges us only to be free, to be ourselves as we constantly experience life

unafraid; *guilt* is that feeling we suffer when we do not assume this responsibility but let others define who we are.⁶

Jaspers’ philosophy dealt with the opposition between authentic and inauthentic living. He referred to *Dasein* as *being-there*, or literally, the objective fact that we do materially exist.⁷ Nature automatically determines that we exist in this sense. But another realm of existence that Jaspers termed *being-one-self* demands personal action before it is realized (created). To be oneself requires effort, personal decision, and the selection of alternatives that might not prove popular. The group cannot provide this being-oneseelf for us. It can, however, set limits on what we might be. The point is not to reject all of its views about what is good and/or proper in life, but to realize that only individual effort can bring about being-oneseelf.

For Heidegger, authenticity was fulfilling one’s possibilities.⁸ That is, we can become what we aspire to be. As humans we can see a “potential being” ahead of us and work to become that unique self. The term *Dasein* as used by Heidegger includes this possibility, this tentative projection of what “might be” in the future. We also realize that our possibilities are not unlimited. Other human beings have established certain prescribed ways of doing things, as codified in our laws. We can go along with this established routine without question—which would make us inauthentic—or we can evaluate, accept, discard, and affirm our own ways of possible living—which when realized in our lifestyle would make us authentic.⁹ No one can be completely free of group pressures. The authentic person thus synthesizes the imposed and the self-willed to reach a pattern of existence (*Dasein*) that is uniquely his or her

own. We admire Aaron, for though he is a conventional person, he has a style all his own which he obviously has carved out for himself and within which he feels at home. Aaron is authentic, more genuinely alive than the unorthodox people with whom he comes into contact because he is self-created and they are merely conforming to the latest fad in eccentricity.

Subject versus Object

The person who lives inauthentically, said Kierkegaard, who lets others define his or her identity, begins to think of that identity as an *object* and not as a *subject*.¹⁰ Objects are things to be factually described, manipulated, and put in their place because they are passive. The subjective side to life, on the other hand, involves action, a desire to create that which is not yet factual but a mere possibility. In morality, for example, we project an “ought” as a possibility and then make it a reality in our life. We say “A man and woman who marry ought to be faithful to each other,” and then create this pattern in our own, subjectively determined pattern of behavior. If we merely express this moral principle objectively, it remains a mere possibility and hence we never make it so.¹¹ To bring moral precepts alive, we must first think of ourselves subjectively, recognizing thereby that we have a unique responsibility to do something more than just pay lip service to what is being stated.

Jaspers made a similar point in speaking about the error of letting modern science define who we are as persons. Science *levels* everything on earth into a common form of description and analysis, confounding thereby the objective realm of being-there with the subjective realm of being-oneself. Since the

former can never arrive at the latter, Jaspers asked that we transcend (rise above) mere objectivity and think of ourselves subjectively.¹² Heidegger referred to the inauthentic form of existence that results when we consider each other to be objects rather than subjects as *nothingness*. To the objectivist, a person is “anyone” or “everyman” or a “plastic person.” The danger is that we allow ourselves to become a part of this objective mass, this faceless crowd of objects which move about like ants conforming to the manipulations of science, church, and country without subjectively examining and creating our lifestyles for ourselves. To *be* is to emerge from the background of nothingness as a figure emerges from the ground (see p. 570).

Commitment, Action

The essence of the human spirit according to existentialism is *activity*.¹³ It takes active effort to become a subjective person. As Kierkegaard once put it, “To be human is not a fact, but a task.”¹⁴ Nietzsche said that we must leap into life with passion and, above all, a sense of *commitment* to that which we are bringing about. This passion does not mean that the committed person is irrational. Reason and emotion are not antithetical.¹⁵ Only an automaton is without passion, and if we simply go through the motions of life, we are not existing but simply enacting what someone else has determined we should be doing. When we are alive, we will *feel* alive.

What we commit ourselves to will be influenced to an extent by the historical time in which we live, as well as by our strictly personal set of circumstances. Much has gone before us in our country’s history. Our parents have been living and creating their existence for some time as well. Jaspers cautioned that the wise person does not arro-

gantly reject all that has gone before, but selects to affirm that which a subjective examination establishes is correct and good to live by.¹⁶ Heidegger showed how some people run away from this need to make a subjective examination and a personal commitment by fleeing into mass movements and other popular fads.¹⁷ Millard becomes a revolutionary, not out of a real examination of the issues he is opposed to, but because he obtained a quick sense of identity by becoming part of a powerful movement with an aim to achieve. But this is still not Millard's subjective aim. Randal may have entered the priesthood on equally unreasoned grounds—to obtain the same cheap solution to a life problem that faces all of us. Sartre called this self-deception *bad faith*, by which he meant letting ourselves down and not really fulfilling the possibilities open to us in life.¹⁸ The thrust of existentialism is thus to put the individual at the center of life, personally responsible for what then takes place in that life. We cannot sidestep this responsibility and claim that we behave as we do because of our parents, our society, or our racial inheritance. We must recognize that even when we refuse to *choose*, to act, to commit ourselves to a direction in life, *we have already chosen*. There is no escaping the existential predicament of *having to be*.

Anxiety, Dread, Despair

The existentialists use words like *anxiety*, *dread*, and *despair* to describe inauthentic living. Kierkegaard spoke of anxiety as the “sickness unto death,”¹⁹ resulting from self-alienation (inauthenticity) and giving the person nothing but despair to look forward to. Nietzsche considered fear or anxiety to be the result of negating or refusing to use one's will to power.²⁰ Not everyone who suffers the dread of inauthenticity appears to be

anxious overtly. We look at Rita as she works feverishly to organize the local Parent-Teacher's Association chapter, and we never realize that her heightened tempo and breathless commitment to the PTA masks an underlying sense of emptiness in her personal life. Rita really does not know who she is, but as her mother was an active person in PTA, she too now tries to solve her problem of existence through her mother's solutions. Sometimes a person living through an inauthentic existence masks the underlying anxiety with overt boredom. Everything in life bores Charles. He tends to blame others for this sense of boredom, but the truth is he is personally unable to commit himself creatively to life. Hence, as Heidegger said, his anxiety reflects his nothingness, which in turn manifests itself as boredom.²¹ Anxiety can be a constructive factor in life, for as both Kierkegaard and Heidegger stressed, out of anxiety is born the motivation to conquer indecision and self-deception. Anxiety is in one sense the beginning of self-affirmation. We are afraid, but this means we “are,” and in our being, we can as identities alive to the possibilities in things bring about a tomorrow that is more authentic than today.

Absurd

The last concept we will consider as typical of existentialistic philosophy is *absurd*. This word has been used in both a positive and a negative sense by the existentialists. Kierkegaard used it in the more positive sense, as a basis for belief. For something to be true, we have to believe it, and, said Kierkegaard, when we come right down to it, all belief is subjective in nature. This makes all truth subjective as well. Well, it is clearly absurd to

think of a God who was born, grew up, and died, exactly as other human beings have done and are doing. Yet when we think about this subjectively, it is the very absurdity of this sequence of events that lends it believability.²² Paradoxes and absurdities always seem to bring us up short, make us think about what they are driving at; in this way they carry great weight as evidence. When we honestly look at some things privately and openly, as subjects, we are moved to think, "That is just so unusual, so odd, so different that there must be some truth to it. It is absurdly true."

Sartre, on the other hand, used the term *absurd* in a more negative sense. He tended to view absurdity as a way of talking about human existence. The human drama is full of absurdities. We have the absurdity of death, bringing to an end nature's highest creation.²³ We have the absurdity of clashing moralities, where opposed sides are drawn along a line of armed conflict aiming to demolish one another in the name of their God (Who is often the same). We have the absurdity of birth, in which material advantages are partitioned according to class or race. And the more complex modern life becomes, the more absurd it becomes. The implications of Sartre's rather pessimistic summation is that if we would each contemplate these absurdities in our own subjective state of existence, we could in time remove them through individual commitment and action.

Existential Themes in Oriental Philosophy

In recent times there has been much interest shown in the philosophy of the East by Westerners, particularly in the world view of Zen

Buddhism. Oriental philosophers and historians stress the style of thought among Indian, Chinese, and Japanese peoples.²⁴ The remarkable thing about Buddhist thought is that, although it differs from existentialism on the active-passive dimension (see below), this religiophilosophical world view shares many ideas with existential philosophy. Many of the pop (popular) philosophies of the 1960s and 1970s in the West have combined existential themes of authenticity and subject-object with the themes of Buddhist writings, so that today we often hear Kierkegaard and Sartre being wound into conversations centering on some wise Indian guru or Japanese Zen master. In this section, we will try to capture the essential themes of Oriental philosophy, and to show how they relate to existential-phenomenological thought.

The Quest for Unity

Buddhism took root from the even more ancient religion of Hinduism, which traces its lineage back to the ancient sacred writings of the Vedic literature in India (about 1500 B.C.).²⁵ These writings placed great stress on the interrelatedness of everything in lived experience, so that a state of alienation would be considered very unnatural and even immoral.²⁶ This theme—of searching for the unity that exists in nature, which must not be violated by introducing false dichotomies or intellectualizing about nature—remains foremost in Buddhist philosophy. We see here a parallel to existentialism's authenticity in that what is most authentic, real, and natural is what lives spontaneously and free of what must always be arbitrary and forced distinctions.

Western science teaches us that to know anything, we must first break it down into its presumed parts (reduce the one to the many pieces that make it up). Buddhist

philosophy runs counter to such reductionism, challenging us to remember what the gestaltists taught us (see p. 569), that we can never find the whole by merely summing up its parts. The concept of complete totality in all things is captured by the Hindu conception of the *Brahma* or the Buddhistic conception of *Buddha*. These concepts symbolize both a deity and also the ultimate in unity we all can find if we will but make an internal search, finding within our personal identity a kind of universal soul to which we can relate. Each person makes this internal search individually, and it involves an active commitment similar to what we saw occurring in the Jungian individuating (balancing) process (see p. 206). Jung, of course, relied on Buddhistic writings to support his theory of the centering of the personality.

According to the traditions of Hinduism and Buddhism, all theories about reality or the nature of life are equally true.²⁷ Westerners presume that one point of view must be right and the others wrong, hence they search for a single account of reality by looking outward, empirically testing this and that in hopes of finding *the* truth. Truth is interpreted as something split off from error, and what is erroneous is therefore useless, to be tossed aside onto a slag heap of meaningless experience. The Eastern philosophy strives to liberate the person from this outward search and replace it with a kind of internal examination of the question-answer, proof-finding process itself. As a counter to the splitting-up process in knowledge seeking, early Buddhistic philosophy proposed a *negation* of the dualities being proposed by other philosophies of that time. The great Buddhistic philosopher Nāgārjuna (c. A.D. 100–150) proposed a widely cited Eightfold Negation. In doing so, he claimed there was neither birth nor death, neither coming nor going, neither permanence nor extinction, and neither unity nor diversity.²⁸

This denial sounds strange to our Western ear, but the point involved is that when we first pose dichotomies like life versus death or coming and going, we of necessity force ourselves to say where we *are* in relation to them. Are we dead or alive? What is death? What is life? Is nature dead or alive? When we die, are we no longer a part of nature? Are we coming or are we going in life? In relation to what? If we are going, then what direction ought we to take? If we are coming, where have we been and why did we leave? All of these ridiculous questions, said Nāgārjuna, spring to our minds only because we first split up our existence needlessly.

What Nāgārjuna sought was the “middle path” of existence, or as it is called, *nirvana*. By rejecting such dichotomies placed onto nature, we avoid the tension of extremes (either-or) and attain a balance combining both sides into a unity, totality, or “middle path.” Once again, Jung’s centering process in individuation best captures the meaning here of how we can find our complete selves inwardly and attain a more balanced midpoint (see p. 231). It is clear that Buddhistic philosophy is heavily dialectical and that it contrasts dramatically with the more demonstrative emphasis given to logical reasoning in the West (see p. 11). The Indian Hindu, for example, would not reason as a Western scientist and say that we can see what is *there* on a table or see nothing at all; instead, the Indian mentality has it that “looking at the table, we can say that there is no cat there, just as we can say that there is a book there.”²⁹

It is when we affirm (express a belief in) our own body, our own mind, our own personal egos that we separate ourselves from *Brahma* (or *Buddha*). Through *meditation*, it is possible to employ a dialectical tactic of

dismissing each of these antithetical (contradictory) affirmations in order to arrive at oneness (unity). Once achieved, and all separation from the unity of Brahma is removed, we can speak of the person as having attained *enlightenment*.³⁰ This process begins in knowing who we *are*, and then by negating our customary separateness as individuals, we become what we *are not* ordinarily—that is, a unity. Once the focus of our search for knowledge has shifted from *are* (self) to *are not* (unity, Brahma), we rise to a level of harmony (balance, centering) that transcends all our previous experience and where dichotomies are unnecessary and the striving for certainty is pointless because a direct knowledge of nature is achieved by becoming one with it. Knowledge (enlightenment) is immediate and enriching, spontaneous and certain.

It is this dialectical reverse logic of seeing what is not there and negating what one is to become what one is not that prompts Westerners to view Oriental philosophy as mysterious. It also appears to the Westerner that the Buddhist philosophy achieves enlightenment by denying the validity of a question put to nature. Though this is true, we must appreciate that the Easterner has traditionally sought to live with and in the natural order, rather than seeking to alter it or even destroy it, as our fears today about pollution and catastrophic warfare surely imply can take place. In a sense, Western thought has emphasized the thesis-antithesis schism of dialectic, whereas Eastern thought puts its emphasis on the synthesis.

Probably the most famous of dialectical concepts of Oriental philosophy is the *yin-yang principle*, which can be traced to the ancient collection of writings known as the *Tao Te Ching* (c. 600 B.C., probably of multiple authorship). This principle attempts to

explain the actions of all things in nature and might be contrasted with the demonstrative principle of constancy which Freud wrestled with as a tool of explanation (see p. 53). The *yin* force or element is described as passive, receiving, and meek (on the face of things); yet, like the female or mother, *yin* represents the potential for infinite creation in the world. In this sense, *yin* is closer to *tao* or the *way*—that is, the creative principle that patterns the growth and development of everything in nature. The *yang* force is more active and bold, showing its power openly in a more masculine sense. Harmony as a kind of dialectical balance between *yin* and *yang* is most desirable, although it is traditional in Buddhism for the enlightened person to hide the more aggressive *yang* forces and thus appear overly passive to the Western intellect. Yin and yang thus interact dialectically to bring forward the creativity of *tao*. We can see this exchange of active and passive in all things, as in, for example, the developments of the weather in which wind and storm (*yang*) are followed by sunny calm (*yin*) to encourage growth (*tao*) in all vegetation.

The Buddhist ideal of the strong (*yang*) person appearing passive (*yin*) has even been incorporated into the martial arts of the Orient, such as jujitsu or kung fu. The preferred style in these encounters is to use the opponent's aggressive moves (*yang*) as a self-defeating act. For example, by deftly grasping the arms of a person who lunges for us, we can fall backward and, using our legs as a lever, carry this lunge through to catapult the aggressor behind us. The deftness and style of our action is effortless (*yin*), but the outcome can be devastating nevertheless.

Not all Chinese philosophy is dialectical. Confucianism is more demonstrative in tone, oriented to tradition and parental authority.³¹ Confucius (551–479 B.C.) was critical of the rulers of his time, whom he felt were unconcerned for the welfare of their citizenry. He

was a great teacher and tried to influence subsequent generations by stressing the character of the Chinese people. His sayings are still quoted as guidelines for the right, proper, and humane way in which to live. He believed that there is a right and a wrong way in which to behave, and it was absolutely essential to respect one's parents as supreme authorities. The demonstrative flavor of his approach is clear, and we would look in vain to find a dialectical contradiction in his writings.

But the more characteristic spirit of Chinese thought is dialectical, and there was even a dialectician school of philosophy founded by Mo Ti which represents one of those unbelievable parallels in the history of thought. Mo Ti lived from *c.* 470 to 391 B.C., a span of years which is almost identical to the life of the great Greek dialectician, Socrates (who lived *c.* 470–399 B.C.). There was no possibility of cultural contact here. The fact that two human beings of such diverse backgrounds could frame a world view around the play of dialectic surely argues that there is something basic to human nature in this oppositional, contradictory, paradoxical manner of thought. It was not until 1227 that Dogen brought the Soto Zen sect of Buddhism to Japan. We find in his writings the paradoxical statements of this philosophy, such as the often cited query "What is the sound of one hand, clapping?" Such paradoxical statements are called *koans*, and they are frequently used as the focus of attention in meditation exercises (see below). Muso (or Soseki) followed Dogen, and the general style of master-student instruction in Zen was perfected under his leadership and example. As we have noted above, Zen Buddhism is the specific school of thought that was popularized in America, beginning in the 1950s and continuing to the present day (influenced to a great extent by the writings of Alan W. Watts³²).

Thus far we have seen many similarities

between the philosophy of existentialism and Oriental philosophy. Both approaches call on the individual subject to become authentically balanced and in tune with the world as experienced phenomenally. Both approaches stress the alienation that results when we try to press onto nature our theories rather than listening to nature sensitively and accepting what we hear without bias or prejudice. They each value sincerity and tranquil acceptance of life *as it is*. But there is a major difference between Eastern Buddhist precepts and Western existential precepts, having to do essentially with the notion of commitment. As we have seen, the existentialist stresses the need for action, for putting one's values to action in some concrete way rather than accepting the status quo. The Zen Buddhist, on the other hand, views such commitment as an inward action, a coming to terms with oneself rather than with the external world. The external world is not to be acted upon so much as accepted for what it is. Existentialist arguments were used to justify civil disobedience in America during the 1960s Vietnam War period. Believing in what they were committed to, certain individuals took a Nietzschean leap into the situation and burned draft (conscription) cards, demonstrated illegally, destroyed records and property, and so on. The stress here on yang over yin is not consistent with Buddhist precepts, where presumably a more passive resistance would be the style followed.

This contrast between East and West can also be seen in a comparison of Socrates as dialectician with the typical Zen master's method of instruction.³³ Though both methods of seeking insight, knowledge, or enlightenment are based on a dialectical exchange between teacher and student, the manner in which this instruction is carried out differs tremendously. In his dialogues

with students, Socrates always took the initiative (yang) to keep the exchange moving along, following up a student's answer to his question with another question. The Zen master, on the other hand, is always pictured in a passive (yin) role, and it is the student who must take the initiative in asking questions. When the student does this, the Zen master responds in a most unusual manner by Western standards. He might give an answer that is completely unrelated to the question; he might simply raise a finger or a fist as a kind of reply; or he might pick up a small stick and throw it at the student. Often he remains silent. If the student prods for knowledge long enough, the master might ask the student to meditate by focusing on some koan ("What is the sound of one hand clapping?").

In the literature of Zen, one routinely reads of students going from one master to another, trying various questions out on them, getting assorted replies or queries of the paradoxical type mentioned, all the while suffering a sense of almost unbearable frustration. Students have even been known to strike their Zen master, but to no avail because a conventional answer was still not forthcoming.³⁴ Socrates at times frustrated his students, but this was due to the sense of confusion his involved questioning sometimes brought on. The Socratic dialogues did not always end in clear-cut answers, and occasionally they led to unexpected paths that created more problems for the student than they solved. But the Zen student's irritation stemmed from the frustration of not even getting started on the road to knowledge—or so it seemed!

What students had to learn, of course, was that there *is no such road*. All of the ques-

tions they put to the Zen master could not satisfy their hunger for knowledge in any case. Knowledge must lead somewhere, it must find that focus or nodal point at which oneness (Buddha) is grasped, understood, and accepted. Questions do not lead to such unity. They break up the totality of experience, posing those dichotomies that we pointed out above detract from unity. When they attain *perfect enlightenment*, Zen students no longer raise questions. The Hindus call this understanding of the unity of nature *nonattachment*. This does not mean that the Zen student forgoes life or loses interest in the commitments of everyday experience. Emotions are a vital aspect of this totality, and pleasures can be taken so long as they do not come between the person and the experiential totality.³⁵ Someone who would pursue pleasures in a selfish manner, for example, would destroy the unity of experience which knows no selfishness. Nonattachment merely signifies that the person can experience all sides to life, feeling both positively and negatively on the same experience without fearing that this somehow violates the logic of life. Life is dialectical and admits of contradictions within its overriding unity.

Psychotherapy and Zen Buddhism

Zen Buddhism is sometimes considered in the context of psychotherapy, and before leaving this section on Oriental philosophy, we should address this possibility. Actually, a person who entered a relationship with a Zen master would not be getting "therapized," if we mean by this having one person somehow cure or readjust the lifestyle of a second person. Zen Buddhism is a way of life, one that has been mastered by the teacher and that must in turn be mastered by the student.³⁶ The teacher is a very special person in this relationship, one who teaches entirely

by exemplifying (modeling) that which the student-disciple seeks to understand.³⁷ What is sought might be best termed a *re-evaluation of life*. As we have seen, the Zen master would have no formal ideology—no theory—to offer. Distinctions between conscious and unconscious would not be accepted. In time, the point would be demonstrated that rational considerations—the verbal questions and answers we discussed above—only get in the way of the person's liberation from the problems of his or her past life. We have to forgo our dependence on rational concepts, on the explicit, demonstratively precise explanations we assume must be present in life to account for why things are as they are.³⁸

In a sense, Zen would consider such intellectualized efforts at explanation to be a form of defense mechanism, a way we have of dismissing immediate phenomenal experience in preference to some way we want to think, believe, or justify what is taking place. We can turn off our real feelings and go on intellectualizing. Zen practices are quite similar to Rogerian therapy in this sense (see Chapter 9). But there is more to Zen, particularly in regard to the meditative experience.

Zen masters since Dogen have distinguished between *thinking*, *not-thinking*, and *nonthinking*.³⁹ Thinking involves categorizing things, naming them, applying arbitrary schemes in questions, answers, and so on. Not-thinking refers to a rejection of this process, a refusal to conceptualize anything. But nonthinking is neither of these things. Nonthinking is a preconceptual state of mind, a purely spontaneous phenomenal state of being which is fundamental to both thinking and not-thinking. When the Zen master *meditates* in a seated posture, the aim here is to attain the state of nonthinking. This state is said to transcend time (*transcendental meditation*). That is, the meditator steps out of time's unilinear (demonstrative) flow for brief periods to fix his or her attention on a

koan, a *mantra* (richly flowing word), or a *mandala* (graphic, usually circular image). The focusing of consciousness here immerses the person in the present and also removes him or her completely from the customary state of seeking to conceptualize (name, know, question) things or negate such conceptualizations.

When the person is able to achieve a state of nonthinking, Zen advocates contend that he or she has arrived at the virtual root-source of all thought. Harking back to our discussion of gestalt psychology in Chapter 9 (see p. 567), we might say that nonthinking is like a generalized *ground* on which mind must build. Once we achieve this state, we do not need to review our past lives in that freely associated sense that Freud employed to find the causes of today's problems. We have gone beyond such mental conceptions to the basic flow of life as ground to all else. This capacity to transcend the fixed figures of the mind (that is, conceptions, ideas) and melt into the ground of a unified totality (Buddha) sets the person free from so-called unconscious forces, fixations, hang-ups, or whatever.

Functioning in the present the person can now return from the meditative interlude to begin a new middle path to living without dichotomizing it at every turn. This is not simply a return to normalcy, it is a positive elevation, an advance to supernormalcy. There is no longer any need for resistance or defense because there is nothing to defend against. If unconscious conflicts existed before, they only did so because the person had not yet transcended the unnatural divisiveness of his or her psyche to live a more balanced life of nirvana. Once again, the closest parallel we have to Zen therapeutic change in the West is Jung's individuation process,




Ludwig Binswanger

a fact that has been acknowledged by experts in Zen Buddhism.⁴⁰ The major difference is that, whereas Jung had each person framing his or her unique way in which to individuate, the Zen Buddhists framed a common course of individuation, a *tradition* of how to achieve this balanced state of enlightenment which is then handed down from master to student by example.

Biographical Overview of Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss

Two men have taken the lead in applying existential philosophy to personality and psychotherapy. Both men were Swiss in national origin, Heideggerian in philosophical outlook, and initially trained in classical (Freudian, Jungian) approaches to psychoanalysis. In the chapter sections to follow, we will review the customary topics by interchanging the



Medard Boss

thought of these two men, providing contrasts where called for. The actual founder of existential analysis or *Daseinsanalyse* (after Heidegger) was Ludwig Binswanger, who was born in Kreuzlingen, Switzerland on 13 April 1881. There was a tradition of medicine in his family, and Ludwig decided to follow it, taking the M.D. degree from the University of Zurich in 1907. He studied under Jung for a time and also took an internship with Eugen Bleuler (see p. 177).

In 1911 Binswanger succeeded his father as director of the Sanatorium Bellevue at Kreuzlingen, a position he held for over four decades during which he earned an international reputation. Although he studied with Jung, the major therapeutic interest among the Swiss in the first decade of this century was Freudian

psychoanalysis. Binswanger became active in this area of psychiatry and gradually cemented a personal friendship with Freud—who visited him in 1912 when Binswanger was ill.⁴¹ Gradually, however, Binswanger became disenchanted with Freud's seeming need to explain human behavior in essentially dehumanizing terms—as being due to energies, psychic systems, and the like. Somewhere in this translation, Binswanger felt Freud was losing the phenomenal reality of human experience. There followed a period of reading and study during which Binswanger became interested in the philosophy of Heidegger. By the 1920s he had worked

out a view of human behavior which he felt was more accurate than Freud's. Binswanger delivered a lecture in Vienna on the occasion of Freud's eightieth birthday in which he attempted to contrast psychoanalysis with a more existential view.⁴² The paper was not well received by the Freudians, and not until recent times has existential thought made inroads on the classical analytical position.⁴³ Binswanger and Freud remained on good personal terms through all of their disagreements.⁴⁴ In 1956 Binswanger stepped down from his directorship of the Sanatorium Bellevue, though he continued to study and write until his death in 1966.

Our second existentialist, Medard Boss, also graduated from the medical school of the University of Zurich. He was born in St. Gallen, Switzerland, on 4 October 1903 and is currently professor of psychotherapy at the University of Zurich Medical School, as well as the director of the Institute of Daseinsanalytic Therapy there. Boss also studied Jung, Bleuler (his former teacher), and, of course, Freud. Though he was to disagree with the founder of *Daseinsanalyse* (translated as "Daseinsanalysis") on certain points, Boss acknowledged that he was initially stimulated to study Heidegger by the writings of and then personal contacts with Ludwig Binswanger.⁴⁵ Boss became a close personal friend of Martin Heidegger as well. He has written more extensively than Binswanger and has also lectured in the United States and South America. For many years Boss was the president of the International Society for Medical Psychotherapy. Boss uses the term *Daseinsanalysis*, but we can consider this translation interchangeable with *Daseinsanalyse*, both of which are synonymous with "existential analysis."

Personality Theory

Structural Constructs

The Centrality of Phenomenal Meaning for the Person as a Body-Mind Gestalt

Phenomenologists believe that the only reason the so-called problem of how body can interact with mind arises in psychology is because we have split the person up into these two sides in the first place. When experience is studied phenomenally, Binswanger noted, the person "is and remains a unit."⁴⁶ Body and mind are always found to be two sides to the same thing—*being!* This is what interests the existentialists, the study of being, or to use the technical term meaning the same thing, *ontology*. When we look at the problem of mind versus body ontologically, we find that it does not exist. People live out their lives without drawing such distinctions; they know themselves as living beings primarily and only consider a mind-body issue when it is raised for them by scientists as a theoretical issue. Psychological scientists would like to solve this problem of their own making, but it is of course unsolvable because it is based on a phenomenologically untrue division of our being.⁴⁷

Since scientific explanations must be based on what *is there* (bodily substance) and not on what *is not there* (substanceless thought), psychologists conclude that they must reduce the phenomenal to the physical.⁴⁸ Existence is viewed as what *really* exists, and in the process of scientific explanation, we find the person being turned from a *subject* into a material *object*.⁴⁹ Yet Boss noted: "Without a subject nothing at all would exist to confront objects and to imagine them as such. True, this implies that every object, everything 'objective'—in being merely objectivized

by the subject—is the most subjective thing possible.”⁵⁰ Phenomenally considered, we *are* our experience. We do not have ideas about things; we *are* our ideas.⁵¹ When we stand before a beautiful tree, we do not face it with our consciousness or perceive it with our eyes or brains. The tree is simply there in phenomenal awareness, it presents itself to us as we experience it for what it is.⁵²

This is not to deny that brain processes go on as we come to know the tree. The tree’s image surely appears on our retina, and nervous impulses can be measured as they move toward certain areas of our brain. But what has this to do with the *meaning* we experience in our relations with the tree? Very little, said Binswanger, who added concerning the role of such biological processes, “What we perceive are ‘first and foremost’ not impressions of taste, tone, smell or touch, not even things or objects, but rather, meanings.”⁵³ Boss enlarged this theme by noting that “. . . man cannot see, hear, and smell because he has eyes, ears, and a nose; he is able to have eyes, ears, and a nose because his very essence is luminating and world-disclosing.”⁵⁴ To suggest that the eye “causes” the meaning of tree through vision is to completely overlook the phenomenal realm.

Hence, as existentialists, we may speak of the “body,” but we recognize in this merely a partial realm of existence, one that has no real significance for phenomenal experience. The scientific truths about brain function, the chemical actions of the nervous system, and so on, may well be valid, but the subjective meanings of existence are not to be found in chemical substances or biological processes; indeed, the concepts of instinct, libido, and drive are considered equally meaningless as descriptive terms for experience—regardless of their *facticity* (the *given fact* that a person *has* instincts as he or she *has* ears).⁵⁵ Binswanger referred to the bodily sphere of experience as the *eigenwelt* (see below).

Existence, Being-in-the-World, and Dasein as Endowed or Disclosed

The core theoretical constructs used by our existentialists are *existence*, *being-in-the-world*, and *Dasein*. All these terms refer in one way or another to *being*, and we can actually think of them as synonyms. Being is central to existence, and it transcends in importance all other qualities of experience, such as colors, the size and weight of materials, the feelings we may experience as emotions, and so on. Being *is* something in phenomenal existence, even though it *is not* something that can be captured by the usual terms we employ to say what something *is*. To clarify what we are driving at here, we can review an argument that was first advanced by Hegel and later adapted by Heidegger concerning the nature of being.⁵⁶ It runs as follows: suppose we were to explain the being-ness of one of nature’s most common items, the chunk of earth known as a *rock*. If we now ask, “Is the rock’s being-ness due to its color?” the answer would be, “No, its being is not due to its color.” Comparable questions about the rock’s shape, its material substance, its weight, and so forth would also be answered in the negative. A rock’s being or not-being is not quite any of these qualities—even when we put them into combinations (gestalts). Stripped of all its qualities, therefore, we would still have failed to capture the is-ness of the rock. Even more paradoxical, after all of the qualities have been removed from the rock, we would have *nothing*. Heidegger as Hegel before him thus concluded that being and nothingness are closely related. Hegel considered these as opposites and Heidegger viewed these as independent though partially identical states of existence.⁵⁷

One might say: "But this is surely nonsense. For all practical purposes and insofar as it is possible to prove anything, a rock *is* the sum of its qualities, which I perceive and name as a 'thing.' When the properties are not there, the rock does not exist and there is no such concept as 'being' to be concerned about." Granting this retort for a rock, what does one say in response to a person's *self-examination*? If we simply and honestly look into our own *phenomenal* experience, what do we learn about *our* being? Is it not true that even as we grow to adulthood and change coloring, size, personal attitudes, and ambitions, we somehow sense a continuity of having-been, of being-now, and of being-in-the-future? And is there not (for some) a spiritual sense of continuing on with this identity even beyond the grave, a compulsion to feel this futurity even though we may know scientifically that it is unlikely?⁵⁸ What do we learn about *our* being? Is it not true experiences of being? Are we to dismiss them as quaint illusions, or are we to attempt an ontological study of them in their pure form?

The existentialists have obviously decided on an ontological course of study. But Binswanger and Boss do not come at this study in exactly the same way. Binswanger emphasized the ways in which phenomenal experience is made possible or *endowed* with meaning by the human being's most basic ways of looking at and thinking about it. To endow is to furnish something which in turn makes something else occur. Boss, on the other hand, emphasized the meaning *disclosed* to the human being by existence, as if it were not so much how we look at existence that matters but how existence reveals itself to us. A disclosure is an opening up or a making known. Returning to the example of phenomenally perceiving a tree, Binswanger would suggest that our phenomenal frame of

reference lent (endowed) meaning to the tree, whereas Boss would say that the tree simply presented (disclosed) itself to our phenomenal awareness. This contrast in views will become clearer as we move through the more technical terms of the theories.

Turning to Binswanger first, a major structural construct employed in his version of existential analysis might be called the *a priori ontological structure*.⁵⁹ *A priori* means "coming before," and *ontological structure* refers to the kind of beginning frame of reference the person has in coming at life. Binswanger also called these basic assumptions about life *world-designs*. We say that Melissa is an optimist because she greets each day with an expectation that everything will go well. Greta, on the other hand, is called a pessimist because she always expects the worst to happen. These are the attitudes that Melissa and Greta *endow* their existence with daily—beginning assumptions of a positive or negative variety. Examples like these are rather complex and far removed from the *a priori* ontological structures that we all bring to bear as infants and young children. Binswanger held that we all begin very early in life making certain assumptions, given our very narrow and poorly formed understanding of things. One such example of a primitive world-design might be the belief by an infant that the world is something to be sucked and tasted, since this is the extent of his or her experience in the first weeks of life.

These *a priori* structures are not to be thought of as inherited ideas, nor was Binswanger interested in trying to find out how many ontological conceptions a person carries about at any one time—though he did mention this point in his theory of illness.⁶⁰ What Binswanger wanted to convey in this construct is that human beings begin to frame a matrix of meaning within which they continually know their ongoing experience.

There are various ways in which the existential analyst can come to recognize a person's most basic presumptions. "Language [that is, what a person says about life], the poetic imagination, and—above all—the dream, draw from this basic ontological structure."⁶¹ Optimism or pessimism would surely be easy to identify in how a person speaks about life or the sorts of poetry he or she would write. Dream themes are full of such attitudes as well.

Boss was none too pleased with Binswanger's explanation of how our being-in-the-world supposedly takes place—as if it were framed in by an overriding abstraction coming before concrete experience is possible.⁶² For Boss, existence is not predicated on anything; it simply happens. Being is a concrete happening that needs no preliminary structure to lend it meaning. "Fundamentally, 'being' always means 'coming forth and lasting.' How could any such coming forth and lasting be possible without a lightened realm into which this happening can take place?"⁶³ In other words, if we let Melissa and Greta tell us phenomenally about their lives, they will in no sense tell us about assumptions, world-designs, or ontological structures. These are conceptions that Binswanger used, but they are *not* part of the immediate experience of our two women. Melissa's life simply happens in optimistic fashion, whereas Greta's life continually discloses itself to her in pessimistic fashion.

Boss viewed life as if it were constantly emerging under the rays of a torch or flashlight, carried by the living person. The rays are actually the person's awareness of concrete experience, the structured phenomena of life. As Boss noted, "The very word 'phenomena' . . . is derived from *phainesthai*, i.e., to shine forth, to appear, unveil itself, come out of concealment or darkness."⁶⁴ Hence, for Boss, a *phenomenon* is "that which shows itself."⁶⁵ Binswanger would say that the phenomenon

is found most directly in the language expressions of an individual as a world-design.⁶⁶ There is a kind of chicken-egg problem developing here, for according to Binswanger, the world-design helps frame the meanings to follow in phenomenal experience. Boss, on the other hand, pointed out that it could well be that the world-design itself has been shown to the person out of a more primitive (original) form of being.⁶⁷

Both men stressed the importance of *meaning* to existence. They also were in agreement that existence consists of a *being* (sein) *there* (da) that is always immediate and ongoing, a right-now happening that must be studied in its own terms and not taken out of context or otherwise contorted by theory. Hence, we can think of the *Dasein* (there-being) as being-in-the-world or existing concretely. There is also the idea here of the human being as an aspect of nature different from, for example, subhuman creatures or inanimate structures like rocks. Binswanger noted the "distinction between human existence (*Dasein*) or being-in-the-world, on the one hand, and nature on the other."⁶⁸ Boss defined *Dasein* in terms of his light analogy, which he called *lumination*, and emphasized that the *there* (da) of *Dasein* is a luminated happening.⁶⁹ We can essentially equate *lumination* with *disclosing*, as the following definition by Boss makes clear: "*Dasein*, thus being essentially and primordially of a disclosing, i.e., luminating, nature, shines forth at any given time. But—as with every kind of 'light'—its lumination varies as to color and brightness."⁷⁰

The fact that lumination varies underscores the fact that *Dasein* (existence, being-in-the-world) takes on different features. Binswanger thought that *Dasein* is experienced in both a temporal and spatial sense. Our existence passes through time, and it extends outward in various directions. Even

though we have a memory of the past, Binswanger would say that the primary emphasis in the temporalization of Dasein is on its pitch toward the future.⁷¹ This is sometimes called *futurity* and it refers to the fact that human beings always frame their upcoming life in an intentional manner. We are not simply shaped by what has gone before. We intend that certain things come about in our lives, and then maneuver circumstances as best we can to attain our ends.

Sometimes we are unable to maneuver or otherwise change things about and hence must direct our behavior according to what already exists or must be carried out. For example, we are born into this world with certain physical equipment, into cultural environments with already established beliefs and laws. We cannot become outstanding athletes if we lack the physical stature, and it hardly seems reasonable to object to every law now on the books in our society. The existentialists would say we are *thrown* by such circumstances.⁷² Related to this concept of being under the constraints of our physical and cultural heritage is the concept of *historicity*.⁷³ Binswanger would be more likely to use this concept, by which he would mean the world-designs and related assumptions that have been worked out and brought to life by our ancestors. Our Dasein is in this way continuous with the Dasein of our forebears. Historical precedents are thus one way of speaking about the thrownness of Dasein; there is a facticity about the history of a people which any one person born into the group must recognize and appreciate if he or she is to feel adjusted. We tend to call influences from out of our past social norms or social values, but they are in fact simply the historicized aspect of our *present* Dasein.

Dasein is at all times a gestalt totality. Boss said, "There are *myriads* of *different*

modes of human relationships and patterns of behavior toward what is encountered, all of them constituting man's *one* fundamental nature, i.e., his unique way of being-in-the-world as the disclosing, luminating realm of world-openness."⁷⁴ As a totality there is always the communal or social aspect to consider. Though we can speak of the individual's Dasein, we must not forget that an aspect of "being there" is "being with" others.⁷⁵ We are not cutting up existence into individual private worlds when we speak of the Dasein. Binswanger considered the Dasein to be a gestalt total consisting of three differentiated aspects or "worlds" (*welts*): (1) *eigenwelt*, the self-world of inner feelings and affections, including all of those experiences we think of as *within* our bodies; Andrew feels love or anxiety in his *eigenwelt*; (2) *umwelt*, the environment or world around us, including both animate and inanimate features of existence; Andrew perceives trees and city streets with people walking along them in his *umwelt*; and (3) *mitwelt*, the social world, the interpersonal world of people as psychological rather than physical beings, including all of those things we mean by *society*; Andrew meets others, argues, flirts, and feels an allegiance to causes in his *mitwelt*.⁷⁶ This last aspect of existence has been highlighted by Boss, who noted that "the world of *Dasein* is essentially *Mitwelt*."⁷⁷ We live primarily in relation to other psychological human beings.

If our Dasein is to some extent thrown by the intentions of people in earlier times (as in our legal systems, and so on), then it must be possible for us to project *possibilities* for fulfillment into our future and the future of others who come after us as well. Binswanger called this *being-able-to-be* and added that the human being achieves greatest *authenticity* through actualizing such potentials or possibilities.⁷⁸ Indeed, the very notion of temporalization—Dasein moving across time—

demands that we all try to frame and then achieve a better tomorrow. We live *inauthentically* when we are simply thrown by circumstances and do not try to improve things.⁷⁹ Thus Boss warned how easy it is for us to fall prey to the anonymous, unauthentic mentality of tradition or to the authoritarian commands of a superior in the hierarchy of social power.⁸⁰ The person who does something less than human and then says, "I was only following orders" is not excused by existentialism. There is always a dialectical interplay between the thrown features of Dasein and the possibilities open to the person in the future. It is in this future that we modify the past by which we are being thrown. The existentialists speak of *care* (caring) when they discuss the willingness a person has to commit himself or herself to change and growth by way of fulfilling possibilities.⁸¹ It takes courage to grow, for we must *transcend* the familiar and the accepted to put ourselves at *risk* in the henceforth (future) of our life existence.

Dasein and Identity

Now that we have reviewed the nature of being and the global view of Dasein which existentialists advocate, we might ask, "Is there a concept of self or personal identity which is used to explain personality?" This question may be answered with both a no and a qualified yes. That is, strictly speaking, the existentialist, like any convinced phenomenologist, is opposed to categorizing experience according to some arbitrary preconception (see pp. 755–758). To name a self in the personality means we must speak about the self versus the environment, or the external world confronting the self. This structural split is *not* acceptable. Freud was thus taken to task by the existentialists for having split up the unity of experience into an id, ego, and superego.⁸²

Technically speaking, no *formal* construct of self has been proposed by the existentialists, even though the word *per se* is used descriptively as an *identity* concept.⁸³ Hence, we can for the purposes of discussion use the general term *identity* to refer jointly to that aspect of Dasein that other theories mean by references to the *self*, *person*, *human being*, *I*, *Me*, *man*, *woman*, and so on. All of these words can be found in the writings of the existentialists as symbols of identity. In considering identity according to existentialism, we must also keep in mind the endowing versus disclosing distinction which Binswanger and Boss have drawn in their outlooks. Figure 26 presents a schematization of the Dasein and identity, as modified according to meaning-endowing or meaning-disclosing features of the Dasein.

Point 1 of Figure 26 is a figure-on-ground arrangement, with the global figure labeled "identity" and the entire complex (of darkened global figure and dashed-line arrows) labeled the "Dasein." It is not unusual for the existentialists to speak of the self as a form of emergent (that is, figure) on the background of the Dasein, so we begin with this tactic.⁸⁴ Assume that we think of the global-identity figure as Andrew, who confronts life daily by way of the three worlds of Dasein. Andrew cannot be passive in this confrontation. He must act, decide, and commit himself to the facticity of his existence and to the necessity of fulfilling his possibilities if he is to live authentically.

Point 2 in Figure 26 is a side view of the Dasein, with the identity portion arbitrarily pulled out away from the gestalt complex as a whole, stretching the fabric of Dasein without disturbing the totality of point 1. Once again, the *identity* aspect of Dasein is not *other than* the Dasein. Andrew is always one




Figure 26 The Dasein and Identity Terms

as a being-in-the-world. The only thing distinctive about Andrew as an identity is the fact that he is the locus of meaning relations within the differentiated *eigenwelt*, *mitwelt*, and *umwelt*. In other words, whether we want to say that Andrew's world-designs (assumptions) endow Dasein with meaning or the Dasein discloses meaning to Andrew, the *point* to which meaning flows or is anchored is the I, self, Me, or whatever term Andrew might use to describe his identity. We have tried to capture this idea of meaning either flowing outward from Andrew's identity or flowing inward to it by the use of several lines with arrows indicating a direction.

At point 3 we can see the different emphases placed on the role of meaning in the stretched Dasein (that is, assume we had taken hold of the identity as if it were a marble in a liquid mass and simply pulled it away from the center without removing it from the total mass, which simply stretched). Note at point 3 that the moving outward, away from identity arrows are labeled "meaning-endowing." This symbolizes Binswanger's view of the a priori ontological structures which lend meaning to the worlds of Dasein. Andrew would be sending his assumptions outward, finding always in life what his frames of reference meaningfully express. Boss, on the other hand, thought of the meanings of the Dasein as flowing inward *toward* Andrew. Thus we have labeled the arrows moving inward, toward identity as "meaning-disclosing." Rather than seeing the person as projecting subjective inner perspectives onto the world, Boss argued that: "... the 'essence' of a human being, as phenomenological investigations of dream phenomena have shown time after time, is of quite a different kind: man 'ex-ists' in the very literal sense of the word. He is always 'outside'; he is with the people, animals and things of the world he meets; just as a light can appear as such only through the things it happens to reveal."⁸⁵

The concept of *lumination* is central to the differences between Binswanger and Boss on how the Dasein has meaning—whether it is endowed or disclosed. To illuminate something like the Dasein is to light it up. If we build on this metaphor of a shining light, it is possible to think of it as shining forth from one of two vantage points. We can think of it from the point of view of the source from which it is being emitted, or we can think of it from the point of view of that onto which it is being projected. We use the vantage point of the source when, after gaining a new insight on some question, we say, "Well now, that throws a new light on the matter." Our thought has shifted its stance and now endows the matter at hand with a new light. This is how Binswanger thought of lumination.⁸⁶ On the other hand, we can describe this process of acquiring a new insight in terms of being given a flash (of light) from out of the blue. Sometimes we get an "Aha, now I see the light" reaction which is like standing in a darkened region and observing the light coming toward one. This is how Boss thought of lumination.⁸⁷

The existentialists do not accept the dichotomizing of personality into conscious and unconscious realms of behavior. This would be another one of those arbitrary distinctions on the order of dividing the person into body and mind.⁸⁸ Freud could arrive at this theory because he had an a priori view of existence as being a matter of being contained within separate, nonopen structures.⁸⁹ He did not see the person as living outwardly, in a world openness. Thus Freud could break up the gestalt totality of human experience into an unconscious person and a conscious person, since two things can be contained within one structure (the psyche).⁹⁰ The rejection of psychoanalysis on this point does not mean

the existentialists deny that behaviors like those that Freud considered unconscious actually take place. For example, if a person is being thrown to some degree, we might think of these often rigid patterns of behavior as being unconscious.⁹¹ Such a person is not directing his or her own futurity and to that extent strikes the psychoanalyst as being less conscious than another person.

Unconscious behavioral tendencies probably also stem from what the existentialists call a *constricted* (too narrow, limited) world-design or world-outlook.⁹² Sometimes the existentialists speak of this constriction as the person's relying on a *key* or *key-theme* to an exaggerated extent (we are referring now to meaning-endowing themes).⁹³ For example, one ofBinswanger's clients viewed the world as either entirely harmonious at any point in time or as on the verge of complete collapse. One day, as she was skating, the heel on her shoe gave away, and interpreting this as a collapse of her entire world, she fainted. She had relied too much on an either-or key-theme in which a moderating ontological category—for example, of the unexpected or chance event—did not exist. The cause of the fainting was not some repressed and hence unconscious conflict or wish but the even more basic factor of a constricted Dasein.

Motivational Constructs

Motivation as Thrownness, Pitch, and the Fulfilling of Possibilities

Since mind cannot be reduced to body, it follows that motivation as a human experience within Dasein cannot be reduced to physical energies or libidos. All such physical substrates to human behavior are said by the existentialists to be an aspect of the thrown-

ness of Dasein.⁹⁴ They make no attempt to reduce the more psychological aspects of Dasein to such elements, although occasionally the term *energy* may be used in the sense of putting forth effort to achieve some end.⁹⁵ Boss spoke of a person's mood, passion, or affect as coloring his or her Dasein. This can alter a person's existence noticeably. Boss spoke of such moods as the *pitch* of Dasein, as follows:

*An individual's pitch at a certain moment determines in advance the choice, brightness, and coloring of his relationships to the world. In a mood of hunger, for instance, he perceives totally different things than when he is in an anxious mood, or when he is in love. He also discloses quite different qualities and meaningful connections of the things he perceives in these respective moods.*⁹⁶

We do not *have* emotions any more than we *have* ideas; we *are* our emotions just as we *are* our ideas. *Emotions* therefore reflect the state of attunement, or being-in-tune with our existence as a whole; they also reflect the special manner in which we are experiencing Dasein at the moment.⁹⁷ Invariably, this means we experience emotions in relation to others in our interpersonal contacts. Boss would say our emotions present themselves to us just as anything else in the Dasein presents itself to us. We find our emotions in our interactions, in what we are doing and in what others are doing, and not in the biological processes of blood chemistry or the nervous system. Lynette feels an emotion coursing through her body, but it has meaning only because this feeling is in fact a sense of irritation with the way in which she has been treated by her parents. Without the interpersonal context (*mitwelt*) of Dasein, the flow of biological feeling would be dismissed as a fleeting malfunction.

The primary motivational concept used by

the existentialists stems from their view of the human being as future-oriented. As a result, it is held that we human beings are constantly drawn to the *possibilities* Dasein offers, so that we are always seeking to grow by transcending what now exists and creating a better future for ourselves as well as others. We do not have to explain Ron's current interest in entering law school and the hard work he is putting into his studies so that he might be accepted to the bar by reducing his motivation to some underlying drive. All we need know in order to understand Ron's present efforts is that he sees a career in law as a possibility, luminated in his Dasein, and he is now working to bring this possibility into facticity. This creative ability is what distinguishes the human being from the lower animal. Binswanger said, "The [subhuman] animal has its environment by the grace of nature, not by the grace of freedom to transcend the situation."⁹⁸ A person, on the other hand, can be many things—a student, marital partner, business person, artist, and so on—all in one span of time or at various times over his or her life.⁹⁹ Indeed, we human beings are probably always more "about to be" something we are not quite yet than we are anything fixed and "given." Boss reflected this emergent theme when he said, "In reality, man exists always and only as the myriads of possibilities for relating to and disclosing the living beings and things he encounters."¹⁰⁰

If Dasein is thrown and assumes a pitch from time to time, how can we suggest that the human being is free to choose one manner of behavior over another? The existentialists have probably devoted more time to this question of freedom and choice than any other group of thinkers in modern times. Essentially, the answer to our question is that each person must face up to the fact that Dasein *is* thrown. This is the facticity of Dasein, and to deny it would be to deny our very existence. Our freedom begins "in the

commitment of the Dasein to its Thrownness."¹⁰¹ Having accepted the facticity of Dasein's thrownness, we can then oppose ourselves to the *seeming* rigidity and fixity of the past, and, using these set ways of doing things as a point of departure, oppose ourselves to them. We can say no to certain forms of thrownness and, instead of allowing them to continue unchallenged, project a possibility that will negate them. This is effectively what happens when we challenge a law that is on the books. If the law has now been outmoded, we call for a re-examination of the grounds on which it was based and, through this *possible* basis for a change, sometimes effect a new legal statute. The civil rights changes that have come about in recent American history reflect this kind of turning the thrownness of the past into the facticity of the present by actualizing a possibility. Not all possibilities are realized, of course.

Boss emphasized that to recognize and accept the disclosed possibilities of one's Dasein and bring them to facticity in a unique and free manner is the very heart of authentic living.¹⁰² Too many people are so invested in the views and lifestyles of others that they cannot see real possibilities for themselves. Hence, they live other people's lives, they live inauthentically! It takes courage to live authentically. The pitch of Dasein makes claims on us. We feel this way or that about what we are doing, who we are relating to, and what sort of person we are. Feeling this way, what is suggested in our mood? A change? Can we change our occupation, turn our backs or at least say no to our so-called friends, and become the sort of person that we now are not? This is the beckoning challenge of Dasein, the claim that it makes on us through suggested possibilities at every turn. And Boss concluded, "Man's option to respond to this claim or to choose not to do

so seems to be the very core of human freedom.”¹⁰³

Existential versus Neurotic Forms of Anxiety and Guilt

Though the last section ends on a positive note, the truth is that not all people opt for freedom or try to transcend their current circumstances to achieve a future possibility. Even those who do can see yet another possibility that was not attempted, a further possibility beckoning from tomorrow's Dasein. In speaking about why possibilities are or are not achieved or furthered by the individual, Binswanger and Boss emphasized the concepts of anxiety and guilt, respectively, even though at a certain level, these constructs seem identical.

Binswanger thus distinguished between what he called *existential anxiety* and what we may term *neurotic anxiety*. All anxiety stems from difficulties in the world (mitwelt, umwelt, eigenwelt) as experienced by the individual.¹⁰⁴ Rosa is flooded with anxiety at the prospect of having now to actually take charge of her life, to leave her parental home, find a job, and seek her own circle of friends. Her world seems to have disintegrated as she now faces the prospects of living authentically for the first time in her life. This authentic living is still merely a possibility. Whether it will be actualized remains to be seen. The existentialists note that anxiety often begins with a feeling of *uncanniness*, such as when things begin happening that seem unfamiliar to our previous experience.¹⁰⁵ Something unnatural or weird is taking place, but we are in the dark about why this is happening. In time, our level of apprehension and confusion grows to a level of *dread*.¹⁰⁶ And when we fix

this dread upon something definite—we realize that our work performance may have slipped below acceptable standards—then our emotional state has moved into *fear*. Anxiety (*angst*) thus moves from an amorphous quality through uncanniness to a heightening level of dread and then into a state of fear.

How does anxiety arise in the first place? Binswanger pointed out that part of *being* in a *world* is concerned with the likelihood that this world will fade into *nothingness*. It is this basic loss of world that he calls *existential anxiety*. This form of anxiety is not an emotion, it is not felt in a heightened, tremulous state of terror with perspiring hands and quaking voice. Binswanger once described a bland, soft-spoken client of few words as “a burned-out crater” and added that this state was not a feeling or an affect: “but an expression of *existential anxiety*, that is, of the draining of the existence, and of its progressive loss of ‘world.’ Of course, loss of world is accompanied by loss of self. Where the existence is no longer in a position to design the world freely, it also suffers the loss of the self.”¹⁰⁷ Existential anxiety is thus the reason why some people feel bored, empty, and void. Melanie does not seem to be suffering from anxiety, since she is constantly moping about, complaining about how bored she is. But Binswanger would say that she is actually suffering from the “nothingness of anxiety,” which has petrified Melanie's Dasein, narrowing its horizons and negating all chances that she will be sensitive to the possibilities for growth in the future.¹⁰⁸ Recall that being and nothingness are related concepts. Hence, everyone is motivated to enrich Dasein and thereby avoid the nothingness of existential anxiety.

The other form of anxiety, which is *neurotic* in tone, is also likely to be experienced by all of us from time to time, but it is more an unpleasant sensation we usually identify as feeling uptight, jumpy, shaky, and so

forth. Those individuals who develop a neurosis invariably arrive at this level of derived anxiety by way of their world-designs. A common reason for this is *constriction of world-design*. "The emptier, more simplified, and more constricted the world-design to which an existence has committed itself, the sooner will anxiety appear and the more severe will it be."¹⁰⁹ Healthy people have a broad-ranging world-design. If one aspect of their world does not go well, they can move on to another for they have alternatives at hand. The constricted person, however, like the young woman who fainted while skating, must surely sense a loss of world (that is, anxiety) more readily.

Although Boss referred to anxiety as a mood, or the pitch of Dasein, he developed the themes we are now considering under the construct of *guilt*.¹¹⁰ That is, we can distinguish between an *existential guilt* and a *neurotic guilt* on almost the same grounds that we have distinguished between these two forms of anxiety. By existential guilt, Boss meant a primary or basic *debt* the person has, to carry out possibilities in existence that keep presenting themselves and that would allow the person to further his or her potentials, enrich life in some way, improve things, and so on.¹¹¹ If we think of all of those things that need doing in life, that have to be accomplished in order for Dasein to be enlarged and enriched in meaning-openness, then we must surely recognize that all human beings sense a basic indebtedness to their future. We feel a sense of responsibility for our futures because that is where we are always creating ourselves. Think of all those things we know—deep in our hearts—that we should have done or could have done in our past lives that would have enriched our existence today! And in the present, we know that with every act, with every choice we make, we must of necessity close out other possibilities that might be open to creation if we had chosen

them instead of the alternative we opted for. This too puts us behind the flow of events as we ponder "Have I done the right thing?"

For this reason, Boss viewed the human being's basic life situation as being one of guilt. If being and nothingness are two inevitable aspects of existence, then being and guilt are also necessary aspects. And here we can speak of the *conscience* in existentialism. "Man is aware of existential guilt when he hears the never-ending call of his conscience. This essential, inevitable being-in-debt is *guilt*, and not merely a subjective *feeling* of guilt."¹¹² As existential anxiety is not *simply* an emotion, existential guilt is not *simply* a feeling. We are down to the basics of existence here. Neurotic guilt, on the other hand, is a form of derived guilt in which the individual has suffered the misfortune of having been reared in a given environment.¹¹³ This is the result of historical accident, an unlucky development which might have been otherwise in this person's life. But existential guilt is something we all *must* experience as we commit ourselves to the possibilities of our Dasein, and woe to the psychotherapist who fails to distinguish between these two fundamentally different manifestations of guilt. Neurotic guilt can sharpen and worsen existential guilt, but the reverse is not true.

Psychodynamics and the Adjustment Mechanisms

If Dasein cannot be split into conscious and unconscious regions or into the subdivisions of ids, egos, or superegos, then surely it cannot be made into a *past* which now psychodynamically influences the *present*.¹¹⁴ For Boss, *defense* meant that the individual is unwilling to become aware of a certain world-relationship which is under illumination.¹¹⁵

The more Alvin tries to defend himself against the lumination in his Dasein that he is relating to others in a childish, dependent manner, the more certain it is that he will go on acting in this fashion. He really cannot escape this behavioral pattern no matter how much he looks past the lumination which is there for the seeing if he but looks. We cannot hide the real character of our behavior from its world-openness.

The theories of Freudian adjustment mechanisms all presuppose some arbitrarily reductive, divisive breakdown of existence. Take, for example, Freud's concept of *introjection*. Boss saw an entirely different phenomenon here. "Wherever so-called introjection is observed, nothing has been taken *in*. On the contrary, a human existence has not yet taken itself *out* of and freed itself from the original being-together undividedly and indiscriminatingly with somebody else."¹¹⁶ Freud seemed incapable of looking directly at the phenomenal reality of experience to describe what was luminated directly. Rather than our calling something *repressed*, we would be more accurate if we said that an aspect of existence is unable to become engaged in an open, free, authentic, world-disclosing relationship.¹¹⁷ A person does not *project* into Dasein, but finds there what experience means as he or she luminates existence.¹¹⁸ Who is to say that a subject's Dasein is a projection of something else?

Although Binswanger agreed with Boss in this general matter of defense and so-called mechanisms of adjustment, he was more likely to use language that smacked of these meanings—often in an informal sense and occasionally with apologies.¹¹⁹ So-called defenses are merely one way of speaking about world-designs. For example, if a person endows Dasein with the meanings of solid certainty versus holes of uncertainty, then he or

she might well take in meaningful patterns from others in order to fill the areas (holes) of phenomenal uncertainty.¹²⁰ Such filling-in or taking-in can be termed *introjection* or *identification* for a practical clinical purpose.¹²¹ But we must never forget that it takes a more basic assumption (a priori structure) to be in operation before the defense mechanism is possible. Binswanger made informal references in his writings to regression, repression, and progression, each of which were interpreted differently from Freud.¹²² He had rather severe reservations concerning *sublimation*, however, since it implies that something higher literally comes out of something lower—and this is essentially the reverse form of the reductive explanation that existentialism has found unsuitable.¹²³

One genuine mechanism (in the sense of a stylized behavioral tactic) can be laid at the feet of the existentialists, and that is what might be termed *trusting to fate*. To believe that *fate* will somehow enter into one's existence and decide alternatives for one is an escapist device that many people use.¹²⁴ Such individuals relieve themselves of existential anxiety by saying, "Oh well, no need to feel guilty or worry about how things are going. It was my destiny to be here and you can't argue with your fate."

Time-Perspective Constructs

Dasein's Historical Development

The existentialists have not worked out a detailed scheme for the description of human development. Their feeling is that Freud and others stressed development based on biological assumptions,¹²⁵ which calls for such notions as growth, physical stages of maturation, and so on. We do not have to believe that biological forces bring about differences in life experience over time. Since Dasein is a historical totality which includes the past,

present, and future (temporalization), extensions across time are to be expected in the life experience of the person. At birth, each of us is thrown into existence with certain givens, such as our sex and possible strengths or weaknesses in physical structure.¹²⁶ The first meaningful relationship established in the *mitwelt* is with our mothers. Children come to know existence in its fundamentals through their relation with their mothers. If she is not open and luminating—conveying love and modeling behavior for the child—then the child will be likely to frame narrow and constricted world-designs.¹²⁷

The existentialists frankly admit that we cannot really say what the original world-designs of an individual were like, since they were preverbal. Of the earliest a priori structures of one client, Binswanger observed, “If we knew the infantile arch-form of the father theme, we would probably recognize in it the seeds of all possibilities which we found developed and utilized in the later variations.”¹²⁸ This suggests that our world-designs build on each other over the years, modifying through extension but always having a common theme. The main difference from Freud here is that Binswanger would insist that we cannot find *the* meaning of today’s world-designs in these earlier formulations. We cannot reduce today to yesterday, even though we can find threads of similar meanings across time. It is possible for the person to form impermeable boundaries between the *eigenwelt*, *umwelt*, and *mitwelt* of Dasein.¹²⁹ For example, a baby might begin sensing anxiety (uncanniness) early in life. Even though this originates in the relationship with mother (*mitwelt*), the child begins to separate himself or herself (*eigenwelt*) from the rest of world that is *not* self (*umwelt*) by stopping the ingestion (sucking) of milk. If the relationship in the *mitwelt* (with mother) does not improve, the child can become seriously ill and, even

following treatment, can retain an unnatural splitting up of Dasein into worlds that fail to influence each other with ease. The more normal developmental progression is for the *eigenwelt*, *umwelt*, and *mitwelt* to act as a totality and maintain an openness to each other as the child learns about these three aspects of existence over the years.

The Task of Life

If there is a central theme in the existentialist’s view of what life development is all about, it is that we as individuals must advance on life actively and assume the responsibility of meeting our possibilities to enrich and extend Dasein. Each of us must attain *independence* from the thrownness of rigid nature, paternal direction, and those related social forces that take decision and choice out of our hands. The major life theme and challenge of existence is thus *dependence-independence*. Though they referred to stages merely informally,¹³⁰ ample evidence suggests that a mature-versus-immature existential life pattern¹³¹ was being used by both Boss and Binswanger in their assessment of life’s developmental aspects. Boss reflected this attitude when he observed that “. . . the child’s world must die and give way to ever more grown-up ways of behavior.”¹³²

Major shifts in the nature of Dasein take place at important points in life. Probably the first and most general change in Dasein occurs during that period when language is being learned. The very concept of phenomena in existentialism rests upon language capacity, for as Binswanger has observed, “. . . it is in language that our world-designs actually ensconce [settle into] and articulate [clarify] themselves. . . .”¹³³ Of course, many thrown aspects of Dasein are already *given* in the language structure which the child is

taught. Eskimo children are taught several words for *snow* that have meanings different from the one concept of *snow* that a non-Eskimo child is taught. Eskimo children therefore recognize and relate to many different nuances of snow, which is not simply one phenomenon but many. Even so, the existentialists point out that language is a pre-verbal possibility of Dasein, a possibility that need not be actualized, but that the infant does have open in life, for “understanding something *as* something, marking it, spotting it, denoting it, indicating it, necessarily presupposes language, even though the perceived characteristic of the thing cannot be named as yet by audibly perceptible names.”¹³⁴ Hence, the existentialists would reject any suggestion that experience is the result of language or that language is “input” to make Dasein possible. Language is vital to phenomenal experience, but Dasein contains a basic and primary possibility for language expression.

Another major change (development?) in Dasein occurs at the time of school. The possibility of forming friendships increases at this point, and henceforth the *mitwelt* increases in importance. As we noted above, Boss liked to emphasize that *being* means primarily *being with* others, as well as things.¹³⁵ At puberty, there is a fantastic extension of horizons as Dasein holds the possibilities for sexual and love relationships. Identity problems are quite common during adolescence, and it was in this sense that Binswanger was likely to use the term *identification* to say that a meaning relation to peers is cemented during the teen-age years.¹³⁶ This gradual shift from family to complete independence is furthered over adolescence until adulthood. Adolescents have by now elaborated their world-designs and luminated existence in their own subjective fashion. So-

called fixations would represent the inability for Dasein to move forward (reminding us here of Jung’s theory, see p. 211). This is called a *stuck Dasein*, in the sense that it is not moving forward to mature properly, which in turn amounts to a constriction. The Freudian Oedipal conflict is viewed as an immature pattern of a stuck Dasein, in which extreme dependency on a parent is the major feature.¹³⁷ The existentialists do not agree with the sexual interpretations of Freud. Sex is a possibility which arises at one point in life, and by adulthood a well-adjusted person has usually affirmed this choice and acquired a sexual partner. However, if an adult were to opt for a life of religious celibacy, this would not necessarily mean the person had taken an abnormal course.¹³⁸ Freud greatly simplified things in his overly sexualized accounts of behavior.

The Role of Religion

Binswanger and Freud had one of their most fundamental disagreements over the human being’s religious inclinations. Freud thought of religion as an adult type of dependency. People were trying to extend their paternal affections into a cosmic principle—a father in the sky. Binswanger argued that this seemed to be another one of those reductions that Freud was so fond of, reducing one thing (religion) to another (paternal fixation). Binswanger tells us of his retort to Freud.

. . . I found myself forced to recognize in man something like a basic religious category; that, in any case, it was impossible for me to admit that “the religious” was a phenomenon that could somehow be derived from something else. (I was thinking, of course, not of the origin of a particular religion, nor even of religion in general, but of something that I have since learned to call the religious I-thou relationship).¹³⁹

Freud dismissed such talk as essentially an emotional and personal wish on the part of Binswanger to defend religion. Whatever the case, though existential analysis may view other behaviors as immature and dependent, the cultivation of religious I-thou unions with others and even a phenomenally sensed supreme being is *not* considered an immature adult pattern.¹⁴⁰

Individual-Differences Constructs

Since the existentialists are particularly sensitive to the alienating possibilities of theories that supposedly capture why Dasein is as it is, they naturally are reluctant to name a host of theortypes. What one means by types, such as anal, oral, and so forth, is that a given and restricted world-design has taken hold of an individual.¹⁴¹ Anality, for example, may be true of miserly people, compulsive people, and so forth. This world-design is probably one of viewing the world as a hole, to be filled up.¹⁴² This filling premise makes possible the eventual clinical picture of anality, since the former preoccupation frames and hence shapes the latter. Subsequent fillings may also take place, and we may call the person a compulsive hoarder of money, affection, ideas, and so forth.

Of course, in order to apply their theories to all people, the existentialists have to generalize their concepts. We have already seen how they speak about what is essentially a dependent-versus-independent Dasein pattern in the growing child. They also speak of tradition-bound people who are thrown by the attitudes and beliefs of the inauthentic *everybody* rather than living by the authentic views peculiar to themselves.¹⁴³ We might therefore accuse the existentialists of doing precisely what they find objectionable in Freudian theory. However, the thrust of their theory is clearly to keep their general concepts

more abstract than those of classical analysis, leaving thereby a broad range of detail for the subjective description of any one person's case history. Hence, their very concept of individual differences is more individual than is the case in classical analysis.

Psychopathology and Psychotherapy

Theory of Illness

Constricted Dasein

The personality system that advances on life with only a few a priori ontological structures is most vulnerable to abnormality.¹⁴⁴ Dwight has grown up thinking that people are either good or bad, and that one either succeeds perfectly in what one attempts or fails completely. Given this set of life assumptions, it is no wonder that Dwight ends up one day feeling paranoid, that he experiences people as evil and desirous of making him suffer miserably. With only one or two world-designs to fall back on, our world must inevitably shrink. The more constricted it becomes, the more likely it is that a situation will arise that cannot be understood—leading in turn to that sense of uncanniness that signals the onset of anxiety (refer above). In a sense, a person with limited world-designs suffers an *unfreedom* to act, because not enough alternatives are open to him or her.¹⁴⁵ Dwight's problems stem from wanting things to be too perfect in life, and this is a frequent cause of difficulty for people. We tend to idealize things in our Dasein, confusing what *ought* to be in life with what *is*. This is an example of finding the *eigenwelt* (self beliefs)

to be incompatible with the *mitwelt* (people's actual behavior).¹⁴⁶

The constriction of *Dasein* also takes place across time, resulting in a temporally stuck existence.¹⁴⁷ Dwight's problems with others may have surfaced in his teen-age years, and now we find him at the age of thirty-five still recounting and reliving failures from his high school years. He cannot experience a sense of achievement or advance today because his world is always a replay of yesterday—again and again.¹⁴⁸ Rather than extending and growing, Dwight's being-in-the-world is being thrown by this replay.¹⁴⁹ He is not living authentically and has become totally alienated from the potentials for successful living that he once enjoyed. Former friends and associates describe him as a very disturbed, highly immature, and resentful human being. He does not know quite what to make of himself, but feels certain his problems are due to other people and not himself.

Lack of Autonomy and Independence

Dwight's beliefs about who is at fault for his miserable existence, in which he merely sits about the house and lives off his parents since being fired from his last job, is typical of the abnormal individual. If we study abnormals, we learn that they have actively surrendered themselves to the thrown aspects of existence. When things go wrong for a long period of time, an abnormal person may reject the *mitwelt* in preference to a fantasy life, but at least in the beginning, the abnormal adjustment accepts direction from others only too willingly. The existentialists do not blame this so much on the modeling (shaping) capacities of parents and other external influences in the child's life as they do on the

individual's own actions. Dwight is the cause of his own difficulties, for, as Boss has observed: ". . . in the strict sense of the term, no event in the life history of a person can ever be the 'cause' of neurotic symptoms. Personal experiences merely initiate inhibitions against fully carrying out all possible interpersonal and interworldly relationships."¹⁵⁰

This attitude places the major responsibility on Dwight's shoulders to move beyond the difficulties of his environment, where because of a harshly demanding parent, he might have indeed felt that things were either perfect or totally unworthy. But as he came to find other people having other points of view, he was not forced in any necessary way to go on limiting his *Dasein* to the characterizations of his parent. By constantly focusing on his past and blaming his parent for the latter's overprotectiveness and unrealistic standards, all Dwight accomplishes is further constriction, because his problem is *not* in the past but in the present and the future. Dwight has never been willing to commit himself to authentic living by first accepting responsibility for remaining where he is now at in life. For this reason the existentialists would describe Dwight as living—like all abnormal individuals—in a state of *self-chosen unfreedom*.¹⁵¹

The point of growing up is that we must learn to transcend, which includes rising above the difficult experiences of life, and to carry out our potentials by authentically committing ourselves to the new avenues the future opens up. Some people have more difficult times than others, but if we clinically examine the life histories of abnormals, we often find that they have permitted minor life setbacks to defeat them. It is the subjective interpretation of setbacks that counts, of course.¹⁵² Dwight's serious problems began the first day of his high school attendance when he tried to have a course changed but was denied. He never got over this rebuke, as

he considered it. As with most abnormals, he could never understand the grounds for this rejection, but childishly insisted in his own mind that he was being punished unfairly.¹⁵³ Often, the abnormal person is unable to accept authentic feelings when they arise. Boss once analyzed a nine-year-old boy who was terrified of police dogs and concluded that the boy "could not achieve a free relationship to his own impulsive and sensual possibilities of relating, nor to the realms of being which show themselves in the light of these possibilities."¹⁵⁴

Binswanger has noted that many abnormals vary the fixing-on-fate defensive maneuver by projecting a certain amount of inauthentic futurity. Thus, through emphasis on superstition, luck, and magic, the immature person hopes to offset doom by performing some rite, saying certain words, carrying a potent charm, and so forth. Normal manifestations include knocking on wood or believing in lucky numbers or rabbit's feet, but an overreliance on such devices suggests that an *existential weakness* has developed. "By existential weakness we mean that a person does not stand autonomously in his world, that he blocks himself off from the ground of his existence, that he does not take his existence upon himself but trusts himself to alien powers, that he makes alien powers 'responsible' for his fate instead of himself."¹⁵⁵ The various forms of mental illness are thus extensions of a tendency to surrender the self to others, to circumstance, to a world-design that limits authentic growth.

Differential Diagnosis

Since the existentialists are critical of the classic medical model of disease as reductive, they are reluctant to diagnose their patients in the style of this model.¹⁵⁶ On the other hand, they do not deny the legitimacy of clinical pictures and over the years they have

offered a number of explanations of the so-called clinical entities.¹⁵⁷ *Symptoms* are viewed as forms of communication, announcing the existential problem in which the person feels himself or herself trapped.¹⁵⁸ Often the symptom is just as much a possibility as is any other form of behavior. It may offer a way out of an intolerable life circumstance.¹⁵⁹ By settling on a paranoid delusion, Dwight can stay in his parent's home and avoid having to face the humiliation of failing on his jobs again and again. The symptom often conceals a world-relation the individual does not wish to be open about.¹⁶⁰ Dwight's hostility toward his harshly dominating parent comes through as a severe stammer which he displays each time he must speak to his parent. In the final analysis, said Boss, the diagnostic picture always emerges in a *social* context. ". . . No psychopathological symptom will ever be fully and adequately understood unless it is conceived of as a disturbance in the texture of the social relationships of which a given human existence fundamentally consists, and that all psychiatric diagnoses are basically only sociological statements."¹⁶¹

The existentialists view *neurosis* as an increasingly serious constriction of Dasein with the accordingly self-surrender of autonomy and independence. This self-chosen unfreedom moves into *psychosis* when the degree of surrender is so complete the individual lives entirely within fantasy, which means that literally a "new *form* of being-in-the-world" has come about.¹⁶² In other words, when a psychotic person *hallucinates* something that is not *there* in our Dasein, this does not mean it does not exist in his or her Dasein. We should not call these hallucinations unrealistic or figments of imagination, because to the

psychotic person they are just as real as anything we consider to exist in our Dasein.¹⁶³ In most cases, a person has the hallucination because he or she is finding some reason for being thrown. Thus, a figure appears to tell the psychotic what to do and to pass judgment on these actions once they are carried out. The self-surrender of abnormality comes back in this literal form with a vengeance.

To further round out the picture, psychotics usually concoct some kind of *delusional system*. Here again, though false from our vantage point, these belief systems must be considered as genuine aspects of the Dasein within which the psychotic is living. Binswanger suggested that a delusion—especially of persecution—is always lurking somewhere in the psychotic state. Because of this central dynamic of feeling persecuted, the psychotic inevitably comes to hate those whom he or she considers to be enemies.¹⁶⁴ There is always a good deal of hatred in psychosis, and by so directing hatred to others, the psychotic individual can take the spotlight off his or her personal responsibility. Indeed, this is how self-identity is eventually lost in psychosis. As Binswanger noted: “Where there is delusion there can no longer be any genuine self. To speak of a ‘delusional self’ would be a contradiction. . . .”¹⁶⁵ In time, the psychotic loses all sense of distinction between inside and outside, between what he or she is as a self-identity in existence and what the world is as another aspect of that existence.¹⁶⁶ When this occurs, the psychotic individual has slipped completely into a thrown state. Neurotic anxiety is compounded by existential anxiety, and the future is bleak indeed.

We will next examine some of the classic clinical syndromes which the existentialists have mentioned in order to illustrate their approach to diagnosis.

Ulcer cases. The world-relation typical of an ulcer patient emphasizes seizing, overpowering, and taking possession of the environment, so that everything is robbed of its individuality.¹⁶⁷ The considerable concealment of this demolishing pattern among ulcer patients renders its manifestation inward. The person may appear to be unaggressive, even passive, but the somatic (bodily) realm behaves in the style that typifies the Dasein’s true structure. Food is grasped, cut up by the teeth, and plunged into the stomach and intestine, where it is literally demolished by an overabundance of motility, hydrochloric (digestive) acid, pepsin, and the enzymes of the pancreas.¹⁶⁸ As a by-product of this world-disclosing pattern, the symptoms indicate the actual intestinal damage known as a peptic ulcer.

Hysteria. The hysterical patient is far more open and straightforward in showing a symptom of neurosis than is the ulcer case. Hysterics invariably show us an extremely immature, passive world-design.¹⁶⁹ Valerie smiles weakly and snuggles closer to her husband as she tells the doctor that the pain in her bowels feels as though a hot poker is being shoved right through her body. She then coughs softly and looks at her husband as a child looks at a parent. It is far more obvious in hysteria than in almost any other disorder that the patient in making physical complaints is seeking to be cared for. Usually we find, as in the case of Valerie and her husband, that the hysterical patient has formed an almost organic bond with another person—usually a parental substitute. Symptoms tend to be dramatic, including various tremors, limp extremities, even blindness. We note in these symptoms the fact that the hysteric no longer feels capable of carrying his or her Dasein forward in authentic living. A not infrequent solution for the hysteric is to suf-

fer amnesia, which is a kind of total collapse of responsibility for the self.

Phobia. Phobias (unnatural fears) guard against an individual's losing hold of his or her world completely. As long as Luke can focus his anxiety on dirt, he can at least keep a certain order in his life as he plans his routine and maneuvers through the day, making certain he stays clear of filthy things and the germs he presumes they carry. Without this phobic concern, Luke's world would reveal its nothingness and precipitate in turn a really traumatic existential predicament.¹⁷⁰ Luke also uses various magical rituals and lucky charms to keep his world in order, a not infrequent accompaniment of the phobic symptom.

Sexual Abnormality. In most instances, a person with a sexual abnormality is finding it difficult to affirm and make real the possibilities that Dasein is luminating in the sexual sphere.¹⁷¹ The peeper cannot participate in sex but wants desperately to observe acts of sexual copulation. It is relatively safe to observe from afar, even though a threat is posed by the fact that a law is being broken in trespassing and window peeping. The homosexual cannot give himself or herself to an opposite-sex partner; the essence of this pattern is to continue a lower level of masturbatory sexual activity by entering into a same-sex relationship. In every instance of an abnormal sexual tendency, we can find a time in development when the afflicted person did not accept the responsibility of committing himself or herself to possibilities a maturing physical status had brought.

Obsessive-Compulsive Neurosis. Obsessive individuals invariably have world-designs that are highly intellectualized.¹⁷² That is, everything is expected to fall into line with pure, conceptual thought. Life is like a huge

conceptual puzzle that does not require emotional commitment so much as accurate, logical thinking. The strategy here is clear, for the obsessive-compulsive person finds in this world-design a kind of defense against having to form close interpersonal ties in the *mitwelt*. People can be dealt with on an affectless plane, as if they were logical machines. The existentialists do not deny the Freudian anal tie-in to this syndrome, but they see in this relation a fear developing of one's creature, emotive, nonintellectual side. In other words, anal tendencies of neatness and precision develop because the person is denying his or her basic humanness. Just as logical machines do not produce organic waste nor invite disorder, so too the obsessive-compulsive individual likes to have a life free of human frailty, including fecal matter, filth, or disorder of *any* variety. Fearing to be quite that human, the person denies possibilities and approaches life in a more idealistic, superhuman, intellectual vein.

Schizophrenia. Binswanger called this disorder a complete "emptying of the personality."¹⁷³ The schizophrenic patient retreats from *mitwelt* into *autism*, so that there is a complete split with the world of others.¹⁷⁴ But even in this dreamlike world, the person has no true self-direction or competent identity. The delusions and hallucinations that direct the schizophrenic make his or her world a nightmare of thrownness. Binswanger pointed to two general steps in the schizophrenic process.¹⁷⁵ In the first phase, this person begins sensing many types of inconsistencies arising, which is due of course to the fact that he or she is not in control of life. When we allow circumstances and/or other people to direct us, it is inevitable that such inconsistencies will arise because there

is no unifying point of view (world-design) to keep things flowing consistently. In the second phase of the illness, these inconsistencies are split into what is right and what is wrong, or what things are like and what things should be like. Following this split, the schizophrenic tries to attain what he or she considers right or what should be done. As these rightful “shoulds” are defined subjectively and with a poor grasp on reality, we have the seriously ill individual trying to achieve good ends which are completely bizarre from our perspective.¹⁷⁶ Thus we have the madman lurking about a large city, shooting people in the name of some deity in order to cleanse the world, or some such. A psychosis this dramatic is extremely rare, of course. In most cases, the schizophrenic is hospitalized without serious incident, although as the rigid and inaccurate delusional systems crumble, these individuals go through some personally difficult periods of confusion and terror.

Manic-Depressive Psychosis. The manic-depressive person jumps from one world-design to another, thrown into each one, yet never freely committed to any.¹⁷⁷ This is a type of inconsistency slightly different from the one experienced by the schizophrenic. The manic-depressive person seems to be on the verge of finding a perspective, a world-design that would put his or her existence into order. There are periods of clarity, and yet in each period, there seems to be another alternative suggested, so that the manic-depressive seems always to be moving between two worlds. And there are mood changes accompanying these shifts, so that we see euphoria (elation) on the one hand and melancholy (depression) on the other. The melancholy seems to come on when things projected in a state of euphoria do not work out as expected; these

possibilities are not realized because in fact the person is being thrown. At times of failure, the manic-depressive person is likely to blame others for his or her frustrations.¹⁷⁸ Not infrequently, those receiving the blame are the very ones who direct the abnormal person’s life, but what is required is not re-priming or fault-finding. The manic depressive must begin living authentically. When he or she cannot do so, there are often severe guilt feelings, sometimes taking the form of self-destructive tendencies (suicide attempts, and so on).¹⁷⁹ Suicide, however, is another of those avoidant behaviors wherein, rather than solving life problems, the person is defeated most finally by them.

Theory of Cure

The Search for Authenticity and View of Insight

There are probably three points which the existentialists would make about what it means to be well-adjusted. The mentally healthy person is *free to choose* and hence transcend,¹⁸⁰ *mature* in outlook,¹⁸¹ and *independently responsible*.¹⁸² The goal of psychotherapy is therefore to help the unfree and childishly dependent person become a genuine human being. Boss spoke of this as a debt owed to one’s existence, because in the poorly adjusted lifestyle, we have a depleted Dasein, one probably not yet bankrupt but in need of replenishment (enrichment).¹⁸³ Psychotherapy is a process of phenomenological study, helping the patient to understand his or her *present* circumstances as thoroughly and honestly as possible. Binswanger’s goal as therapist was to find “the particular world-design, the being-in-it, and the being-self corresponding to it.”¹⁸⁴ Boss was seeking the “immediately accessible essential meaning and content of all immediately perceptible phenomena.”¹⁸⁵

The focus of existential analysis is thus on self-understanding or insight, but this is of an immediate, current nature. "How am I existing in the present? What are my assumptions about life and how do I see them in operation 'right now'? What does my experience disclose to me if I am open and just 'let it happen'?" These are the kind of questions we would be putting to ourselves, not some far-removed obscurity like "Where are the fixation-points in my life history?" The existentialists see little use for such Freudian genetic examinations.¹⁸⁶ This does not mean that Boss or Binswanger would avoid going over a client's life history in therapy. They make a very thorough analysis of the client's Dasein from the earliest years, including fantasy products like favorite daydreams and so on. But what is being sought is not *the* explanation for what now exists but rather the historical grasp of Dasein. We can only understand a person's Dasein through a review of the complete historicity of the total organization of experience. In this search and review, the existential analyst always stays within the language usage of the client.¹⁸⁷ We want to understand things in the client's own words, so technical jargon should be avoided.

Several factors account for a cure. First of all, the person gains a more genuine perspective of his or her Dasein, knowing for the first time in life how the three worlds interrelate and summate to present possibilities for the future. This *future orientation* is important, for if the person now begins actualizing possibilities, the Dasein is more likely in time to become unstuck.¹⁸⁸ The therapist assists the client to begin taking charge of life (we will return to this important role in the next section). A client is not cured simply because these first steps to independence are taken, of course.¹⁸⁹ But this is an important beginning and we must encourage the process to continue. Binswanger

noted that we can usually count on the client's conscience for some help at this point. The client invariably feels guilty about forgoing responsibility for life and self-direction. Conscience is thus a kind of calling back to authenticity.¹⁹⁰

Hence, the existentialist may not be too ready to dismiss or explain away the client's guilt feelings. As we have noted above, to feel guilt is normal. Existential guilt is a major experience of all human beings. If we now confuse this form of guilt with guilt over something far removed from the existential predicament of the present—a fixation or unresolved Oedipal complex—we effectively teach the client that he or she should *not* be feeling this guilt. It is removed from the ongoing present and cannot be relevant to what is now taking place. The existentialists feel that the Freudians arbitrarily decide on which of the phenomenal experiences to take seriously in this fashion, distorting the client's Dasein in the process. Existential analysts take *all* phenomenal experience at its face value, seeking the meaning for present existence of all moods and emotions.

As clients begin to respond to their feelings, see possibilities in their future, and make attempts to achieve these possibilities, they steadily increase their independence and sense of well-being in lifestyle. The existentialists insist that behavioral changes must take place outside of the consulting room if we are to speak of successful therapy outcomes. Merely talking about the same old life in new dynamic terminology would not impress Boss as a successful therapeutic endeavor.¹⁹¹ When growth takes place in behavior outside the therapy hour—and we cannot fix a definite time period for when this will come about—existential analysis has been brought to a successful conclusion.¹⁹²

*Relationship, Transference,
and Resistance*

The existentialists believe that an essential ingredient in therapy is the sense of trust a patient has in his or her relationship with the therapist. Binswanger spoke of the therapist as “the post to which existence clings while adrift in the whirlpool, from whom it expects aid and protection as a sign that some inter-human relationship is still possible.”¹⁹³ The severely disturbed person needs to be rescued by someone else.¹⁹⁴ Boss emphasized that these are *genuine* relationships between two human beings, and any love expressed by the client for the analyst is therefore “love of the analyst himself, no matter how immature and distorted it may appear because of the limitations of perception imposed on the patient by his earlier relationship to his real father.”¹⁹⁵ In other words, existential analysis would not want to detract from the present situation by reducing it to the past experience of the client.

The existential analyst is at all times kind and reassuring, respectful of all that emerges from a client’s Dasein, and above all, *permissive* in the relationship.¹⁹⁶ Of course, this permissiveness does not mean that the existential analyst is passive, allowing the client to direct therapy entirely to his or her whim. Permissiveness encourages clients to be open, so that now, for possibly the first time in their lives, they can live out their true being in relation to their therapists.

The existentialists accept the clinical facts of *transference* and *resistance*, but they interpret them differently from the Freudians. The client truly loves the therapist, who is after all a source of last-ditch help in meeting the client’s problems. Of course, the nature of such loving may indeed be colored by the past, particularly since Dasein is stuck in the

client’s life pattern. As a result, we begin to see the client’s love expressed as if it were still the kind of love being sent forward to a parent. But this is only because the client is immature.¹⁹⁷ Nothing is being transferred in this expression of love. If the therapist accepts the role of a parent and somehow—possibly through distortions in his or her own Dasein—encourages such a pattern in the client-relationship, the therapist is sure to generate hostility in the client. This is what the Freudians have done, although they mistakenly interpret this natural irritation with their method of relating to the client as *negative transference*.¹⁹⁸

Boss observed that if a male analyst is aware of the childlike nature of the female neurotic’s Dasein, he will never confuse the erotic demands she makes on him with “grown-up sexuality.”¹⁹⁹ He will appreciate that these demands arise from a childlike longing to be loved and cared for as a small daughter. The therapist must appreciate that in psychotherapy clients have to at some point live out or “act out” those world-designs that are ever active in their Dasein. The existential analyst makes these known through proper interpretations and thereby encourages the client to begin advancing on life through a more appropriate world-design—which is worked out through phenomenal self-study. The therapist might say to a female client at some point, “You seem to express your love to me as if I were your father. Have you ever thought about this? Are there times, for example, when you can love other people in some other way than a daughter-father way?”

The client naturally finds it difficult to make this phenomenal study and often feels a certain degree of resentment in being encouraged to do so. Some clients are literally terrified by the threat of having to face their Dasein openly, and at this point we are likely to see signs of *resistance*.²⁰⁰ It is here that the therapist must demonstrate his or her greatest

compassion and skill in order to help the client overcome this resistance—that is, a flight from responsibility. The therapist encourages the client to begin in a small way, looking openly at first at the luminations of Dasein. As more confidence is achieved in this vein, the therapist can help the client set modest goals for actualizing those possibilities that have a high probability of being realized outside the consulting room in life proper. The existential analyst is completely committed to the client, even to the extent of going to the latter's home during times of crises to provide support and encouragement.²⁰¹ A classical Freudian analyst would never do this, feeling that this would suggest countertransference on the part of the therapist.

In fact, many critics of Daseinsanalysis charge that the approach formalizes countertransference into a technique of therapy. Boss rejected this criticism and observed that a decided healing agent in the relationship must necessarily be what he called *psychotherapeutic eros*. This is not like any other love relationship in human experience, not like a parental, romantic, friendship, or even a religious love for others. It has a quality completely its own. "Genuine psychotherapeutic eros . . . must be an otherwise never-practiced selflessness, self-restraint, and reverence before the partner's existence and uniqueness."²⁰² Therapists who cannot feel this love for certain clients should remove themselves from the case in question. Boss frankly admitted that he had done this on more than one occasion.²⁰³

Therapeutic Techniques

Comparison to Classical Psychoanalysis

Since Binswanger and Boss began their professional careers as orthodox Freudian-Jungian psychoanalysts, it is appropriate for us to

compare their present techniques with the classical procedures from which they took leave. In the strict sense, existentialistic therapists do not like to use doctrinaire techniques, because they fear these stylized steps of how to do therapy may alienate the client from his or her true phenomenological experience.²⁰⁴ For example, the methods of free association (Freud) or amplification (Jung) tend to take the client away from what is immediate or current in the Dasein to some other or earlier locus of concern, which is then said to be the important or real cause of the problems in living. This often twists a true symbolical manifestation into meaning something it does not—such as when the analyst finds sexual objects behind fantasies by waiting until the patient suggests something sexual in free association.

At the outset of therapy the client is required to be absolutely and unreservedly open in the relationship.²⁰⁵ Honesty and candor are valued in this approach as they are in classical analysis. If the patient prefers, he or she may lie down, but this position is not essential.²⁰⁶ Existentialists follow most of the customary procedures of classical analysis; the therapist generally listens silently and tries to enter into the meaning-disclosing relationship of the client.²⁰⁷ Free association may be used but never in a rigidly doctrinaire fashion. This is merely a convenient way in which clients can begin reviewing their world.²⁰⁸ As the client goes along, the therapist may question in order to clarify; gradually the clinical history begins to take shape.²⁰⁹ It is at this point that interpretation is employed to further client insight.

The point of the *interpretation* is to clarify a world-design, although it may be some time before such insights are possible. Existential analysis can take anywhere from one to five years, although presumably there are shorter

contacts with some clients.²¹⁰ But when an interpretation is advanced, it may just as likely refer to the current life activity of the client as to his or her past.²¹¹ In line with their de-emphasis of genetic explanations of neuroses, the existentialists do not feel that some *one* dynamic must be confronted with each client—like having to analyze the unresolved Oedipal conflict. Furthermore, the so-called deep interpretation is not likely to be made by an existentialist therapist, because he or she sees these depth efforts as reductive attempts. Hence, the interpretations are probably more at the level of common sense. A good example of Boss's interpretation, made to a female patient and bearing content that a classical analyst would consider Oedipal, is as follows:

*Perhaps those feelings toward me that came over you, and that you had for your father in that dream, and your wish to have pretty clothes and to be attractive, are still far too big and unmanageable for you. I don't think the little girl, who you really are, can yet even begin to cope with such feelings. Perhaps it will be best if you don't do anything, or start wanting to do anything, without first asking the little girl within you if it's all right with her.*²¹²

This is a particularly good example because we can see the immaturity view of neurosis reflected in the little-girl reference. There is no intricate superstructure of personality theory here to bring into an interpretation. We are concerned as existentialists with the person's ever-present world, hence interpretations are made in terms of the present life setting. There is also a form of challenge put to the client to begin meeting the possibilities revealed in the Dasein.²¹³ Boss

observed: "The Daseinsanalyst often asks his patients, 'Why not?' thereby encouraging them to ever greater tests of daring. 'Why is it that you don't dare to behave in such-and-such a manner during the analytic session?' is a question which is often asked in place of the usual analytic 'Why?'"²¹⁴ Of course, we should not put the "why not" question to a client too early in the analysis, for this would place undue pressure on him or her to act. But it is apparent that given the great commitment they have to the client and the gentle pressure they are willing to put on their clients, the existential analysts take a highly active role in therapy.

Dream Interpretation

The existentialists make use of dream interpretation, and in fact, Boss wrote two books (1958, 1977) on the topic. Consistent with their broader view, the dream is seen as a legitimate aspect of Dasein. Binswanger viewed it as somehow entangled in the *eigenwelt*, reflecting a certain amount of confusion and self-forgetfulness there.²¹⁵ In our dreams we mean to act, but seem immobilized by the passing of visual events.²¹⁶ Binswanger added, "To dream means: I don't know what is happening to me."²¹⁷ Boss was critical of Binswanger on this point, feeling that he was differentiating unnecessarily between wakefulness and dreaming, and that he assigned much too passive a role to the dreamer.²¹⁸ Boss emphasized the totality of Dasein when he said, "Waking and dreaming, as but two different modes of carrying to fulfillment the one and same historical human existence, belong fundamentally together in that one existence."²¹⁹ When we are awake, our Dasein presents itself as more alert, but otherwise there is no basic difference between being asleep and dreaming and being awake.²²⁰

Boss emphasized that "we *have* no dreams; we *are* our dreaming state. . . ." ²²¹ The dream

state is a completely subjective experience which can, for example, present us with new perspectives on the experience of time and space.²²² Events change rapidly, and we move backward and forward in time; there are distortions, but this does not make the dream a product of some unreal other world (Dasein). Our waking and dreaming worlds are opposite sides of the same coin.²²³ We do not take dream contents and call them symbols of something else. We take them in the phenomenal reality at their own level and then explore the meaning as expressed for the individual *with* that individual.²²⁴ Boss called this unbiased study of phenomenal reality *phenomenological observation*.²²⁵

For example, assume that Ivan comes to us for therapy and that in the course of treatment he tells of a dream in which his teeth are being removed or otherwise tampered with. Boss noted that Freud would have considered such a dream to be involved with masturbation—as the wish to masturbate, guilt over masturbating, or whatever.²²⁶ Why would Freud think that teeth somehow symbolized masturbation? Because in the slang Viennese dialect of his time, to “rip one out” (as a tooth) referred to onanism (penis removed before ejaculation during intercourse) or to masturbation.²²⁷ Boss showed how Freud’s interpretation completely overlooked the fact that teeth *actually* serve us in the realm of seizing, gripping, capturing, assimilating, and gaining power over things. The existentialistic therapist would never limit himself or herself to the single and clearly arbitrary symbolic interpretation of the Freudian analyst. To be fair to the Freudians, we are not entirely certain an analyst would be this routine in making interpretations today, either. But Boss was addressing Freud’s writings, and his main point was that when something appears in a dream, we should consider it more openly than he felt Freud did. Freud seemed to Boss to have been more

interested in advancing a theory than in observing and capturing the phenomenal truth.

Boss distinguished between objective and subjective dream interpretation.²²⁸ Freud approached the dream objectively, hoping to isolate a theme common to all dreamers. Hence, if Ivan went on from his teeth dreams to dream that he was plowing a field, Freud’s sexual bias would suggest ipso facto that the plow was really a penis and the furrow it parted was really a vagina.²²⁹ Once again, Freud would be overlooking relevant alternative interpretations, such as that it might reflect a prompting to pick up life again, to forge ahead and break new ground by meeting responsibilities and affirming possibilities, no matter how much effort might be required. Boss said that *dream interpretation* comes down to two main questions.²³⁰ First, to what phenomenon is the person’s Dasein sufficiently open, so that it shines forth in the dreaming state? Second, upon awakening, can the person recognize features in existence that are identical in essence with the dream phenomena? In drawing the latter parallels, Boss referred to this as *explication*.²³¹ To explicate is thus to enlarge on the meanings of dreams, relating them to the Dasein as a whole—including the waking state. Thus, Boss would ask Ivan if he could see any parallel in his current life situation with the theme of plowing through or forging ahead? He would refrain from *telling* Ivan what the dream meant and always phrase his statements as questions. This would ensure that Ivan would not be put in the role of a subordinate or infant, and that he would feel free to agree with the thrust of a question or not.²³²

Most of what Freud and Jung called *symbols* Boss would view as reflections of the luminating Dasein, visual contents reflecting

a given world-design. For example, a person might dream that he or she was a thing, rather than a person. This would suggest existentially that the person was being made aware of a certain inability to act or commit in the waking state.²³³ The dream would suggest that the person was an inanimate, inert something rather than a human being. The terror dreams of children often involve wild animals or strange creatures. We can view these existentially as fearful reactions to certain newly discovered sensuous or hostile possibilities that the child is just becoming aware of. As such, the strange creatures do not symbolize anything needing covering up. The creatures rather capture precisely what is going on in the conscious aspect of *Dasein*. A man dreams that he sees his brother lying dead in a casket, having been killed in a traffic accident. Boss would interpret this *not* as a covert (hidden) death wish for a sibling but as the projected softer, loving side of life, a side this man had been turning his back on in his egotistical devotion to business matters.²³⁴ The dream is telling him that he is killing off his humane side in the vain pursuit of material wealth.

Note the uncomplicated approach to dream interpretation here. There is no claim made of a dream censor, distorting what is into what is not.²³⁵ Dreams merely supplement the rest of our experience. In a true sense, they alert us to possibilities developing in life.²³⁶ This is where their use in therapy is particularly relevant. We can, as existential therapists, base our “why not?” questions to the client on material and behavioral directions suggested by dreams. The person’s childishness can be brought out in a dream,²³⁷ but also the person’s better side can be suggested in the dream content.²³⁸ By discussing the dream content and drawing implications therefrom,

existential analysts can usually find something vitally meaningful to their clients from which to begin a new approach on life.

Summary

Chapter 10 begins with a survey of the major themes that have issued from the philosophy of existentialism: alienation, authenticity, subject versus object, commitment, action, anxiety, dread, despair, and absurdity. Philosophers who have been important in this school of thought include Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, and Marcel. In recent times, the themes of existentialism have been paralleled with similar concepts in Oriental philosophy, and Chapter 10 reviews in broad outline the essentials of this Eastern outlook. Beginning in ancient Hinduism and extending into Buddhism—particularly Zen Buddhism—these concepts of living in unity with nature have enjoyed great popularity along with existentialism. It would not be incorrect to say that the second half of the twentieth century has been an age of existentialism, providing that we understand the parallels across Western and Eastern philosophies.

The two personologists discussed in Chapter 10—Boss and Binswanger—have both drawn from the writings of Heidegger. Their approach is based on a study of being, or as it is called, ontology. The German word *Dasein* has the meaning of “being there,” hence analysis of immediate experience is what *Daseinsanalysis* attempts to do. Existential analysis (*Daseinsanalysis*) focuses on the phenomenal experience of a person as it is immediately experienced. Binswanger stressed the way in which phenomenal experience is *endowed* with meaning by the human being’s most basic ways of looking at and thinking about existence. Boss, on the other

hand, emphasized the meaning *disclosed* to the human being *by* existence, as if it were not so much how we look at existence that matters but how existence luminates or reveals itself to us.

Binswanger viewed the person as bringing to bear certain a priori ontological structures, or world-designs, which function at the phenomenal level and make experience what it *is* to the individual. These phenomenal frames are what endow Dasein with meaning. Boss, on the other hand, felt that Dasein is not framed by a priori structures, but rather shines forth or luminates the phenomenal realm with meaning. Dasein was said by both Boss and Binswanger to be pitched toward the future. There is also a historicity to Dasein, a past that reflects the commitments and actions of earlier human beings who have pitched their Dasein into their futures and in the process thrown the current Dasein of people in one direction rather than another. Binswanger distinguished three worlds (welts) in the totality of Dasein: (1) the eigenwelt, or world of inner feelings and affections; (2) the umwelt, or the physical environment around us, including both animate and inanimate things; and (3) the mitwelt, or the social world of people, including all those things we mean by society.

To avoid being completely (100 percent) thrown by the intentions of others, we must behave authentically, assume responsibility for our commitments, and exhibit care in furthering the possibilities that come up in the futurity of our lives. We must occasionally transcend the familiar and routine ways of doing things and put ourselves at risk by making new commitments. Though there is no formal *self* concept in existentialistic personality theory, there is an emphasis on the identity of the person, who comes at life phenomenally and opens it up to alternative possibilities. If this is not done, the Dasein can constrict. Emotions reflect the unique

pitch of Dasein that a person may experience at any point in time. Binswanger discussed the difference between existential anxiety and neurotic anxiety. The former is a sense of alienation, a loss of world that might be captured in the idea of nothingness. It can be experienced as boredom and emptiness. Neurotic anxiety stems more from a constricted world-design, a simplistic and unrealistic framing of the world which makes the person vulnerable to collapse in the face of a challenge.

Boss makes a comparable distinction between two kinds of guilt. Existential guilt arises from the basic sense of indebtedness that the person bears, since it is not possible to fulfill every option in life. Affirming one alternative, we forgo many others. This kind of guilt is borne by all of us, and it reflects a realistic assessment of existence. Our conscience prompts such existential guilt, and this is not a sickness as Freud sometimes made it appear to be. Neurotic guilt, on the other hand, is the result of having been reared in an unhealthy environment. Commitment always brings about existential guilt of one sort or another. But neurotic guilt can spring from a lack of commitment, or it can sharpen the pain of existential guilt. Even so, we should keep these two types of anxiety and/or guilt separate. Psychotherapy aims at removing the neurotic forms but not the existential forms of anxiety and/or guilt.

Rather than speak of repression, the existentialists suggest that an aspect of Dasein has remained closed and inauthentic. Most of Freud's defense mechanisms are said to be due to underlying world-designs (Binswanger) or inauthenticity (Boss). The existentialists criticize both psychoanalysis and behaviorism for attempting to reduce the Dasein to something else. Rather than taking Dasein as it is, these schools of therapy re-

duced it to underlying S-R units, or place it under the compulsion of repeating what has gone before. One genuine defense mechanism the existentialists might be said to recognize involves trusting to fate. To believe that fate will somehow enter into one's existence and decide alternatives is an escapist device which ultimately denies authentic living. The existentialists do not accept clear-cut stages in life, but they do recognize that Dasein always has an historical development. The task of life is essentially to gain one's independence from the thrownness of others—or at least reduce the extent of such dependency. If the Dasein does not move forward and become enriched in maturing, the existentialists speak of a stuck Dasein, much in the vein of the Jungian conception. The existentialists are also much more accepting of a role for religion in the life of people. The existentialists do not wish to categorize people into typologies, but take a very individualized view of each personality as a unique product of the identity concerned. To be overly tradition-bound is to live an inauthentic life of "everybody."

The theory of illness employed in existentialism follows the themes of a constricted Dasein, a stuck Dasein, or the self-chosen unfreedom leading to a kind of existential weakness for the individual, which then collapses altogether. Neurotics are people who have created their own seriously constricted Dasein, surrendering their autonomy to others and eventually paying the price of inauthenticity. Psychotics in their delusions and hallucinations reflect a completely new form of being-in-the-world, one in which supposed, independent forces taunt, threaten, and then actually direct what will take place. Each of the classic syndromes—ulcer cases, hysterias, phobias, sexual abnormalities, obsessive-com-

pulsives, schizophrenias, and manic-depressives—reflect their own unique form of this existential weakness and constricted Dasein. It is not the specific diagnosis that is important, but an historical understanding of the unique Dasein framed by or illuminated to the identity concerned.

The mentally healthy person is said to be free to choose, hence transcend the given of life to affirm possibilities, assume a mature outlook, and be independently responsible. Daseinsanalysis is an insight therapy which seeks to aid a person to achieve these three broad goals in life. The future is stressed because the person must let the past stand and begin building a better life in the henceforth. It is important for the client to trust the therapist, and existentialistic therapists take quite an active role in the establishment of a genuine, permissive relationship. Boss felt that an important healing agent in the relationship is psychotherapeutic eros, that is, a unique kind of selfless reverence for the client's existence and uniqueness. We are reminded of Rogerian writings at this point. If the therapist cannot feel this commitment for the client, he or she should discontinue the therapy contact. Though something like positive or negative transference arises in therapy, the existentialists refuse to accept this as the literal transferring of anything. There is either some immature, groping attempt to cement a bond to the therapist (positive transference), or probably there is a well-deserved feeling of irritation for the fruitless procedure (negative transference) of observation and misinterpretation by the psychoanalysts. Resistance is a flight from responsibility and not some kind of interpersonal warfare waged by the client against the therapist.

The existentialists follow most of the techniques used by the psychoanalysts, though they naturally give dreams and free associations a completely different kind of interpre-

tation. Interpretations are aimed at clarifying the world-design predicating the person's phenomenal experience. Many of these interpretations bring out the stuck Dasein, the unwillingness people have to mature and assume responsibility in life. Boss referred to the study of dreams as phenomenological observation, which means that he tried to understand the dream at its own level, rather than making it fit some preconceived scheme. In a manner similar to Jung, the existentialists reject Freud's manifest-versus-latent-content theory of dream formation. A dream presents an aspect of the Dasein to us as framed by the dreamer; it reflects his or her unique situation at the time. Another term used in the description of dream analysis is *explication*.

Outline of Important Theoretical Constructs

Existential philosophy
being • ontology • existence

Alienation

Authenticity
guilt • Dasein • being oneself

Subject versus object
object • subject • being-there • nothingness

Commitment, action
activity, action, to act • commitment
• bad faith • choice in non-choice

Anxiety, dread, despair

Absurd

Existential themes in Oriental philosophy

The quest for unity
Brahma • Buddha • negation • nirvana
• meditation • enlightenment • yin-yang
principle • *Tao Te Ching* • tao • koan

• perfect enlightenment • non-attachment

Psychotherapy and Zen Buddhism
re-evaluation of life • thinking, not-thinking, and non-thinking • transcendental meditation • mantra • mandala

Existentialism as a theory of personality and psychotherapy: Binswanger and Boss

Biographical overview
Daseinsanalyse or *Daseinsanalysis*

Personality theory

Structural constructs

The centrality of phenomenal meaning for the person as a body-mind gestalt
being • ontology • subject versus object
• meaning • facticity

Existence, being-in-the-world, and Dasein as endowed or disclosed
existence = being-in-the-world = Dasein
• phenomenal self-examination • endowed phenomenal experience • disclosed phenomenal experience • a priori ontological structure • world design • illumination of Dasein • futurity • thrown, thrownness • historicity • *eigenwelt*, *umwelt*, and *mitwelt* • possibilities
• being-able-to-be • authenticity versus inauthenticity • care • transcendence
• risk

Dasein and identity
identity • constricted Dasein • key, key themes

Motivational constructs

Motivation as thrownness, pitch, and the fulfilling of possibilities
pitch • emotion(s)

Existential versus neurotic forms of anxiety and guilt

existential anxiety • neurotic anxiety
• uncanniness • dread • fear • angst
(anxiety) • nothingness • constriction
of world-design • existential guilt
• neurotic guilt • conscience

Psychodynamics and the adjustment mechanisms

introjection • repression • projection
• identification • sublimation • trusting
to fate

Time perspective constructs

Dasein's historical development

The task of life

dependence versus independence
• stuck Dasein

The role of religion

Individual differences constructs
everybody

Psychopathology and psychotherapy

Theory of illness

Constricted Dasein
unfreedom

Lack of autonomy and independence
self-chosen unfreedom • existential
weakness

Differential diagnosis

symptoms • neurosis • psychosis
• hallucination • ulcer cases • hysteria
• phobia • sexual abnormality • obses-
sive-compulsive neurosis • schizophrenia
• autism • manic-depressive psychosis

Theory of cure

*The search for authenticity and view
of insight*

free to choose • mature outlook
• independently responsible • future
orientation

Relationship, transference, and resistance

genuineness • permissiveness • trans-
ference • resistance • negative trans-
ference • psychological eros

Therapeutic techniques

Comparison to classical psychoanalysis
interpretation

Dream interpretation

phenomenological observation • dream
interpretation • explication • symbol(s)

Notes

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- Ibid., p. 41. **64.** Ibid., p. 28. **65.** Ibid., p. 70. **66.** Binswanger, 1958, p. 200. **67.** Boss, 1963, p. 218. **68.** Binswanger, 1958, p. 232. **69.** Boss, 1963, p. 39. **70.** Ibid., p. 183. **71.** Binswanger, 1963, pp. 5–6. **72.** Ibid., pp. 130–131. **73.** Ibid., p. 174. **74.** Boss, 1963, p. 233. **75.** Ibid., p. 55. **76.** Binswanger, 1958, p. 224; 1963, p. 72. **77.** Boss, 1963, p. 55. **78.** Binswanger, 1958, p. 303. **79.** Binswanger, 1963, p. 116. **80.** Boss, 1963, p. 68. **81.** Binswanger, 1963, p. 213; Boss, 1963, p. 45. **82.** Binswanger, 1963, p. 171. **83.** Ibid., p. 67. **84.** Ibid., p. 100. **85.** Boss, 1958, p. 183. **86.** Binswanger, 1963, p. 174. **87.** Boss, 1958, p. 108. **88.** Boss, 1963, p. 89. **89.** Ibid., p. 92. **90.** Binswanger, 1958, p. 326. **91.** Binswanger, 1963, p. 219. **92.** Ibid., p. 31. **93.** Binswanger, 1958, p. 223. **94.** Binswanger, 1963, pp. 99, 311. **95.** Ibid., p. 117. **96.** Boss, 1963, p. 41. **97.** Ibid., pp. 113–114. **98.** Binswanger, 1958, p. 198. **99.** Ibid., pp. 197–198. **100.** Boss, 1963, pp. 182–183. **101.** Binswanger, 1963, p. 116. **102.** Boss, 1963, p. 47. **103.** Ibid., p. 271. **104.** Binswanger, 1958, p. 205. **105.** Ibid., p. 280; 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Boss, 1963, p. 147. **211.** Binswanger, 1963, p. 30. **212.** Boss, 1963, p. 22. **213.** Ibid., p. 196. **214.** Ibid., p. 248. **215.** Binswanger, 1963, p. 231. **216.** Ibid., p. 319. **217.** Ibid., p. 247. **218.** Boss, 1958, p. 129. **219.** Boss, 1977, p. 190. **220.** Ibid. **221.** Boss, 1963, p. 261. **222.** Boss, 1958, pp. 47, 89. **223.** Ibid., pp. 80, 127. **224.** Ibid., p. 158. **225.** Boss, 1977, p. 141. **226.** Ibid., p. 226. **227.** Ibid. **228.** Boss, 1958, p. 120. **229.** Ibid., p. 158. **230.** Boss, 1977, pp. 26–27. **231.** Ibid., p. 32. **232.** Ibid. **233.** Boss, 1958, pp. 155–156. **234.** Boss, 1963, p. 265. **235.** Boss, 1958, p. 103. **236.** Ibid., p. 130. **237.** Boss, 1963, p. 200. **238.** Ibid., p. 204.

Chapter 11

Two Kinds of Constructive Theories: Jean Piaget and George A. Kelly

We depart from our usual organization in Chapter 11, because in this instance, we will be reviewing the theory of Jean Piaget, which is *not* specifically aimed at abnormal behavior or psychotherapy. There are two reasons for taking up Piaget even though he is not a psychotherapist. First, his theory has become increasingly important in recent years and many personologists feel that it should be considered by everyone concerned with human behavior, whether engaged in psychotherapy or not. Second, and more germane to our purposes, Piaget has helped to popularize the widely used term *construction*, a term also used, but in a different sense, by the second theorist of this chapter, George A. Kelly. Because Kelly was a psychotherapist-personologist of wide influence, it is important to clarify the meanings employed in these related but still different theories of human behavior.

The Evolutionary Rationalism of Jean Piaget

Jean Piaget considered himself a scientist engaged in the study of *genetic epistemology*, which has to do with “both the formation and the meaning of knowledge.”¹ We will return to this phrase below, after first familiarizing ourselves with some basic Piagetian terminology. Because of the central role he assigns to evolution in his concept of development, and because of his great emphasis on the developmental stability (he called this *equilibrium*) of higher-level cognitive conceptions, we have chosen to characterize Piaget’s theory as *evolutionary rationalism*. This meaning will be clarified as we move through Piaget’s thought.

In a sense, Piaget is to the phenomenological-existentialistic school of thought (see Chapters 9 and 10) what Bandura (see Chapter 7) is to the behavioristic school of thought. That is, Piaget has tried to be comprehensive in his explanations of human behavior; in doing so he rivals Bandura’s eclecticism. However, where we saw Bandura uniting behavioristic with cognitive terminology having less of a mechanistic sound to it (see p. 487), we will find Piaget moving in the reverse direction, so that his fundamentally non-mechanistic theory embraces terminology taken from cybernetics; he is willing to draw parallels between his explanations and those of clearly mechanistic theorists.² Even so, Piaget is a decidedly individualistic theoretician who has much to say about human behavior that is unique.

Biographical Overview

Jean Piaget was born on 9 August 1896 at Neuchâtel, Switzerland and died on 16 September 1980 at Geneva. His father, a teacher and scholar of medieval literature, set the pattern

for Piaget’s own lifestyle in which a devotion to the study of factual matters is uppermost. Piaget tells us that he has always “detested any departure from reality,”³ and this attitude takes on even greater significance when we realize that his mother apparently suffered from pronounced neurotic tendencies. For a time his mother’s maladjustments spurred an interest in psychoanalysis and abnormal psychology, but after he had achieved independence from his parents, Piaget lost all interest in such topics, preferring, as he tells us, “the study of normality and of the workings of the intellect to that of the tricks of the unconscious.”⁴ Piaget was a child prodigy. At the age of ten, he submitted a one-page article on the albino sparrow to a journal of natural history, and it was accepted for publication. He then obtained permission to study after hours at the museum of natural history in Neuchâtel, specializing eventually in land and soft-water shells. He was on his way to becoming a naturalist and almost all of his free time was spent in collecting mollusks.

Piaget continued to publish in natural history throughout his teen years, and an amusing outcome of his growing reputation in the scientific literature was that he received a letter offering him a position as curator of a mollusk collection in another town while he was still in secondary (high) school. Piaget experienced his share of the usual problems confronting adolescents, especially those having to do with religion. He was given a traditional education in this regard, but eventually he worked free of religious dogma, preferring a completely scientific outlook. In his mid-teen years, an uncle, worried about Piaget’s narrow interests in mollusks, encouraged him to read Henri Bergson, the philosopher who espoused creative evolution. The basic idea here is that evolution is not



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merely a series of static structures that are fixed like so many points along the way, but involves also a flow of change between such points which must be given proper consideration and emphasis. Organisms that exist in nature are living beings in a *constant* state of change, a creative motion which is just as much a part of their total being as the

part-structures that evolve. Piaget was impressed by this idea, but he also felt that Bergson failed to provide an experimental basis for his theories, and therefore, they were open to easy rejection.

After he had taken the baccalaureate degree in 1915, Piaget threw himself into the reading of a broad range of scholars, including Kant, Spencer, Comte, Fouillée, Lachelier, Boutroux, Lalande, Durkheim, Tarde,

Le Dantec, James, Ribot, and Janet. An important teacher of this period was A. Reymond, a logician who introduced Piaget to the study of psychology and scientific methodology. Piaget learned from Reymond that "logic stems from a sort of spontaneous organization of acts."⁵ This idea of an organization of acts into logic would combine with the Bergsonian conception of evolution as a dynamic, creative movement and remain with Piaget forever after. We will see its mature development in Piaget's conception of increasing stages of equilibration in development, culminating in the stability of mathematical formulations (refer below).

In 1918 Piaget took his doctoral degree from the University of Neuchâtel, with a dissertation on the mollusks of Valais. He had by this time acquired an interest in psychology, which promised to combine his biological and philosophical interests. He went to Zurich hoping to work in a psychology laboratory, but found nothing satisfactory. In the autumn of 1919 he went to Paris, where he was to spend two years studying pathological psychology at the Sorbonne. Piaget learned to interview mental patients here, which was important to his later work, because he always considered his research style to be an adaptation of the clinical method.⁶ He also studied more philosophy of science and was notably influenced by the historical-critical method of Brunschwig. This is important to our understanding of Piaget, for in his subsequent approach to the study of genetics, we have more than biology reflected, we have a decidedly historical interpretation of development being employed as well.⁷

His career as genetic epistemologist really began when Piaget was asked to standardize some reasoning tests on Parisian children. He was given the right to use Alfred Binet's laboratory at the grade school of the rue de la Grangeaux-Belles in Paris. Binet, who was then deceased, had achieved fame for de-

vising the first effective means of assessing intelligence through the use of (IQ) tests. Rather than simply standardizing the reasoning test he was given, Piaget engaged the children in discussions patterned after the psychiatric questioning he had learned in the clinical method. He found that children up to the age of eleven or twelve have difficulties unsuspected by the adult in identifying such things as the part common to two wholes. For the next few years, he continued his study of both normal and abnormal children, which in time convinced him that here was that method of studying developmental-evolutionary processes that he had found wanting in Bergson. He could actually study the laws of mental development empirically. For example, he found that logic is not inborn but rather develops little by little over the childhood years. Concepts of cause-effect are not understood by children until they have reached a certain stage of development. Piaget interpreted this development as an evolution of mental structures. In a sense, he found himself studying an "embryology of intelligence."⁸

The next career move by Piaget established him professionally and fixed his life's course thereafter. In 1921 he was offered and accepted the position of director of studies at the Institut J. J. Rousseau of Geneva. His responsibilities involved guiding and associating with students working on advanced degrees, including the direction of their work on studies of Piaget's choosing. Piaget had by now decided to study the development of thought for itself, using his new interview method which would take him in directions he could not necessarily predict but was willing to follow. He and his students did their work at the primary school of the Rousseau institute and the local public schools. The data on which his first five books were based

issued from this extensive research effort. One of the graduate students at the Institut Rousseau was Valentine Châtenay, who was to become Piaget's wife and coworker.

Piaget's thesis that logic follows a genesis, an evolution over the years of maturation in childhood, found immediate popularity among scholars all over the world. He was widely read and invited to many different countries where he presented his researches and theories of development. As the years passed, Piaget broadened the scope of his investigations, studying not only language and the verbal expression of ideas but the manipulations and experiences young children have with objects even before they have learned their native tongues. He also worked to perfect his theoretical formulations, noting in later years that sometimes his colleagues took more interest in his empirical findings on the stages of development than they did in the basic theory on which the researches were based.⁹ This is a distinctive characteristic of Jean Piaget—a desire to advance *theory* as well as *method* (empirical research findings). We will in this chapter emphasize his theory and deal in less detailed fashion than is customary in books on Piaget with his developmental studies per se.

In 1925 his former teacher, A. Reymond, vacated the chair of philosophy at the University of Neuchâtel, and Piaget was given a portion of this appointment. Later he was appointed to the science faculty of the University of Geneva, where he taught child psychology. Piaget has also taught courses on the philosophy of science, and we see in his mature writings a genuine concern with the problems of scientific investigation and explanation. Much has been said of Piaget's children, two daughters and a son born be-

tween the years 1925 and 1931. With the help of his wife, Piaget carefully studied and recorded the development of his children, so that in some of his writings, he refers not only to subjects selected from the local school system, and so on, but also to observations made on his own children from cradle to school years. Over his long career, Piaget has worked with many colleagues and friends, but two who should be specifically mentioned are A. Szeminska and B. Inhelder. His publication rate of articles and books relating to genetic epistemology has been astonishing, and today he is cited in the writings of colleagues with a frequency second only to Freud. His worldwide appeal has remained constant, and his books are regularly translated into many other languages.

In 1929 Piaget became a professor of the history of scientific thought at the University of Geneva; within a few years he was also named a codirector of the Institut Rousseau, which eventually affiliated with the university. In 1939 Piaget was made professor of sociology at the University of Geneva, and a year later, moved to a chair in experimental psychology. He was also named director of the university's psychological laboratory. After World War II ended, Piaget was named president of the Swiss Commission to UNESCO and later served on its executive council. In 1952, he became a professor of child psychology at the Sorbonne. In 1955–1956 Piaget founded an international Center for Genetic Epistemology at the University of Geneva. Here, he assembled a staff which studied various aspects of mental development from an interdisciplinary perspective, employing knowledge from the biological sciences, psychology, sociology, mathematics, and cybernetics, to name only a few of the sources Piaget is willing to tap.

Piaget has been given many signs of recognition over his long and distinguished career. He was awarded honorary doctoral de-

grees from many leading schools, such as Harvard University, the Sorbonne, the University of Brazil, and the University of Brussels. In 1969 he was the first European to receive the Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award of the American Psychological Association. Piaget's findings and theoretical interpretations are clearly among the most important items of knowledge in the study of personality, and we will now consider his outlook in terms of our usual organization of theoretical constructs.

Personality Theory

Structural Constructs

Construction of Patterns Among Related Actions

Piaget's lessons from Bergson and Reymond left him as unwilling to focus on static, unchanging structures as are the phenomenologically oriented theorists of Part III. Living organisms may take on patterned shapes, as all things in experience take on patterns, but we must always appreciate that the basic nature of reality is change, movement, and development. In the case of human learning and personality development, this begins early in life as a form of reflexive, sensorimotor action.¹⁰ As infants, we learn by essentially copying the early automatic movements we make in our cribs. We first reach automatically in a direction, observe that we are reaching, and then copy the action by practicing it over and over again in our play (shaking rattles, clenching our fists, poking our fingers here and there, and so on). Now, there are two kinds of things here we can learn as a pattern. We can observe or see ourselves doing things, and we can also sense ourselves doing what we are doing in our

motions. At first, we reach reflexively, but as we practice our reaching, we are learning in a way that is no longer reflexive nor simply observational.

To understand Piaget, we must first grasp that he distinguishes between the copying of an action by *internalizing* (or *interiorizing*) its actual pattern of motion and the copying of an action by internalizing an image of what needs to be done or how it is to be carried out.¹¹ We do not learn about life by first forming an image of what needs doing or what we wish would happen and then carrying this action forward to overt action. The analysts of Part I looked at the infant's mind (psyche) in this way and Piaget disagreed with them. We must *first* act and then gradually learn what we can or cannot do over our life's ever-changing course. Piaget emphasizes that "as regards action itself, we have time and again seen that it plays a far more fundamental role than does the image."¹² To interiorize is thus to take in a cognitive awareness of the patterned action by abstracting from our play in the crib. As we grow older, we can, of course, copy the behavior of others by simply observing them and forming an image of their behavior, as in Bandura's modeling conception (see p. 483). But there is a long period of development between the crib and this adult stage of behavior.

The most basic structure of action in Piaget's theory is called the *scheme* (also referred to as *schema*). A scheme may be defined as "what there is in common among several different and analogous actions."¹³ For example, one such scheme might concern the understanding of distance. Infants learn, through reaching and moving about and through others moving in relation to them, that things and/or people may be close

to them or farther away. This knowledge permits the maturing child to generalize from one action situation to another. Moving toward the kitchen sink is similar to reaching for a toy that is away from our side. Even so, Piaget does not consider a *scheme* to be identical to a *concept* of the understanding. Concepts are broader, taking into consideration both what is common and what is different about not only actions but all sorts of things (see George Kelly's definition of *construct*, p. 713). A scheme is what is common among different actions carried out at different times—like our moving about to close distances between ourselves and other people or things in many different situations. Though each person frames his or her scheme individually, it is also true that, because life is similar for everyone, the schemes we all make up share common meanings, by analogy if nothing else. It is such shared schemes that make the learning of language possible.¹⁴ We can communicate through words because we have begun our understanding of things in schemes which permit us to grasp words, as the specific word *distance* is learned after we have already formed a scheme of this life experience.

When Piaget looks at the human mind as a totality, he thinks of the *schemata* (plural for *schema*) as interlacing parts of this much broader structure—reminding us of the field theories of gestalt psychology (see p. 571). Piaget does not consider himself a gestaltist, but he admits that had he read Wertheimer or Köhler early in his career, he probably would have become a member of this school of thought.¹⁵ But he is surely within the theoretical traditions of Part III on the matter of looking at behavior globally rather than reductively. The whole-pattern is not just the sum of its part-patterns. The part-patterns (schemes) interlace and are in constantly

shifting relations both internally and externally with other part-patterns to form in turn a whole-pattern. When we as children put together schemes of distance with other schemes like “resting upon,” we can achieve a whole-pattern, enabling us to move toward something (for example, a table) to place something upon it (for example, a cup). Two schemes—“distance” and “resting upon”—combine into a more complex structure of action. The resulting whole-pattern is created not as two singles adding up to a double but as a *new pattern of relationship*, a distinctive singularity unique unto itself. Piaget is careful to point out that in the formation of patterns, it is “the relations among elements that count.”¹⁶

The term Piaget uses to speak generally about patterned relationships like this is *structure*. Structures must have a reliably distinctive form (pattern) which is capable of being abstracted and recognized again and again. A mere heap of things piled together in haphazard fashion is not a structure.¹⁷ Because structures have this reliable form making them capable of abstraction and recognizability, we are likely to think of them as fixed entities, but Piaget cautions that they are also *systematic* processes. A *system* is a regularly interacting or interdependent group of items (for example, schemata) forming a unified whole. In defining *structure*, Piaget therefore notes that it involves a distinctive pattern “which presents the laws or properties of a totality seen as a system.”¹⁸ Such structures can change, grow, and develop—tendencies Piaget captures in his concept of *transformation*. “Whereas other animals cannot alter themselves except by changing their species, man can transform himself by transforming the world and can structure himself by constructing structures; and these structures are his own, for they are not eternally predestined either from within or from without.”¹⁹

Piaget seems to have first used the concept of transformation in his study of the development of concepts of number and related mathematical understandings in children. There are several transformations a mathematician can make on the same group of number relations without necessarily changing the fundamental meaning of the structural totality. For example, the group $x(yz)$ can be transformed to $(xy)z$, so that the equation $x(yz) = (xy)z$ is both different in organization on either side of the equation yet retains a basic identity. This is called associativity in mathematics, and there are other transformations that could be cited, such as closure, unity, and inversion. However, for present purposes, all we need grasp is the fact that patterned relations can be changed within a structure even though the overall systematic form remains identifiable. It is in this sense that Piaget can say "transformation and identity are forever inseparable."²⁰ This reminds us of the Heraclitian insight that we never step in the same river twice, even though there is a constant river-form (logos) moving before our eyes each day (see p. 4). The river transforms itself as an ongoing system even as it retains its identifiable pattern.

Referring to the transformation of physical objects like this is not inappropriate. Piaget notes that "a structure would lose all truth value if it did not have this direct connection with the [physical] facts."²¹ As a genetic epistemologist, Piaget is primarily interested in the structures that relate to the formation and meaning of knowledge, but knowledge would have no validity if the structures of the mind failed to match up to the structures of physical reality. The reason our mental structures do coincide to our experience of reality is because they actually begin in the physical patterning of real events.²² As suggested in the quote above regarding animals changing their species, the very survival of

organisms in nature depends on their capacity to structure physical patterns favoring adjustment to reality. Thus, Piaget notes, "The organism adapts itself by materially constructing new forms to fit them into those of the universe, whereas intelligence extends this creation by constructing mentally structures which can be applied to those of the environment."²³ Thus, the physical body of any animal represents a structure having both an identifiable form and also a constantly changing process of interaction with the environment in which it takes on chemical nutrients and gives off wastes to carry on the survival actions of life.

From these basically physical exchanges, a higher-order organization occurs which is also physical; the structures involved, however, permit that creative interplay with nature that Piaget referred to above as "transforming the world" in human behavior. These higher-order structures also develop through transformation of earlier forms. "Actually the whole process of development, starting out with perception and culminating in intelligence, demonstrates clearly that transformations continually increase in importance, as opposed to the original predominance of static perceptual forms."²⁴ This idea of moving from the static and unchanging to the fluid and flexible structure is important in Piagetian developmental theory. We may as children look at things concretely and literally, so that we fail to analyze our schema and the structures within which we relate them in helter-skelter fashion. A child slips on the wet pavement while playing in the rain and for a period of time thereafter presumes that water or wet means harm, hurt, or something of the sort. Now, a wet surface that becomes slippery can indeed signify potential harm (danger), but this is merely one

aspect of the total structure of what rain, water, or wetness actually means. When children (or adults for that matter) think in such personal, vague, or unanalyzed schematic structures, Piaget calls this *syncretic thought*.²⁵ We all begin with syncretic thinking, but thanks to our maturing capacity to transform structures of a primitive, sensorimotor (reflexive), schematic nature to increasingly abstract structures, we can promote our cognitive understanding. In doing so, we construct *structures* by our own design.

This brings us to the central theoretical term employed by both theorists of this chapter. Piaget dramatizes its importance to his structuralist theory when he states, “*There is no structure apart from construction, either abstract or genetic.*”²⁶ Unlike George A. Kelly (see below, p. 713), who viewed construction as a purely cognitive (mental) process, Piaget suggests that we have both a *material construction* of bodily adaptations in organic evolution (generating new species, and so on) and also a more abstract, cognitive *construction of structures* which the human being uses to transform his or her world (see earlier quotes in this section). We might say that for Piaget, the general term *construction* means to bring about a structure (schema, and so on) in the ongoing, systematic processes of both organic and mental life. In general, this takes place through either *combination* and/or *differentiation* of part-structures (schemata) or whole-structures.²⁷ In organic evolution, an animal might differentiate by evolving a unique appendage (fin, claw, and so on), making possible motions that better adapt it to reality than another animal. In the case of human beings, a structure might have been created by combining two seemingly unrelated schemes in an unusual way. For example, the discovery of

the wheel might have occurred when the human animal put together the scheme “rolling” with the scheme “unmoving” in a unique way by having a stable bed of wood undergirded with poles and slices of logs that could rotate.

The outcome of both (organic and cognitive) constructions is a new structure, and in Piagetian theory, it is usually assumed that such changes are advances or progressions over what had existed to that time. An animal better adapted to the physical world is improved over one not so endowed, and a reasoning human being who can reconstruct the world of natural forms can transform it to his or her liking. The essential point in both *organic* and *cognitive construction* is that the animal is actively involved in what comes about. Piaget dislikes the British Associationist account of behavior which merely assumes that the newborn child is a reactive mechanism having the capacity to know that when a stimulus occurs, it is spatially located either “over here” or “over there.”²⁸ To the contrary, says Piaget, “the perception of space involves a gradual construction and certainly does not exist ready made at the outset of mental development.”²⁹ The physical environment does, of course, impinge upon the developing person to influence what organic or cognitive structures will be formed, but there is also a reciprocity of structural formation. Reminding us at this point of Bandura (see Chapter 7), Piaget says: “Knowledge does not begin in the I, and it does not begin in the [physical] object; it begins in the interactions. . . . there is a reciprocal and simultaneous construction of the subject on the one hand and the object on the other.”³⁰

Cognition as Equilibrating Operations

Since mental activity (cognition) is a systematic process of constructing experience (making structures) through an interaction

with the physical world, Piaget must now propose terms that enable us to describe how this mutual interdependence of the subject (person) and object (environment) takes place. This is somewhat of a chicken-egg problem, difficult for all theorists to deal with. Few theorists of this volume (including Jung) have wanted to say that a person is born with all of his or her knowledge structured into understanding (innate ideas). Obviously, we all learn from living. The behaviorists of Part II are prone to emphasize the environment, but even they recognize that the organism must somehow process (pattern, order) the stimuli that are input, and Bandura in particular insisted upon the role of an active organism in reciprocal interaction with the environment. The phenomenologists of Part III have tended to put their emphasis on the person's conceptualizations, which are essentially what is meant by the phenomena, in preference to the independent reality, which is more on the side of the noumena. The phenomenal field of Rogers (Chapter 9), the world design of Binswanger (Chapter 10), or the personal constructs of Kelly (see below) all point to a kind of person-over-environment (phenomena over noumena) emphasis on the source of knowledge and understanding. Piaget is no real exception to this rule. He focuses on the person as actor and conceptualizer, but unlike the other phenomenologists, he insists on studying the biological basis of construction.

That is, the patterns of structure that the other phenomenologists of Part III accept as given in the phenomenal realm are said by Piaget to be derived from organic development. It is pointless to speak of a phenomenal field as ordered spatially in the newborn child, when, so far as Piaget is concerned, experimental evidence proves that children must construct their life space over a period of time. They achieve this by *beginning* with material or organic constructions and only later accom-

plish the structures known as the phenomenal field in their cognitive (mental) constructions. This heavy reliance on the psychobiological basis of phenomenal understanding sometimes leads to confusion among those who study Piaget. He seems to be saying that mind reduces to body, and therefore it is a kind of secondary phenomenon. Though one might argue that this is the practical outcome of his theory, Piaget at least does not want to suggest that mind or cognition reduces to the physical body. Mind has legitimacy in its own right, and through his uniting conception of construction, Piaget attempts to show how patterned structures occur at both the organic and the cognitive levels of existence. All he wants to do is remind the phenomenologists that their cognitive conceptions are not given at birth, but must in fact begin in the constructive capacities of the body as foreshadowed in the reflexive movements, the sensorimotor actions that we all bring with us biologically when we are born. The developmental course of construction is thus from body-to-mind *as a matter of fact!* What is important is to recognize the structuralism of this constructive process and not to try reducing one level (mind) to the other (body).

How then are we to think of the interaction between the person on the one hand and the environmental factors on the other? Piaget employs two concepts at this point, one of which frames on the person's influence on an understanding of the environment, and the other of which captures the environment's influence on the person. The first of these is *assimilation*, or the taking-in of the surrounding environment on the basis of an existing scheme or the more complex (whole-)structures they make up.³¹ From this point forward, we will refer simply to the schemes or schemata that people construct, recognizing but not mentioning that these more basic

structures can be combined into the larger whole-structures or structures proper discussed in the previous section. All organic life tends progressively to assimilate more and more of the surrounding environment as growth proceeds (for example, the chemical substances in foods and water are assimilated during development). In constructing structures at either the organic or the cognitive level, the organism is assimilating. Babies suck their thumb because they have assimilated this appendage to the schema of their mother's breast.³²

As children mature, they can assimilate all kinds of actions of others by drawing a sort of analogy between their schemata and the observed behaviors. Piaget calls this *prehension*, which is an early form of imitation that can occur without the use of language.³³ Another form of assimilation occurs, called the *circular reaction*, which Piaget describes as follows: "A circular reaction is a reproductive assimilation. It is the mechanism by which a scheme is developed. The child performs an action, is interested in the result, and repeats the same action again. . . . It is this repetition that engenders the scheme."³⁴ By repeating an action such as picking up a toy, the infant gradually differentiates the specific movements, structuring or constructing the schema of "picking up" as something distinctive from the schema of "reaching." Assimilation is, therefore, another way of talking about the construction process, a process that has two sides.

On the other side of the person-environment interaction we have *accommodation*, or the "remodification of behavior as a result of experience."³⁵ In this case, rather than making the environment fit the scheme already constructed, the person modifies the scheme to fit the environment. This is when

a new differentiation or combination is called for, because the person discovers that a scheme no longer fits the demands of reality too well. For example, a baby may observe someone's eyes close and open wide once again, and in trying to assimilate this, the baby may open and close his or her mouth.³⁶ The assimilation here is in error, and in order for the action to be imitated properly, the child will have to differentiate between a visual-action scheme and a mouth-action scheme. In making this accommodation, the child is drawing an analogy between mouth action and eye action, but the point is that through experience, a behavior has had to be modified and reschematized. In like fashion, throughout life we are forced to modify or transform our schemata in the face of new experience, as we learn that we cannot grasp the moon or that everything we place on water does not float.

Life is a continuing interplay of assimilation and accommodation in our growing cognitive understanding, and in order for our lives to be reasonably well adjusted, it is good for these two processes to be well coordinated.³⁷ There is a reciprocal interaction going on here, and if it is not balanced off reasonably well, the person can become rigidly fixed in schemata that are no longer reality-oriented, or conversely, can be readily swayed by irrelevancies in the environment. Piaget calls such reciprocal balancing relations *equilibrium*, which in this instance he would define as the compensatory adjustments made in personal action in response to intrusions from the external environment.³⁸ However, he has a much broader referent in mind in his equilibrium concept, one that covers both the physical and the psychological aspects of existence.

. . . *Equilibrium is . . . an intrinsic and constitutive property of organic and mental life. A pebble may be in states of stable, unstable,*

or indifferent equilibrium with respect to its surroundings and this makes no difference to its nature. By contrast, an organism [that is, living being] presents, with respect to its milieu, multiple forms of equilibrium, from postures to homeostasis.³⁹

Even so, Piaget places greatest emphasis on the equilibrium of assimilation and accommodation in his personality theory, because this is what he takes to be the course of improvement occurring in development. Thus, he can say, “. . . [the] developmental theory necessarily calls upon the concept of equilibrium, since all behavior tends toward assuring an equilibrium between internal and external factors or, speaking more generally, between assimilation and accommodation.”⁴⁰ In other words, as the maturing individual experiences *disequilibria*⁴¹ between the internal (assimilation) and the external (accommodation) relations of its functioning schemata, a *motive* is generated to rectify the disbalance. We will take up Piaget’s motivational constructs below, but for now we merely wish to demonstrate that, according to Piaget, in resolving the disequilibria successfully, the individual *necessarily* progresses, advances, that is, *develops* higher and higher levels of structure. Furthermore, according to Piaget, the equilibrations (acts bringing about equilibrium) that have been achieved in the past remain with the person, so that as life proceeds, the person who develops successfully should be more advanced than the person who does not. In general, adults, because of the very fact that they have *equilibrated* for years, are more advanced cognitively and emotionally than children.

Put another way, as we go along living our lives, we gradually work out a set of useful notions and points of view that fit our understanding of reality pretty well. We call this our knowledge or our intelligence. The four-year-old child has a shaky grasp of what

the concept of school or schooling means, but as the person develops over the years through elementary and secondary school education, an increasingly stable and also complex and sophisticated understanding of school develops. As we saw in the transformations of mathematics discussed in the previous section, higher-level thought always has this quality of being able to change relations without losing the identifiable structure (recall Heraclitus’ *logos* and the ever-changing river).

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Piaget’s entire approach to the study of cognition has borrowed heavily from the terminology used and reasoning processes followed by mathematicians. In fact, it is impossible to understand equilibrium fully without appreciating that the highest-level, most equilibrated structures in existence occur as the abstract concepts of mathematics. In discussing anything having to do with thought, we are, of course, referring to cognitive rather than organic constructions. We have left the realm of physical structures and are speaking of what are often called in psychology higher-level mental processes. Piaget employs four terms which will help us understand what he is driving at in suggesting that equilibration is a process of greater and greater stability even as shifting relations occur within the structure of the process. We shall take up in order these concepts of *transduction*, *reversibility*, *decentration*, and *operation*.

Ordinarily, in thinking, we employ cognitive processes known as *induction* and *deduction*. To induct is to move from a particular meaning to a general meaning—that is, make a generalization from a series of specific points. We induct when we find it difficult to hit a tennis ball, stumble awkwardly in running after a soccer ball, and gasp with fright in trying to swim, then conclude from

these particulars that “I am not athletic.” Later, when someone asks us to try golf, we may deduct from our generalization (“I am not athletic”) to a judgment on the particular prospect facing us and conclude, “I will be terrible on the golf links.” The question of accuracy is not at issue here. We may indeed be a poor athlete, or it may be that we have not yet found our sport. But in reasoning as we do, we are in effect moving up and down a hierarchy of levels of abstraction (see p. 20). We move from the particular (less abstract) to the general (more abstract) in inducting and vice versa in deducting. However, Piaget has found that early in life we also move from the particular to the particular, unable somehow to abstract in our more syncretic style of thought to construct a hierarchy of from lesser to more abstract meanings. Piaget calls this reasoning at the level of particulars *transduction*.⁴²

We would reason transductively if we played golf and found ourselves doing well at this sport, and concluded thereby that our tennis, soccer, or swimming skills had also improved. In other words, we would not have differentiated within the structured class of athletics the one sport in which we did well from the others in which we did not. Improving in one (particular), we assumed we improved in another (particular). Except for the brain-damaged or the mentally retarded, adults do not ordinarily reason transductively, but children always begin reasoning this way before they think more hierarchically by way of induction and deduction. Piaget gives as an example the case of a child who reasoned that if a hunchback had influenza and was cured of it, the first affliction would disappear as well.⁴³ Another way in which Piaget has defined *transduction* is as “reasoning without reversible nestings of a hierarchy of classes

and relations.”⁴⁴ The core word here is *reversible* for it relates to a concept Piaget framed very early in his studies on the development of cognitive constructions. Reversibility is another way of speaking about equilibrium, for when there is a permanent reciprocity existing between accommodation and assimilation so that distortion in a construction does not take place, we can speak of reversibility.⁴⁵ In other words, it would not matter whether we were looking at a construction from the point of view of the subject (assimilation) or the object (accommodation); both structures would work equally well.

Young children who think transductively cannot reverse in this fashion (the same is true for syncretic thought in general). They are unable to shift their point of view from what they perceive to be going on in their experience and think about the reverse possibilities that might be involved. Our child does not see a hunchback with a cold (two schemes) but merely a sick person (single scheme). In order for a more accurate understanding of the circumstances to arise, the child must be able to move beyond what he or she perceives—the sick-person schema—and look at it from another perspective. The child must move from assimilation to accept the possibility that an accommodation is called for, that something besides a sick-person schema is involved. Piaget refers to this breaking free from what we literally perceive in order to cognize, to *think* about the various aspects of what we perceive, as *decentration* (or the act of *decentering*). To be glued concretely to merely what is perceived (schematized) is called *centration* (or the act of *centering*). To be creative in reasoning, we have to decenter and lose our simplistic understandings of our external reality. When we decenter, we can improve our level of adjustment, because “decentration . . . results in equilibrium between assimilation and ac-

accommodation, an equilibrium which of necessity tends towards a reversible structure."⁴⁶

When a reversible structure exists in thought, this means we can turn it around in mind and look at it from all sides. Our child can essentially say, "Wait a minute. I have been thinking [assimilation] that 'sickness is sickness' but maybe looked at from that person's problems over there [accommodation], this is too simple. My point of view just may not fit the facts over there." This would be an example of *reciprocal reversibility*,⁴⁷ with the reciprocity (inverse relationship) taking place between assimilation and accommodation. Piaget also refers to *negational reversibility*.⁴⁸ In this case the person is capable of questioning his or her own viewpoints by essentially negating their certainty ("I could be wrong, maybe a hunchback isn't an illness like a cold after all") or by bringing the facts into question by negating them ("How do we know these so-called influenza symptoms aren't due to an allergy?"). Once we are able to do this, an important development occurs in cognition. "It is this freeing from perception that marks the beginning of operations properly so called, which are thus seen to be the result of the progressive reversibility of thought."⁴⁹

The concept of the *operation* or *operational thinking* summarizes in a way all of the cognitive constructs that have been advanced to this point in Chapter 11. This is as close as we get to saying "thought in action" or "cognition" in Piagetian theory. There are four characteristics of an operation.⁵⁰ It is an interiorized action, so that it can be carried out in thought as well as executed materially in physical behavior (that is, we are talking about cognitive as well as organic structures in referring to operations). An operation is a reversible action, so it can be enacted in opposite directions. Operations also have an invariant structure about them, retaining the identifiable characteristic of the system even

though they change relations through reversibility. Finally, no operation exists alone; it is always related to a system or total structure. This latter point is important because it tells us that operations are more than schemata and always involve a "co-ordination of differentiated actions within the framework of a single whole."⁵¹

As we shall see, operational thought begins at what Piaget will call a *concrete* level, one that is above transductive reasoning but that is still not very advanced (developed). The child will begin to interrelate different parts of a total pattern under consideration without yet attaining the definite mobility and complete reversibility of the more rational operations of the adult.⁵² The more rational thought becomes and the more it attains equilibrium (including the Heraclitian identity of form), the more *abstract* it becomes. And with this abstraction we witness an ever-increasing stability of organizational structure; in effect, thought becomes increasingly systematic. The highest levels of such abstraction occur in the operations of formal logic and/or mathematics.⁵³ The person can now think of multiplication as an "addition of additions," reflecting a beautifully reversible construction in which multiplication and addition are one, even though they are also kept separate in schematic organization. The critic might object that mathematical reasoning is not based on the motions of an action, but Piaget's fundamental assumption is that all mathematics arises from action patterns.

Mathematics for Piaget is simply the higher stages of biological evolution, a purely "man-made"⁵⁴ construction that defines relations among inanimate actions and provides a set of universal structures of great stability and reversibility. We human beings have

come by way of our structured beginnings in the organic constructions of life to this most abstract of all rational constructions, operating cognitively but in a remarkably transpersonal manner to give the best picture not only of inanimate reality, but of ourselves as human beings. Piaget's fundamental assumption about human nature, and the reason we have called him an evolutionary rationalist, may be seen in the following summation: "Hence the universe is known to man only through logic and mathematics, the product of his mind, but he can only know how he constructed mathematics and logic by studying himself psychologically and biologically, that is, in terms of the entire universe."⁵⁵

The Dynamics of Human Operations

We now have an understanding of Piaget's highly fluid conception of patterned orders (structures) taking form across all levels of life, beginning in the organic and evolving to ever-higher stages of stable identity and reversibility through equilibration. With this background, we can now review a number of concepts bearing on the higher-level operations—remembering always that when we speak of an operation, we are speaking of an interiorized structure, hence a *mental* organization of some pattern. Now, patterns exist independently of mind in physical reality. When the person has knowledge of an object from direct contact with it, Piaget calls this *perception*.⁵⁶ We perceive something like a house by constructing its image mentally through the act of interiorizing. Piaget has referred to *mental images* as "imitative schemata,"⁵⁷ in that they copy the structures of experience by actively rehearsing them again and again. We do not look and then take in a carbon copy of the world in our perceptual images (the same goes for hearing,

smelling, feeling, and so on). We actively construct a mental image, bringing it into greater stability and reversibility as we come to understand that which we perceive.⁵⁸ We think about houses. We picture ourselves going into and coming out of houses, both as we actually *do* enter and leave, but also later in our imagination.

The fact that we can think about things like houses even when we are not perceiving them (no house is directly present) signifies that we have *represented* these schemata in mind. *Representation* or imagination is not only active when we are away from houses, of course. To represent an object in mind when it is present is the same operation as representing an object in mind when it is absent.⁵⁹ Here is where we find a decidedly phenomenological emphasis in Piagetian theory. He does not want to say that we use our active imagination in thoughts *only* when we are not in direct contact with environmental objects (people, things, weather conditions outside, and so on). We constantly use our imaginations in constructing our knowledge of the perceived world. Of course, being able to represent this world allows us to go beyond the present situation facing us, extending our cognitions (thoughts) out into both space and time.⁶⁰ We can place ourselves into the past or the future, jump over in mind from where we *are* to where we *might be* in location.

Since representation tends to bring in (interiorize) the external world to the cognitive sphere of understanding, we can also see it as a form of accommodation.⁶¹ That is, even though there is always the equilibrating interaction of assimilation and accommodation going on, the basic thrust of representation is to accommodate the mental schemata to *something else*. A representation represents something else. Piaget would say that as representation becomes increasingly abstract, we can begin speaking of *concepts* taking place in mind, rather than images.⁶² That is, as we

begin to equilibrate at higher levels of thought, our operations lose that tie to perception that they once had. We have perceived many houses, but now in thinking about the concept "house," we might begin getting all kinds of ideas about what a house might be someday. We might even redesign the typical house and come up with something that does not even look like the actual houses we have perceived in the past. In order to do so, we would have to decenter and, through higher-level conceptions based on reversible operations, dream up an alternative in our mind which is entirely creative. To the extent that we center on perceptions, our representations remain very rigid and concrete, and therefore they are unlikely to be very creative or innovative.

Representations thus make intelligent *thought* possible, and in turn: "It is operations that are the essence of thought . . . it is of the nature of operations continually to construct something new."⁶³ Operations copy not the form of objects per se, but rather the form of our actions on objects. Thought is a continuous series of constructions in which the hierarchical classes, groupings, and systems of knowledge gradually evolve over the years of maturation from childhood to adulthood.⁶⁴ *Mind* is therefore a continuing process of constructive activity with a large amount of self-construction involved.⁶⁵ We will discuss the role of self below, as an aspect of the motivational constructs in Piagetian theory. As we shall see, Piaget does accept the role of an identity factor in human behavior. People construct their worlds, and they construct a picture of themselves within this complexity of interlacing factors. The natural attitude of the mind is to be credulous, that is, to believe everything that is perceived and constructed as basically true.⁶⁶ Young children demonstrate this most clearly. It is not until later that doubt creeps in (via reciprocal or negational reversibility), and it is some

time before the young person can understand what it means to look at things hypothetically.

Having seen how Piaget accepts a phenomenological theme, we might now demonstrate the reverse instance. This arises when Piaget tells us: ". . . there are no innate structures in the human mind which simply come into being . . . all our mental structures must be constructed."⁶⁷ This position would directly contradict what some existentialists call the *a priori ontological structure* (see p. 634). The gestalt laws of organization are also interpreted by many psychologists to exist mentally as an aspect of human nature from birth (see p. 568). Though Piaget realizes that assimilation must come before accommodation in all circular reactions—because to accommodate means a previous schema exists and this "implies assimilation"⁶⁸—he also contends that the very *first* time a scheme is organized (in early life), this process is based on the copying of a *biological structure*. Mind begins by accommodating bodily constructions which assimilate at the organic level. For example, a common organic assimilation is that of taking in food nourishment. We might say that the infant accommodates this taking-in organic scheme to an interiorized mental assumption by credulously believing all that is perceived is true ("taken-in" as perceived without doubt).

There *are* innate bodily structures in the form of sensorimotor actions called reflexes. The sucking response is one such example, and so from birth, the child begins to suck at the mother's breast automatically and then later assimilates to this action (as we have noted above) his or her thumb. Looked at this way, the mind may be said to imitate or learn from the innate structures of the body. Mind qua mind has no innate structures of its own, but the body in turn has no opera-

tions. Bodily constructions are not operational. They lack the reversibility and the stability of form that we have seen characterizes abstract levels of thought. Hence, in time as we mature, we all literally create a sphere of cognitive understanding which makes us more than strictly organic organisms. Indeed, our mental operations take on greater importance in our personal lives and for humanity as a whole than the innate organic structures on the basis of which they have been patterned.

This treatment of how mind organizes from the innate structures of body is unique and stamps Piaget as a theorist apart from the mainstream of the phenomenological-existential school—a school to which he is nevertheless closer than either psychoanalysis or behaviorism. When Piaget uses the term *behavior*, he couches it in light of the basic terminology we have been considering. Thus, he observes that “every behavior . . . has two poles: assimilation to earlier schemas and accommodation of these schemas to new situations.”⁶⁹ Behavior is action, and it therefore bears a necessary relation to the entire process of beginning life in sensorimotor construction and moving through development to the cognitive operations of mind. Behavior also involves motives and valued goals, but as these are properly motivational conceptions, we will put them off for consideration below.

Piaget would say that what is generally called *intelligence* consists of establishing permanent relations between schema that cover greater and greater spatiotemporal intervals. Our representations extend across various perceptions and organize into a stable, permanent understanding of what seems related to what, or how one event bears an implication

for another event.⁷⁰ Implications reach for the future and therefore we call intelligent those actions that order future lines of behavior. We can plan our actions and anticipate their outcomes before they even take place when we behave intelligently. Piaget has no faith in so-called IQ tests, feeling that though statistical findings of a person’s performance on various tasks in relation to other people’s performances may have a practical benefit in prediction, they never tell us anything about the operations involved in doing these IQ tasks.⁷¹ This interest in how the person actually accomplishes a task, remembers, organizes, and so on, is what got Piaget started on his long career as genetic epistemologist.

The emphasis on permanence in relations among schema in Piaget’s view of intelligence is important, because this is what he means by *conservation*, a characteristic of operational thought he has studied in great detail. Piaget reminds us that every notion we have in common sense of a lasting value presupposes a fixed or set structure, a permanence in definition.⁷² For example, when we discussed the constancy principle in Chapter 1 (see p. 52), its fundamental idea was that something (force) remains permanent in a closed system. If we look at other widely accepted scientific principles like that of inertia or consider moral precepts like the Golden Rule, what gives them meaning is the fact that we can all grasp a permanent, unchanging given that retains its structure, even though we may apply this organization to different specific instances. We may speak of inertia as it affects the rolling wheels of a racing automobile or the tumbling of a rock down a sloping hill. Treating others as we would have them treat ourselves may serve as a principle in relating to people of all ages, races, and sexual identities. The principles do not change. Piaget believes that it is this tendency for thought to take on such permanent conceptual organizations that gives the exis-

tentialistic-phenomenological theorist the impression that there are a priori organizations in thought.⁷³

For example, in the history of mathematics, it so happened that both Newton and Leibniz discovered the differential calculus independently of each other. We might be tempted to conclude from this that there were a priori organizations in mind necessitating such a discovery, no matter who did the thinking. Piaget, on the other hand, would hold that it was because of the developmental evolution of higher-level operations that this common discovery was possible. Both Newton and Leibniz, beginning as children and following the leads of other thinkers who had already constructed certain stable (conserved) mathematical structures, carried this evolutionary process forward to its natural and necessary end state. This development was not an *effect* of an a priori structure but rather a *point of arrival* following a long period of construction. More than one mind could make the journey to arrive where it did, but the end state of *permanent* (conserved) mathematical order was evolved nevertheless.

We have now seen Piaget both agree and disagree with aspects of the phenomenological-existentialistic theoretical line. We have also suggested that Piaget is clearly not a behavioristic theorist, since he believes that stimulus input would never directly influence behavior until after it had been constructed and equilibrated. This would seem to remove Piagetian theory from any hint of being mechanistic. However, as we noted in the introductory comments to this chapter (p. 668), it so happens that Piaget does embrace cybernetic theory, a point of view that many personologists believe is not truly compatible with his otherwise more humanistic orientation. The feature of cybernetics that attracts Piaget is the *feedback loop*. Recall from Chapter 7 (p. 480) that feedback occurs when a

portion of the output from a computer returns as input to the computer, so that there is a possibility for adaptation to changing circumstances.

For example, a robot employing the mechanisms of cybernetics might have its core electrical computer send output to its "legs" indicating a move to the left. Now, part of this output message would also return as input to the core computer, so that if the legs bumped something while underway, this new message of "getting bumped" in conjunction with "moving left" would combine as new input to the computer. In this case, thanks to the computer's program, a new output could be sent to the legs, like "back up and move ahead to the right" or some such. Without the additional feedback of "moving left," the computer might have continued sending the legs to the left in an ineffective effort to get past whatever the obstacle was. Feedback is essential information if an ongoing process is to modify or regulate its course while continually underway.

Piaget has concluded that feedback is essentially the same thing he had earlier called the circular reaction of the equilibration process, and the reason he holds out hope of uniting his theory with cybernetics is because he believes that both approaches deal with the question of self-regulation in an ongoing process. In discussing his construct of equilibration, Piaget once said:

Now I did not use cybernetic terminology when I began talking of this factor, but nonetheless since the beginning I have insisted that it was not a balance of opposing forces, a simple case of physical equilibrium but that it was a self-regulation. And of course today cybernetics is precisely that, the study of self-regulating models.⁷⁴

Piaget does not delude himself into thinking that human beings are identical to robots or computers, of course: “. . . even if we could build a maximally complex computer and keep using it over and over again, this computer will never change. But the human mind with all its complexity continues to actually grow with use. It becomes more complicated.”⁷⁵ Computers cannot invent problems as the human being can. Even so, as a description of the underlying mechanisms of both organic and cognitive constructions—interacting assimilations and accommodations—the feedback model is helpful, and therefore Piaget intends to use it.⁷⁶

*Genetic Epistemology as
Evolutionary Rationalism*

We can now look in more detail at what Piaget means by *genetic epistemology*, beginning with the dictionary definitions of the two words making up this phrase. The adjective *genetic* refers to the origins, development, and antecedents of something. For example, if we were to study the biochemical determinants of hereditary transmission from parent to child, we would be studying the genetic code. The noun *gene* refers to such a determining element in the germ plasm, controlling hereditary transmission like this. The noun *epistemology* refers to the study or theory of the nature and grounds of knowledge, including such topics as the limits and validity of what we know. Putting these two terms together, we can understand why Piaget defines *genetic epistemology* as the study of “both the formation and the meaning of knowledge.”⁷⁷

Piaget’s specific definition of *genesis* combines the meanings of antecedents, transformations, and increasing stability, as follows:

*We can define genesis as a relatively determined system of transformations comprising a history and leading in a continuous manner from state A to state B, state B being more stable than the initial state and constituting an extension of it. For example, in biology, ontogenesis leads to the relatively stable state of adulthood.*⁷⁸

We have discussed ontogeny in Chapter 1 (see p. 65); it relates to the developmental study of an organism through stages, from conception through *in utero* maturation, and after birth, through childhood to adulthood (maturity). Piaget holds that the course of this development is one of moving from structure to structure, in which there is a *formative transition* from an unstable, weaker to a more stable, stronger structure.⁷⁹ It is therefore correct to say that for Piaget, development is synonymous with progress.

We see a heavy biological emphasis in Piaget’s theory of development, but this is not precisely an emphasis on the physical matter being transmitted from one human generation to the next—like germ plasm, for example. Though we find Piaget saying in one context that his aim is to “uncover the psychogenetic and biological roots of thought,”⁸⁰ in another context he emphasizes that “knowledge is not predetermined in heredity; it is not predetermined in the things around us—in knowing things around him the subject always adds to them.”⁸¹ In other words, though human beings have organic structures which undoubtedly have evolved and which are influenced by genetic codes carried by the very protoplasm of parent to offspring, the structures of thought—knowledge—are *not* so transmitted. Even though the thought of children bears a resemblance to the thought of primitive peoples and the thought of adults bears an identity to the thought of the ancient Greeks, and so on, this is not proof that we have inherited our thought processes or

that children are re-enacting a primitive time of the race (ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny; see p. 65). Piaget suggests that quite the reverse is true, because "since all men, including 'primitive men,' started by being children, childhood thinking preceded the thought of our most distant ancestors just as it does our own!"⁸²

The study of genetic epistemology must be seen as a scientific study in its own right, calling for interdisciplinary contributions but never fully accounted for by related fields, such as biology. Since, according to Piaget, mind begins its development by interiorizing the structures of the body, it is here that the biological roots of thought may be said to occur. Biology has a contribution to make to genetic epistemology, but it is a vain hope to expect that thought can be explained in terms of physical matter. Genetic epistemology teaches that the mind is constructed by its own actions, primitive and unstable at first, but in time increasingly stabilized, conserved, and reversible—made better and better, thanks to the actions of the person on the source of knowledge in the environment. The person constructs mind like the artist constructs a work of art. Beginning with malleable clay, an artist continually molds and shapes, modifies and reworks the form of his or her artistic production, adding details, looking at it from all sides, and in time completing it by achieving the best (strongest, most stable, and so on) form of the work possible. The clay is then baked and in time, a bronze statue is cast, further strengthening the artist's conceptualization. In like fashion, the evolution of mind is an active process of shaping and reshaping knowledge until that stability in abstraction we outlined above is achieved.

Piaget refers to his style of theorizing as *constructivism*. He has a *constructive theory* of cognitive structure.⁸³ We have called his approach an *evolutionary rationalism* because

of the unique way in which he rests mind on body, *not* as a direct outgrowth of physical matter, but as a developmental patterning over and beyond the physical structures to achieve the reliability and reproducibility of rational thought. The highest form of rationality is achieved in logic and/or mathematics, and for Piaget these are the virtual end points of a lifelong evolutionary process reproduced in the thinking of every person, whether or not the fruits of such thinking are codified and recorded in textbooks. Of course, not everyone would evolve an understanding of higher mathematics, but presumably the potential for such development is "there" for the developing in all human beings. It is always to some extent up to the person.

In fact, Piaget's conception of evolution allows for the possibility that changes in physical structure might be affected by the actions of the behaving organism and genetically transmitted. Piaget once studied a pond snail (*Limnaea stagnalis*) which he found making certain movements during growth that resulted in an altered physical structure (phenotype), which combined with its genetic species characteristics (genotype) to be transmitted through heredity to succeeding generations.⁸⁴ This Lamarckian theme in Piaget's work has been supported by the writings of the eminent naturalist and evolutionary theorist E. H. Waddington, who refers to such interactions of heredity and what the organism does in actually adapting to the environment as *genetic assimilation*.⁸⁵ Waddington has also demonstrated that in documented cases, animals have been known to change environmental locations *not* because of any pressing need to migrate (such as hunger, temperature extremes, and so on) but simply because they "chose" to do so.⁸⁶

Though Piaget has theoretical reservations about using words like *choice* in his theory (see our discussion of his self construct, below), this view of an organism interacting with its environment to bring about changes is very helpful to his constructivist position. Evolution or development becomes a two-way street, influenced by physical (hereditary) genesis but also by cognitive (behavioral) genesis. Lower animals construct their physical structures by assimilation and accommodation just as higher animals construct their rational cognitive structures by assimilation and accommodation. Piaget's theoretical constructs can hold "up and down" the levels of animal evolution. And when we look more closely at the constructions of mind, we find Piaget standing against the behavioristic type of explanation in which it is said that mind "inputs" schematic structures from reality in ready-made fashion. Though Piaget may use the language of cybernetics in trying to capture the self-regulatory nature of human thinking, he never forgoes that phenomenological insistence upon the mind as having the capacity to organize its *own* schemata.

This is why Piaget can say that "development is more fundamental than learning"⁸⁷ in the construction of schemata. The person does not learn cognitive operations in the same way that language is learned. *Learning* is a concept that characterizes the ongoing equilibrations of the ever-improving schemata over the years.⁸⁸ There would be no learning possible unless the organism did not already possess this native or innate capacity to structure experience. The structures that result are not innately programmed, of course, which would mean that we are back to a heredity explanation. What is innate is strictly the active process of construction. Evolutionary de-

velopment then takes off from here to wend its progressive way upward to the abstract levels of rational thought. Piaget rejects theories of behavior like Dollard and Miller's (see Chapter 5) that suggest that we learn to reason rationally or logically as we are being taught our native language.⁸⁹ Language is the content of mind, mere verbal instrumentalities that we use to express knowledge. Logical reasoning on the other hand reflects the active patterning of this knowledge, quite aside from the specific content that is being ordered and conveyed.⁹⁰ Even a person reared in the wilds of nature who had never learned a language would reflect a logic in his or her crudely unstable cognitive operations. Hence, just as we will not find the roots of mind exclusively in the protoplasm of hereditary transmission, so too will we not find it exclusively in the input shapings of sociocultural instructions. As genetic epistemologists we must fashion our own theory rather than borrowing quick and ready explanations from other bodies of knowledge in the scientific community.

Motivational Constructs

Behavior as Teleonomic

Piaget uses the term *behavior* to cover all those instances in which an organism is seeking to change the outside world in some way or to change its own position in relation to surroundings.⁹¹ Such adjustments are seen across the full range of equilibrating developments. "At the lowest level, behavior amounts to no more than sensorimotor actions (perceptions and movements in conjunction); at the highest, it embraces ideational internalizations, as in human intelligence, where action extends into the sphere of mental operations."⁹² The more complex behavior becomes the more it presupposes intelligence, and above all, the more it implies that a mo-

tive and/or a goal will be involved in the observed action.⁹³ Piaget uses the adjective *teleonomic* to describe the fact that behavior is goal oriented. It is a mistake to believe that because the body suffers from a biochemical lack, this insufficiency can bring about behavior. Not until this disequilibrium is both sensed physiologically and oriented toward a goal can we speak of the actions occurring as genuine *behavior*.

Behavior is not centered on survival; to the contrary, it has decentered from the aim of "just getting by" both to expand the environmental range within which the organism behaves and to facilitate the organism's mastery of this environment.⁹⁴ Behavior is action par excellence. Whether we think of the wild animal roaming through the forest in search of food or the human being coming alive intellectually in going to school, all behavior moves outwardly to assimilate more and more experience. As long as this mastery occurs without a hitch, we can speak of *adaptation* or adjustment in the organism's behavior.⁹⁵ In this case, equilibration is moving along nicely as development proceeds. If a disequilibrium occurs in behavior, then we can consider this a *need* of the organism.⁹⁶ This term is used when the disequilibration is not severe or chronic. Marie is not presently liked by her peer group in school. As a new student who has just moved into the school district, she has yet to prove herself to the other students. Marie is *disequilibrated* and needs to accommodate to the fact that the other children expect her to do more than simply be polite to them. She has to relate more personally to them, play with them, and reveal herself as a regular person. If she does indeed make this accommodation, Marie's need for acceptance will be resolved. If she does not, if she is for some reason unable to adapt, then her disequilibration will become chronic, and we could refer to Marie as *maladapted* or *maladjusted*.

Personality as a System

Thus far we have made it appear that emotional schemata do not occur, but this is not true. Piaget uses the term *affection* rather than emotion, but he makes it quite clear that all thinking is shot through with the interests and biases of emotional schemata, and that we must always consider the ongoing actions of affective equilibration in human behavior.⁹⁷ Affective schemes are harder to generalize than intellectual schemes. There is an energetic quality about affective schemata, which makes them distinctively different from the purely structural role intellectual or cognitive schemata play in thoughts.⁹⁸ Affections get us going and orient our teleonomic behavior in relation to the ends we seek. As Piaget summarizes it:

*Affectivity is the motor of any conduct. But affectivity does not modify the cognitive structure. Take two school children for example. One who loves mathematics, who is interested and enthusiastic, and anything else you wish; and the other who has feelings of inferiority, dislikes the teacher, and so forth. One will go much faster than the other, but for both of them two and two makes four in the end. It doesn't make three for the one who doesn't like it and five for the one who does. Two and two are still four.*⁹⁹

We see here Piaget's clear distinction between the structural demands of purely logical operations like arithmetic and the affective operations of how much these necessary patterns are liked or disliked by the individual who must at some point confront them. If we add to these two schemata the sensorimotor patternings that take place early in life, we have pretty well covered the range of operations we are likely to see in a person's total

behavioral pattern. This is what Piaget means by the *personality* in general—that is, the total system of interrelating schemata and operations thereby which occur across the sensorimotor, intellectual, and affective levels.¹⁰⁰ Piaget also uses the term *personality* more specifically to mean a person's character, that is, the capacity the person has to willfully pursue a valued course of action when tempted to disregard it. We will return to this specific usage below, when we discuss Piaget's theory of development and in particular his self construct (see p. 702).

We come now to a problem in the understanding of Piaget's theory, which stems from the general way in which he uses the concept of construction. In suggesting as he does that there are material (organic) as well as psychological (cognitive) constructions, we are left with the problem of wondering what perspective to take in thinking about this constructive process. Do we think about it as happening *to* the organism (extraspectively; see p. 21)? Or do we think of the constructive action as occurring from the point of view of the behaving organism (introspectively), who brings it to bear in the sense of Binswanger's world-designs (see p. 634) or Kelly's personal constructs (see p. 713)?

Our problem here is like watching the growth of a tree versus a person. The tree matures and grows branches with leaves which assimilate nourishment from the sun even as the tree's roots assimilate nourishment from the earth. These physical processes may indeed be patterned and active in constructive organization, because trees must accommodate to weather and soil conditions even as they assimilate nourishment according to already established structures like leaves and roots. But the growing person, who patterns mental operations on the physical constructions of his or her body, is doing so in a different sense.

To understand what is taking place, we must necessarily look *through* the cognitions of the actively constructing intellect in a way that is impossible to do in understanding the equilibrating processes of trees or human (physical) bodies. We may use a single word like *construction* to describe both physical (organic) and mental (cognitive) processes of equilibration through the construction of structure, but this does not alter the fact that there are major differences in how we must understand what appears to be taking place. Without denying that both forms of construction do take place, we are still left with this puzzle.

A major difference between trees or bodily physical actions (like digestion) and what we call the person or personality is, of course, the possibility of *self-direction* in behavior. Common sense suggests that people are agents directing their behavior, and by using the word *teleonomic* to describe behavior, Piaget certainly implies that he considers people to be agents. This is a central tenet of the phenomenological outlook of Part III. And yet, Piaget is not really sympathetic with an *agency* interpretation of human behavior. He does not want to hypostatize (make real) something he considers to be a construction by the person moving from *organic* to *cognitive constructions*. That is, a *self*, or *cognitive self*, as Piaget sometimes calls it, is itself a schema framed by operational thinking. At birth, Piaget believes the baby and the physical environment are not yet differentiated, so that there is no sense of I versus the world in the cognitive processes of the infant.¹⁰¹ In order to gain some sense of a self—a continuity of I-ness—the child must in time come to construct this self-concept, and this can only occur through the usual processes of assimilation and accommodation. Earliest thought is said to be *egocentric*, by which is meant the fact that children cannot differentiate between their thoughts and

themselves as thinkers nor can they grasp what is make-believe and what is real, much less the difference between their point of view and the viewpoints of others.¹⁰²

The fact that the child's earliest thought is egocentric does not mean that he or she has an ego in the sense suggested by Freud's theory. This concept of egocentricity is more the observer's term, applied to the child's cognitive style in capturing its essentials. Of course, as already noted, in time children construct a cognitive self-image, a picture of themselves in relation to others. But since this self-concept is the *result* and not the cause of assimilation-accommodation in equilibration, we have difficulty assigning true agency to the personality of the individual. Construction in assimilation and accommodation leading to equilibrations over childhood maturation take place automatically, even though they are not mechanical in the sense of behavioristic theory. It is as if, in describing the processes of self-regulation in feedback and equilibration or disequilibrium, Piaget has kept a true self-directedness out of his theory whether he intended doing so or not.

We can think of a robot as teleonomic in that everything it does—its behavior—is goal oriented. But in achieving its equilibrations, does the robot know that *it* as an identity (self) exists and that it is carrying forward intentional actions? Obviously not. Robots lack such self-reflexive intelligence even when we program them to make statements "sounding" like they are aware of "themselves." The same can be said of Piagetian personality theory, particularly in light of the following wherein the term *organs* is used to describe mental equilibration as essentially a mechanism:

The organism has special organs of equilibrium. The same is true of mental life, whose organs of equilibrium are special regulatory mechanisms. This is so at all levels of

*development, from the elementary regulations of motivation (needs and interests) up to will for affectivity and from perceptual and sensorimotor regulations up to operations for cognition.*¹⁰³

At a more subtle theoretical level, Piaget's attitude regarding the use of anything smacking of a finalistic (final-cause) explanation in science is quite negative. For example, in his study of children's understanding of causation, he found again and again that they attributed intentions to inanimate structures, so that they would say the sun was causing the rain today much as their mothers might water potted plants. Piaget interprets these anthropomorphic explanations as not true causal explanations; that is, he will not accept final causation as a legitimate construct (see p. 5). He prefers to call such explanations *precausal*, which he interprets as a "primitive" view of reality in which the person has not yet differentiated psychological motivations (à la egocentric thought) from the natural causation of a scientific form of description.¹⁰⁴ Unlike Adler, Piaget does not wish to be considered a theorist who uses finalistic explanations.¹⁰⁵ It is this continuing commitment to the traditional explanations of hard science that keeps Piaget from introducing more decidedly teleological concepts into his theory. Behavior is always seated in the interacting equilibrations of assimilation and accommodation which, according to basic Piagetian tenets, occurs with or without a self identity in the personality structure.

Conscious versus Unconscious Cognitions

Piaget states flatly that "all thought, even the most rational, is both conscious and unconscious."¹⁰⁶ *Consciousness* arises in personality

when the environmental situation in which the person finds himself or herself blocks some ongoing activity. Children act in accordance with their needs and everything takes place without conscious awareness of the equilibrations going on until there is a frustration arising (see a comparable theme in Piaget's treatment of will below, p. 699). Food is wanted and mother is not there to provide it, or a toy is reached for but it is too far outside the playpen's confining limits to grasp. Each of these frustrating circumstances serves to focus the child's attention on the reasons for the disequilibrium rather than simply on the desired goal (food, toy). This in turn generates a sense of consciousness and as the behaviors of life extend in maturation, a growing sense of consciousness will occur because of the inevitable frustrations life brings about.

When reasons for the frustration are examined, the child must eventually recognize that something like a self "over here" wants to obtain something else "over there." These preliminary schemata are what begin ordering into a system of what we then call consciousness. The self-image therefore parallels development of consciousness. In line with what we discussed in the previous section, Piaget does not really place much emphasis on the role of consciousness in behavior. He does not believe that consciousness is an essential focus of concern for psychology because: ". . . the task of psychology is not the explanation of the working of the nervous system in terms of consciousness of behaviour, but rather the analysis of the evolution of behaviour. That is to say, the way in which a perception, for example, depends on past perceptions and conditions subsequent ones."¹⁰⁷

Piaget rejects psychoanalytical interpretations of *unconscious symbolism*, believing that Freud confused the contents of symbols

with the primitive, egocentric schemata that children were constructing when they framed these so-called symbols.¹⁰⁸ Indeed, Piaget presented a paper on this very point at the 1922 conference of the International Psychoanalytical Association,¹⁰⁹ at which Freud was present. Piaget argued that his studies found all childish thinking to be syncretic and pre-logical, and therefore so-called unconscious symbols could be found in a child's statements even while awake. Piaget views the *symbol* as a special form of scheme, in which the *signifier* (name of a thing) has been differentiated from the *object signified* (the thing named).¹¹⁰ When this occurs, the person uses the object as a means of symbolic adaptation to reality. For example, Monique might use a little box to symbolize a cat in her play. She has differentiated the image of the thing we call a box (signified object) from the word *box* (signifier) and can now use the former as a symbol for a cat walking across the floor. Piaget would call this a *primary symbol* because Monique is conscious of her playful representation.¹¹¹

However, in another context, Monique might employ a *secondary symbol*, in which case she would be unconscious of its role in her behavior. Assume that Monique had been made jealous by the birth of a younger sister and is playing one day with two dolls of unequal size. In her play, we observe that Monique has the smaller doll go away on a long journey while the larger doll stays home with mother (Monique may pretend that she is mother). The larger doll may then be made to pet the cat as represented by the box, demonstrating as Piaget contends that conscious and unconscious thought goes on side by side. The distinction between conscious and unconscious behavior is always a matter of degree, and consequently, it is also true that "symbols cannot be classified once and for all as either primary or secondary."¹¹²

As for the Freudian construct of *repres-*

sion, Piaget would say that this occurs when the person refuses to accept what reality demands in the way of an accommodation and persists in assimilating reality to an egocentric schema which is unadaptive. For example, Marcel soon learns upon going to school that he can no longer have things entirely his own (egocentric) way. He cannot always have first turn in kicking a soccer ball, but must share this advantage with the other boys. If he does not accommodate to this demand of reality, but instead loses interest in soccer and begins to occupy his time in bullying younger children on the playground, pretending egocentrically that he has real leadership ability and even popularity, we would witness a case of repression taking place. Piaget does not see why we need to believe there is a censor within the personality to understand such unconscious behavior. The dynamics are clear enough. "A repressed tendency is by definition deprived of accommodation, and therefore dissociated from the conscious ego. If, in spite of this, it seeks support, it can only be by way of egocentric and unconscious assimilation, i.e., by means of a symbolic substitute."¹¹³

Another type of unconsciousness that may be seen in behavior stems from the fact that cognitive operations are based on physical constructions, and the latter may be at work without benefit of the former. Children will often know something in action as a *sensorimotor* kind of *intelligence*, yet not know it cognitively in awareness.¹¹⁴ Andrea, a kindergartner, has outstanding ability to jump rope. She has a knack of moving into and leaving the rope area which ensures that she will almost never be caught by it, no matter how quickly it is rotated by the other girls. Andrea is unable to describe her technique of rope-skipping because she is totally unaware of the fact that she has one. Her behavior has been constructed at the sensorimotor level, but it has not yet been made operational.

When it is, Andrea will be able to offer an opinion on what she does to avoid being caught by the rope. Such "unconscious" sensorimotor learnings take place in adulthood as well, although they do not represent nearly the proportion of total behavior that they do in childhood. Sometimes the course of learning is in the opposite direction from operational thought to sensorimotor construction. Driving an automobile is a case in point. At first, we learn by concentrating on every move, but in time, as sensorimotor intelligence (motoric construction) takes over, we are able to drive the automobile without really thinking about it.

Piaget is distrustful of the analytical method of discovery and proof, whereby a patient recalls past occurrences and assumes that they are true. He tells of a very precise, detailed, and lively personal memory he still has of an attempted kidnapping in his early childhood. He can see in his mind's eye his nurse struggling with the kidnapper, the arrival of a passerby, and the eventual appearance of the police. It was not until he was fifteen years old that his former nurse wrote to his parents and confessed that the story was a hoax, made up to account for some scratches on Piaget's forehead which occurred because she had been derelict in her nursing duties. How did this clear memory arise? Piaget suggests:

. . . About the age of five or six, I must have heard the story of this kidnapping which my parents then believed and, using this story, I invented a visual memory which today still remains. This then is a matter of reconstruction, although false, and if the event had really occurred and consequently if the memory were true, it is quite probable that I would also have reconstructed it in the same manner, for no memory of evocation

*(but only one of recognition) exists for a baby in its carriage.*¹¹⁵

We are always interacting with our past in this way, so that *memory* is never a matter of holding fixed contents in mind, like carbon copies of what really occurred. Memory is an active reconstruction, bringing alive past constructions into ever-new constructions.¹¹⁶

Piaget views the *dream* as comparable to symbolic play, but with the additional proviso that the self or ego consciousness is lost.¹¹⁷ Games are more deliberately controlled, whereas dreams carry the person beyond the point to which consciousness would ordinarily want to go. Almost anything is fair game to the dream. Piaget does not object to the view that dreams may be *wish fulfillments*, as long as we appreciate that a wish is nothing more than the person's effort to assimilate reality to the self or the ego (the two terms mean roughly the same thing). Wishing is like hoping that something desired really will happen, and in dreams we occasionally pretend that these desired goals really *do* happen. In certain cases, those accommodations that have been turned aside as so-called repressions may turn up as assimilations in the dream. Marcel might dream that he and only he is kicking the soccer ball around the playground as the other boys watch and applaud his skill. In having this wish fulfilled, Marcel is assimilating without regard for reality accommodations, because the boys would never permit him to do this nor would they applaud his clumsy kicking efforts.

Time-Perspective Constructs

Piaget is probably best known for his empirical studies of the development of various

physical and mental characteristics, such as sensorimotor intelligence; the knowledge of space, number, and chance; moral concerns; play patterns; dreaming; imitation of others, and so on. In each of these researches, Piaget may be seen breaking development down into a series of stages and substages, ranging usually from three to six in number. Piaget insists that before we speak of a *stage of development*, four characteristics must be evident: (1) there must be a constant and orderly succession of acquired behaviors over time; (2) an integration of these behaviors must take place across succeeding levels; (3) this integration must have the quality of a completion of earlier development but also a preparation for further development; and (4) there must be a sense of totality as a whole structure rather than there being simply piecemeal or minor changes taking place.¹¹⁸ Keeping these criteria in mind, we can consider Piaget's overall theory which can be said to have three major periods of development—infancy, childhood, and adolescence. Childhood is broken down into early and later stages so that on occasion, students of Piaget will refer to his developmental theory as containing four major stages.¹¹⁹ The main point for our purposes is to catch the continuing flow of action across the three or four levels of development to which we now turn.

Infancy: Birth to Age Two Years

This first major stage of life is sometimes called the prelanguage period, and it could be broken down into as many as six substages if we wanted to follow each specific nuance. We will, however, follow the drift of Piaget's explanations of his experiments in terms of three succeeding substages which he has on occasion used in his writings to capture the main characteristics of infancy. Keep in mind that at each level equilibration and (physical) construction is taking place.

Reflex Action. At birth, the infant's behavior is completely unconscious and limited to the exercises of *reflexes*, the major one of which is sucking. Piaget notes that considered mentally, for the infant "the world is essentially a thing to be sucked."¹²⁰ Sucking action is therefore used schematically to assimilate other objects to it, such as the thumb in place of mother's breast, and so on. There is no proper mental life going on in this period, because only the basic motor schemata are active. Of course, as Piaget reminds us, the reflex is the "forerunner of mental assimilation"¹²¹ because the mind will be patterned on such structures as constructions move from the organic to the cognitive.

*Every realm of sensorimotor reflex organization is the scene of particular assimilations extending . . . physicochemical assimilation . . . [and] these behavior patterns, inasmuch as they are grafted on hereditary tendencies, from the very beginning find themselves inserted in the general framework of the individual organization [that is, organic scheme]; that is to say, before any acquisition of consciousness, they enter into the functional totality which the organism constitutes.*¹²²

Organization of Percepts and Habits. Gradually, the child learns to thumb-suck in a more systematic way and also to turn his or her head in the direction of a sound. From about the fifth week on, children begin smiling in response to interpersonal prompts from their parents, and in time during this substage, the child will come to recognize certain persons as distinct from others. Piaget calls the equilibrating assimilations and accommodations taking place over these early months of life *reflex cycles*.¹²³ Such reflex cycles will develop into circular reactions because the child develops an interest in some activity and repeats it automatically. Thus, the infant of a few months of age finds that

the head-turning action is workable and begins repeating it; or the child may look about to recognize people again and again. Piaget calls such beginning practice of actions based on reflexive patternings *reproductive assimilation*,¹²⁴ because in reproducing the action, the child is assimilating the environment to it in an active way—as well as accommodating for environmental changes. For example, the child learns that head-turning is easier to do in some positions rather than others only because of the effort he or she has given to reproductive assimilation in the first place. In practicing looking at people and then at things in general, the child comes to organize *percepts* (things seen), and the practice of actions like head-turning lead to stable mannerisms of behavior called *habits*. It is not until about nine months that children begin actively looking for specific percepts like a rattle on which to center attention.

Sensorimotor Intelligence. The child in the second year of life is sometimes said to be living in a period of *practical intelligence* because he or she knows things without yet having internal thoughts.¹²⁵ That is, the child through circular reactions is continually expanding his or her range of understanding concerning how the world is patterned, how hands work and where the mouth is located, and so forth. All such schemata are differentiated completely at the level of organic construction. Piaget refers to the structures of this period as *action* schemata because they are all based on the active manipulation of objects rather than on the use of words or concepts. For example, at about the age of eighteen months, children are able to grasp a stick and use it to draw a toy toward themselves which had been placed out of reach.¹²⁶ Children have no operations (words or mental concepts) to

use in reasoning through such coordinated movements, but rely totally on sensorimotor action schemata.

In addition, this stage of development reflects what Piaget has called *reciprocal assimilation*, by which he means a form of coordination that takes place among the separate action schemata of the child.

For example, a baby presented with a new object successively incorporates it into each of his "action schemata" (shaking it, stroking it, balancing it, etc.), as though he could come to know the object by perceiving how it is used. . . . It is natural, then, that these various action schemata should become assimilated with one another, i.e., coordinated so that some serve as a goal for action as a whole, while others serve as a means.¹²⁷

There is no differentiation of a self at this time of life, so everything the baby perceives is centered on himself or herself. Psychoanalysis has called this the period of *narcissism*. Piaget says he would not quarrel with this designation, as long as it is appreciated that this is a "narcissism without Narcissus"¹²⁸ because the child has no *personal* awareness at all. Whereas Freud placed ego identity in the unconscious, for Piaget egocentricity early in life is a state of unconsciousness *without* what will later be termed self-identity. Like most of the phenomenological-existentialistic theorists, Piaget places emphasis on consciousness in the workings of what are often called the higher mental processes. Lower, automatic, sensorimotor "mental" habits of the sort we witness in infancy are nothing like what Freud believed took place, because operational thought has not yet evolved (developed). There really is no mind in that self-reflexive sense of reasoning around things,

trying to get one's wishes expressed or enacted through strategies like the *parapraxes* (Freudian slips), until *after* operational thought begins.

It is out of the centering of narcissism (on our own person) that the next stage of development becomes possible. Because the child does indeed consider his or her own bodily processes (satisfactions, activities, and so on) as being everything in life, there is a natural tendency to focus on them and reproduce them. Building on natural-reflex cycles, this narcissistic egocentricity will in time lead to constructions of what in the next stage of development we will call the concrete operations. This occurs by interiorizing the patterns of reflex cycles through assimilation and then by way of further circular reactions, evolving the basis for thought itself. In the second half of the first year of life, children begin to imitate the actions of others. These imitations are all of the physical variety, of course, such as reaching for what others are holding, opening the mouth when parents do, and so on. In this way, sensorimotor intelligence widens as the child is creating and reciprocally assimilating more and more schemata to the ongoing store already constructed.

By the end of the second year of life, the child has evolved four important action schemata which form the basis of *sensorimotor intelligence*: (1) a sense of the distribution of surrounding space; (2) the perception of objects (including the body) in this space; (3) a notion of causal sequence in which something brings something else about; and (4) a beginning sense of time's passage.¹²⁹ To know that objects exist, the child must first grasp the idea of permanence. Early in life, infants who fixate on an object (for example, a toy) which is then covered by a handkerchief make no effort to find it. By the end of the second year, they are seen to do so. Piaget found a direct relationship between the de-

velopment of a sense of space and that of sensorimotor intelligence. To realize that objects can be nearer or farther away from our bodies is essential to our getting what we want or avoiding what we do not want. Causality is linked first of all with the child's own egocentricity. Children naturally assume that everything that happens does so because of the same motives we all have in wanting to satisfy our needs. We shall return to this point below. Finally, children have some idea of delay, waiting, happening, and all similar states that we associate with the passage of time.

Early Childhood: From Ages Two to Seven Years

Piaget has discussed this major substage in light of four topics, and we will follow his breakdown.

Socialization of Action. Early childhood reflects the groping beginnings of social life, even though as we shall see there is no real interpersonal action taking place in much of what the child does. By age two, children are conversing with some regularity so that parents are in constant verbal communication with them. Imitation is facilitated by such exchanges, as the child tries to talk like and be like mother and father. Piaget refers to the parental and other adult models as *ego ideals* for the child.¹³⁰ But the basic tenor of life during early childhood remains that of egocentricity. Children still do not have a self-awareness, although it will begin to be laid down during this preparatory period. In his studies of language development, Piaget found that until the age of seven years, children scarcely know how to have a discussion among themselves. They speak as if playing at words in a way that has no real focus on communicating ideas to another person. We see children gathered around the same table

coloring pictures, and as they jabber away in what Piaget calls a collective monologue,¹³¹ real ideas are not being conveyed or exchanged, even though each individual participant seems to believe that he or she understands and is being understood by others. In time this interpersonal jabbering will mature into true social relations, but in early childhood it is difficult to see how language inputs from the environment have much effect on actual behavior.

The Genesis of Thought. Piaget refers to early childhood as a *preoperational stage* in the development of thought.¹³² This means that there is not yet complete interiorization achieved in the patterning of organic schemata to mental levels of schematization. In essence, early childhood is a transitional and preparatory substage during which the child is moving from complete reliance on sensorimotor intelligence to the beginnings of operational intelligence. This does not begin until about age seven when use is made of *concrete operations*. "We will call concrete operations those [which] we bear on manipulable objects (effective or immediately imagineable manipulations), in contrast to operations bearing on propositions."¹³³

We cannot really consider early childhood to be a truly operational substage because, though preliminary schemata are being gradually interiorized, they are not yet reversible, so they cannot be used to actively think one's way from point A to B and back again. The child's grasp of reality remains narrow and rigid, even though steps are being taken in the right direction by interiorizing the action schemata of sensorimotor intelligence through circular reactions. This often occurs during play. For example, the child may facilitate interiorization of schemas of motions, such as

“moving toward” or “moving away,” by having two dolls actually come together or be separated in some little drama like “Daddy go work. Mommy stay home.” Although thought is being assimilated to action here, the child has not yet interrelated *go* and *stay* in a reversible sense (*going* means *not-staying*, and so on), so that true operations are not yet being “thought.”¹⁸⁴

From the age of three (sometimes earlier) to the age of seven, a question that occurs with increasing frequency among children is the well-known “why?” A child will ask, “Why does it rain?” or “Why does my marble roll?” If an adult tries to answer these questions with the usual scientific-mechanical explanations of atmospheric moisture and temperature or the effects of an inclined plane on gravity, these explanations will not be understood. It is impossible *in principle* for them to be understood. Children at this level cannot understand cause-effect in the abstract way required to explain rain or the workings of gravity. As we noted in a previous section (see p. 687), Piaget defines *precausality* as a primitive structural relation “in which causation still bears the marks of quasi-psychological motivation.”¹⁸⁵ In other words, what the child wants to hear from us is that the sun made the rain fall or the marble rolls because it is fun to roll.

Such anthropomorphic explanations can be assimilated to the child’s schemata because this is how he or she egocentrically understands the world. The child can make water spill by toppling over a glass, and it is certainly true that rolling down a slope is fun to do. This belief that inanimate things like the sun or a marble have intentions like we do is called *childhood animism*, which is another way of referring to the general question of anthropomorphization (see p. 11). Piaget notes that most children at this age “. . . are

practically unanimous in believing that the moon accompanies them on a walk, and their egocentricity impedes them from thinking what the moon would do in the presence of people strolling in the opposite direction.”¹⁸⁶ Along with believing in the humanlike (anthropomorphic) nature of physical reality, children also assume that everything that takes place has a point to it, an end (*finalism*) or a purpose which must be accepted as a kind of moral law. In fact, no distinction is drawn between natural and moral laws, so the child assumes that what occurs in the world should occur, because mother, father, other important adults, or God made things the way they are and that is how they should always be.

Children cannot abstract, so they never understand the spirit of a law, but always demand that the letter of the law be observed. This is termed *moral realism*, a tendency we see merging late in this substage at about six years of age and carrying over into later childhood: “. . . moral realism induces an objective conception of responsibility. . . . For since he takes rules literally and thinks of good only in terms of obedience, the child will at first evaluate acts not in accordance with the motive that has prompted them but in terms of their exact conformity with established rules.”¹⁸⁷ The combined effect of precausality, childhood animism, and moral realism on the psychology of the child is to present a world of intentional beings and objects, all focusing on the child, doing things for the child, and yet conforming to a set of rules that have no special justification but exist merely to be obeyed. Out of this egocentric and literal grasp of reality the child constructs a series of schemata, which is unstable and poorly systematized at first; but the very simplicity and rigidity of such preliminary understandings ensures that a stable pattern will eventually be interiorized as childhood is lived through.

Intuition and Semilogic. If operational thinking is not occurring in early childhood, then what do we call this early cognitive effort on the part of the child? It is an in-between kind of activity, not totally sensorimotor but not yet up to concrete operations either. In some of his earlier writings, Piaget referred to the first efforts at operational thought during early childhood as intuitive reasoning or simply *intuition*. He defined this concept as follows: "Primary intuition is no more than a sensorimotor [action] schema transposed into an act of thought so that it naturally inherits the characteristics of the sensorimotor schema."¹³⁸ For example, a child of four or five years may be shown a series of eight blue discs aligned in a row with little spaces between each, and then be asked to reproduce the series by selecting red discs from a pile. The child will intuitively construct an arrangement of red discs in a row of exactly the same length as the blue discs but without bothering to keep the number of discs identical and without considering the matter of spacing between discs.¹³⁹ Piaget points out that this child has thought of the task solely in terms of quantity, that is, of the space occupied as a unit by the blue series in the perceptual field. It is as if a global impression as an action scheme is taken over uncritically and used whole hog without accommodation.

A more detailed examination of the task would have required the child to reason with reversibility. That is, the child would have needed to mull the task over, looking at it from different perceptual angles ("Let's see, what is that blue bunch really like? Is it just those discs all together or is there another thing about them?") and asking questions once a copy had been made ("Now, is the red bunch just like the blue bunch? How are they alike and are they different at all?"), and so on. This more abstract reversibility in reasoning has yet to be constructed by the child. Piaget first called all such preoperational

thought intuition, but as he did further work, he began to see that there was a certain degree of half logic (half operability) in these crude understandings, and in time, he called this *semilogic*.¹⁴⁰ Here is another example: Paul, a five-year-old boy, has a brother Etienne, and when asked, he correctly states that he (Paul) has a brother, but Etienne *does not*. The semilogic reflected here is in Paul's premise that "one boy plus a brother makes two." Hence, as there are only two children in the family and Paul is unable to reverse perspectives, if he has *the* brother, then Etienne cannot.¹⁴¹ Thanks to Paul's egocentricity, the concept of "brother" can mean only "in relation to me."

Affectivity and Expanding Motivations. Affectivity continues its maturation along with the development of semilogical thought. Piaget places emotions on a par with strictly intellectual cognition, as follows: "There is never a purely intellectual action, and numerous emotions, interests, values, impressions of harmony, etc., intervene [with each other]—for example, in the solving of a mathematical problem. Likewise, there is never a purely affective act, e.g., love presupposes comprehension."¹⁴² There are many challenging sources of affection at this time of life, sources that create the disequilibria of needs and motivate the child to restore equilibrium—which in turn spurs further development because this is never a matter of settling things or quieting them down. With every need met, a further step is taken along the road of life bringing on the possibility of further needs being generated.

Some of the major feelings experienced at this age relate to the interpersonal. Feelings of sympathy and antipathy (dislike) are important. To feel in sympathy with another

person, we must share certain basic values or preferences. Ordinarily, there is no problem here in most families because children at this stage are quite literal in accepting whatever the adult wishes, often taking via moral realism each parental request or show of interest as a command. Feelings of dislike occur when the child comes into conflict with the values of others, and sometimes this arises from the unusually high standards generated by moral realism. A child of six or seven might severely criticize a younger sibling for not following some home rule—such as wiping one's shoes before entering the family dwelling—and generates considerable interpersonal hostility in the process. Slight changes in familiar patterns during this age may provoke anxiety in the child, who much prefers keeping the world as it is. Along with enjoying the same fairy tale told to them night after night, children like to have the same routine followed on special occasions, such as holidays or birthdays. It is as if the predictable routine of these events is reassuring, something to be looked forward to and counted on as completely known and understood.

Near the end of early childhood, an important affective event takes place in what Piaget calls the act of *self-evaluation*.¹⁴³ This refers to the relative feelings of worth a child senses in relation to his or her emerging identity and touches upon what Adler was getting at in his constructs of inferiority or superiority feelings. As the child is beginning to frame some understanding of a self, moving to later childhood where this sense of identity will be even more important, it is essential that a proper equilibration occur in relation to mastering environmental challenges of both an interpersonal and impersonal nature. In addition to getting along

with others, children must feel competent to dress themselves, handle their food utensils, color with a crayon, and so on. Piaget notes that all of us have our failures and successes in early childhood, and that in time, we frame a scale of worth concerning ourselves which is fairly accurate. Some of us form higher opinions of ourselves, some lower, but as long as they meet reality, this is as it should be. Sometimes, however, children get distorted pictures of themselves. Mother must neither minimize frustrations or shortcomings for the child nor escalate the importance of every challenge or setback in the broader scheme of things. It is especially harmful when children begin imagining pluses or minuses in their personality which do *not* exist. If there is mutual love in a family, such extreme disequilibrations will normally be avoided.

Late Childhood: From Age Seven to Twelve

In considering late childhood, we will repeat the same four-part breakdown we used in looking at early childhood.

Progress in Behavioral Development and Socialization. Many changes take place when children reach the age of seven or eight years, the most important of which is that social and intellectual egocentricity is being left behind.¹⁴⁴ Egocentrism has permitted the child to detach the processes of adaptation from reality in favor of make-believe experience.¹⁴⁵ With the loss of such nonreality orientations, children in later childhood begin to concentrate better on the tasks of life; they also begin working more effectively in collaboration with others.¹⁴⁶ In a sense, children help construct each other's grasp of reality, thanks to their individual behavioral gains. There is a reciprocal process going on—one in which each individual child begins to see that he or

she has a viewpoint distinctly independent from and often contrary to the viewpoints of others.

The continuing socialization process also helps alert the child to his or her internal processes through a rudimentary *self-reflection*. Piaget observes, "Reflection is nothing other than internal deliberation, that is to say, a discussion which is conducted with oneself."¹⁴⁷ This *internal dialectic in self-dialogue* serves to further a sense of selfhood as the child comes to affirm (believe in, agree with) a point of view rather than holding to all points of view without concern for contradiction.¹⁴⁸ Having a point of view and sticking to it permits clearer social relations to occur as children align themselves on one side or the other of various issues and reputations for believing this or that are established. The practice of internal discussion is helpful in resolving interpersonal disagreements, because each child can now see that there is more than one outlook on a question. Whether to play a game following one set of rules or another set can be negotiated and changed if necessary to meet the needs of all participants. By and large, children tend to cooperate at this stage of life because in many cases a logic of fairness is suggested.¹⁴⁹ By pleading for fairness, most children in later childhood can influence the course of a disagreement as long as a good case can be made for what they are recommending to their playmates. We will return to this point below in discussing morality.

Progress of Thought: Development of Conservation. Piaget and his colleagues conducted numerous experiments to establish the fact that reversibility emerges in late childhood. These studies are called *conservation experiments*, because what they aim to find out is whether a child can grasp that quality of change within stability (permanence) that typifies the more abstract schemata (see p.

680). Can the child appreciate that concepts like mass and weight are constant even though we manipulate their *perceived* appearance by pouring liquids from glass to glass or slice wholes into portions? For example, assume that we have two identical glasses, A and B. Bridget, a four-year-old girl, and Annette, a seven-year-old girl, are both asked to place equal numbers (a dozen or so) of blue beads in glass A and red beads in glass B. We next ask both girls to pour the blue beads from glass A into glass C, which is taller and narrower so that the level of beads is stretched out in glass C, thanks to its more tubelike shape. Even though they have poured the blue beads from A to C themselves, when asked which glass, B or C, now has more beads, Bridget will say C and Annette will say that neither has.¹⁵⁰

Annette has constructed a stable conception of volume (schema) to interrelate with her conception of shape (schema), enabling her to abstract operationally and not rely solely on what is seen (perceived) but on what is *known*. Bridget is still very concrete in operational thought, more sensorimotor in her schematic understanding, so that she cannot abstract conceptions like volume and shape but must instead report what she sees (perceives in a literal sense). And what she literally sees is one glass much taller than another with beads piled in it almost to the top, whereas the shorter glass is not nearly so filled up. Annette is able to take her thinking forward from the original comparison of glasses A and B and then bring it back after we have manipulated her visual field by bringing in glass C. This is why Piaget defines *conservation* as "the possibility of a rigorous return to the point of departure."¹⁵¹ This flexibility enables her to decenter her

egocentricity and view things in a reversible fashion, thereby enabling logical thought to proceed to even higher-level constructions of rational thought.

The Rational Operations: Concreteness. As soon as a child's intuition or semilogic is transformed into reversible thought, we can begin speaking about true operations taking place. Piaget explicitly states that the age of seven or eight is the point where *concrete operations* first appear.¹⁵² This means that in late childhood we still witness schematic organizations which relate to manipulable things rather than to abstractions. The average child cannot therefore follow discussions in which hypothetical or relativistic propositions are being considered. It would be pointless to make a list of the concrete operations employed during this stage. Almost anything relating to thought or cognition is an operation. About the only distinction we see Piaget making is that of separating affective operations from what we might call intellectual operations. The main point needing emphasis is that *rational thought* is evolving, maturing, developing, but it is doing this in an actively *constructive* fashion.

A distinctive feature of rational thought is that it takes two initially separate schemata and combines or *groups* them to create a new structure. This constructive process of *grouping* is essential to the development of rational thought, to the creation of even more stable—hence abstract—cognitive operations. Grouping also includes the processes of reversibility, of course. Indeed, *four characteristics of grouping* are necessary preliminaries for further evolution of rational (logical) thinking in the child. Using mathematical examples, Piaget summarizes these four characteristics as follows:

We may draw a general conclusion: a child's thinking becomes logical only through the organization of systems of operations which obey the laws common to all groupings: (1) Composition: two operations may combine to give another operation of the grouping (e. g., $+1 + 1 = +2$). (2) Reversibility: every operation can be inverted (e. g., $+1$ becomes inverted to -1). (3) The direct operation and its inverse gives rise to an identical or null operation (e. g., $+1 - 1 = 0$). (4) Operations can combine with one another in all kinds of ways.¹⁵³

Once these four characteristics have been constructed, the child will be moving into the higher-level cognitive operations of adolescence and adulthood.

Affectivity in Morality and Willful Behavior. The gradual loss of egocentricity in later childhood has great relevance for the development of morality. Piaget distinguishes between the *morality of constraint* and the *morality of cooperation*.¹⁵⁴ All morality, according to Piaget, "consists in a system of rules,"¹⁵⁵ and hence this morality distinction has to do with how children look at the following of rules. As we have seen, in early childhood, moral realism rests upon a literal rule-following pattern in which the child feels constrained to behave as expected simply because "that's the way it is." The world is set up with strict laws and the child follows them as understood without regard for their (abstract) rationale. This morality of constraint begins to give way to a morality of cooperation in later childhood, as the growth of reversibility in thought makes it better understood that things are not *always* "precisely so" or that the natural order of lawfulness is not identical with a moral order of how things "ought" to be in every case.

Piaget has conducted many interesting studies on rule-following behavior. Using

games like marbles, he has shown that young children find it upsetting to be arbitrary in following rules once they have been learned. "For very young children, a rule is a sacred reality because it is traditional; for the older ones it depends upon mutual agreement."¹⁵⁶ Younger children also are much harsher in assigning punishment to those who break the rules. They seem to want to emphasize the punishment for its own sake, whereas older children use punishment more to show the transgressor that a bond has been broken between people when a wrongdoing takes place. Piaget's value system considers rule by cooperation a more satisfactory equilibration in human relations than rule by authority. In order for a *rule* to work without authority pressures, there must be feelings of mutual respect among the persons who subscribe to the rule.¹⁵⁷ This necessarily brings affectivity into considerations of morality. Authoritarian constraint rules through feelings of anxiety and fear, but when mutual respect exists among people, a morality of cooperation can occur. Just as logic is the sum of rules that intelligence makes use of to control behavior, so too is morality the sum of rules that our affective life makes use of to control behavior.¹⁵⁸

Affections (emotions) are therefore closely aligned with *self-control*, filling thereby not only an energizing but a selective role in behavior. We do things that make us feel pleasant or good (including morally good) and avoid things that make us feel unpleasant or bad. Affective operations are therefore important to self-emergence and willful behavior because:

... to the extent that the emotions become organized, they emerge as regulations whose final form of equilibrium is none other than the will. Thus, will is the true affective equivalent of the operation in reason. Will is a late-appearing function. The real exercise of will

*is linked to the functioning of the autonomous moral feelings, which is why we have waited until this [late-childhood] stage to discuss it.*¹⁵⁹

Not until the child has left the egocentric-moral-realism stage of seeing rules as unquestionable and progressed to the stage of seeing rules as demanding personal judgment and commitment can we speak of the will emerging in the personality.

Piaget thinks of willfulness as occurring when the person must regulate his or her energy expenditure. If a person has a single, firm intention to do something like eat an ice cream cone, then there is no point in speaking of willful behavior in this action. Piaget describes the origins of will much as he described the origins of consciousness (see p. 687), that is, as entering when there is a conflict in behavioral tendencies. The nine-year-old boy who is struggling with the temptation of watching television rather than doing his homework is involved in a willful decision-making process. At the precise moment of temptation the boy's morally superior tendency (to study) is *weaker* than the more pleasurable albeit inferior tendency (to watch television). "The act of will does not consist of following the inferior and stronger tendency; on the contrary, one would then speak of a failure of will or 'lack of will power.' Will power involves reinforcing the superior but weaker tendency so as to make it triumph."¹⁶⁰ In this way, when a duty is momentarily weaker than a specific desire, will re-establishes values according to the hierarchical order that was initially constructed by the boy in assigning values to his various behaviors. If he had not constructed a value system placing study over television viewing, there would not have been a con-

flict to begin with. Will is therefore an operation that permits reversibility to take place in returning fleeting interest values that arise as feelings of pleasure (watching television) to their proper place lower in the systematic hierarchy of values (studies come first).

The will waits on two important earlier developments to occur: (1) *self-identity* must begin, because intentional behavior is impossible without self-awareness;¹⁶¹ and (2) disequibrations in the form of *moral conflicts* must arise. Thus, as we noted earlier when discussing Piaget's reticence concerning finalism (see p. 686), even though he describes behavior as teleonomic,¹⁶² this does not mean it is thought of as being under freely intended direction by the individual. Self-identity and intentionality in behavior are late-born developments that spring from earlier (unconscious, reflexive) equilibrations and the resultant constructions which were fashioned concerning the self and others. In the final analysis, there is a kind of impersonal evolutionary flow to behavioral events which carry them from origins in bodily patterns to the abstractions of high-level thought without benefit of selfhood, although later in life when a self-image has been constructed, this contributes to the forward-moving, improving, evolutionary process.

Adolescence

The final stage of development is adolescence, which carries the person forward into adulthood. As we know, dramatic physical and physiological changes take place in the body at this time. Piaget notes that the maturation of the sexual instinct results in a degree of disequibration for the young person, so that in accommodating this new factor and as-

similating it to ongoing schemata, there is a "characteristic affective coloration"¹⁶³—namely, a preoccupation with emotional display and heterosexual contacts. There are also dramatic changes taking place in operational thought. We will consider these two sides to the adolescent's experience, beginning with the intellectual and moving to the affectional.

The Formal Operations of Mature Thought. Beginning sometime between eleven and thirteen years of age, we witness the developing person beginning to use *formal operations*, which means that he or she employs "the form of general ideas and abstract constructions"¹⁶⁴ rather than relying on the perception and/or manipulation of concrete objects. Adolescents can therefore begin taking an interest in problems that are totally removed from everyday reality. We might say that adolescence is the period of life in which theorizing is born. "Formal thought is 'hypothetico-deductive,' in the sense that it permits one to draw conclusions from pure hypotheses and not merely from actual observations."¹⁶⁵ All of the typical adolescent characteristics the Freudians and others have explained as sublimations of sexuality—intellectualism, desire to improve the world, asceticism, religiosity, and so on—are reflections of this newly evolved ability to "think about conceptual thought" and not merely to deal with concrete reality. Adolescents can see what "is" and aspire to achieve what "might be" because their thinking is no longer "practical"; indeed, it is often idealistically impractical.

Formal operations of abstract thought are like concrete operations in the sense of reversibility and a logical ordering of what is understood in their use. But in reasoning formally, reversibility moves up a notch, so that now the person can be more arbitrary and consider not only alternative courses of action but also the advisability of pursuing alternatives in the first place. This thought

turning back on itself is what is meant by *reflexivity*, or *self-reflexivity*. The person can think about the form his thought is taking as a series of propositions, so that rather than merely planning a course of action, he or she can frame a "representation of a representation of possible action."¹⁶⁶ When we reason *propositionally*, we are essentially taking an "as if" or a "let's assume" or even a "let's pretend" attitude about the most stable structures of our perceived experience. In order for Einstein to challenge concepts like time and space, he had to think about assumptions, about how physicists before him had affirmed unchallenged premises (propositions) regarding their study. It is this key ability for self-reflexivity that truly separates formal from concrete operational thought. "Formal operations engender a 'logic of propositions' in contrast to the logic of relations, classes, and numbers engendered by concrete operations."¹⁶⁷

In his later writings, Piaget was to refer to this capacity of thought to pair off contrasting or conflicting propositions as a *dialectical* form of reasoning (see p. 9). However, when he did so, he was usually referring to the developmental synthesis to be achieved, so that his conception of dialectical mental processes is tied closely to his idea of progress in thought achieved by resolving differences and moving ahead to a new level. Thus, we do not find Piaget referring to the contradictory style of thought used by children up to ages seven or eight as dialectical, presumably because no synthesis is achieved moving thinking as a constructive process along.¹⁶⁸ Dialectic should be reflected in the progressive flow of events, events that do not move in a linear fashion but evolve to higher levels nonetheless. Piaget says, ". . . dialectic over and over again substitutes 'spirals' for the linear or 'tree' models with which we start, and these famous spirals or non-vicious circles are very much like the genetic or interactions

characteristic of growth."¹⁶⁹ As we shall see below in this chapter (see p. 713), Kelly frames his process of construction as a dialectical understanding of how two items are alike and yet contrasted oppositionally to a third; but he does not relate this process to a developmental progress, to higher and higher levels of structured thought.

Piaget, on the other hand, seems to place construction at the heart of the evolutionary process, as in effect bringing about dialectical advance. "It is often construction itself which begets the negations along with the affirmations, and the syntheses whereby they are rendered coherent as well."¹⁷⁰ We can see this in logical or mathematical reasoning, wherein dialectic is reflected as a "construction by negation."¹⁷¹ Dialectic allows the developing person to abstract by understanding that whatever he or she is thinking about, alternative meanings are generated by the opposites suggested. Believing that "My neighborhood is the best one in the whole city" may be accepted quite literally by the child reasoning according to concrete operations. But with formal operations, the child begins to understand that this is simply a statement of opinion, one needing support and justification in some manner, and that its validity might depend on the grounds we arbitrarily select to judge this blanket statement. There is a decentering in such a self-reflexive examination, a loss in the authoritative conclusion which was reached. But in understanding things this way, the child necessarily constructs a higher-order schemata, form, and so on, making possible a much broader and more sophisticated grasp of what knowledge is all about. Thus it is that dialectic must be seen as essential to the equilibrating process of assimilation-accommodation, reversibility, and so on: ". . . the dialectical attitude seems essential to the full working out of structures;

dialectic is both complementary to and inseparable from analytic, even formalizing, reason.”¹⁷²

Even though *egocentricity* in the childhood sense is over by adolescence, we should not get the idea that it stops occurring during this period, or even later in life for that matter. Egocentricity is a certain style of thought people use—predominantly in early life, but later as well. Adolescent egocentricity is reflected in the often simplistic schemes young adults have for improving the world. They have their point of view, and even though they are capable of seeing alternatives, they may decide with great genuineness and/or arrogance that this is the *only* answer to the problem at hand. As Piaget says, “Adolescent egocentricity is manifested by belief in the omnipotence of reflection, as though the world should submit itself to idealistic schemes rather than to systems of reality.”¹⁷³ Accommodation is called for here, and in time with increasing experience, the young adult will gradually achieve an equilibration between his or her formal thought and the realistic possibilities of reality. Even so, there are times when the exuberance of adolescence effects a significant change in society. Young people have made important contributions by thinking the unthinkable or by serving as the conscience of their country to bring about a change in its national policy.

Affectivity as Personality in Adult Society. Paralleling the evolution of formal operations in thought, Piaget sees a rise in adolescent affectivity in the completion of personality and its injection into adult society.¹⁷⁴ We are now considering personality in the more specific (nonsystematic) sense referred to above (see p. 686). Personality began to emerge in middle to late childhood (eight to twelve years) along with the development of will

and the formation of a value system. Piaget draws a distinction between the *self* and the *personality* in overall behavior. The self is a more primitive aspect of the person, so that it is closer to egocentricity of either a conscious or unconscious variety than is the personality.¹⁷⁵ The person constructs a schema of identity, but this is still centered on the self in a “selfish” manner because of the continuation of at least some egocentricity. Piaget’s concept of personality now comes in to counter this egocentric selfishness in the sense of the person’s *character* (see p. 27). Thus, personality is the capacity to submit oneself to some form of discipline. “For example, a man is not said to have a strong personality when everything is egotistically determined and he remains incapable of dominating the self. He is said to have a strong personality when he incarnates an ideal or defends a cause with all his activity and will.”¹⁷⁶

Personality therefore implies “a kind of decentering of the self,”¹⁷⁷ which subordinates the more egocentric tendencies to a disciplined course of action. Piaget does not believe that such value-directed behavioral patterns are “input” from the environment. The person must construct his or her own personality (character). Consistent with what we have already said of the egocentricity of idealistic thought in adolescence, there is a paralleling sense of affective egocentricity during this stage of life. Piaget believed that the adolescent: “. . . wants to surpass and astound them [his or her elders] by transforming the world. That is why the adolescent’s systems or life plans are at the same time filled with generous sentiments and altruistic or mystically fervent projects and with disquieting megalomania and conscious egocentricity.”¹⁷⁸

Adolescents therefore inject themselves into adult society by means of projects, theoretical systems, and ideas of political or so-

cial reform. Their hypothetico-deductive thinking—that is, from presumed propositions to deduced implications—may depart from reality in that their hypotheses may be debatable, but their emotional feelings of commitment to the values they embrace are real enough. The gradual movement into higher education or a job will tend to help restore the equilibrium as the older adolescent comes to focus emotions on a more structured, realistically oriented goal once again.¹⁷⁹ At this point, we often witness the young adult's true genius as creative innovations are made a reality. In the final analysis, Piaget puts his trust in reason to calm the turbulent waters of adolescence. "In reality, the most profound tendency of all human activity is progression toward equilibrium. Reason, which expressed the highest form of equilibrium, reunites intelligence and affectivity."¹⁸⁰ This is precisely where we would expect him as an evolutionary rationalist to place his trust. Human beings are rational animals who have evolved in body-to-mind fashion a higher intelligence which serves them in the affective sphere as well.

Commonalities and Variations in Development

Piaget's contention is that all human beings pass through the stages of intellectual and affective development we have just reviewed. They do so *not* because they have been pre-programmed by heredity but because there is a kind of logico-epistemological *necessity* for all human beings—given their natural endowment—to develop in this fashion, once interactions with reality are begun following birth. It is easy to confuse the biological necessity of heredity with the logical necessity of higher and higher levels of thought. Our biological structures frame certain beginning limits on how we will think and what we can normally think about. But in time, logic of

both a dialectical (oppositional) and a demonstrative (linear) type (see pp. 6–9) will allow the person to move beyond biological determinism yet *also* proceed in an evolutionary way to develop common thought and emotional patterns. There is a logical necessity over and above the biological necessity, which is why systems of mathematics have been worked out by different cultures and by different people within the same culture with no direct contact between them. The specifics of a logical system might even differ from one point of view to the next, but the form all thought takes as regards conceptions of space, succession, order, and so on, will be common. It is as if each person relives the same process in each individual life (ontogeny recapitulating a phylogeny of logical development).¹⁸¹

This does not mean that everyone makes it to the highest levels of abstract thought, of course. Some people do not construct things clearly; they make errors in judgment or fail to progress beyond a certain level. This is what Piaget would call a *fixation* in development—a failure to evolve. He also offers some interesting observations on the possibility of only limited development in operational thinking, as follows:

*. . . There can be fixations at certain stages; there can be delays and accelerations. But I would even go further. Within the formal operational level, it is entirely possible that some people, for instance those in manual professions, specialized laborers of various sorts, may reach the formal operational level in the particular professional domain, but not right across the board.*¹⁸²

Here again—since it is always up to the person to construct what will eventuate in cognition—Piaget is making allowances for

the fact that there will be variations in the development of higher-order operations. But there is no talk of regression in his theory. He follows more the theory of Jung concerning fixation than that of Freud (see p. 211). People do not regress to an earlier stage; they simply fail to progress completely to the next level or do so in only a limited sense.

Individual-Differences Constructs

Becoming a Person: Interiorization via Imitation

Piaget obviously leaves much room for the person as actor in constructing not only his or her self schema but also the affective schema which, as a system of values, holds the more selfish side of behavior in check as the personality (character). The specific contents of these schemata are naturally influenced by the people with whom the child is reared and the society in which the rearing takes place. But it is up to the person to do the actual constructing of self and personality. It is true that people pattern themselves after others, interiorizing those aspects of another person's behavior which they *imitate*. Piaget defines *imitation* as the "primacy of accommodation over assimilation."¹⁸³ Of course, assimilation is always primary to accommodation and imitation probably grows out of reproductive assimilations which have a beginning schema already patterned. As Piaget notes, "The child imitates an aeroplane or a tower because he understands their significance, and he is only interested in them when they have some bearing on his own activities."¹⁸⁴

In time, however, as the child imitates more and more things, he or she finds the accommodation side of the circular reactions

that result quite fascinating, particularly because in the act of imitation, there is always more to be learned about the self. Imitating others, we also learn how we might differ from others and to this extent we know more about our selves. Affection plays an important role as well, because children are more likely to imitate liked than disliked people.¹⁸⁵ Piaget would suggest that so-called *identification* with a parent is tied closely to the accommodations based on affective schemata. We interiorize our parents' behavior and values because we have emotional schemata to which we assimilate their identities and then accommodate that which they believe in.¹⁸⁶ Piaget has no series of personality stereotypes to which he alludes in his writings. What the particular self-identity and personality-related value system will be like depends entirely on the uniquely developing individual, the equilibrations achieved in the continuing circular reactions of adjustment, and the peculiar patterns accommodated through imitation. We would have also to take into consideration any fixations or partial fixations in development, as discussed in the previous section. It follows that the range of *individual differences* in Piagetian theory is great indeed. He, like the other theorists in the phenomenological-existentialistic tradition, is loathe to categorize people.

Language as a Means of Personality Influence: Pros and Cons

Piaget has never been of the opinion that language structures thought. His studies of egocentric language convinced him that verbal usage is not patterned by the environment but is rather constructed from within the child's internal mental activity. Sensorimotor constructions and action schemata are patterning behavior even before the child has a language to use. Thus, says Piaget, ". . . prior to any language, more or less complex

systems of representation can be formed.”¹⁸⁷ Once it is learned, language can influence what we think, but it cannot be said to shape thought itself as the behaviorists would claim.

In using language, the child’s imitative capacities are being extended, but the point of importance is that the child does actively make use of words as an instrumentality to gain a desired goal (teleonomic behavior). Language is an accompaniment to action, beginning mainly in the form of orders and expressions of desire by the child. Once it is being used, the child is also able to reconstruct past actions in memory by verbalizing about them; this would be the beginnings of representation (imagination).¹⁸⁸ In time, the word used to describe an action begins to function as a sign, so that rather than just being a part of the action, it can evoke the action or bring it to mind. Then and only then is the verbal scheme detached from the sensorimotor scheme and used in imagination as a memory. The child begins by grasping the teddy bear reflexively and, in time after imitation-prompts from parents, learns to say “teddy” while fondling the beloved toy. The word would never be related to the toy if the child did not already possess a sensorimotor scheme of the fluffy plaything. Later, each time the child plays with the toy, the word “teddy” will be part of the action, but also a verbal scheme will be under construction. Once it is constructed, the child will be able to ask for “teddy” and/or recall playing with the toy bear (representation).

Even after the child has constructed a series of verbal schema (words tied to perceived objects, persons, and so on), there is no assurance that by using them a genuine communication is being attempted. During the period of collective monologue, “words have no social function”¹⁸⁹ as the child is playfully assimilating them to action schemata. Piaget would say that a true *dialogue* does not occur until the child responds to a state-

ment expressing a proposition by talking about something that was in that proposition.¹⁹⁰ If Paul offers an opinion on why the swimming-pool water is so cold only to have Louis “respond” by laughing and saying that he is going to throw his toy duck into the water, a dialogue has *not* been joined. When it does emerge, it will be because both children make an effort to cast their language in a mutually understandable way. Piaget suggests that children probably learn the importance of this by first getting in an argument over some point of mutual interest.¹⁹¹ For example, if Louis jumped into the water and claimed it was *not* cold, then in the quarrel with Paul over this issue, a lot could be learned by both boys in how to communicate. As in the case of the development of will, so long as a statement goes unchallenged, the child simply *says things* to accompany the more important fact that he or she is *doing things*. Language thus evolves from a playful endeavor to the serious business of making our wants and opinions known.

Once this bridge has been crossed, language becomes an important factor in social influence. The child can through representation make a better estimate of what is taking place in life and can more clearly negotiate circumstances to his or her preference. With the acquisition of the skills of reading, the maturing person will greatly extend representations, take on various interests, and eventually construct those important schemata known as the self and the personality. Even though language plays such an important role in development, Piaget must be considered a critic of personologists who explain behavioral style in terms of environmental shaping through language acquisition. Language does not shape the person; it is the other way around. Indeed, Piaget has reserva-

tions about those explanations of personality that rest upon social influence.

The Limitations of Social Explanations

In the final analysis, Piaget's message is that mind and those related factors entering into personality are created (constructed) independently not only of language shapings but of *any* form of social or cultural influence. There is a patterning of behavior constantly underway in development, but the logical order of this pattern is not done *in* the environment and then placed *into* the person. The person as an organically developing but also logically developing organism does the patterning, the *constructing* of what he or she will be like as a finished product in adulthood. *Society* is not something apart and different from the individuals who make it up. All members of society learn to be who they are in a similar fashion, and although there are interpersonal factors to consider in each individual's life, these factors do not explain how this learning is achieved.¹⁹² Learning is rooted in human nature, in the biologically based sensorimotor actions on which mind is then constructed. Society is in this sense closer to biology than to a supra-individual force of a group mind or some such. Humanity is the reflection of the single mind of any one human being.

Piaget's views are nicely summarized in the following: "Society' is neither a thing nor a cause, but a system of relationships, and it is for the psychologist to classify these relationships and analyse separately their respective effects."¹⁹³ Now these relationships are not simply *there*, in reality from the beginning of time. *Social norms* are constructed over historical time and bind people to them,¹⁹⁴ but in the final analysis, they exist

only because they have been so structured by individuals. In this sense, ". . . *all* the social sciences yield structuralist theories since, however different they may be, they are all concerned with social groups and subgroups, that is, with self-regulating transformational totalities."¹⁹⁵ As social scientists, we study these stable structures called societies, structures that have evolved through construction in the same way that higher mental reasonings have evolved within the skulls of each of us. Just as we do not reify *mind* as existing independently from body, we do not reify *society* as something existing independently from the individuals who gave it birth and now sustain its existence by mutual consent.

Having now put the matter of society's origins straight, we can recognize that the normative structures of the historical past serve a constraining influence on the present. Society is not transmitted from generation to generation internally, as is the case of instinctive behavior in lower animals. Only through the external pressure exercised by individuals upon each other can the weight of society be felt.¹⁹⁶ In this sense, society can be seen as "a series (or rather many intersecting series) of generations, each exercising pressure upon the one which follows it. . . ."¹⁹⁷ If we look at the history of societies, we find a gradual lessening of this pressure brought to bear on one generation by an earlier generation. "The more complex the society, the more autonomous is the personality [of its members] and the more important are the relations of cooperation between equal individuals."¹⁹⁸ In a complex society, it no longer becomes possible to press just one point of view in an authoritarian, constraining sense. People must at this more advanced stage of societal evolution cooperate and compromise in order to maintain the integrity of the culture.

Looked at from the point of view of the individual person evolving beyond the sensorimotor influences of biological reflexes to a

higher order of reasoning, the major role of society is to further consciousness among its individual members. For the individual, left to himself or herself, would remain unconsciously egocentric.¹⁹⁹ It is in the comparison of oneself to others—attempting to convey an idea through language or observing some disparity in behavior between oneself and other people—that more and more awareness is generated. Also the resulting competitions when we compare ourselves to others stirs greater achievements as well as cooperative endeavors. All of the problems of interpersonal relations then enter to greatly complicate the picture of what human nature is *really* like. Piaget's basic image of humanity stresses the biological beginnings and the individuality of construction in genetic epistemology. The child is parent to the adult, and children develop from an organic reality which must not be forgotten in our zeal to explain behavioral patterns interpersonally.

Implications for Abnormal Behavior

Though Piaget does not have a formal theory of illness or cure, there are many points in his writings at which we can see implications for these aspects of personality study. First of all, we must get a general definition of what abnormal behavior or maladjustment means to Piaget. Recall that Piaget defines learning as taking place when a *durable equilibration* is achieved via some behavioral action.²⁰⁰ The person who has learned has constructed a behavioral pattern that lasts because it is successfully answering needs via the circular reactions of assimilation and accommodation. On the other hand, Piaget notes that “. . . durable disequilibria constitute pathological organic or mental states.”²⁰¹ In other words,

when we have a lasting (learned) pattern of behavior that fails to meet the person's needs, we have *abnormality* taking place. It is not “natural” for evolution to develop *disequilibria*, of course. But since the individual person is a factor in the construction of schemata and the operations of thought that employ these conceptual frames, it is inevitable that serious problems will arise. We might now review some of the possible sources of difficulty.

First of all, Piaget notes that the very inadequacy of being a child among adults has within it the possible seeds of a serious problem. Children are constantly surrounded by adults who not only know more than they do, but who are capable of anticipating the thoughts and desires of children. This leads to some children thinking that adults (and later, other people in general) can read their minds. This may even be the reason egocentric children do not make the effort to talk clearly, convinced as they are that adults know what they are thinking about anyhow. Piaget suggests that some of the delusional symptoms to be seen in adult psychotic disorders like schizophrenia may stem from this early experience.²⁰² This may come about especially if the child is reared in a home where control through constraint rather than through cooperation and mutual respect is practiced. Though children construct their own self-identities and the affective schemata of personality, they are obviously influenced by the kinds of interpersonal relations (love, trust, and so on) they encounter in their family setting.

We have already noted in our discussion of development that it is essential for a child to acquire a realistic self-estimate. Children who grossly overrate or underrate themselves are doomed to maladjustments of one form or another. Piaget is fundamentally a *realist*

in theoretical persuasion (see p. 14). The point of evolution is to actively adapt the person to both the physical and the social environment.²⁰³ If the maturing child fails to accommodate to the realities of existence but instead represses those aspects that are not assimilable, then maladjustment is sure to follow. Probably we all have a certain degree of such denials of reality. We all live somewhat in a dream world, assimilating to our self-images those things we find admirable and repressing those things we dislike. But if this lack of realistic adaptation to the realities facing us gets too extreme, we will essentially construct our own problems because it will be us and not reality that is out of adjustment. Affective schemata in particular are likely to distort reality in this essentially unconscious fashion.²⁰⁴

We must also recall that Piaget's recognition of fixation allows for abnormal thought patterns to develop, because if a child retains egocentricity and continues thinking about reality in syncretic and other prelogical ways, it would be increasingly likely that his or her social adjustment would suffer in maturation to adulthood.²⁰⁵ Many of the bizarre behaviors witnessed among psychotic individuals can be understood as being due to the confused perceptions and operations that result from fixated, narrow, syncretic thought. The rigidity of paranoia, for example, suggests a lack of reversibility as noted in the intuition of semilogic of early childhood. It is not that the paranoid has regressed to early childhood, but merely that he or she has fixated at this level. Partial fixations can also be seen in restricted problems of narrowness of the sort that Jung called one-sidedness. To the extent that the schemata are narrow and thought lacks reversibility, the individual may be seen to compensate by pressing schemata that really do not fit onto reality. When this hap-

pens, Piaget tells us that "assimilation is distorted."²⁰⁶ It is a combination of all these factors—durable disequilibria, feelings of weakness, repression, and fixation—which provides the basis for explanations of abnormal behavior in Piagetian theory. In order to cure these difficulties, Piaget would doubtlessly put his trust in an honest facing-up to the realities of life. The well-adjusted (adapted) person in Piagetian theory is self-accepting, willing to accommodate, and above all, realistic about life.

George A. Kelly's Psychology of Personal Constructs

We next move to a constructivism of another variety in the psychology of personal constructs proposed by George A. Kelly. Though he shares certain phenomenological precedents with Piaget, as a psychotherapist interested in viewing the world from the (introspective) point of view of his clients, Kelly had a purely cognitive or conceptual interest in the constructive process. He did not have that biological or material form of construction in his theory that we found so central to Piaget's views.

Biographical Overview

George A. Kelly was born in America's heartland, the flat, expansive state of Kansas on 28 April 1905. Kelly was an only child, and his mother doted on him. His father was a Presbyterian minister and farmer who was forced to give up his ministry for reasons of health but did occasionally follow his calling over the years. Kelly was born in a farm home and began his education in a one-

room elementary school. He later attended high school in Wichita, Kansas, living away from home much of the time after he was thirteen years old. Kelly's parents were devoutly religious in a fundamentalist sense, and they were always working to help the needy in any possible way. His mother made pastoral calls on the sick, and his father was active in his faith, even when he was not leading a church congregation of his own. The family was hard-working and frowned on the less serious aspects of life like dancing or card-playing. However, as the only child, Kelly was given much attention by his parents, and his school attendance away from the family home provided him with a broadened outlook on life which he might not otherwise have had.

Kelly attended Friends University for three years, where he was active in debate and music. His last year of undergraduate work was spent at Parke College, where in 1926 he received the B.A. degree in physics and mathematics. Kelly was not certain what he wanted to do with his life at this point. He first considered a career in aeronautical engineering and even worked in this new field for a brief time before he found his interests turning to education.²⁰⁷ In rapid succession, he worked at a labor college in Minneapolis, taught speech for the American Bankers Association, and then conducted an Americanization class for future citizens. It was while he was teaching at a junior college in Sheldon, Iowa, during the winter of 1927-1928, that Kelly met Gladys Thompson, who later became his wife. Mrs. Kelly was teaching high school English, but both she and George coached dramatics in the same building. This work in theater was to prove extremely important to Kelly's eventual theory of behavior.

Kelly's professional development took a major turn in 1929 when he was awarded an exchange scholarship. He spent a year studying under Sir Godfrey Thomson—an eminent

statistician and educator—at the University of Edinburgh. Kelly earned a Bachelor's degree in education during this period, but in the process he developed an interest in psychology. He returned to the United States from Scotland in 1930 to enter the State University of Iowa as a graduate student in psychology. In 1931, working under Lee Travis, Kelly was awarded the Ph.D. based on a dissertation dealing with common factors in speech and reading disabilities. He had, in the meantime, begun work in physiological psychology and developed a speculative theory on the nature of what he called transient aphasia.²⁰⁸

The stock market collapse and subsequent depression had settled on America by this time, and Kelly's career did not seem especially promising as he took up a position with the Fort Hays Kansas State College. He had recently married. Times were difficult, and though Kelly's home life was a source of personal happiness—he was to father a daughter and a son—he soon decided to “pursue something more humanitarian than physiological psychology.”²⁰⁹ Kelly threw himself into the development of psychological services for the state of Kansas. He was the major force in establishing a program of traveling psychological clinics which not only served the entire state but permitted his students to obtain practical field experience. Kelly never distinguished between what in psychology was science and what was application. His early writings dealt with such practical issues as training and treatment, but Kelly was a confirmed experimenter and creative thinker. He was beginning to piece together his innovative approach to personality and therapy.

Kelly first turned to Freud when he dropped physiological psychology.²¹⁰ He had to admit that Freudian interpretations often helped his clients understand themselves, but



George A. Kelly

he also noted that other theoretical explanations worked as well to provide insight and thence a cure for some disturbance.²¹¹ He was also reading Moreno and Korzybski during this period, theorists who emphasized language and the importance of the human being's dramatic or role-playing capacities. By 1939 he had begun using a form of role play in his therapeutic approach as well as a technique of fixed-role therapy.²¹²

Kelly often said that a major influence on his life was the onset of World War II. He entered the Navy as an aviation psychologist

and was placed in charge of a program of training for local civilian pilots. Later he went to the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery of the Navy in Washington, D.C., and remained in the Aviation Psychology Branch until the war's end. In 1945 he was appointed associate professor at the University of Maryland. The war had brought considerable demand for the training of clinical psychologists as U.S. veterans were returning en masse with all forms of personal problems. Indeed, World War II was doubtlessly the single most important factor in evolving the profession of clinical psychology. Kelly was to become a major figure in this development—working

with medicine, psychiatry, and related professions to spell out a proper role for psychology in the healing sciences. In 1946 he moved into national prominence as professor and director of clinical psychology at Ohio State University. Carl Rogers had already left Ohio State for Chicago, and Kelly, along with his brilliant clinical colleague Julian B. Rotter, during the next twenty years built this program in clinical psychology into one of the best in the world.

Kelly completed his major theoretical work at Ohio State. His students helped to refine his thought, conducting supportive experiments; at the end of a decade of hard work, the *Psychology of Personal Constructs* reached print (1955a & b). The only other volume of Kelly's work appeared posthumously under the editorship of a former student, Brendan Maher (1969). Kelly spent the last decade of his life applying his theories to various aspects of psychology. He held visiting professorships at several universities in the United States and lectured at various research congresses and institutions of learning all over the world. He acquired followers and admirers on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In 1965 Kelly left Ohio State to take the Riklis Chair of Behavioral Science at Brandeis University. He was in the process of putting his many papers together into a volume when he died in March of 1967.

Personality Theory

Structural Constructs

Body-versus-Mind Theoretical Formulations and Constructive Alternativism

Kelly based his approach to psychology on a single philosophical assumption: "We assume

*that all of our present interpretations of the universe are subject to revision or replacement."*²¹³ He did not mean to frame a complete philosophical system concerning the universe but called this attitude *constructive alternativism*. For Kelly the world in which we live is one of continually changing *interpretations* or points of view rather than a world of frozen meanings. It is not that we make up the world to suit our fancy, for we do not live in a dream world. Events must be handled in such a way that our interpretations fit what is actually present.

*The universe is real; it is happening all the time; it is integral; and it is open to piecemeal interpretation. Different men construe it in different ways. Since it owes no prior allegiance to any one man's construction system, it is always open to reconstruction. Some of the alternative ways of construing are better adapted to man's purposes than are others. Thus, man comes to understand his world through an infinite series of successive approximations.*²¹⁴

The distinction between mental and physical events troubles theorists only because they think of the problem in these terms at the outset. Yet, literally, "any event may be viewed either in its psychological or in its physiological aspects."²¹⁵ Events in the real world do not belong to any one discipline or any one scientist. The physician cannot claim the mind as his or her province simply because a physical theory underwrites brain function. Nor can the psychologist claim the mind as an area of study completely out of the realm of physical theory. Kelly did not feel that a genuine solution to this divergence could be achieved by simply uniting the

realms of mind and body, nor did he think that a dualistic assumption placing these two theories of events side by side made much sense.²¹⁶ He thought it most useful simply to admit that these are two different ways in which human beings have tried to make sense of their experience. As meaningful alternatives, each interpretation can be used independently of the other—at least for the time being. Kelly left open the question of whether it is possible to frame a *single* theory of reality—arguing that *if* this were to take place it would happen at a very distant point in the future.²¹⁷ Even so, Kelly, like Piaget (see p. 708), essentially accepted a realistic view of the world.

It made the best sense to Kelly to proceed for the foreseeable future with theories of an intermediate, even “miniature” nature, theories that did not profess to be capturing the single or ultimate nature of reality. He spoke of his psychology of personal constructs in these terms, expecting that it would one day give way to better formulations which might say more sweeping and lasting things about the reality of experience.²¹⁸ Kelly asked his students to try his theory on for size to see how instructive it might be, and he always added that if after ten years or so the theory was found to be unfruitful, he would toss it aside and try something else. Thus for Kelly, the issue of mind versus body is a pseudo-problem, one that disappears when we properly understand the nature of theorizing in psychological science.

Every Person a Scientist: The Human Organism as a Process

Kelly was opposed to those theories of behavior that viewed the human being as fundamentally passive and inert, as a fixed and finished structure being moved by forces out-

side of human nature per se. Too many psychologists have accepted the view that human evolution has ceased.²¹⁹ For Kelly, what human nature “is like” must still be seen as an open question, for we continue to alter, change and develop *by definition*. “For our purposes, the person is not an object which is temporarily in a moving state but is himself a form of motion.”²²⁰ Hence, the person is a behaving *organism* steeped in the *process of movement* which is pitched toward the ever-recurring future events taking place in life. Kelly stated flatly that “all behavior can be construed as anticipatory in nature.”²²¹ Behavior is the person’s way of posing questions about life.²²² Human beings come at life with an active intellect, one that is not under control by events but that puts events under control by posing questions of experience and then seeking answers to them.²²³

As people find these answers and pose new questions, they constantly change their outlooks. That is, they do so spontaneously if they have not cut off such flexibility initially by freezing into a single outlook which is no longer open to questions and answers. Human beings can *learn* or they can *avoid learning*.²²⁴ There is nothing special about our capacity to learn. This is simply another way of speaking about ourselves as *processes of organismic functioning*. A *person* is thus an organismic motion, a network of posed questions and answers sought along various pathways into future experience.²²⁵ For this reason Kelly could say that “. . . every man is, in his own particular way, a scientist.”²²⁶ Kelly once remarked that he was amazed to see the contrast between personality theories employed by psychologists to explain their *own* behavior and those they employed to explain the behavior of their experimental subjects.²²⁷ Psychologists describe themselves as designing experiments and framing hypotheses which they put to test at will and with a clear knowledge of where they are going. Subjects,

on the other hand, are described in terms of a blind determinism, a reinforcement history which pushes them onward like some unwilling and unthinking blob of protoplasm.

Running through the very heart of Kellyian psychology is this continuing polemic waged against those theories of personality that deny the subject or therapy client the same organismic status afforded the scientist. Kelly insisted that a personality theory *must* account for *all* people—those under study and those who study and report on the findings of psychological science. For his part, *personality* was defined in terms of the organismic processes already mentioned, as “a course of events that keeps flowing along.”²²⁸

The Basic Nature of Construing and Constructs

The person looks at life, notes a series of recurring events which seem repetitive, and then “places an interpretation” upon this *predictable* aspect of his or her experience.²²⁹ This process of interpretation and prediction is termed *construing*. It bears the meaning of an abstraction from events and also involves conceptualizing subsequent events according to this abstraction. These events or the facts of experience are real enough, but each person sees them from his or her own particular slant. Different people do not always see the same meanings in the same fact pattern. Shirley pokes fun at Lori in an effort to be friendly, but Lori finds this humor offensive. Not only has Shirley failed in her effort to be friendly, she has alienated Lori altogether. Neither young woman is at fault here. Shirley might indeed have intended to be hostile in making a joke about Lori’s behavior. In point of fact, she was not. But also in point of fact, Lori construed the joking behavior as intentionally hostile and this is what will require change if this interpersonal relationship is to improve.

Kelly emphasized that the construing process is temporal, so that “to construe is to hear the whisper of the recurrent themes in the events that reverberate around us.”²³⁰ This process is uniquely *bipolar*. That is, when a person affirms the commonality of events that recur over time, he or she must *also* negate some other aspect of that experience. To say “Redheads tend to be hotheads” is *also* to say “Nonredheads tend to be level-headed.” Construing is *never* a unidimensional process.²³¹ Indeed, said Kelly, *thought* is only possible because we humans can and must dichotomize experience into *similarities* and *contrasts*.²³² Meaning always takes on this bipolar nature, for when we speak of what something means, we are always referring to a *relationship* between what things seem *like* and also *different from*. Lori undoubtedly feels that Shirley’s jokes are like those of another associate’s, Margot—and everyone knows how hostile Margot is! On the other hand, Stephanie is never hostile like this and she is one of Lori’s dearest friends. In contrasting how two people are alike and yet opposite in behavior from a third, Lori has effectively given us one of her *personal constructs*. Kelly defined the *construct* as follows: “In its minimum context a construct is a way in which at least two elements are similar and contrast with a third. There must therefore be at least three elements in the context. There may, of course, be many more.”²³³

Constructs are like transparent patterns or templates which human beings create (construe) in order to fit over the recurring realities of life.²³⁴ They begin in abstraction and generalization, but they are also imposed on subsequent events, so that in a sense we all create our personal experiences at least as much as they create us.²³⁵ Lori’s (mis)construction of Shirley’s behavior might become

a self-fulfilling prophecy if she begins to respond in kind, and overt hostility does in fact emerge in the relations between these young women. Constructs are always the end product of that organismic process discussed in the previous section—a process we may now call *construing*. Kelly used several different terms and phrases to refer to constructs over the years, including “working hypotheses,”²³⁶ “interpretations,”²³⁷ “predictions,”²³⁸ “pathways of movement,”²³⁹ and even “appraisals.”²⁴⁰ His point is that the construct is an identifiable, patterned structure or style of viewing life experience which we, as students of personality, can point to in others and in ourselves. It is not essential that a construct be named.²⁴¹ Kelly presumed that children begin formulating constructs even before they can speak. Some of our constructs are so difficult to put into words that we may find it necessary to pantomime them. For example, poking a forefinger under a nose to slightly raise the head can signify “being uppity” or “stuck-up.” This is a construct, even though we might not add the symbol (word) *uppity* to the visual act.

Of course, just saying “uppity” makes it appear that we have named our construct in terms of a commonality of behavior—as seen in people with inflated self-conceptions, for example. This would not quite capture what Kelly meant by a construct. To be specific, we must name *both* ends of the construct dimension in order to define it properly. Kelly once put it in terms similar to our example, as follows:

We do not explicitly express a whole construct if we say, “Mary and Alice have gentle dispositions but neither of them is as attractive as Jane.” We would have to say some-

*thing like this, if we were to express a true construct: “Mary and Alice are gentle; Jane is not.” Or we might say, “Jane is more attractive than Mary or Alice.”*²⁴²

Kelly referred to these two ends of the construct dimension as the *poles* of a construct. Each construct thus must have a *similarity pole* and a *contrast pole*.²⁴³ A construct always says how two things are alike (similar) and also different (contrast) from a third thing. Kelly rejected the term *concept* because he felt that it merely considered the similarities among things, and he never wanted to overlook that saying what something *is* implies what it *is not*.

When we come to name our constructs, we are free to choose the most secret, cryptic, and even vague designations we might spontaneously arrive at. This is what Kelly meant by the *personal* construct, combining the meaning of *private*, *unique*, and even *peculiar* into its designation. We never know what a person’s language actually means until we have a fairly good understanding of his or her personal constructs in light of this verbal usage.²⁴⁴ This is not to say that we lack group constructs or common constructs which everyone grasps quite clearly (objectively). But as a personality theorist, Kelly was trying to show how individuals arrive at their (subjectively) unique interpretations of things. Constructs are usually named on the basis of their similarity pole. In Kelly’s example above, for instance, “the construct of *Mary-like-Alice-unlike-Jane* is likely to be symbolized in the person’s thinking simply as *Mary* or *Maryness*.”²⁴⁵ Our construct of “uppity” suggests that we see people commonly (similarity pole) as having this characteristic but that there are others who are *not* seen this way. Of course, just what the contrast pole may be named is up to the individual who is doing the construing. One person may contrast “uppity” to “just plain folks,” whereas an-




Figure 27 Alternative Constructions of the Same Life Event

other may contrast “uppity” to “poor folks.” The point of a psychology of personal constructs is to find what the individual personally (subjectively) means when he or she brings a construct to bear in life.

Figure 27 presents a schematization of two construing minds, A and B, ordering identical life events from different perspectives. Note that one templet or construct is stylized as a square (mind A) and the other as a triangle (mind B). This symbolizes the fact that the specific constructs may vary, yet the events brought under consideration or framed by the constructs may be identical—which is essentially what occurred when Shirley viewed her jokes (life events) one way (let us say, as mind A) and Lori viewed them quite another way (mind B). In most instances of the sort depicted in Figure 27, the two people concerned would find it difficult to communicate because they would literally be viewing the world from two different perspectives. On the other hand, other constructs can come into

play to facilitate communication, or the constructs presently employed can always be *reconstructed* (changed) in order to bring into alignment their conflicting alternatives (circles can become triangles or vice versa).

Kelly always stressed that the human being is not locked into a fixed construct system unless he or she believes that this is true. The square thinker can take on a triangular slant for variety or in a “let’s pretend” sense. When this takes place, the kinds of meanings that will issue from the life events under construction will have changed somewhat. The person will see things differently. A *reconstruction* will have taken place. Indeed, if each mind symbolized in Figure 27 assumes the other’s perspective, we might end up with, rather than a square and a triangle, two circular constructions of the same life events as a meeting of the minds comes about. This

is what *constructive alternativism* is all about. People should constantly seek to find a better fit between their perspectives and the demands of life—which invariably include the points of view of others.

Common Characteristics of Constructs

Since constructs are not only abstracted from but imposed upon life events—ordering them and determining the meanings of one’s experience—they can be called *controls*.²⁴⁶ A construct can lock us into a fixed course of action. Constructs are real, and they capture real events. Although the reality of a construct is not necessarily the reality of a factual element under construction, the person behaves in terms of his or her controlling construct and *not* in terms of the factual elements.²⁴⁷ A divorce lawyer hearing a husband and wife recount the “facts” of their declining marital relationship soon realizes that people are not simply lying about what happened. With each hurt, a predicted recurrence of the offending partner is put to test again and again, convincing the husband or wife of the other’s loss of devotion. Neither seems to see that by not accepting the viewpoints of each other, they have effectively doomed their relationship. A reconstruction is required, but the time seems past when it might have been possible.

Life would be an intolerable series of inconsistent events if the human being could not perceive regularities and thereby formulate constructs. We also have the capacity to systematically order our constructs into what Kelly called *construction systems*.²⁴⁸ We do this by overlooking inconsistencies in the use of our constructs, so that even if a construct does not fit exactly in each recurring life event, we keep its general order intact. We cannot make allowances for every little nu-

ance of change that we notice in one rain-storm to another. There are changes, but the consistencies are what count. Cultural stereotypes are negative examples of our tendency to systematize our constructs. We do not analyze those times when a black person is industrious, a Catholic is flexible, or a Jew is shy and suggestible. We allow our prejudiced (controlling) views to freeze us into the stereotypes of lazy blacks, rigid Catholics, and aggressive Jews, despite the many contradictions we confront daily. Even such fixed constructs can help us anticipate events, of course, as long as our predictions are not always invalidated. If it is possible to see laziness, rigidity, and aggressivity in *any* person—to some extent, at least—then finding these qualities in our ethnic prejudices should not be too difficult. Furthermore, how we behave in relation to blacks, Catholics, and Jews could easily bring about the kind of behavior we predicted from the outset. As we have noted above, constructs can become self-fulfilling prophecies.

Constructs are not all framed (construed) at the same level of abstraction, so that some of them have a broad reference in our lives, whereas others refer to very limited and specific life events. Kelly referred to this higher- or lower-order ranking in abstractness as the *ordinality* of constructs.²⁴⁹ A *superordinate* construct is said to *subsume* (include the meaning of) a *subordinate* construct. The former is more abstract than the latter, and it thus can take the latter into its *range of convenience* (its scope of referential meaning).²⁵⁰ For example, a construct such as “loyalty” may be superordinate to the less abstract concepts of “working unselfishly” and “doing what’s asked.” The range of convenience a construct has also delimits the relevance its meaning has to the person. Going beyond the range of convenience means a construct is no longer relevant or applicable to life events. In Figure 27 the life events sub-

sumed by the square or triangle would define the range of convenience for these constructs. Those life events that fall outside a construct's range of convenience are *not* opposites of the construct but are simply irrelevant to the dichotomous meanings being applied.²⁵¹ Thus, a person may apply his or her loyalty construct *only* to the family sphere. Family members should be loyal to one another. Once it is outside of parental and sibling relations, the range of convenience for this construct ceases and we no longer need exhibit loyalty even to our friends.

A construct can move up or down the ordinal ladder of abstraction, subsuming other contexts of the construction system by extending its range of convenience or by delimiting a narrow range by constricting and specifying only a few life events to which it applies. For example, we can *dilate* our construct by broadening the perceptual field within which we make it applicable (spread out along the life events of Figure 27 more and more).²⁵² The loyalty construct can be extended beyond the family setting. Sometimes this extension of a construct's range of convenience is *loose*, so that the meaning is unclear because of its tentative fit to the range of life events being included.²⁵³ If we extend loyalty to people beyond the family, when do we stop? Can a boss be loyal to a worker, particularly during times of economic recession when a cutback in the work force is necessary? Is it possible to lay someone off work and yet be loyal to that person? Such questions arise for all of us as we attempt to make sense of our lives, and we all have these more or less *loose* constructions in our hierarchy of personal constructs. To loosen construct meanings is not always bad, since it leads to creative insights at times.²⁵⁴ When we loosen, we apply a "rubber-sheet templet" to experience and thereby shift our frame of reference.²⁵⁵ The best way in which to do this is consciously, dealing with a construct's

meaning in an experimental fashion and looking for the new insights a changing meaning might provide us with. Once again, the construing process is one of raising and answering questions about our life events.

It is also possible to *tighten* constructs, to freeze them into rigid definitions. Tight constructs lead to unvarying predictions, which can in turn have either a positive or a negative impact on the fit of our construct system.²⁵⁶ Assume that Vernon has a stereotype about redheaded people being hotheads. If he were now to tighten this construct when confronting a redheaded man, he would say to himself something like this: "Now, let's see, if it's true that redheaded people are hotheaded, then this redheaded guy talking with me will lose his temper if I press him on a point. Let's see if he does!" Here is a clear-cut prediction in which the outcome will put the construct system to test. Had Vernon persisted in using a loosened construction of his stereotype, he would have simply chatted along with the man and then later "recalled" certain things said as being hostile in tone. Or he might have gone through the conversation with the idea, "I had better be careful in talking to this guy or he'll fly off the handle." In behaving like this, Vernon never puts his loose construction to risk. Tightening stabilizes constructs and facilitates their organization. Superordinate constructs are difficult to develop if the lower-order constructs they subsume continue to be vague and unstable (loose).²⁵⁷ If every person is a scientist, then tightening is obviously an important aspect of experimentation—making thinking clear, projecting a hypothesis that can be confirmed or denied, and so forth.

Tightening also relates to the *permeability* of constructs. By this Kelly meant the relative capacity for a construct to take on new

elements.²⁵⁸ A permeable construct is not necessarily loose. If a construct of “loyalty” could not be applied beyond the family context, it would be *impermeable*, but this would not necessarily mean it was loose. We could have a very tight conception of loyalty limited to the family context. A good example of a tight, impermeable construct occurs when someone says, “That is clearly a chair and all one can do is use it as a chair.” A person like this would be unlikely to see the myriad possibilities of chair functions, such as ladders for reaching, props against doors, or barricades for children’s games. The impermeable thinker reasons like this, rigidly asserting that “You are either right or you are wrong, now which is it?” In contrast to such impermeable constructions, Kelly noted, “A construct is permeable if it is open to the addition of new elements, or elements beyond those upon which it has been explicitly formed.”²⁵⁹ The permeable construct admits situational differences. A ladder is not a chair, but given certain situations in which no stepladder is available, we can substitute a chair or even a table for a ladder. Here is the beginning of supple thought, responsive to circumstance in a creative fashion. Like anything else, it can lead to difficulty if constructs are too impermeable and hence interfuse with one another to a great extent. Here permeability may shade into looseness.

Kelly termed a highly impermeable construct that freezes its elements into *only* its unique range of convenience a *pre-emptive construct*.²⁶⁰ The black-or-white form of thinking so typical of the rigid person reflects this extreme form of impermeability. On the other hand, a construct that permits its elements to belong to *other* realms concurrently (at the same time), even as it fixes definite

qualities for present purposes, Kelly called a *constellatory construct*.²⁶¹ For example, assume that Marty is called Jewlike even though he is a Christian; the qualities of a Jewish stereotype would be immediately constellated to him: if Jewlike, then aggressive, pushy, materialistic, and so forth. The pre-emptive thinker would say, “Only Jews are Jewlike,” whereas the constellatory thinker can generalize a construct or use it in an analogical sense without diminishing its fundamental meaning. A construct that leaves its elements open to construction in all other respects is termed a *propositional construct*.²⁶² The propositional thinker is likely to engage in conscious elaboration of a permeable construction system, for he or she would reason that “it is conventional to view all Catholics as rigid and authoritarian, but let’s see if things can be this uniform and simple.” The propositional thinker is thus open to new evidence, willing to take an altered view on an experimental basis, and to this extent, he or she represents an opposite end of the continuum from pre-emptive and constellatory thinkers.²⁶³

There are other terms of descriptive importance used by Kelly. A *comprehensive construct* is one that subsumes a wide variety of events, whereas the *incidental construct* has a much narrower range of convenience.²⁶⁴ Mildred reflects a comprehensive construct when she says, “Life is mostly a matter of good or bad luck,” but her construct is more incidental when she says, “Once in a great while I seem to let what other people say or don’t say get to me.” Constructs can be made more comprehensive through dilation, of course, which broadens their range of convenience. The opposite tendency to focus a construct and thus restrict or narrow its range of convenience is called *constriction*.²⁶⁵ It is possible so to constrict the range of convenience that it will apply to a very limited aspect of life. Presumably, something like a pro-

found religious experience that has taken place only once in life might be delimited by a highly specific, constricted construct. The feelings and impact of this single experience might not be applicable anywhere else in life. A *regnant construct* is a form of superordinate construct which subsumes many other constructs and helps to color their meaning.²⁶⁶ This kind of regnancy is reflected in Herman's suggestion that "People are either for me or they are against me." As he goes through life, Herman will be letting this superordinate construction color all of his interpersonal relations. When they are impermeable, such constructions are likely to become pre-emptive and constellatory.²⁶⁷ At some point in life, Herman might begin seeing more and more others against him, which in turn suggests the development of a paranoid delusion.

*Conscious, Unconscious, and the Self
as a Core-Role Construct*

We have already noted that not all constructs are verbalized. Kelly accounted for the conscious-versus-unconscious-mind conceptions of classical analytical theory in terms of this capacity for people to formulate templates which are not put into words. So-called unconscious mental contents, as seen in dreams, represented preverbal constructs which continue to exert an influence on experience.²⁶⁸ Strictly speaking, Kelly did not want to use this distinction.

We do not use the conscious-unconscious dichotomy, but we do recognize that some of the personal constructs a person seeks to subsume within his system prove to be fleeting or elusive. Sometimes this is because they are loose rather than tight. . . . Sometimes it is because they are not bound by the symbolism of words or other acts. But of this we are sure, if they are important in a person's life

*it is a mistake to say they are unconscious or that he is unaware of them. Every day he experiences them, often all too poignantly, except he cannot put his finger on them nor tell for sure whether they are at the spot the therapist has probed for them.*²⁶⁹

Kelly was opposed to thinking of an entity called self or ego, but he did say that we all have some construction label in terms of *self-identity*. ". . . It is quite appropriate to refer to a given person's self-construct, or to a class of constructs which can be called personal self-constructs."²⁷⁰ Here again, we are likely to formulate our *self-construct* around what we see as a core of similarity about our behavior transcending a series of life events. We are "sincere" or "athletic" or "nice" in all of life's circumstances; at least, we believe ourselves to be consistent across many time-bound life events like this. It might surprise and even hurt us to discover that what we consider nice behavior another person calls passivity, but that is how life goes. The point is: we do formulate constructions of our own behavior based on our experience, and these self-constructs exert the typical *control* on what we do as we move through life.

Why do we formulate a self-construct in the first place? It happens spontaneously as we mature, passing through interpersonal relations. Indeed, to construe another person is often to construe oneself.²⁷¹ We tend to see ourselves as *like* others yet *different* from people at the opposite end of our self-construction. Sometimes we place ourselves at the *different* end of a construct dimension. Certain people are "dirty" or—more positively framed—"confident" and we are different from them in that we are "clean" and/or "unconfident." The particular meaning that enters into our construct issues from our inter-

personal impressions as we frame the behavior of others. Kelly called this tendency we have to relate ourselves to others the *role relationship*, and he was so taken by this conception that he even toyed with the idea of calling his approach to personality study “role theory.”

Kelly’s use of the term *role* should not be confused with the usage often employed by sociologists and social psychologists. A *role* in the latter sense refers to a series of behavioral prescriptions (how to behave), laid down by the culture and then enacted by all those people who play the role of father, physician, mother, teacher, and so forth. Kelly viewed the *role* as a pattern of behavior defined by the individual rather than as a cultural product. It is a *process* whereby we as individuals construe the construction processes of other people, and basing our actions on what we uniquely understand is taking place *in relation to us* with these other people, carry out an interpersonal activity.²⁷² In a manner of speaking, we each write our own scenario for how our interpersonal relations will be going with other people. We make an *interpretation* of what they are thinking about us, and then we frame a *role construct* based upon this assumption.²⁷³ This role construct guides the role relationship we have with these other people. Clayton suspects that his teachers find him boring, and basing his actions upon this personal construct of boring-interesting, relates to his teachers in a certain way. Kelly emphasized that a role construct must be “based upon one’s interpretation of the thinking of the other people in relation to whom the role is enacted.”²⁷⁴

Now, the interesting thing about such role relations is that the other people with whom we relate do not necessarily have to be thinking about us in the way that we assume they

are!²⁷⁵ Clayton’s teachers are not necessarily finding him boring, and even if some do, they all do not. This teaches us that role constructs may include gross distortions of the interpersonal truth.²⁷⁶ The beautiful young woman who finds one day that her pleasant-ries spoken to a rather innocuous young man down the block have led the latter to construe an intricate and involved love affair between them finds herself the victim of the unfortunate lad’s colorless and lonely life. Yet insofar as this fantasied love affair entered into the young man’s behavior—eventuating in a highly embarrassing scene when he sees his “girlfriend” on the arm of another—we can speak of his delusional system as a kind of role relationship (predicated on erroneous role constructs). In most cases, of course, the role relations of people are more realistic and interpersonally accurate than this. Most of us learn to read the intentions of others more correctly.

Now, when we speak of the *self* as a construct or a *self-construct* (self-concept, and so on), we actually refer to a special case of the role construct. Kelly noted that there are unique *core-role constructs* which define our relationship to other people.²⁷⁷ We behave in relation to these as if our very life depended on them—as in one sense, it does. The early Christians, for example, who went to their deaths rather than renounce their faith were behaving in terms of their core-role constructs, viewing their cobelievers as brothers and sisters in God. A more mundane example might be the case of Dennis, who thinks of himself as an individualist. This is his core self-image, and he invariably arrays people along this comprehensive and superordinate construct of individualism versus collectivism. If Dennis senses that others are—in their construction of him—putting him into a mold, he might react quite angrily and stubbornly to any suggestion that he compromise or accommodate his views to those of the group.

Motivational Constructs

*The Person as a Problem-Solving
Animal: Freedom versus Determinism in Behavior*

Since Kelly began with the assumption that human beings are processes in constant change, he did not think of motivation as a form of propulsion added to a personality structure in order to get it moving. There is no frozen psychic structure to move. Hence, we need no mental energies to run the personality system.²⁷⁸ Kelly specifically rejected such terminology, as well as the drive construct which has been used so widely by the learning theorists.²⁷⁹ He was not sympathetic with the views of learning being advanced in the academic centers of his time, which he felt saw the person as little more than the tail end of an unplanned reinforcement history.²⁸⁰

Rather than seeing people as behaving according to some hedonistic principle based on the satisfactions of energetic expenditure or instinctual reinforcements, Kelly said that people find their rewards in the successful anticipation (prediction) of events.²⁸¹ It is not the reward but the *solution* that brings the person satisfactions.²⁸² There is nothing special about this sequence of "construe in prediction and solve." All behavior is like this. Motivation is not a special topic for the psychologist, who could as readily dismiss it from the professional vocabulary as retain it.²⁸³ If we look to the person as a problem solver engaged in an active process of constructing events in order to predict and control them, then both learning and motivation fall into line without special treatment. For Kelly, *change* was always a question of *reconstruction*.²⁸⁴ When an individual's construction system confronts new life events and yet is not helpful or applicable, a change is called for. When newly formed constructs

are inconsistent with older constructs, a change is called for.²⁸⁵ Of course, we human beings do not always change. We develop *habits*, which Kelly defined as "a convenient kind of stupidity which leaves a person free to act intelligently elsewhere."²⁸⁶ Or we literally avoid changing because of the secondary factors operating on us, such as the lack of understanding that change is possible or the threatening possibilities that changing our behavior implies.

It was on the basis of constructs as controls that Kelly developed his conceptions of *choice*, *freedom*, and *determinism*. Since a construct projects its meaning onto reality, the range of convenience and the significance of the construct are important controls. If these constructs prove to be impermeable, the individual becomes locked into their meaningful import in an unvarying, controlled, inflexible—literally determined—sense. Superordinate constructs are naturally the most significant determiners of behavior, for they subsume many lower-level constructs and thus have a broader range of convenience and influence.²⁸⁷ To become free of this superordinate control, the individual must either reconstrue his or her circumstances or otherwise alter the most superordinate constructions. Once we have placed a new determining control over our outlooks like this, we can speak of a freedom taking place. Freedom and determination are not two different things, but rather are opposite sides of the same coin. ". . . Determinism and freedom are two complementary aspects of structure. They cannot exist without each other any more than *up* can exist without *down* or *right* without *left*. Neither freedom nor determination is absolute. A thing is free *with respect to something*; it is determined *with respect to something else*."²⁸⁸

If we are to see behavioral change, we must alter the “respect to something” that freezes a person into his or her present pattern. As we have noted, this amounts to some form of construct alteration. Kelly was sensitive to the charge that his theory of freedom and determinism as a relationship between superordinate (controlling) and subordinate (controlled) constructs might be seen as an overly “intellectual” account of human behavior.²⁸⁹ His typical response to this criticism was that the person’s construing of events is *not* limited to verbalized symbols. Furthermore, conative (active doing) as well as cognitive (passive knowing) behaviors fall under the range of convenience of one’s construct system. Behavioral conations like all overt actions are not something *other than* our cognitions. Intellectual explanations would seem to be limited to verbalized (symbolized in language) and cognitive explanations, which is clearly *not* the tactic selected by the psychology of personal constructs.²⁹⁰ Actually, Kelly did not like to think of his view as a cognitive one.²⁹¹ He did not believe the term signified anything worthwhile for the personality theorist.

The C-P-C Cycle and the Creativity Cycle

Two important concepts used by Kelly clarify how constructs and construction systems can change. The first is the *C-P-C Cycle*, which involves a sequence of construction in which *circumspection*, *pre-emption*, and *control* follow in that order and lead to a choice which precipitates the person into a particular situation.²⁹² By *circumspection*, Kelly meant that the individual deals with the issues facing him or her as regards some problem in a propositional fashion. Recall that a propositional

construct leaves its elements open to construction in all other respects. It is “open to alternative hypotheses.” Hence, at the outset of the C-P-C Cycle, individuals mull over the various possibilities facing them and look at the problem from different slants, until they finally *pre-empt!* Pre-emption means that one and only one alternative is taken on as *the* definition of the problem under consideration. And as the old saying “A problem defined is a problem half-solved” suggests, once this pre-emption occurs, a course of action in the service of its resolution is undertaken.

When Hamlet mulled over his life situation, including his father’s death, his mother’s behavior, his uncle’s attitude, and so forth, he was dealing circumspectively with a gnawing issue. However, when he finally settled on the question “To be, or not to be?” Kelly argued that Hamlet had pre-empted other possibilities, other middle grounds short of his murderous construction (kill versus don’t kill).²⁹³ A definite control (determination) was fixed to Hamlet’s future behavior once he decided which of the pre-emptive alternatives open to him he would follow. Kelly notes that the final C of the C-P-C Cycle could just as well be termed a *choice* as a *control* feature of the cycle.²⁹⁴ Because of the dichotomous nature of thought, people are always free to choose in the direction of a construct pole that they believe will further their construction system as a whole—and the subsequent prediction of events this system makes possible.²⁹⁵ Once the choice has been made, then the control settles in and an act of behavior is *determined*. And so it happened in the gloomy “destiny” of Hamlet that he was to kill his uncle.

Kelly termed the second way in which we can observe a sequence of events taking place in the process of construction leading to change the *Creativity Cycle*. In this case, the succession of events follows a loosening-to-tightening of constructs.²⁹⁶ People with tight

constructs find it difficult to be creative, for they cannot go beyond the bounds of their rigid frames of reference. Creative people, on the other hand, can allow their constructs to stretch or bend. They can often play with constructs or, as Kelly liked to phrase it, “try them on for size.” We do not always have to take ourselves seriously or believe everything we think or say. It is this “what-if?” or “let’s-assume-this-for-the-heck-of-it” attitude that differentiates the Creativity Cycle from the C-P-C Cycle. In the latter case, we are always engaged in a process that will *bring us to an action* of some personally construed variety.²⁹⁷ We are not fooling around but are engaged in a search that will be a mere preliminary to some action. We are committed to act, even though the specific directions of this action are not worked out yet at the outset of the C-P-C Cycle. In the Creativity Cycle, there may be no appreciable personal commitment to an eventual action, although it is true that when something new is construed, an action does often follow.

Emotive Terms and the Psychology of Personal Constructs

Kelly thought of *emotion* as behavior that was either loosely defined²⁹⁸ or was not a word-bound but a preverbal or nonverbal construction.²⁹⁹ A person’s *feelings* are inner events needing construing (for example, “What’s happening to me? Why do I have this mood?”).³⁰⁰ Sometimes what the individual calls an emotion is the other side of some consciously known and expressed construct. How we *feel* is in this sense the other side of what we *know*. By and large, however, in the psychology of personal constructs, emotional expression is considered *loose* construction.³⁰¹ Emotional people are essentially unable to say clearly what their attitudes are toward some aspect of their lives. We only make sense of emotional behavior after we

have clarified what is taking place in the construction system.

Kelly had many creative things to say about those aspects of behavior that are typically associated with the emotions. Take *humor*, for example. *Jokes* were interpreted by Kelly as neat reconstructions of ongoing experience associated with quick movements and unexpected outcomes because of a reversal in our constructive expectations (predictions).³⁰² The arrogant and pompous general stumbles on his way to the rostrum and in his subsequent blushing and stammering proves to his snickering troops that he is a human being after all. If we analyze our favorite jokes, we are struck by the fact that, as Kelly said, their punch lines invariably rest upon a twist (reconstruction) which rapidly rearranges our expectations of what is taking place.

Kelly defined *threat* as awareness of an imminent comprehensive change in one’s core-role constructs.³⁰³ We are threatened to the extent that what we feared might take place looks as though it is really coming about. Threats are unhappy predictions we make. We do not want these predictions to come true, but we expect them to anyhow. We are fearful that we have some terrible disease, so we arrange to see our physician. With each solemn look on the physician’s face, we grow increasingly apprehensive, for we continually predict that she is finding what we are fearing she will indeed find—usually quite in error, of course. *Stress* is a more removed psychological state, a kind of awareness of potential threat.³⁰⁴ Stress moves into threat when the person becomes convinced that something is about to happen which will upset the ongoing construction system.³⁰⁵ As this begins to happen, as the constructs begin to lose their grip on our personal reality, we

are likely to say that things look shaky, or scary, or simply incomprehensible.

At times like these, we witness *signs of emotion*. The person may tense up, perspire, act erratically, and possibly in time, actually flee from the threatening situation in a headlong panic. Flights into states of amnesia which leave the person completely unable to recall anything about his or her past life are also possible. In fact, a spotty memory is characteristic of the threatened state. Because it is difficult to hold in memory that which is unstructured (poorly, loosely construed), people have a hard time remembering what is happening to them when under various levels of threat.³⁰⁶ Here is where abnormal states termed *unconscious behavior* are likely to be seen. One of the main reasons we fail to construe properly under states of threat is because we have the feeling that our ready-made constructs cannot help us. We are essentially waiting to see what will happen in our life, thereby forgoing the important role we must personally play in structuring the future course of that life.

Kelly considered the resultant “loss of structure” to be *anxiety*.³⁰⁷ He used to refer jokingly to this psychological state as being *caught with our constructs down*.³⁰⁸ When we are anxious, we cannot predict; hence, it is impossible for us to solve our problems. The emotional state of *fear* is at least a more focused experience. Fear occurs when some imminent incidental construct has loomed up in one’s path to suggest that impending change is likely to take place.³⁰⁹ In our earlier example, we suffered anxiety as we watched our physician, knowing not what she might find but predicting that whatever it was, it would be terrible. When she now fixes a specific diagnosis (incidental construct) which is serious and demands immediate treatment, we begin to suffer *fear*. The advantage of fear

is that with the stipulation of a given illness we have already begun a process of reconstruction. We can now set about following our physician’s directions for cure, read up on our disorder, lay new plans for health care, and so on. Of course, if our illness is incurable, our anxiety will never turn to fear. Here is something—death—so incomprehensible that nothing within our present construction system subsumes it properly. At this point, what problem solution we arrive at depends on many factors, including our views on the meaning of existence and afterlife.

Another aspect of emotional life having great relevance to personality is what might be termed *aggression* or *hostility*. Although these terms are often used interchangeably by psychologists today, Kelly had a unique way of viewing what he took to be two distinctive emotional states. For him, *aggression* was tantamount to an active elaboration of a perceptual field.³¹⁰ Nate is an aggressive person. He is constantly trying to broaden his horizons, to extend the scope of his construction system. We see him relying on the Creativity Cycle a lot as he plays with new ideas, reads new books, and looks for alternative courses of action. He is also a bit stubborn, reflecting the end state of the C-P-C Cycle, at which point he has put down a plan of action and is now committed to put his ideas into practice. Nate is always willing to put his ideas on the line, devising experiments which put his thinking to risk. Larry, on the other hand, is a *passive* individual. Larry dislikes having to put his ideas on the line. He tends to put this off, or he expects conditions to be perfect before he is willing to try anything out. Of course, we are all a little like Nate in some areas of life and a little like Larry in others. But the point is: for Kelly, aggressive-passive as a construct describing behavior related to how actively we elaborate our construction system from day to day. Unfortunately, because the aggressive person does seek to

know and to do things actively, he or she is likely to upset the gentle routine and construction systems of other people, who then misconstrue this aggressivity and consider it hostility!

We are only *hostile* in Kelly's terms when we insist upon finding true the predictions we have made in the face of contradictory evidence.³¹¹ As Kelly observed: "The trouble with hostility is that it always attempts to make the original investment pay off. It is unrealistic."³¹² The hostile individual freezes his or her constructs into impermeability. Garret "knows" what is taking place in his job situation, where he has been having a lot of trouble with his coworkers. He "knows" what others are thinking, and why they are giving him all the trouble he is experiencing. No amount of explanation or alternative recommendations by his coworkers will change his mind. It is the same thing at home with his children, where Garret never spares the rod. His children had better do what is expected of them, and he allows no excuse making. There is no effort on his part to understand a child's construction of events when things go counter to what Garret demands. As is true of all hostile people, Garret really does not care what other people think. If he were simply an aggressive person, Garret would take an interest in other people's viewpoints, even though he might dispute them. But Garret always punishes, frustrates, or somehow injures others when they fail to behave in the way his construction system predicts they ought to be behaving. He can even do this injury in a passive way, by not hearing what others say to him, by forgetting an appointment or a birth date, or by overlooking the positive aspects of life in preference for the negative in all things.

Another emotional tone often emphasized in personality theories is *guilt*. Kelly defined this as perception of apparent dislodgment from one's role structure.³¹³ The guilty person

is thus one who has done something which either is or seems to be in direct contradiction with his or her self-image around which the core-role constructs order themselves. Here is where the psychology of personal constructs would place *conscience* or *superego*. Note that this dislodgment of guilt still represents threat. We are threatened by guilt just as readily as we are by anxiety—and indeed it is sometimes difficult to separate anxiety from guilt. In general, however, a guilty person can identify the specific source of the emotional upset. The guilty individual feels that he or she has transgressed a core-value system, which, if religious in nature, represents a *sin*.³¹⁴ When we violate our core-role constructs, we often feel alienated from others, because it is here that our interpersonal relations take root. The once-faithful husband who "slips" from his role and has an affair with another woman while on a business trip finds himself unable to relate to his wife upon his return home. By dislodging his self-construct, this man both feels guilt and finds that he can no longer relate to his wife on the same grounds as before. What to do? If confession is eventually made of the infidelity, it is because the husband wants to reconstrue his self-image (as no longer perfectly faithful but a repentant "sinner") and regain a sense of relatedness with his wife. Of course, the marital bond itself might be reconstrued by the wife, resulting in divorce or a much less affectionate relationship, and so forth.

The Defense Mechanisms

Kelly did not favor a defense-mechanism approach to the description of behavior, though he did comment on some of these Freudian conceptions. He considered *repression* to be a suspension or stopping of the construing process, occurring most probably when a per-

son could not come to grips with the threat of an imminent change in the construction system or possibly saw unresolvable contradictions in the system.³¹⁵ *Incorporation* was described as a person's willingness to see other people like himself or herself.³¹⁶ *Identification* or *introjection* results when we take over constructs our group—including family members—have already been using.³¹⁷ *Regression* is due to behavior that is predicated upon either preverbal or at least very immature constructions of life.³¹⁸ *Projection* would be a special form of hostility, in which the person insists on naming what another's motives are despite all evidence to the contrary. Note the implicit tie here between hostility and projection! *Reaction-formation* is an attempt to put the "opposite" construct pole in effect when it is the other pole that bears the significance for a person.

Time-Perspective Constructs

Development as the Dispersion of Dependency

Kelly did not formulate many time-perspective constructs, feeling that the *present* is what counts in behavior. The psychology of personal constructs also turns our attention forward in time. Even so, some things can be said about development from birth to maturity.

Essentially, this question of maturing construction extends the human being's dependencies from one or a few to several persons. Kelly did not favor calling people either dependent or independent, since he believed that everyone is both. We cannot exist without relying on others. In the earliest months of life, children presumably focus their relatively crude attention capacities on their mothers. They frame a *dependency construct*

at this stage of life, by which Kelly meant a preverbal figure construct signifying that some one person (mother) is essential to personal survival.³¹⁹ By *figure* we mean the image (mental picture) of a mother or surrogate (stand-in) mothering-one. Kelly noted, "When the child uses a figure in this manner he actually develops two levels of meaning for *Mother*: the one referring to the actual behaviors of his mother, the other referring to *motherliness*."³²⁰ Such preverbal constructs relying on images tend to be impermeable and are what we usually find popping up in dreams and other so-called unconscious behaviors. They are not very effective in determining interpersonal relations because they fail to consider the other person to be a construing organism. In other words, they are *not* role constructs.

The task of maturing now becomes one of making such basic dependency constructs more permeable, extending the child's reliance for existence to others besides mother. We can be fairly certain that in their initial contact with them, children assess other people in terms of preverbal mothering constructs. They will begin seeing how other adults (father, uncles, aunts, visitors) are alike and yet different from mother. Language enters in time to increase the complexity of this construing process. Kelly defined *language* as "a device for anticipating the events that are about to happen to us."³²¹ Verbal constructs allow a sense of growing awareness (consciousness) to develop, including the insight that other people are construing our behavior even as we construe theirs. The net effect here is that role construction takes place, and children extend their dependencies onto others even more as they form *friendships* during their school-attending years.

Another important development in everyone's life is the ability to experiment, to predict and control events in order to find avenues for extending the range of one's con-

struct system. In childhood, this is the function of *play*. Kelly observed: "Play is adventure. Its outcomes are always veiled in some delightful uncertainty."³²² Children develop skills in their play even as they are putting down some of their primary constructs. Even in later adulthood, we can get some idea of what a person considers most important in life by observing recreational selections. Some people are very social in their recreations, whereas others prefer solitary pursuits.³²³ To understand the person, we would do well to observe his or her free-time activities.

If the child matures properly, we will in time begin seeing a development away from the rigidly simplistic construction system toward greater use of propositional constructs and more permeable dependency constructs. The range of dependency expands as the person comes to understand life in a more complex fashion. Children move from whole-figure constructs—in which the mother image is rigidly framed as *only* such-and-such a person—to more flexible trait attributions that recognize alternatives in the behavior of a single person. Mothers are motherly at times but they can also be quite *unmotherly* at other times. Thus as we grow to adulthood, we can confirm or disconfirm our constructs *in part* rather than in their entirety.³²⁴ We do not totter on an all-or-none brink of construct application so that with each failure in prediction we are flooded with threat. Rather, we mature to adulthood knowing that some lack of predictability is normal in any construction system.

Society and Culture as a Validational Backdrop for Individual Prediction

Our personality styles are drawn out along lines that tie into the patterns of our *society* and *culture*, so that we tend to behave like other people on many important dimensions. Southerners in the United States speak in a

dialect which stamps them as regional residents quite different from New Englanders. The question naturally arises: is not our behavior entirely determined by our culture and society? Kelly could not accept an affirmative answer to this question, preferring to focus on the individual person rather than on such "in common" descriptions of behavior.³²⁵ Thus, he insisted that "social psychology must be a psychology of interpersonal understandings, not merely a psychology of common understandings."³²⁶ Society exists, *not* because it is some form of external power dictating social roles for people to fill, but *rather* because people do construe one another as fellow construers and hence can enter into role relationships.³²⁷ We must not be tricked into assigning the responsibility for our behavior to an impersonal society any more than we must be tricked into assigning it to an impersonal nature.

Of course, society's cultural values and rules are important. A *cultural norm*, for example, may be thought of as "the eyes of society," and it is the unusual person who can ignore the evaluation of such eyes completely.³²⁸ Kelly believed that cultures arise in the first place because people just happen to "construe their experience in the same way."³²⁹ This means that a group of people can agree on what will *validate* their construction systems, their individual predictions as to life experience, and so forth.³³⁰ Hence, as we are the initial construers of culture, we human beings can only submit to cultural controls by construing things in this way—believing that we are merely pawns being moved about by cultural forces.³³¹

The best way to think about culture is as a kind of background against which we can put our constructions to test. For example, in growing to adulthood, the individual selects a career or job vocation. But the work situa-

tion is fraught with a number of cultural practices which enable the individual to test out or validate what this vocation really means.³³² In fact, the person begins to construe the entire culture through the eyes of his or her profession. Farmers have one view of what is right or wrong about their society and truck drivers have another. Communistic theories have made it appear that it is a culture's means of production that determines the person's construction system, because of this tendency for people to see things by way of their occupational validations. Kelly found the communistic analysis wanting, and he was also critical of the tendency to break society down into upper-, middle-, and lower-class levels.³³³ Though such breakdowns do tell us what advantages large groups of people enjoy, they sidestep the fundamental issue of how the individual person can come to view the world independently of his or her class norm. Kelly thought that too often sociocultural analyses of behavior oversimplify descriptions of human behavior. Furthermore, they tend to downplay the responsibility the individual has for his or her behavior. "Just as we have insisted that man is not necessarily the victim of his biography, we would also insist that man is not necessarily the victim of his culture."³³⁴

Individual-Differences Constructs

Personality differences arise because different people take on different constructs in coming at their life events. To understand the person, we have to know how he or she typically approaches life. Since people are essentially alike in many ways, it is possible for us as students of personality to abstract commonalities between them, call them dimensions or traits, and then begin aligning people along these

constructs according to what *we* consider individual differences. Kelly was not opposed to psychologists doing this, and in fact he said that psychotherapists must have an ability to construe their cases in some such fashion so that they can organize their knowledge.³³⁵ Yet, he also stressed that such professional constructions must always be propositional and permeable, open to invalidating evidence, and adhered to only speculatively rather than rigidly.

If we now wish to capture the typical drift of a person's construct system, we may do so—calling the person dependent³³⁶ or aggressive³³⁷—but Kelly was not much interested in promoting such common designations. He developed a means (Rep Test) for identifying the unique constructions people make for themselves, recorded from their own unique slant. Kelly could see little profit in pigeonholing other people. What the psychology of personal constructs aims for is to grasp the unique slant of each individual human being. This means that by definition advocates of this approach have entered into a role relationship with these individuals and thus can carry out the purposes for which the theory has been laid down. As far as Kelly was concerned, the major purpose of his theory was to further professional activity in the clinical area, particularly as regards psychotherapy.³³⁸

Psychopathology and Psychotherapy

Theory of Illness

Personal Constructs in Abnormality

Kelly defined *psychological disorder* as "any personal construction which is used repeat-

edly in spite of consistent invalidation."³³⁹

The construction system is thus not accomplishing its purpose.³⁴⁰ The person's experiments are not coming out as predicted, but he or she insists upon using them anyway. Amy is convinced that her problems in life are due to the fact that everyone in her home town has been jealous of her family name. Her forebears were always leading citizens of the community, and ever since her youth, Amy has found people blocking out of pure jealousy her attempts to take a leadership role. Amy never examines the evidence that her leadership efforts have been of low quality, or that when others have tried to work out differences with her, she has bluntly turned them aside as covering up their jealousy of her family background. In fact, so intricate have Amy's rationalizations become that when she first entered into psychotherapy at the age of forty her therapist had difficulty understanding her behavior. This is one of the signs we have of a serious abnormality in a personality—when we as therapists cannot predict our client's behavior.³⁴¹ Of course, therapists have a professional construction system which should always permit prediction of client behavior to some extent.³⁴² But Amy is skirting the fringes of a delusional system at this point and there is much that is unpredictable in her behavior as she departs more and more from common sense in order to maintain her inadequate construction system.

Amy reflects the basic attitude of all abnormal individuals, in that they feel their troubles stem from the *facts* of their life events rather than from their *interpretation* (construction) of these factual events.³⁴³ Often, the abnormal person will begin retreating to earlier constructions of life, resulting in so-called *regression* taking place.³⁴⁴ Abnormals turn to their parents, marital partners, or physicians for support and assistance in the validation of their distorting constructs.

When regression is severe and an activation of preverbal constructions is pronounced, we are likely to perceive what the analysts call acting-out behavior in which the person is unable to verbalize the reasons (constructs) for his or her unusual behavior.³⁴⁵ This is usually the point at which a maladjusted individual is likely to enter therapy.

The *presenting complaint* of a client in psychotherapy will usually provide us with a reference point for beginning our understanding of the maladjustment process. Kelly would have his clients elaborate on their presenting complaint so that he could grasp the conceptual processes within which the maladjustment developed originally and is now being sustained.³⁴⁶ What does Amy really mean by *family name* and *jealousy*? These are two important constructs, but are we sure that we understand how she is using these meanings? As she makes her thinking clearer to us regarding the complaint, we are bound to learn how Amy has approached life in general.³⁴⁷ We learn from her elaboration that by *family name* Amy means something more like *respect*, and *jealousy* has the distinct connotation of *nonacceptance* about it. Amy is telling us that she has been unable to gain respect from others, and that they do not accept her as a person. Kelly did not favor a professional construct of "conflict," saying that this really does not capture what the client is experiencing.³⁴⁸ Amy is anxious because her construct system is not working, she is *not* "conflicted" about anything in her life.

A normal reaction to the sense of anxiety that heralds the fact that a construction system is not working—that it is failing to structure life events helpfully—is to *reconstruct* these events. The normal person relaxes the superordinate constructs and rearranges the

more permeable aspects of his or her total construction system.³⁴⁹ The increasingly disturbed person, on the other hand, does a poor job of reconstruction and hence the system is not improved; in fact, it is made worse. Were we to know more about Amy's jealousy construct, we would learn that early in life she properly understood that other children were *not* accepting her because of certain selfish mannerisms in her behavior. Rather than reconstrue her self-construct at this point and behave less selfishly, she fixed the impermeable and unrealistic construct of jealousy on others. Henceforth she could dismiss all self-examination when others rejected her by saying, "They are just jealous of my family name." Her family name provided her with a—highly distorted—sense of respect and hence she could continue on as she did for years in a vulnerable psychological state, using a brittle construction system which was to put her on the brink of paranoia.

Amy will be helped in her therapy, for she has not allowed her mental organization to deteriorate completely before seeking help. In cases of severe deterioration, the person has often loosened rather than tightened the construction system, dilating his or her constructs to some bizarre extreme of plausibility. As this occurs, it becomes obvious that the person has a loss of structure known popularly as loss of a grip on reality. Kelly held that no one loses the patterning structure of his or her construction system *entirely*.³⁵⁰ Even the most regressed psychotic has some remnant of construction in operation. In fact, we can view the *symptom* of a disorder as one form of this remaining structure. Kelly defined the symptom as "the rationale by which one's chaotic experiences are given a measure of structure and meaning."³⁵¹

Symptoms are, therefore, inappropriate ways of adapting to problems.³⁵² Rather than meet a life challenge, an individual gets sick or gets drunk feeling that his or her inability to meet challenges is somehow now more acceptable. The illness developed need not be free of an organic involvement, for just as an element of a construct is used as a referent for that construct in symbolic form (the "name" of a construct), so too can a bodily organ become the symbol of a construct. "When the client talks about the pain in his chest he may be expressing in his own language a far more comprehensive construct than the psychologist at first suspects."³⁵³ Preverbal constructs are based on the raw experience of bodily sensation without labels, and so-called psychophysiological disturbances are likely to be expressions of such beginning attempts to construe experience.

In addition to providing a rationale (reason, excuse) for present behavior, a symptom is also the way a client asks questions about the future.³⁵⁴ The person is often asking, "Must I go on in this wretched state, being hounded and manipulated by people who do not understand what a good person I really am?" From an external reference, this might be viewed as a delusional thought pattern. But from the client's viewpoint, it is an admission that he or she is unable to enter into satisfying role relationships and to have a free interpersonal contact with the give-and-take all of us hope to experience with others.

Diagnosing Personal Constructs: The Rep Test

Kelly could find no real use for the Kraepelinian system of categorizing clients into what often become impermeable constructions of a disease entity.³⁵⁵ He considered *diagnosis* to be the "planning stage of therapy."³⁵⁶ In diagnosing the client, we as therapists are trying to get a better understanding regard-

ing which way the client will move, given that certain circumstances will arise either in the consulting room or outside. By diagnosing, we are experimenting, making predictions which, if supported by a client's subsequent behavior, establish that we do really understand him or her.³⁵⁷ The therapist needs a set of coordinate axes as reference dimensions within which client behavior can be plotted and predicted.³⁵⁸ These professional constructs should be propositional and permeable. Most important of all, the professional-construct system of the clinician must be capable of subsuming the personal-construct system of the client. In order to facilitate this process of coming to know how the client is viewing his or her world, Kelly designed what he called the *Role Construct Repertory Test*, or simply the *Rep Test*.³⁵⁹

Let us assume that we have a client named Marco who has come to us with complaints of losing confidence in meeting challenges, and we want to increase our understanding of his construction system by administering a Rep Test to him. The logic of this test involves getting Marco to use and then name his personal-role constructs by having him compare and contrast several people with whom he has had to deal in his life to date.³⁶⁰ Various figures can be drawn from life, as for example: "a teacher you liked," "the most successful person whom you know personally," "the most threatening person whom you know personally," or "the most ethical person you know personally." In addition, the test taker's parents and siblings are used, and there is usually a self figure as well. Through the use of individual cards for each test figure or a specially prepared test form combining all figures on one page, Marco is then taken through a number of sorts in which he states how person X and person Y are alike and yet different from person Z. For example, he might be asked, "Compare your mother and your favorite teacher, and tell me (or record

in writing) how they are alike and yet *different* from your best friend."

The characterization that emerges here—let us say it is "competent"—is considered only one pole of the construct actually involved. After a series of other comparisons and contrasts of this type, Marco will be taken back through his list of descriptive words (*competent, sneaky, moral, threatening*, and so on) and asked to name the other pole of the underlying constructs. Assume that Marco would write down "questioning" as the opposite pole for "competent." Kelly would say that one of the basic dimensions along which Marco relates to other people is in terms of this construct of "competent versus questioning." Whereas Marco's therapist might have assumed that the opposite of competence was *incompetence*, Marco has now revealed that he believes that competent people are likely to be a little close-minded and unquestioning in their approach to life. An open, questioning attitude may not suggest competence to Marco, and as therapy proceeded, this interesting usage might become a central point of consideration as his feelings of lowered confidence came into the discussion. Maybe because he does tend to question things and is open to other people's viewpoints, he assumes that he is *not* a competent person! There are many such hypotheses to be gleaned from a study of the client's construction system, and the point of the Rep Test is to bring therapists into the world of the client's personal construction system.

Kelly also devised a method for *factor analyzing* the construct matrix of the Rep Test.³⁶¹ In the test form, for example, Marco would have provided us with twenty-two constructs, having sorted some nineteen different persons (test figures) as outlined above (that is, how are X and Y alike and different

from Z). Through the (nonparametric) factor analysis of these sorts, a therapist can arrive at a much shortened list of basic constructs presumably used by Marco in his actual construct system, but which he essentially renames several times in going through the Rep Test. Rather than his having twenty-two constructs, we learn that Marco has only four or five construct dimensions that he *actually* uses in coming at life. This *core* of meaningful conceptions is what we must get at if we are really to understand Marco and help him to change by reconstruing at this most basic of all levels.

Constructs are not always stated in single words. Test subjects often describe their role constructs in brief phrases like “I feel good with them” or “I don’t like being with her.” Prepared with such a list of constructs, the therapist can now (1) appreciate the client’s slant on life; (2) adapt the language used in therapy to that of the client’s level of understanding; and (3) begin framing hypotheses about which way the client’s construction system will take him or her, given the changing events that arise over the course of therapy. This is the proper scientific attitude, the one Kelly wanted all advocates of personal-construct theory to follow.

Clinical Syndromes and the Psychology of Personal Constructs

Although Kelly did not feel we need to retain the classical syndromes of personal maladjustment, he did make some effort to subsume these well-known Kraepelinian distinctions. He took a quantitative view of the differential diagnosis between neurosis and psychosis, feeling that the same individual could pass through both patterns of living.³⁶² The essential difference between these two states cen-

tered on the level of anxiety and the kind of solution made to the problems in living. The *neurotic* is likely to manifest anxiety more consistently and to show greater variation in pattern because of the fact that he or she is constantly trying to frame a new construction of events.³⁶³ The *psychotic* has passed through this fumbling phase and, after possibly going to the heights of anxiety, has now settled on some delusional or hallucinatory solution to the problems of living.³⁶⁴

The neuroses are variations on this idea of trying to frame new constructions to justify the growing maladjustment. The *hysterias* are typified by converting problems from one area (psychological) into another (bodily).³⁶⁵ Hysterical and other *psychosomatic* patients are often people who have construed their worlds dualistically and pre-emptively—that is, in terms of either a body or a mind sphere.³⁶⁶ Having accepted this predicate assumption, they can easily symbolize their mental problems in terms of a chest pain or an immobile hand. *Obsessive-compulsive* clients use tightening as a defense against the failure in prediction they are beginning to sense in their construction systems.³⁶⁷ When their compulsions begin to trip them up, locking them into some ritualistic performance, we witness the end stage of a tightly drawn, impermeable construct. Anxiety neuroses or *panic* states come about when a sudden comprehensive construction is suggested with no escape in sight.³⁶⁸ The person in a state of panic is probably as low in predictive power as the human ever gets, and we often see these states popping up just before a psychotic solution is arrived at. Kelly saw the *psychopath* as a person whose style of construction is not truly of a role-relationship variety.³⁶⁹ That is, a psychopath is interested in manipulating others rather than relating with them in a spontaneous fashion. Psychopaths are very selfish individuals, thinking only of themselves in any interpersonal encounter.

Kelly felt that *suicide* is attempted for various reasons—as a dependency reaction, for example—but that in every instance, it is a form of problem solution, even if it means escape from the responsibility of having to go on predicting.³⁷⁰

We have already noted that *delusions* and *hallucinations* are forms of problem solution. Delusions of grandeur (“I am the most powerful person on earth”) or persecution (“Everyone is out to do me harm”) are forms of construct dilation.³⁷¹ Delusions of world destruction would suggest imminent collapse of the construct system (“My world is falling apart”), and a constricted solution might well lead to delusions of self-worthlessness (“I can’t find a way out of my problems because I’m useless”). The *depression* psychotic often takes the latter solution to his or her problems.³⁷² We all construct our fields of action when under pressure to solve some life problem. Depressed cases simply take this tactic to its extreme, severely limiting their alternatives to act. Suicide is always a danger here, but sometimes the depressed person swings to the opposite tactic and dilates his or her construction system into what is then termed a *manic* phase of the same disorder. Delusions of grandeur are then likely to appear, and the person’s loosening of the construct system can also be seen in the phenomenon known as *flight of ideas*. The *schizophrenic* individual also reveals such flights, but these are of a long-standing nature and they reflect a much looser form of construction (usually called schizoid thinking). Kelly did not wish to label people as schizophrenics.³⁷³ Too often such labels could not be wiped from a client’s record after therapy had been successfully completed. Besides, schizoid thought could be helpful in the beginning of the Creativity Cycle, and it was Kelly’s view that creative people loosen in this fashion without moving into a psychotic state.³⁷⁴ Some forms of schizophrenia reveal considerable withdrawal, sug-

gesting a constriction as well as a loosening of thought patterns.³⁷⁵

The *paranoiac* reaction, or some less systematized *paranoid* variation on the schizophrenic diagnosis, was seen by Kelly as involving more permeable construction systems than most psychotics. The paranoid has a highly systematized construction system, and the superordinate constructs are sufficiently permeable to account for changes in experience.³⁷⁶ This is what makes paranoids so difficult to treat. They can successfully counter virtually anything we think of to shake their delusional systems. There is considerable threat in a paranoid case, probably more so than in any other mental disorder.³⁷⁷ Finally, the *hebephrenic* and *catatonic* variations of schizophrenia may be seen in terms of highly regressed or preverbal construction systems.

Theory of Cure

Cure as Reconstruction and the Nature of Therapy

People are mentally healthy to the extent that they can solve the problems they encounter in life.³⁷⁸ Kelly was fond of speaking of this process of solving life’s problems as the rotating of “the axes on life.”³⁷⁹ A new set of dimensions comes into play which opens freedom of movement. Kelly once considered calling his therapeutic approach *reconstruction* rather than *psychotherapy*, and he was never happy with the latter term.³⁸⁰ He finally settled for a definition emphasizing that “psychotherapy is a reconstructing process.”³⁸¹

The therapy relationship is viewed as a kind of running psychological experiment or a laboratory for the testing of ideas and feelings.³⁸² As therapists, we ask our clients to

join us in a controlled investigation of their lifestyles.³⁸³ Experiments will be performed and field studies will be carried out (at home), with proper validation sought for the predictions both the therapist and the client will make. Kelly did not believe that therapy was confined to the four walls of the consulting room.³⁸⁴ Since reconstruction cures, the therapy will not be successful unless a client begins his or her reformulations in the actual life setting. Therapy involves the dual task of reviewing present constructs and then either altering them in some fashion or formulating entirely new ones which might serve the process of life more adequately.

Kelly liked to speak of this process of change in therapy as *movement*. It is a good prognostic sign if clients enter therapy with some preliminary construct of movement of their own;³⁸⁵ for example, if they see themselves as already changing in some way—even getting worse—this is better than seeing themselves as frozen into a situation which somehow changes around them. Such clients recognize that they are participating in the flux of events, and hence we can work with them to direct their movement productively. One of the first types of movement to be seen in a therapy series is *slot movement*.³⁸⁶ This involves simply moving over to the contrast end of one's constructs, as when the woman who sees her neighbors all as kindly begins to think of them as mean. Kelly considered this a superficial change but a process of movement worthy of note. We can as therapists build on this change, extending the client's alternative constructions to a more comprehensive level. Whether neighbors are kindly or mean can then be tested in a series of experiments—such as asking the client to predict what will happen at the next church social or block party.

Following a statement of the opening complaint by the client, the therapist usually asks for more information on the circumstances surrounding such difficulties. Kelly viewed this preliminary as a fundamental task of the therapist, one he called *elaboration*.³⁸⁷ The point is: in elaborating the complaint, the therapist encourages the client to extend the range of convenience of his or her constructs and usually to bring other constructs into play as well. Reconstruction often begins in the loosening that such elaboration encourages. That is, as clients date the onset of their problems and move backward or forward in their recollections, they naturally begin to loosen their terms.³⁸⁸ The therapist assists in this loosening process, encouraging a tightening at the proper moment so that, in effect, the Creativity Cycle or the C-P-C Cycle may operate. The therapist's goal is to help the client develop a set of constructs which are permeable and comprehensive.³⁸⁹ As these are psychological activities, Kelly can sum up his definition of the therapeutic contact as follows: "Psychotherapy is the intelligent manipulation and organization of various psychological processes."³⁹⁰

Interpretation, Insight, and the Client's Viewpoint

The most vital point of Kellyian therapy is that in the final analysis, the client always cures himself or herself. This is why the therapist considers the client to be a coinvestigator in a running series of experiments. Kelly never tired of telling his therapy students, "If you don't know what's wrong with a client, ask him; he may tell you!"³⁹¹ To be effective, the therapist must have (1) a permeable, nonpre-emptive set of professional constructs within which to construe the client, and (2) a talent for making use of the client's construct system in its own sense.³⁹² Kelly did not expect his clients to learn the professional

constructs of his approach. He did not force interpretations onto clients that were cloaked in the terminology of personal-construct psychology. Kelly was not doctrinaire in making interpretations, and in fact, he held that *insight* in the classical sense was not always necessary for a cure to result.³⁹³

Kelly defined *insight* as “the comprehensive construction of one’s behavior.”³⁹⁴ Note that the vantage point of this definition is the client’s. The same goes for *interpretation*. “‘Interpretation’ is a term for which we have no particularly limited definition. . . . The therapist does not so much present interpretations as attempt to get the client himself to make helpful interpretations.”³⁹⁵ The therapist says such things as “Is this what you mean when you say that you feel people are ignoring you?” or “Let’s try this on for size and see if it helps us organize our thinking about the problem.” In saying these things, the therapist is not directing the client toward any single area of knowledge called insight. Clients always provide the focus of therapy because of personal constructions they introduce, and whatever change takes place is similarly going to take place only on the basis of their personal efforts to reconstrue their lives. Kelly would take his clients through a review of their past lives, but not because this was required by his theory of personality or therapy cure. Indeed, the past is only relevant because it can shed light on the present and the future life into which the client is moving.³⁹⁶ Therapy serves a primarily anticipatory function.³⁹⁷

Kelly liked to think of the therapist as a source of validation for the client.³⁹⁸ In reconstruing their experience, clients must necessarily begin with their perception of the therapist. They try out their old and new constructs on the therapist at one time or another—framing the relationship in light of their changing perspectives and looking in turn for some kind of reaction in the thera-

pist’s behavior. Kelly liked to use these client experiments as the focal point for insightful comments, or as he preferred to think of it, as *organized instruction*.³⁹⁹ By either validating or not validating the client’s constructions, the therapist—through his or her personal reactions—is effectively teaching the client which constructs fit and which do not. This process of adjusting constructs to experiential reality is then extended beyond the therapy room to the client’s real world. Therapy proceeds, like any other scientific venture, through successive approximations.⁴⁰⁰ The client does not need *one* insight but a host of increasingly predictive insights to formulate and reformulate the construction system. Some of these insightful experiences with the therapist will be unique, whereas others may fall under the constructs of the better known personality theories like the Freudian or Adlerian theories.⁴⁰¹

By saying that insight is not always necessary, Kelly meant that the individual does not have to learn any doctrinaire theoretical explanations of behavior. Some problems are not worth mulling over. Kelly sometimes thought it is better to *encapsulate* an old problem rather than try to work it through and master it via insight.⁴⁰² This can be accomplished through a *time-binding* technique, in which the therapist takes the position: “Well, that was a very tough period in your life all right, and I suppose we might be able to find out more about it if we spent several months in a search. But maybe we can consider that past and begin our search for a happier and more productive time in the present and the future. What do you say?” With an attitude of this sort, the therapist turns the client’s attention away from those intricate, soul-searching efforts in which classical analysis seems to become engulfed.

There are other ways in which psychologists use the term *insight* which Kelly would not greatly quarrel with. For example, if the psychologist feels it is desirable for a client to name—that is, assign a symbol to—some new construct which is emerging in his or her repertoire of constructs, then Kelly would consider this action a form of insight.⁴⁰³ Too many therapists seem to want this more for their own needs—as proof of their effectiveness rather than as a necessary aspect of cure—but Kelly was willing to accept the necessity on occasion. If a highly rigid, religiously devout man who has become more propositional and permeable in his thought is made aware that his thinking has loosened up, he might be spared some later threat when this more liberal outlook now appears in conflict with his religious convictions. This is surely a kind of insight.

Relationship Factors: Acceptance, Transference, and Resistance

When we take up relationship factors in the theory of personal constructs, we begin dealing specifically with *role constructs*. Since therapists are major validators of client constructs, they begin to take on great importance as therapy progresses. This is why therapists, working through their professional constructs, must have greater sensitivity to and knowledge of relationship factors than clients. As Kelly put it, “A therapist-client relationship is one which exemplifies greater understanding on the part of one member than on the part of the other.”⁴⁰⁴ Thus, to be effective as a therapist, one must understand and utilize the constructs of clients—see with their eyes and talk their language. This is what Kelly meant by *acceptance*.⁴⁰⁵ By accepting the client’s construction system

in this way, the therapist conveys a sense of *support* to the client.⁴⁰⁶ This does not mean the therapist approves of the client’s value system, nor does it commit the therapist to going along with everything the client does. Acceptance merely signifies to the client that the therapist truly understands why things are taking place—right or wrong, good or bad things—from the client’s perspective on life. This understanding *reassures* the client and makes it more likely that he or she will undertake the experiments therapy will call for.

This brings us to the factor of *rapport* or relationship in therapy. Kelly interpreted rapport in terms of his role theory.⁴⁰⁷ Rapport is established when the therapist subsumes a part of the client’s construction system and thereby enters into a role relationship with him or her. It is not unusual for the client to establish a comparable rapport with the therapist sometime later in the consulting sessions. Signs of rapport in clients include increased relaxation, greater spontaneity, flexibility, and the willingness to loosen a construction.⁴⁰⁸ Kelly believed that therapists can help promote client rapport by taking on a *credulous attitude* regarding what is being communicated in the therapy hour.⁴⁰⁹ A credulous person is ready to believe whatever is told him or her. Kelly was not suggesting that effective therapists have to be gullible. What he meant by the credulous attitude is that we must take in everything the client says, understand it correctly from his or her personal slant, and above all, never discard information because it fails to fit with our own conceptualization of the case history. Credulity in this sense is openness. When clients perceive us as open to their complete construction of events, we establish in them the proper expectancy for *communication*.⁴¹⁰ We cannot begin to communicate until we believe that the person to whom we send information is actually open to it. The effective

therapist is always open to such information.

Some of the constructions that enter into the relationship are preverbal and hence often distortions of what is taking place. This is how Kelly viewed the phenomenon of *transference*, which especially involves those early dependency constructs that were mentioned above as having been framed in infancy and childhood. Since these are always formulated around parental figures, Kelly viewed transference in the following manner:

*The psychoanalytic use of the term [transference] seems altogether too loose for our purposes. We have therefore tightened up our use of the term to refer precisely to the tendency of any person to perceive another prejudicately as a replicate of a third person. In this sense, "transference" is not necessarily pathological, nor is the prejudgment necessarily pathological, nor is the prejudgment necessarily antipathetic.*⁴¹¹

The dependency construct that underwrites transference is what we must understand, for it is invariably pre-emptive and often constricted—focused on some one type of person in life, such as a rejecting mother or a hostile father. Kelly did not believe that the therapist's task was to make clients *nondependent*. The task was rather to encourage through reconstruction a greater dispersion of dependency. People need one another and must depend on one another if mental health is to be enjoyed by all. Dependency is not a one-way street. It is a mutual give-and-take.

Kelly called the type of transference we have been considering thus far—based on a kind of replay of role constructs from out of the past in terms of parental dependencies—*secondary transference*.⁴¹² It is secondary because nothing in the therapist's personality or physical appearance can account for why the client brings these constructs to bear in the relationship. However, a *primary transference*

can also develop in the relationship, in which case a special construct is framed pre-emptively by the client to be applied to the person of the therapist.⁴¹³ The client may idealize the therapist, turn him or her into a hero figure, and consider the therapy hour the high point of any day. Kelly felt that primary transference is a great hindrance to effective therapy, for it limits construction to the conference room (as opposed to life outside the relationship), distorts reality, and is if anything a kind of smokescreen the client throws up in order to avoid true experimentation. He insisted that when primary transferences arise, the therapist must behave in ways that will disconfirm them.⁴¹⁴ If the client flatters the therapist for "being nice," the therapist might begin acting a bit more aggressively and threaten the client to some degree (all of this is ultimately discussed as therapy proceeds, of course). The worst thing that can happen is for a therapist to begin accepting the adulation and using the power of primary transferences in the relationship; this would be taken as a sign of *countertransference*.⁴¹⁵

Therapists who follow personal-construct theory do not make themselves completely open in a personal sense during psychotherapy—at least, not until therapy has gone on for some time. They are very sensitive to the fact that clients use their person as a source of construct validation, and what Kellyian therapists want above all is to promote these validation efforts *outside* the consulting room. Clients must learn that they can find many ways in which to validate their constructs, and that it is absolutely essential for them to assume personal responsibility in this regard. Hence, at times the therapist must begin to play a role in opposition to the role the client has written for him or her in the idealization of primary transference. Kelly even suggested that acting skills can be helpful to a

prospective therapist.⁴¹⁶ Since cure does not issue from some emotive bond of genuineness any more than it issues from detailed insights, Kelly did not feel that a therapist has to become involved in the relationship *literally* as a personality—revealing himself or herself as if to a close friend or confidant. On the other hand, the therapist *does* have to apply constantly a properly professional set of constructs, for “the therapist who cannot adequately construe his client within a set of professional constructs runs the risk of transferring his own dependencies upon the client.”⁴¹⁷

Kelly found that his clients did not move through only one or two phases of transference, but that often the process went on throughout their contacts. Frequently what was taking place in transference depended on his or her attitude at the time. Hence, Kelly began to speak of *transference cycles* in psychotherapy.⁴¹⁸ Transference cycles typically begin in the secondary sense of attributing dependency constructs onto the therapist, which may then develop into the idealizations of primary transference, before the cycle swings downward again as the client turns his or her attention elsewhere in life and the therapist takes on minor importance. However, a cycle can then be repeated, particularly if for some reason the therapist becomes the focus of a discussion or decision-making process. If countertransference enters, cycles can be drawn out or re-stimulated as well. Kelly defined *resistance* as a downward swing of the transference cycle, where we are likely to find clients countering their therapists, striking out to do more constructing on their own outside of the consulting room, even if this goes against what the therapist might prefer.⁴¹⁹ Therapists can also encourage resistance. For example, by interpreting too early, the therapist might threaten

the client, bringing about a rapid constriction in the latter’s loosening processes which might then be seen by the therapist as an act of resistance.⁴²⁰

Kelly would consider such resistances normal tightening reactions in the face of threat, and he would chalk them off to errors of therapeutic interpretation. However, the notion that a continuing resistance to the therapist must always take place if therapy is to proceed to a successful conclusion was construed by Kelly as arising from the fact that dependencies are being extended to more and more people. The therapist’s lowering in the eyes of the client is also the therapist’s gain, because this means the client is establishing role-relationships outside the therapy hour.⁴²¹ All therapists want their clients to be resistive in this sense, even though the actual experience of being taken out of central focus by the client may prove personally threatening at times. No one enjoys losing adulation, even if that idealized respect is not earned. Even so, Kelly insisted on his students accepting resistance as a natural course of therapy. If a therapist spoke of *negative transference*, Kelly interpreted this to mean something felt by the therapist and *not* the client.⁴²² All moves away from exclusive dependence on the therapist toward distributing dependency to other people was taken by Kelly as a *positive* occurrence.

When a transference cycle has settled and remained stable for some time, the therapist considers termination of therapy. At the very mention of termination, the client may revert to a more dependent pattern, wanting to rekindle another transference cycle, but the therapist should have by this time acquired the confidence that this is not necessary and thus carry out plans for ending the sessions. The therapist never, on the other hand, breaks off therapy at the height of a transference cycle, leaving the client stranded without alternative sources of validation (that is, other people!).

Therapeutic Techniques

Enactment

Personal-construct therapists like to bring their sessions alive by setting up *role-play* situations with their clients, designed to elicit the latter's construction of life events. Kelly defined role playing in the following terms: "The therapist may tentatively present a carefully calculated point of view in such a way that the client, through coming to understand it, may develop a basis for understanding other figures in his environment with whom he needs to acquire skill in playing interacting roles."⁴²³

Assume that Harry, a client in psychotherapy, complains at one point that his boss is always picking on him. A Kellyian therapist would be very likely to enter into a spontaneous role play with Harry, probably by abruptly saying something like, "When you say your boss picks on you, what do you mean? He says, 'Haven't you got that work finished yet?' or something to that effect? Well, when he talks that way what do you say? Answer me in your typical way—'Haven't you got that work finished yet?'" We introduce such on-the-spot acting without fanfare so as not to threaten Harry, who might get tied into knots when told that he will be expected to re-enact his past life in therapy or some such. Gradually, Harry will be brought deeper into the technique as the role-play situations grow longer and more involved. Kelly would also insist that when the roles became anything more than simply a clarifying example of the sort just presented, Harry and his therapist should play both roles. This is called *role reversal*. In playing his boss after first portraying himself, Harry will get a different perspective on the role relationship under study, and the reverse is true for the therapist. As constructive alternativists, we are always ready to see things from more than just one perspective.

The technical term for role-playing is *enactment*.⁴²⁴ In training to become a Kellyian therapist, enactment is very important, because only if a therapist is at ease in role play will the client feel comfortable. Enactments are usually very brief, not lasting more than a few minutes in ordinary therapy. It is also important to avoid enacting caricatures of people. The more lifelike we can make the role play the greater are the chances that the client will benefit. Of course, there is room in working out a role play for the client to experiment and thereby depart from his or her typical approach to others. The therapist can also enact the client in a somewhat altered manner, providing grounds for reconstruction in this manner as well.

Self-Characterization and Fixed-Role Therapy

Although a certain insight can be obtained from enacting roles with the therapist during the regular session, a far greater potential for experimentation and reconstruction lies outside the consulting room in the life sphere itself. Kelly believed that clients should approach their daily lives with a construct system that is not of their usual choosing—all with a sense of "let's pretend."⁴²⁵ This can be done by first rewriting the client's customary constructs, giving the person an essentially new scenario regarding life, and then encouraging him or her to experiment by living according to the modified construction system. The Rep Test can help here, but in addition, Kelly relied on what he termed a *self-characterization sketch*. After Harry has been in therapy for several weeks, his therapist might say to him, "I want you to write a character sketch of Harry Brown, just as if he were the principal character in a play.

Write it as it might be written by a friend who knows him very *intimately* and very *sympathetically*, perhaps better than anyone ever really could know him. Be sure to write it in the third person. For example, start out by saying, 'Harry Brown is . . .'"⁴²⁶

Harry will produce a statement running anywhere from a few paragraphs to possibly several pages of self-description. The next step is for the therapist—usually with the help of other professional therapists—to write out a *fixed role* based on what Harry has said about himself, as well as what has already been learned of him in therapy to this point. What this comes down to is a role written *in contrast* to the role that Harry has written for himself in the self-characterization.⁴²⁷ Kelly suggested that the new role should always remove impermeable constructions, consider available validation for the constructs introduced, and include a framework for constructing others to aid in establishing role relationships. Roles that include notions of financial wealth for a client living in near-poverty conditions or other wildly unrealistic suggestions are pointless. Finally, Harry must be made aware that this is a make-believe experimental effort, and that no matter how he may find other people responding to his contrived change in behavior, he has the protection of experimental fantasy to reassure him. He is, in the final analysis, the person in charge of what is taking place during the fixed-role experiment.

Harry's role would probably involve a more assertive pattern of speaking up when being victimized by his boss or other dominant people. If directly speaking up is not suggested, then possibly some alternative form of behavior might be framed, such as appearing relaxed and inviting criticism in

relation to the boss rather than cowering as he now does. Possibly the role would have Harry begin criticizing himself and/or other people—beating his superior to the punch, so to speak. Whatever role would eventuate, it would be written broadly enough to enable Harry to move permeably within alternatives. That is, we do not want the client to follow specific instructions, but rather to get the general theme of a different approach to life in which he or she could then spontaneously create variations.

It is clear from everything that Kelly wrote on the topic that fixed-role therapy is *not* a manipulative device to subtly and covertly control client behavior.⁴²⁸ Harry is not being encouraged simply to act more assertively in the fixed role, and when he is through with this experiment, he may well return to *exactly* the same sort of person that he was at the outset. As long as he has come to view life from the opposite side of the behavioral street, however, and to see what it is like to be a more critical, bossy person himself, he will have gained something of vital importance from the experiment performed. He can grasp the impact of his manner on others more clearly now for he has taken the role of the "other," a capacity that is essential to understanding and healthy role relationships. In fixed-role therapy, the client writes the first script, the clinician-therapist the second, and the final life plan remains to be worked out. Hence, Kelly defined this technique as follows: "*Fixed-role therapy is a sheer creative process in which therapist and client conjoin their talents.* Any attempt to make it a *repair* process rather than a *creative* process seems to result in some measure of failure."⁴²⁹ His hope was that a fresh personality, of the client's own choosing, would emerge.⁴³⁰

Fixed-role therapy is ordinarily conducted for an eight-week period, though there is no hard and fast rule to follow here.⁴³¹ Clients are often fascinated by the impact their

changed roles have upon others. This can be very upsetting to a spouse or other important figures in a person's life, of course. As Harry reports back on what his wife or boss did in reaction to his altered pattern of behavior, the therapist focuses on these issues and through further role play helps him work through difficult situations. Harry finds some marvelous opportunities in this process for making propositional and permeable constructions of his life events. The first sign of progress will probably occur when Harry informs the therapist that new elements are falling into place in his construction system. He sees now why such-and-thus seems to happen, or he feels in empathy with his boss for doing what he does at times.⁴³² Though we have not written his role for this manipulative purpose, it would be possible for Harry to find himself in the new role and take it over fairly completely in time. This is not the usual outcome, however. Occasionally roles need to be rewritten after a few weeks, and here again Kelly thought it advisable to consult with peers in the therapy profession.

Controlled Elaboration

We have already seen above that a major task of the therapist is to help the client elaborate the presenting complaint. However, Kelly further refined this general therapeutic role into a technique he called *controlled elaboration*. In using controlled elaboration, we take up large sections of a client's construction system and try to make the contents internally consistent so that they can be put to experimental test. The C-P-C Cycle might be used in this effort. A therapist using controlled elaboration might say to the client, "Let us think through how this would be done and how it would turn out in the end."⁴³³ In laying plans for the future, we of necessity must pull our thoughts together in anticipation of what will lead to what, how

we will react if things go this way rather than that way, and so on. All of our constructs necessarily come into play when we frame such broadly ranging plans. Although elaborations of this sort could be done in considering an interpretation of the past, Kelly usually tried to orient the client's thinking forward in time, trying to anticipate and predict the future, and this in turn usually clarified and reorganized the construction system.⁴³⁴

The Use of Dreams

Dreams were viewed by Kelly as "the most loosened construction that one can put into words,"⁴³⁵ and they are often prompted by preverbal constructs.⁴³⁶ Kelly thought it pointless to believe that something as vague as a dream can have a *single* meaning.⁴³⁷ Freud's so-called latent dream content is probably the *submerged pole* of a construct. Of course, dreams can sometimes make sense if we interpret their imagery in an oppositional sense.⁴³⁸ This is similar to slot movement in that a person is likely to try the other side of the conceptual street when in a dream or even a conscious reverie (daydream). This is the reason we are sometimes shocked by what we spontaneously "think of," even while awake. We picture our beloved parent full of life, and in the next instant we see the same loved one dead and lying in a coffin. Dreams skip about like this because they play both ends of our construct poles off against each other.

Kelly did not have a formal role for the dream in his therapy, except in this sense of taking it as a sign of the possible beginnings of loosened thinking. Sometimes this loosening suggested the beginnings of movement. Kelly did not routinely ask the client to re-

port dreams, but he felt that if it were of sufficient impact on the client to be brought up spontaneously, he would at least want to hear the dream story out. He was interested in the loosened construction and not the content of the dream per se. He was opposed to those approaches which see dreams as reflecting *symbols*.⁴³⁹ If a dream heralded some movement, Kelly would interpret this to the client in light of their ongoing discussion as a form of controlled elaboration. For example, a female patient who was beginning to wrestle with her passive approach to life might begin dreaming that she was bound and gagged. This would be a loosening extension of her generally quiet and ineffective manner with others, and Kelly would so inform her.

Procedural Details

Kelly sometimes found it necessary to get clients moving by threatening them or aggravating their anxiety.⁴⁴⁰ He never attacked their construct system directly, of course; the therapist who accuses a client of not having good ideas or lacking insight makes a mistake. But Kelly had a way of bringing the client around to discussions of life areas in which his or her construction systems were simply not working well. This was enough to motivate such clients to begin movement. When it came to opening up new areas for consideration, Kelly always made certain that the client had a foundation construct on which to build his or her understanding.⁴⁴¹ We do not want to send people into areas where they have no frame of reference at all. Kelly advised his students to sharpen their understanding by predicting what their clients would do from one therapy hour to the next.⁴⁴² In working with children, Kelly ad-

vocated bringing the parents into the treatment program.⁴⁴³

Kelly favored *group therapy* whenever a problem area bringing people together with a common dilemma might be arranged.⁴⁴⁴ He considered role-play (enactment) techniques particularly well-suited to group therapy. Occasionally he found it necessary to *confront* a client sharply, to challenge his or her construct system in no uncertain terms.⁴⁴⁵ We have already mentioned the techniques of encapsulation and time-binding. Kelly also spoke of *word-binding*, by which he meant tying the client down to some specific term for each of his constructs.⁴⁴⁶ This is an aspect of tightening, and it can prove useful in making some item impermeable, as when we wish to encapsulate a paranoid idea with something like, "Yes, that's probably another example of those strange happenings which we spoke about last week as things which we all experience but can't explain. Let's chalk it up to that and move on to this next point." We can dismiss the significance of the experience by binding it in the already-discredited construct bound by the words *strange happenings*. This cuts down rumination and turns the client's attention to the more propositional and permeable aspects of his or her construction system.

Kelly said that he had never taken a *fee* from a client in over thirty years of therapeutic practice.⁴⁴⁷ We can only guess what this can mean to the form which his therapy was to take on. It is important to note that Kelly's attitude toward taking payment for psychological services was somewhat negative. Here is an excerpt from his writings on the point.

The psychologist because he operates within a psychological rather than an economic framework, cannot allow himself to be caught up in such a system of values. As a psychologist he is committed to a more comprehen-

*sive viewpoint with respect to human relations. If he makes his fee system the universal basis of his psychotherapeutic relations, he abdicates this more enlightened position at the outset. One cannot always insist upon a monetary exchange as the primary basis of his relations with his client and at the same time hope, as a therapist, to represent values which transcend crass materialism.*⁴⁴⁸

Summary

Piaget's genetic epistemology bridges the gap between body and mind by suggesting that a scheme can be interiorized (cognitively) of the physical motions made (reflexively) by the organism, and that subsequently this patterned relationship can combine into increasingly abstract structures or structured systems. Human beings can therefore transform themselves and their environments intellectually and not only organically through changes in species. As used by Piaget, the term *construction* means the creation of a structure (scheme) through ongoing processes of both an organic and cognitive nature. Thanks to the offsetting cognitive processes of assimilation (taking-in of environmental factors) and accommodation (remodifying behavior due to experience), a reciprocal influence is possible in cognition leading to equilibration. When assimilation brings about a disequilibrium, the organism is motivated to bring accommodation into play to thereby achieve a new level of equilibrium. This balancing process effectively results in new learning. Piaget discusses many cognitive processes in light of their contribution to this equilibrating process, such as induction, deduction, and transduction. Centered thought is glued concretely to merely that which is perceived, whereas more creative thinking calls for decentrations.

An important cognitive process described by Piaget is reversibility, which refers to the fact that higher-order thought can be reciprocally examined or turned around, without losing its original meaning. Reciprocal and negational reversibility enables the maturing child to think reflexively, to bring thought into examination self-critically. Another important construct in Piagetian theory is that of the operation. Operational thinking summarizes all that can be said about cognition. Operations are interiorized actions having the property of reversibility, but also retaining an identifiable structure that can be related to other operations. Operations never exist entirely alone in thought. Operational thinking begins at a concrete level and then gradually develops (evolves) to increasingly abstract levels of cognitive thought. Piaget refers to imagination as representation, an operation that is identical whether we are presently looking at an object (perception) or recalling it mentally (memory). Very abstract representations are what we mean by "concepts," and by using these, we "think." Mind is therefore a continuing process of constructive activity, with a large amount of self-construction involved. Intelligence arises when we establish permanent relations between schema that cover greater and greater spatiotemporal intervals. This ability for mind to take on permanent conceptual organizations is what Piaget means by conservation. Mathematical insights exist as fixed structures with great conservative value, no matter who it is that reasons them out. Piaget interprets the feedback loop of cybernetics theory as a means of retaining structure within change, a self-regulatory process akin to equilibration which also retains the integrity of the structured process. Human beings differ from computers, however, in that they can transform themselves and become more complex.

Piaget notes that all behavior is teleonomic, that is, goal-oriented. Personality is the total system of interrelating schemata and operations that are made possible by these structures, occurring across the sensorimotor, intellectual, and affective (emotional) levels of behavior. Though he accepts the fact that human beings are self-directing actors, Piaget is not sympathetic with theories of agency such as we find in Jung, Adler, Rogers, Boss, or Binswanger. The self or cognitive self (image) that we are aware of as human beings is itself a schema framed by operational thinking. Earliest thought is egocentric and anthropomorphic, or precausal, in nature, so that children confuse their personal constructions with the objects they see around them—attributing humanlike characteristics to clouds, trees, and so on. Consciousness arises when the environmental situation blocks the person from continuing some ongoing activity. Piaget rejects the psychoanalytical interpretation of unconscious symbolisms. He would say that so-called repression occurs when the person refuses to accept what reality demands as an accommodation, but instead persists in assimilating reality to an egocentric schema which is unadaptive. Piaget does not object to the view that dreams may be wish fulfillments, as long as we appreciate that a wish is nothing more than the person's effort to assimilate reality to the self.

Piaget is probably best known for his detailed study of the stages of development. Infancy is the period of life from birth to age two, dominated by reflexive behaviors. Sucking is the first major reflex, providing the child with an initial schema for cognitive growth. Reflex cycles move into circular reactions as the child practices actions like head-turning, assimilating experience to such actions and accommodating them in turn. Piaget

calls these early efforts reproductive assimilations. Percepts and habits are structured in time. Children in the second year of life have a practical, sensorimotor intelligence. Action schemata dominate cognitive life as the child learns how hands work, where the mouth is located, and so on. The schemata are also related to each other via what is called a reciprocal assimilation. By the end of the second year, the child's sensorimotor intelligence includes a sense of surrounding space, the perception of objects in space, a notion of how one event brings another about, and a beginning sense of time's passage.

Early childhood covers the ages of roughly two to seven years. This is the time of early gropings for a social existence, moving out of the egocentricity of infancy. Children model their parents as ego ideals. This is still a period of preoperational thinking, however, in which the person relies on childhood animism, intuition, and semilogic. Moral realism typifies this period, so that rules are followed concretely and without insight into the principles lying behind them. Self-evaluation begins in early childhood.

Late childhood extends from age seven to twelve years. The child becomes more cognizant of self factors through internal dialogue. Conservation reflects development in the child's cognitions during this period, as the child's thought is progressing from intuition and semilogic to reversible thought. Piaget specifies the age of seven or eight as the time of life in which concrete operations first appear—that is, those that bear on manipulable objects (things) rather than on propositions (abstractions). Over the period of late childhood, rational thought continues to evolve, as reflected in a growing capacity to group items and examine them conceptually through reversibility. The morality of constraint (rule-following) of the earlier period begins to develop to a morality of cooperation, in which justice supplants routine.

Because of this, the first moral conflicts arise in late childhood.

The final stage of development is adolescence, which carries the person forward to adulthood. Beginning sometime between eleven and thirteen years of age the development of formal operations occurs. The person can now use general ideas and abstract constructions. Thought becomes self-reflexive and propositional, thanks to the reversibility and dialectical features of such abstractions. Whereas the self is a primitive, hence egocentric schema of identity, the personality that emerges in adolescence takes into account ideals and aspirations beyond just the self. Piaget's conception of personality borrows from the notion of character—that is, an evaluation of behavioral tendencies. Piaget would view fixation in the Jungian vein, as a failure to progress beyond a certain level, resulting usually in errors in judgment when the person behaves in relation to others. Imitation of others' behavior is viewed as the primacy of accommodation over assimilation, and the adolescent is often prone to imitate in the so-called gang age. Identification is a similar idea. There are many behavioral patterns possible in life, so that Piaget accepts a broad range of individual differences, even though he dislikes categorizing people. He also dislikes tracing the differences in people's behavior to explanations relying on language acquisition and the shaping of the person through social pressures. Piaget's theory of abnormality would combine his constructs of disequilibrium and fixation over the years of development.

In George Kelly, we find a different—more clearly and totally Kantian—constructivist. Construing is viewed by Kelly as a process of framing interpretations about life, trying in a sense to capture that which recurs in a dichotomous frame known as the construct. In a construct, there are at least two elements that are similar and they contrast with a third.

Constructs are thus relationships between things that seem alike (similarity) and yet differ from something else (contrast). They are like transparent patterns or templates through which the person makes predictions about life's continually unfolding future. Constructive alternativism (Kelly's philosophy) suggests that there is always more than one way to slice the pie of experience. We can always reconstrue a set of circumstances and thereby place an alternative construction on what we know about things.

Constructs form into interlocking relations known as the construction system. This system is ordinal, so that there are superordinate (more abstract) and subordinate (less abstract) constructs. The former can subsume or take the latter under their range of convenience—that is, their definitional meaning. Constructs can dilate or extend their range of convenience, as they can constrict and focus in on a narrow referent. Constructs can be said to loosen or tighten. Permeable constructs readily take on new elements of meaning, whereas the impermeable constructs do not admit of new possibilities. Pre-emptive constructs fix rigid, either-or distinctions, and the constellatory construct permits its elements to belong to more than one realm of meaning at the same time. A construct that leaves its elements open to new construction—as in accepting new evidence—is termed a propositional construct. There are comprehensive constructs that subsume a wide variety of events, and there are incidental constructs that are more limited in their referent.

We human beings form self-constructs, which is what we mean when we speak about our identities. Kelly was more accepting of an identity conception than Piaget, just as he was purely a psychological constructivist. There is no mention of organic constructions

in the psychology of personal constructs. Personal constructs enable us to control what we do as we move through life. Interpersonal relations encourage the person to frame role relationships. The role is a pattern of behavior defined by the individual such that one person construes the construction processes of another person. We make an interpretation of what others are thinking about us, and then working on this assumption, we frame a role construct. We may err in this interpretation, but our behavior will depend on it even so. The most central conceptions of this type which define our relationship to other people Kelly termed the core-role constructs.

Kelly did not like drive-reduction theories of learning. He, like Adler, saw the person as a process, as behaving and changing through reconstruction when necessary, but always contributing to his or her determination of behavior. Freedom to behave is just another way of talking about the alternative construction people can always place on events. Change in construction systems is said to follow one of two courses. First, we have the C-P-C Cycle, in which the person begins circumspectly by looking at all sides of an issue, using propositional constructions. After considering possible alternatives, the person pre-empts one and only one course of action. This alternative then controls behavior in the course of events to follow. The second method of changing behavior follows a loosening-to-tightening process of employing constructs, which Kelly termed the Creativity Cycle. Kelly thought of emotional behavior as either loosely defined construction or some preverbal construction which has persisted in the construction system. The feelings of threat and stress signal that one's core-role constructs are not working completely and hence might require change. Anxiety is the extreme result of being caught in life

with one's core constructs inadequate to the task of predicting and controlling (understanding and anticipating) the course of life events. Kelly thought of aggression in much the same way that the existentialists think of commitment, that is, as an active elaboration of the construction system. He favored this style of behavior over the passivity of an individual who does not seek to extend the range and diversity of the construct system or does so only tentatively. Kelly drew a distinction between aggression and hostility. Hostile persons insist on using the same bankrupt constructs even though they do not predict and control life well. The emotion of guilt occurs when the person feels dislodged from his or her role structure. This is where conscience or superego would be placed in Kellyian theory.

Though Kelly did not care much for the Freudian defense mechanisms, he did offer alternative definitions in light of his theory. Repression is the suspension or stopping of the construing process. Incorporation is a willingness on the part of a person to see other people like himself or herself. Identification occurs when we take over constructs that our group—including family members—have already been using. Regression is due to behavior that is predicated on preverbal or immature constructions of life. Projection is a special case of hostility in which the person forces his bankrupt constructions onto others. Reaction-formation is an attempt to put an opposite construct pole into effect when it is the other pole that bears significance for a person. Kelly did not propose a stage theory of development, though he did emphasize the importance of other people to proper maturation. He disliked the Rankian-Rogerian talk of seeking independence from others, feeling instead that early dependency constructs framed around parents had to be extended to more and more people with development. He had something in mind like the Adlerian so-

cial interest here, though he called it a dispersion of dependency. This is why societies arise in the first place, because people are dependent on each other, and cultural norms arise because a group of people come to construe existence in a common way. Kelly shared a dislike for categorizing people with other theorists in the phenomenological tradition. Personality styles of either a type or trait variety can always be seen to depend on the unique construction system fashioned by the person in question.

Kelly's theory of illness holds that people who repeatedly bring to bear invalid constructions of life eventually become maladjusted. For whatever reason, the abnormal person is wracked with anxiety or projecting distorted views of reality or behaving in a hostile manner, and so on, because of an unworkable construction system which he or she cannot reconstrue. Symptoms of disorder reflect the rationale the person accepts for this inability to control or predict life—due to strange physical losses (hysteria), terrifying fears (phobias), or intruding forces of unknown origins (schizophrenic delusions). Kelly fashioned a Role Construct Repertory Test (Rep Test), which could help the therapist understand the client's construct system, reducing, through a special form of factor analysis, the various reference frames to a few core constructs. Neurotics reflect much anxiety but are trying to frame new constructions of events (reconstrue). Psychotics have settled on a bizarre delusional or hallucinatory solution to their problems of living. Hysterics convert their psychological problems to a physical rationale. Obsessive-compulsive clients use tightening as a defense against their failing construction system. Psychopaths fail to frame genuine role relationships with others. Depressed clients tend to constrict and manic clients dilate their constructs. Schizophrenic constructions are the loosest of all.

Kelly's theory of cure builds on the idea of reconstruction, for to the extent that people can control and predict their lives they can solve their problems by themselves and achieve mental health. Kelly saw his therapeutic role as helping clients to "rotate the axes" on life and come at things anew with alternative constructions that work better. He spoke of the process of change in therapy as movement, beginning in an elaboration of the presenting complaint and going on to the more involved aspects, using the C-P-C and Creativity Cycles. Interpretations are made by the client, assisted by the organized instruction of the therapist who helps the client know what his or her construction system is, how it is failing, and how it might be improved. Sometimes old problems cannot be solved, and it is best to encapsulate them through a time-binding technique. Kelly always took a credulous attitude with clients, accepting and supporting them in every way so that through such reassurance they would begin reconstruction. So-called transference is due to distortions in the client's constructions, stemming from earlier life (secondary transference) or from the actual regard the client has for the therapist (primary transference). The latter form of transference hinders therapy. Kelly saw therapy as a series of transference cycles, in which the client moves from being highly drawn to the therapist to a period of increasing conflict or resistance as the client tightens construction in the face of threat. Kelly did not really accept the idea of negative transference, feeling that if it occurs, it is probably brought on by the therapist rather than the client.

Kelly used the technique of enactment or role play extensively. He also employed a self-characterization technique preliminary to fixed-role therapy, in which a client was asked

to live according to a different construction system for a period of several weeks. Controlled elaboration was another technique in which the meaning of the presenting complaint and other meanings that occurred over therapy were enlarged upon in the hope of systematizing them to a greater extent; this would point in turn to what the meanings suggested concerning the future course of the client's life. Kelly occasionally used a client's dreams for insightful understanding, believing that they were often prompted by significant preverbal (infantile) constructs. He felt that so-called latent content is nothing more than the submerged pole of a bipolar construct—that is, the other side of what is being used consciously in life all of the time.

Outline of Important Theoretical Constructs

The evolutionary rationalism of Jean Piaget

genetic epistemology • evolutionary rationalism

Biographical overview

Personality theory

Structural constructs

Construction of patterns among related actions

internalizing (interiorizing) • scheme, schema • structure • system • transformation • syncretic thought • construct, construction • organic versus cognitive construction • combination • differentiation

Cognition as equilibrating operations

assimilation • prehension • circular

reaction • accommodation • equilibrium • disequilibrium • motive • equilibration, equilibrate • induction • deduction • transduction • reversibility • decantation • centration, centering • reciprocal reversibility • negational reversibility • operation, operational thinking • concrete versus abstract operations

The dynamics of human operations

mental • perception • mental image • representation • concept • thought, thinking • biological structure • behavior • intelligence • conservation • feedback loop

Genetic epistemology as evolutionary rationalism

genetic epistemology • genesis • formative transition • constructivism, constructive theory • evolutionary rationalism • genetic assimilation • learning

Motivational constructs

Behavior as teleonomic

behavior • teleonomic behavior • disequilibrium • adaptation versus maladaptation

Personality as a system

affection • personality • self-direction • agency • organic versus cognitive construction • self, cognitive self • egocentric thought • precausality

Conscious versus unconscious cognitions

consciousness • unconscious symbolism • primary symbol • secondary symbol • repression • sensorimotor intelligence • memory • dream • wish-fulfillment

Time perspective constructs

stage of development

Infancy: birth to age of two years

Reflex action

reflex

Organization of percepts and habits
 reflex cycle • reproductive assimilation
 • percepts • habits

Sensorimotor intelligence
 practical intelligence • action schemata
 • reciprocal assimilation • narcissism
 • sensorimotor intelligence

Early childhood: from age two to seven years

Socialization of action
 ego ideal • collective monologue

The genesis of thought
 preoperational stage • concrete operation
 • precausality • childhood animism
 • finalism • moral realism

Intuition and semilogic
 intuition • semilogic

Affectivity and expanding motivations
 self-evaluation

Late childhood: from age seven to twelve years

Progress in behavioral development and socialization
 self-reflection • dialectic in self-dialogue

Progress of thought: development of conservation
 conservation experiment • conservation

The rational operations: concreteness
 concrete operations • rational thought
 • groups, grouping

Affectivity in morality and willful behavior
 morality of constraint • morality of cooperation • rules • self-control • will
 • reason • self-identity • moral conflict

Adolescence

The formal operations of mature thought
 formal operation • reflexivity, self-reflexivity • propositional reasoning
 • dialectical reasoning • egocentricity

Affectivity as personality in adult society
 self versus personality • character

Commonalities and variations in development
 fixation

Individual differences constructs

Becoming a person: interiorization via imitation
 imitation • identification • individual differences

Language as a means of personality influence: pros and cons

The limitations of social explanations
 society • social norms

Implications for abnormal behavior
 durable equilibration versus disequilibration • abnormality • realism

George A. Kelly's psychology of personal constructs

Biographical overview

Personality theory

Structural constructs

Body versus mind theoretical formulations and constructive alternativism
 constructive alternativism • interpretations

Every person a scientist: the human organism as a process
 organism • process of movement
 • person • personality

The basic nature of construing and constructs
 construing • prediction and interpretation
 • similarities and contrasts • bipolarity
 • relationship • construct • poles
 • personal construct • reconstrue, reconstruction

Common characteristics of constructs
 construction system • ordinality • super-

ordinate • subsume • subordinate
 • range of convenience • dilate, dilation
 • loose, loosen • tight, tighten • permeability • impermeability • pre-emptive construct • constellatory construct
 • propositional construct • comprehensive construct • incidental construct
 • constriction • regnant construct

Conscious, unconscious, and the self as a core role construct

self-construct • role relationship • role
 • role construct • core role construct

Motivational constructs

The person as a problem-solving animal: freedom versus determinism in behavior
 change as reconstruction • choice
 • freedom • determinism

The C-P-C cycle and the Creativity Cycle
 C-P-C = circumspection, pre-emption, control • determination • Creativity Cycle

Emotive terms and the psychology of personal constructs

emotion • feelings • humor • threat
 • stress • anxiety • fear • aggressivity
 • passivity • hostility • guilt

The defense mechanisms

repression • incorporation • identification, introjection • regression • projection • reaction-formation

Time perspective constructs

Development as the dispersion of dependency
 dependency construct

Society and culture as a validational backdrop for individual prediction
 society • culture • cultural norm

Individual differences constructs

Psychopathology and psychotherapy

Theory of illness

Personal constructs in abnormality

psychological disorder • regression
 • presenting complaint • reconstruction
 • symptom

Diagnosing personal constructs: the Rep Test

diagnosis • Role Construct Repertory Test = Rep Test • factor analysis
 • core constructs

Clinical syndromes and the psychology of personal constructs

neurosis • psychosis • hysteria
 • psychosomatic disorders • obsessive-compulsive disorders • panic • psychopathy • suicide • delusions • hallucinations • depression • mania • flight of ideas • schizophrenia • paranoia
 • hebephrenia • catatonia

Theory of cure

Cure as reconstruction and the nature of therapy

reconstruction • movement • slot movement • elaboration

Interpretation, insight, and the client's viewpoint

insight • interpretation • organized instruction • encapsulation • time-binding

Relationship factors: acceptance, transference, and resistance

acceptance • support • reassurance
 • rapport • credulous attitude • communication • transference • secondary transference • primary transference
 • countertransference • transference cycles • resistance • negative transference

Therapeutic techniques

Enactment

role play • role reversal • enactment

Self-characterization and fixed role therapy
 self-characterization sketch • fixed-role
 • fixed-role therapy

Controlled elaboration
 controlled elaboration

The use of dreams
 submerged pole

Procedural details
 group therapy • word binding • fees

Notes

1. Piaget, 1970b, p. 12. 2. See Evans, 1973, p. 45 and p. 50. 3. *Ibid.*, p. 106. 4. *Ibid.*, p. 107. 5. *Ibid.*, p. 113. 6. Piaget, 1955, p. 15. 7. Piaget, 1967, p. 144. 8. Evans, 1973, p. 120. 9. See his comments in Flavell, 1963, p. viii. 10. Piaget & Inhelder, 1967, p. 452. 11. Piaget quoted by Rotman, 1977, p. 111. 12. Piaget & Inhelder, 1967, p. 452. 13. Evans, 1973, p. 18. 14. Piaget, 1955, pp. 133–134. 15. Evans, 1973, p. 115. 16. Piaget, 1970a, p. 9. 17. *Ibid.*, p. 36. 18. Piaget, 1967, p. 143. 19. Piaget, 1970a, pp. 118–119. 20. Piaget, 1971, p. 37. 21. Piaget, 1970a, p. 112. 22. *Ibid.*, p. 41. 23. Piaget, 1952, p. 4. 24. Piaget & Inhelder, 1967, p. 15. 25. *Ibid.*, p. 192. 26. Piaget, 1970a, p. 140. 27. *Ibid.*, p. 25. 28. Piaget & Inhelder, 1967, p. 447. 29. *Ibid.*, p. 6. 30. Evans, 1973, p. 20. 31. Piaget, 1970a, p. 71. 32. Piaget, 1962, p. 171. 33. *Ibid.*, p. 141. 34. Evans, 1973, p. 22. 35. Piaget, 1967, p. 18. 36. Piaget, 1962, p. 201. 37. Piaget, 1952, p. 32. 38. Piaget, 1967, p. 101. 39. *Ibid.*, p. 102. 40. *Ibid.*, p. 103. 41. *Ibid.*, p. 102. 42. Piaget, 1962, p. 235. 43. *Ibid.*, p. 235. 44. *Ibid.*, p. 234. 45. *Ibid.*, p. 240. 46. *Ibid.*, p. 243. 47. Evans, 1973, p. 27. 48. *Ibid.* 49. Piaget, 1965a, p. 84. 50. Piaget, 1970b, pp. 21–22. 51. Piaget & Inhelder, 1967, p. 296. 52. Piaget, 1962, p. 291. 53. Piaget, 1967, p. 104. 54. Evans, 1973, p. 49. 55. Piaget, 1971, p. 118. 56. Piaget & Inhelder, 1967, p. 17. 57. *Ibid.*, p. 455. 58. Piaget, 1962, p. 70. 59. Piaget & Inhelder, 1967, p. 17. 60. Piaget, 1962, p. 273. 61. *Ibid.*, p. 5. 62. *Ibid.*, p. 67. 63. Piaget, 1965a, p. 202. 64. *Ibid.*, p. 180. 65. Piaget, 1970a, p. 70. 66. Piaget, 1962, p. 167. 67. Evans, 1973, p. 32. 68. Piaget, 1962, p. 51. 69. *Ibid.*, p. 83. 70. Piaget & Inhelder, 1967, p. 418. 71. Evans, 1973, pp. 32–33. 72. Piaget, 1965a, p. 3. 73. *Ibid.*, p. 4. 74. Evans, 1973, pp. 45–46. 75. *Ibid.*, p. 50. 76. Piaget, 1978, pp. 47–48. 77. Piaget, 1970b, p. 12. 78. Piaget, 1967, p. 144. 79. Piaget, 1970a, p. 141. 80. *Ibid.*, p. 53. 81. Evans, 1973, p. 46. 82. Piaget, 1967, p. 27. 83. Piaget, 1970a, p. 106. 84. Piaget, 1978, p. xvi. 85. *Ibid.* 86. *Ibid.*, p. 5. 87. Evans, 1973, p. 9. 88. Piaget, 1967, p. 102. 89. Piaget, 1970b, pp. 18–19. 90. Piaget, 1970a, p. 28. 91. Piaget, 1978, p. ix. 92. *Ibid.* 93. Piaget, 1967, p. 15. 94. Piaget, 1978, p. 8. 95. Piaget, 1967, p. 102. 96. *Ibid.*, p. 7. 97. *Ibid.*, p. 101 and p. 151. 98. Piaget, 1973, p. 32. 99. Evans, 1973, p. 7. 100. Piaget, 1962, pp. 188–189. 101. Piaget, 1952, p. 415. 102. Piaget, 1962, p. 160. 103. Piaget, 1967, p. 102. 104. Piaget, 1955, p. 188. 105. Piaget, 1962, p. 153. 106. *Ibid.*, p. 171. 107. Piaget & Inhelder, 1967, p. 14. 108. Piaget, 1962, p. 156. 109. *Ibid.*, p. 170. 110. *Ibid.*, p. 123. 111. *Ibid.*, p. 171. 112. *Ibid.*, p. 172. 113. *Ibid.*, p. 203. 114. Piaget, 1973, p. 38. 115. *Ibid.*, p. 44. 116. Evans, 1973, p. 5. 117. Piaget, 1962, p. 202. 118. Piaget, 1973, pp. 50–52. 119. Evans, 1973, p. xxxix. 120. Piaget, 1967, p. 10. 121. *Ibid.* 122. Piaget, 1952, p. 409. 123. Piaget, 1967, p. 10. 124. Piaget, 1952, p. 411. 125. Piaget, 1967, p. 11. 126. *Ibid.* 127. *Ibid.*, p. 12. 128. *Ibid.*, p. 16. 129. *Ibid.*, pp. 13–15. 130. *Ibid.*, p. 20. 131. *Ibid.* 132. Piaget, 1970b, p. 50. 133. Piaget, 1973, p. 56. 134. *Ibid.*, p. 52. 135. Piaget, 1955, p. 188. 136. Piaget, 1967, p. 26. 137. Piaget, 1965b, p. 111. 138. Piaget, 1967, p. 32. 139. *Ibid.*, p. 30. 140. Piaget, 1970b, p. 50. 141. Piaget, 1967, p. 52. 142. *Ibid.*, pp. 33–44. 143. *Ibid.*, p. 35. 144. *Ibid.*, p. 41. 145. Piaget, 1962, p. 161. 146. Piaget, 1967, p. 39. 147. *Ibid.*, p. 40. 148. Piaget, 1955, p. 91. 149. Piaget, 1967, p. 39. 150. Piaget, 1971, p. 34. 151. Piaget, 1967, p. 46. 152. Piaget & Inhelder, 1967, p. 406. 153. Piaget, 1967, pp. 53–54. 154. Piaget, 1965b, p. 197. 155. *Ibid.*, p. 13. 156. *Ibid.*, p. 102. 157. *Ibid.*, p. 362. 158. *Ibid.*, p. 398. 159. Piaget, 1967, p. 58. 160. *Ibid.*, p. 59. 161. Piaget, 1952, p. 47. 162. Piaget, 1978, p. x. 163. Piaget, 1967, p. 60. 164. *Ibid.*, p. 61. 165. *Ibid.*, p. 63. 166. *Ibid.* 167. *Ibid.* 168. Piaget, 1955, p. 91. 169. Piaget, 1970a, p. 125. 170. *Ibid.*, p. 123. 171. *Ibid.*, p. 124. 172. *Ibid.* 173. Piaget, 1967, p. 64. 174. *Ibid.* 175. *Ibid.*, p. 65. 176. *Ibid.* 177. *Ibid.*, p. 66. 178. *Ibid.* 179. *Ibid.*, p. 69. 180. *Ibid.*, p. 70. 181. Evans, 1973, p. 71. 182. *Ibid.*, p. 27. 183. Piaget, 1962, p. 5. 184. *Ibid.*, p. 73. 185. *Ibid.* 186. *Ibid.*, p. 211.

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